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Abstract
Internet Access and Freedom: Constructing and Reacting to Transnational Norms about Internet Diffusion
and Use
by
Heather L. Katz
Advisor: George Andreopoulos
This dissertation explores how demands for Internet access have taken shape in the international
system and to what degree a right to access or the Freedom to Connect (F2C) can be said to exist. It
also studies how states have responded to demands related to access and Internet penetration. A review
of the literature reveals that most work concentrates on violations of users’ rights on the Web and
bypasses questions about whether and how users can access this vital piece of technology. Utilizing
discourse analysis, the study shows that the F2C is being framed by a diverse range of actors using
traditional international platforms and through transnational means that include the medium itself. Nine
case studies are conducted to gauge states’ reactions to demands for increased Internet penetration and
meaningful access. It demonstrates that a state’s political culture and its preexisting relationship with
human rights are the greatest predictors of what steps governments take in relationship to a right to
access. Liberal states are quick to view access as either a right in itself or as enabler of other rights like
expression and political participation, while illiberal states claim their sovereignty extends into cyberspace
as a necessary exception to human rights. This dissertation investigates how access is related to larger
issues of Internet freedom like monitoring and censorship. It also addresses how international relations
theory can apply to questions about states’ relationships to information and communications
technologies. Finally, it will help us understand how human rights are understood on the Web and how
normative discourse and development are carried out on the Internet.
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Chapter 1: Theoretical Framework and Literature
Access to the Internet is fundamental to economic, social, and cultural life in the 21st century. For
many in the developed world fast, reliable service does not only mean the banalities of posting to social
media or deleting spam emails, but also means access to the job market, research materials, healthcare
information, government services, and in some cases the chance to directly participate in the democratic
process. For those in developing states, membership in the Information Society could mean leapfrogging
over the development hurdles that typified economies of the past. Despite its importance Internet
penetration within states and across the globe is uneven and inequality of access threatens to deepen in
the years to come.
Internet penetration grows each year; by the end of 2015, 3.2 billion people around the world
used the Internet, representing 43.4 percent of the world’s population. These figures have quickly grown
since 2000 when only 6.5 percent of the world used the Internet (ITU 2015a). Nonetheless, there is a
significant “digital divide” between the Global North and South, urban and rural populations, the rich and
impoverished, and more. This dissertation seeks to understand how demands for access have taken
shape and to what degree a right to access or the Freedom to Connect (F2C) relates to other Internet
freedom norms that have been disseminated in the course of the Internet’s worldwide development. The
norms that exist in regard to the spread of the Internet are developed by transnational norm
entrepreneurs working on typical international platforms like the UN and through virtual networks among
professionals working across states. This study seeks to address the normative development processes
of the F2C and other Internet freedom norms and which theoretical frameworks can be the most useful for
scholarship on international relations (IR) and the Internet.
Power on the Internet is a topic often considered by IR and comparative politics scholars in the
last two decades. States have proven themselves to be important actors in this area that initially invited
cosmopolitan assessments about the diffusion of power embodied by the likes of the “Declaration of the
Independence of Cyberspace (1996).” Despite John Perry Barlow’s contention that states “have no
sovereignty where we gather,” they have asserted themselves in all areas of technological propagation
and use. Studies have largely concentrated on censorship, surveillance, and cyber-attacks at the
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expense of access. How have states reacted to demands for increased access and greater freedom on
the web?
Finally, this study will also address the relationship among access, Internet freedom, and human
rights. Freedom on the web can merely be viewed as the extension of the protection that many states
guarantee offline: expression, assembly, privacy, education, work. But access demands that states take
a proactive role in the provision of what was once considered a value-added service. Is it accurate or
useful to see technology as a right? How have states responded to such demands?
In seeking to answer these questions, this study will test two hypotheses. First, the F2C is an
emerging norm in the international system that is being advanced by those who work to bring it about,
norm entrepreneurs, on traditional and non-traditional platforms. Even the Internet’s founders question
the idea that the Internet is a right that obliges a state not to interfere with its provision or directly provide
the service. It is necessary to discover who the norm’s proponents are and how they frame the problem
of access. Further, has this norm had any effect on states’ behavior? The second hypothesis argues that
states will react to demands regarding increasing Internet penetration and access according to their
political identity and I will use the Freedom House’s Freedom on the Net rankings as a gauge to predict
whether the states examined would have a proactive or reactive response a right to access.
This chapter contains a discussion of how theories of IR consider the relationship between
normative development and power. The study of the development of new duties, rights, or ideas is most
closely associated with constructivism, but is in fact integral to realism, liberalism, and the British school.
Each of these theoretical frameworks’ considerations on norms, cooperation, and the role of non-state
actors will be considered in turn and a synthesis of their insights will be made for the purpose of
evaluating the F2C. IR scholars have long-discussed the transformative capacity of information and
communication technologies (ICTs), and the literature’s merits will be considered. The power of the state
should not be underestimated, but few scholars have given serious consideration to the issue of access
itself.
Chapter 2 will discuss the research methodology for this study and lay out in more detail the data
collection plans for the hypotheses. Framing methodology will observe how different entrepreneurs have
modeled access as a right and what access means. Further, it will justify the selection of nine cases and
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how they have reacted to the F2C, which frames they have adopted, which they ignore, and which they
have explicitly rejected.
Chapter 3 contains the data collected for the first hypothesis, discussing who the norm
entrepreneurs are and how they conceptualize a right to access. Chapters 4 through 6 contain the data
observed for cases selected to test the second hypothesis, including background information, the history
of Internet adoption, penetration statistics, state actions that have been designed to improve or restrict
access, and other relevant efforts relating to the F2C within these states.
Finally, Chapter 7 will compare the efforts of each of the selected cases. Freedom House’s
categorization of cases is a good predictor for the types of efforts states have taken to increase Internet
penetration and meaningful use. Free and Partly Free states partner with others—non-government
organizations (NGOs), multi-national corporations (MNCs), local Internet service providers (ISPs)—in
order to increase Internet access and its meaningful use. In Not Free cases, power remains centered
around the state, limiting the diffusion of the Internet and opening windows of opportunity for interference
in access, going so far as to switch it off. There are even stronger points of comparison between states in
the same region that face similar limitations of geography, regime type, and political culture.
The F2C is a norm that is being developed by norm entrepreneurs on highly visible international
platforms and through the diffuse networks one finds on the Web itself. Not all entrepreneurs frame the
F2C in the same manner just as states will not interpret their duties to access or Internet freedom in the
same way. Normative development surrounding the web is a multifaceted, indirect process in which
states and non-state actors (NSAs) interact to shape the frames of the F2C. Not Free states are not
absent from this process, but are competing with an international society based on a cohesive set of
liberal rights in which the content of Internet freedom norms are understood.
Building a Theoretical Approach to the F2C
Considering the frameworks to IR theory used for this study—realism, liberalism, constructivism,
and the British School—it is necessary to show how each of these approaches will contribute to
understanding the F2C. At first glance this seems to be an overwhelming task, as doing so would mean
this study is a theory-building enterprise that seeks to create new frameworks. On the contrary,
constructing guideposts using each approach’s theoretical assumptions will bring some order to the

3

chaos that is empirical IR research. By simply choosing one or two of these approaches as the backbone
of this dissertation, much of its internal validity would be undermined. The goal of this research is for
others to be able to understand and study the way in which norms in IR and the Internet are created and
what effect they have, not creating a simple theoretical construct.
Such a task is complicated given that each approach has fundamental differences that are
difficult to set aside. Evans and Wilson (1992) undertake a related problem in their article, “Regime
Theory and the English School of International Relations: A Comparison.” The similarities –cooperation,
norms, international law—become problematic because of the differences in underlying assumptions and
methodologies. These problems are multiplied in consideration of the F2C. The following related areas
will be explored in the above paradigms: the role and power of norms, state-interest and cooperation,
international governance, and the role of NSAs. In considering the F2C and Internet freedom at large,
these areas will come into focus in ways dependent on the case and time-period examined.
Norms’ power and role in shaping behavior. The interest in norms seems to lie predominantly
in constructivists’ court, having spent much of the 1990s discussing how norms are created, adopted (or
not), and integrated into international institutions and structures. But norms are not the sole property of
this approach, and others have discussed the roles and limitations of norms within their own frameworks.
Realists view norms, along with international governance and organizations, as epiphenomenal1,
connected to the fleeting whims of states that find them advantageous for short periods under particular
circumstances. The role of morality is generally ignored. Yet this one-dimensional view of IR contains
flaws inherent to the paradigm’s assumptions. Barkin outlines the problem succinctly:
…Waltz has come full circle to meet the Wilsonian idealists who provided the foil for both
Carr and Morgenthau. Waltz’s theory of the structure of power, without scope for morality,
becomes static in the same way that theories of the structure of morality without power
do. Neither pure realism nor pure idealism can account for political change, only the
interplay of the two, subject to the assumption that morality is contextual rather than
universal (337).
To this extent, realism becomes relevant to the study of norms when this critique is taken into account.
Both Barkin and Carr, some four decades prior, come to a similar conclusion. Morality (for Carr) and

1

Oddly, it is the critics of realism that use this term rather than realists themselves. See Ruggie (1998), Krasner
(1999), Brooks and Wohlforth (2005).
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norms (for Barkin) are molded by powerful states. In different ways, both contend that any discussion of
norms in the absence of the consideration of power would be incomplete.
For realists, the rise and relevance of norms are largely dependent on whom the advocates are
and the types of opposition they face. Norms exist for liberal and illiberal states, and for the weak and the
powerful, but realists recognize how power predicates the likelihood of adoption and implementation. The
relevance of the F2C could represent the epiphenomenal desires of liberal states, in keeping with two
related elementary beliefs that liberal states share: the importance of political and civil rights and
unencumbered economic enterprise.
Within the liberal paradigm, regime theory posits how norms and laws become widely accepted.
Keohane repeatedly states among his publications that regimes are not a product of harmonious
coordination of interests that promise mutual benefits to all parties, but are instead a result of a conflictridden bargaining process that attempts to maximize benefits and minimize losses for all parties. Norms
like the F2C are subject to the same wrangling; states’ interests are a powerful factor in defining the
boundaries of any Internet freedom regime. Realists’ concerns about power will make themselves
evident when analyzing the bargaining process of the F2C and how powerful states and MNCs shape
discourse.
An expansive understanding of the power of regimes indicates that they do not just depend on
states for their content, but state behavior can also be affected by NSAs in significant ways not
anticipated by ardent neo-realists. By its very nature, the Internet is a medium that must be analyzed in
ways beyond formal state policy-making procedures. It will be necessary to study the feedback loops
among states, individuals, and other interested parties, ICT companies, transnational civil society, and
IGOs.
While in its early stages of development, an Internet freedom regime is predicated upon older
Western human rights regimes and movements concerning civil and political rights, especially the
freedoms of expression and the press. Rules and decision-making procedures already exist within formal
institutions like the UN’s human rights bodies and NGOs like the US’s Freedom House. A violation of one
norm does not indicate the weakening of an entire regime; instead these norms and rules work together
to reinforce broader agendas.
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The British school begins with the a priori and opposing assumption that international society is a
given, and seeks to explain its purpose and how it is maintained. Compared to its American theoretical
counterparts, the importance of norms is greatly increased even if not expressed using the same terms.
Evans and Wilson (1991) state that “Though states do make power calculations, and from time to time act
solely out of concern for power, in the main they are concerned with a variety of matters, not least their
obligation, their standing, their honour and the propriety of their actions (339).” Given Finnemore and
Sikkink’s (1998) definition of norms—“standards of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity
(891)”—the concern of the British school about propriety and standing is entirely applicable. The divide in
the school between pluralists and solidarists—in particular, how much society actually exists in the
international system—is attention-worthy. Solidarists contend that there are common interests to all
states beyond Bull’s early contentions about things like security and the protection of property. The
challenge lies in determining which states are included in a society that would support the F2C:
Those campaigning in the name of solidarism need to be aware that they are advocating
a particular type of solidarist international society, and not solidarism per se. They also
need to add to their concerns about what values are shared and of equal concern with
those variables that affect the stability of solidarist international societies: how and why
are values shared, by whom, how strongly and with what degree of opposition (Buzan
2004 158).
Would Internet freedom norms simply be the reflection of a society that is based on liberal understanding
of rights? By extension, would analysis be limited to members of that society, and that the violation of a
norm from a state outside the West would not only be unsurprising, but expected? Despite these
challenges, Andrew Hurrell (2007) claims the agreement on human-centered (rather than state-centered)
norms is necessary in a globalized world (14), and this is only possible when powerful states can
coordinate a response to global crises (295). Succinctly, the problem from the British School perspective
would be how to determine the F2C and Internet freedom are important enough to generate general
interest in their support throughout a cohesive, albeit liberal, international society.
John Boli and George Thomas in Constructing World Culture (1999) argue that there are distinct
globalized cultures that in turn shape the actors and institutions that comprise the international system.
Such an argument is similar to the concept of an international society. They continue that “…to an ever
increasing degree, all sorts of actors learn to define themselves and their interests from the global cultural
and organizational structures in which they are embedded (3).” Unfortunately, this convergence in
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interests means that societies are more likely to come to conflict, rather than cooperation, over similar
interests. Martha Finnemore contributes a chapter to the text about the Red Cross; she argues that a
global culture supported humanitarian interests over the one that supported instead the unmitigated
power of sovereign states. “Subsequent normative battles for human rights in the twentieth century have
invoked similar principles of individual worth and universal humanity to protect people from state violence
of all kinds (165).” In short, globalization means that control of Internet and the norms that surround it will
be the interest of many powerful states that take on distinct global cultures: the West versus authoritarian
states.
John Ruggie emphasizes the element of human consciousness and its role in international life.
According to Ruggie, constructivism does not entirely dismiss the importance of material interests and
their constraints on the system, but ideational concerns also drive decision-making. The most important
contributive idea of constructivism is constitutive rules. Regulative rules stem from a need found in
practice (driving on the right side of the road), whereas constitutive rules shape the game itself.
Dominant theories of IR do not seek to explain why these rules become accepted at different points in
time, and why they sometimes change (Ruggie 1998).
Constructivism does not dismiss the role of material interests on state behavior, but as a
methodology in IR, it emphasizes the impact of norms, identity, and culture on behavior in the
international system. For constructivists, at their fullest expression norms have a “taken for granted
quality… [and are] no longer a matter of broad debate (895).” While variations exist, most authors agree
that a norm’s basic elements include: a) a sense of oughtness, appropriateness, or acceptability of certain
behavior, and b) that it is accepted across a range of actors in a given system 2.
One of the successful ways in which norms can be internationally adopted is their adaptability.
“Our contention is that norms diffuse precisely because — rather than despite the fact that — they may
encompass different meanings, fit in with a variety of contexts, and be subject to framing by diverse
actors (Krook and True 105).” This is akin to the adoption of universal human rights into new cultures by

2

See Fukuda-Parr (2011) 123; Kleibrink (2011) 71; Krook and True (2010) 103-104; Legro (1997) 33; Nevers
(2007) 55
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framing them to be relevant to local contexts and political problems as Merry describes in Human Rights
and Gender Violence (2006).
Sandholtz and Stiles’s International Norms and Cycles of Change (2009) critique the dominant
theories of norms because their proponents see them as linear rather than dynamic. The stages of the
norm life-cycle neglect the dialectic of normative behavior resulting from how states interpret them (7).
When a state’s behavior seems to run in contrast with an established norm, the state must justify their
actions by either convincing the group that the actions in fact comply with the rules, must attempt to
establish exceptions, or argue for a new norm entirely. “As arguments modify norms, the cycle has
completed one turn. The modified rules establish the context for subsequent choices of action and the
precedents available in subsequent disputes (18).” While dialecticism of norms does not invalidate the
study of an emerging norm like the F2C, it does highlight the need to appreciate the context of existing
norms, the history of related technological developments, and regime type. Such concerns and gaps in
understanding can be filled in by the alternative paradigms in IR that specialize in the interplay of history,
identity, and the role of complementary norms.
Taken together, the adoption of norms is neither a harmonious nor a linear process, in which a
problem is identified and a solution advocated by norm entrepreneurs, proposals presented on
international platforms, and changes made throughout the state system through regimes and law.
Rather, it is a conflictual process that is undertaken with self-interested actors, especially states, looming
in the background. Norms are continually contested and shaped, first, by powerful actors who may
attempt to change their interpretation to suit contemporaneous needs. This will mean that the belief in
liberalism will necessarily frame their legitimacy and determine their spread. Second, states challenge
them on the basis of the argument that they are the product of hegemonic interpretations of a common
good that are really only common to but a few. Powerful states outside the liberal society will see them
as alien products of the West, at best inapplicable to them or even detrimental to their people and
interests. What is unique about Internet freedom norms will be the independent efforts of NSAs below the
state and in international arenas. Demand for access or other manifestations of Internet freedom could
bypass some of the processes outlined above, including the need for traditional powerful actors to
advocate for new norms.

8

State-interest and cooperation. This area of theoretical inquiry at first appears to be
dichotomous owing to realist and liberal interpretations. For the most ardent of realists, state-interest is
the one-dimensional desire for the accumulation of power. Offensive and defensive realists disagree on
how much power is necessary, but underlying both is the assumption that power is the means by which
states attain their primary goal of security. Cooperation, if it occurs at all, is fleeting and depends solely
on a rational calculation of benefits to be gained by a state associating itself with any organization, treaty,
regime, etc. For liberals, the state’s interest is defined more broadly than that of simple security, and that
cooperation can occur given the right conditions and can change a state’s preferences over time.
Regime theory is one of the manifestations of this difference of each paradigm’s underlying assumptions.
For the British school, state interest is not the starting point for analysis of the international
system; rather they begin with a premise that an international society exists to fulfill states’ needs. These
needs, at minimum for pluralists, include stability and the limitation of conflict on one end of the spectrum,
and at maximum according to the solidarists may include a cosmopolitan vision of world based on ideals
of human rights. The British school does not question when and under what particular circumstance
cooperation occurs—a phenomenon that is seen as relatively new by liberals (Evans and Wilson 342)—
but tries to discover how cooperation and order can help states avoid the perils international relations.
This focus especially concerns how to avoid war and conflict. In order to achieve this, states must care
about their identity and the way that they are perceived by others within that society.
Strictly speaking, constructivism is not a paradigm but instead is a methodology that could exhibit
“liberal,” “realist,” or any political or ideological bent; thus, it does not have a necessary set of
assumptions about state interest and cooperation. Nevertheless, those who are constructivists generally
are interested in when and how cooperation occurs. They study how interests and identity are created in
the first place, and like the British school’s view of society, see these as social constructions rather than
phenomenal realities. Those who use this methodology often study the circumstances in which norms
are introduced, adopted, and implemented—laws of war (Finnemore and Sikkink, Legro and Nevers),
women’s suffrage (Finnemore and Sikkink), humanitarianism (Keck and Sikkink), and development
(Fukada-Parr). These studies seek to understand when and how norms will be adopted and
implemented. The intersection of liberal and constructivist methods is at its strongest when one
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considers that the study of regimes centers on the strength and adoptions of norms, and how those
regimes are representative of emerging societies of like-minded international actors. These concerns are
dominantly liberal in character. This does not preclude constructivists from studying why norms of
sovereignty and preemption might in fact be adopted under a realist framework, but the former type far
outnumbers the latter.
For the purposes of evaluating the F2C, a norm that in part conforms to liberal ideology of
negative freedom, this study will assume that in most circumstances, states will care about the mutual
benefits of cooperation more than relative gains. It will also assume that a normative consensus on the
topic of the liberal international society is or will emerge in the near future. International society as
envisioned by the British school is not universal, so the tenets of realism will become most apparent when
states outside this society are challenged to conform to the standards set by the F2C and the Internet
freedom regime. Regime theory will be able to structure the context in which the F2C is discussed, while
constructivism will provide the tools to analyze how the norm develops.
International governance. For realists, the power of international law and the norms that exist
within the system to explain state behavior face serious weaknesses. Rules, in whatever form, are both
power-driven and epiphenomenal. The laws and norms embodied in organizations like the United
Nations, for instance, have no bearing on foreign policy decisions made by powerful states today since
they are reflection of an era that has long since passed. The desire to avoid another great power war is
no longer at issue. When faced with new threats (or at least perceived threats) like terrorism,
international organizations are not fit to deal with it and must be abandoned.
Yet for all the other approaches discussed, the power of norms, laws, and other forms of
interdependence are cornerstones of their study. Liberals see norms as the building blocks of more
complex regimes, which may or may not include formalized international organization that coordinate
action among states and NSAs to accommodate state-interests, which go beyond the high-politics of
security concerns. Nor does the abandonment of law or long-standing norms in one context or by one
state mean that the system is in danger of collapse, but it is seen rather as a process of governance that
changes according to need.
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For the British school, their a priori assumption of the existence of international society rests on
order. For pluralists like Bull, this order is embodied by things like international law and diplomatic
relations. For solidarists this order goes beyond these codified rules and into the social constructions of
norms and rules that are similar to the ideas expressed in regime theory. One of the weaknesses of this
approach is the lack of recognition of precisely to whose order they are referring. As previously
discussed, Evans and Wilson remark there is little recognition within the school of the imperialistic or
hegemonic vein that runs through assumptions about international society. Those that follow the rules of
law, however defined, are considered members of the society, and those that fail to do so are not (with
perhaps some implication of barbarism).
Foot, Gaddis, and Hurrell (2003) address the problem of the extent of international society by
reframing the issue of “order” and “justice” as articulated by the two branches of thought in the British
school. Pluralists traditionally seen international society based around a rudimentary concept of order in
an otherwise Hobbesian world, but they point out that even this view is in fact a moral supposition:
More generally we should remember Weber's telling critique of reducing all politics to
‘power politics’, a move which reveals ‘a most wretched and superficial lack of concern
for the meaning of human action, a blasé attitude that knows nothing of the tragedy in
which all action, but quite particularly political action, is in truth enmeshed (30).’
Sometimes order and justice conflict, and states choose actions that belie the pluralists’ conception of
order. The authors argue that the world today is no longer one that can “retreat” to pluralism because the
problems that international relations face today are transnational in nature and not state-centric: ethnic
conflict, environmental degradation, disease, etc. They recognize that while transnational civil society
has increased exponentially, justice is a culturally contextual phenomenon. Regime theory supplements
this problem by concentrating on particular problems—regimes will form around issues common to
interested parties.
Underlying constructivism’s focus on norms is an implicit assumption that some sort of
cooperation, coordination, or society already exists, and that the question that constructivism asks is to
what degree, in what ways, and which norms affect this system. The importance of identity is yet another
of constructivism’s foci that may impact the analysis of norms’ effect on state behavior. Referring back to
the concept of international society, identity will come into focus about who is or could be considered
members of that society, and who effectively is out. This is especially true of regional organizations, but
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the membership to an Internet freedom regime may hinge on whether the state identifies with the liberal
tradition in general.
For the purposes of this study, there will be an assumption that norms and rules have lasting
effects on state behavior and identity, and that despite the anarchical system, order does exist within the
myriad of organizations, regimes, rules, and norms. The effects of norms will be the least powerful in
states that do not already abide by or belong to organizations that are related to Internet freedom, or are
not members of liberal international society. This will be apparent in the case of states that view the norm
as an infringement to sovereignty or threat to national security, as has been the case with infamous
Internet censors like China and Iran.
Non-state actors. Realists view NSAs with a fair amount of skepticism, seeing them as having
limited relevance to a state’s fundamental interests. While they acknowledge that international
organizations, terrorist networks, and individuals are actors in the international system, they do not matter
when it comes to state-led decisions about national security. Liberalism’s concentration on cooperation
brings NSAs back into analytical frame, and particularly it is international organizations that facilitate
coordination so states may pursue their interests together to reach outcomes that will benefit all involved.
Regime theory facilitates the investigation of the interception of organization and norms, but sacrifices
some of its internal validity by not addressing the other NSAs that are involved in creating order.
Sandholtz and Stiles address this very fact, drawing a parallel between regimes and legislatures, that
studying only regimes would be akin to studying only the legislature in a given state in order to find out
why a particular policy is adopted. Transnational networks and domestic politics, topics much-explored
by constructivists, help to fill in some of the holes of regime theory.
The British school is primarily interested in a society of states with the interests of order and law.
In fact, as Evans and Wilson report, Bull’s early writings were leery of international organizations and their
power to interfere with the process of order amongst society, disrupting the process of balance-of-power
politics. Other scholars in the tradition have seen these organizations as strengthening order. However,
the problem lies with the implication that the only organizations that matter are the ones created by
international society, and that society is composed of powerful states that can control international
ideology in a hegemonic fashion.
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When studying norms, constructivists pay close attention to the actions of NSAs. In their role as
norm entrepreneurs, individuals help to create new agendas and bring them to the international arena.
Success or failure of new norms depends on the ability of these entrepreneurs to persuade a “critical
mass” of states to adopt norms as their own. Additionally, these entrepreneurs will operate on both the
domestic and international levels, attempting to convince local politicians and using international
platforms to advance their agenda. Some of entrepreneur’s work is explicitly geared to increasing
Internet freedom, for numerous motivations like human rights, increasing marketplaces, or foreign
policies, while others will pursue increases in Internet penetration
It is my contention that the norm of the F2C is being developed from both above and below the
state level. Norm entrepreneurs generate pressure in a top-down manner, compelling states from
international platforms of IGOs or NGOs. The very nature of the Internet suggests that this process does
not have to be the sole avenue of a norm’s early life, and individuals acting transnationally can bring the
agenda to the attention of the political world beyond traditional channels. In time, states may be called to
be responsive to agendas they only had partly helped to create. Sandholtz and Stiles’ recognition of the
feedback loop process of norm evolution might even be strengthened by studying the F2C and norms like
it. Particularly, states will no longer only have to be accountable to each other and the agreements they
make about norms, but they will also have to be accountable to the transnational actors on the very
platform on which they are attempting to regulate.
One of the strengths of this dissertation could prove to be to provide a way to tie NSAs into
traditional British school and realist analyses, examining how organizations and individuals can have an
impact on norm formation and state behavior. While constructivists have been best at considering the
impact of domestic and transnational actors in their analysis, the inability of constructivism to explain who
matters and why can be supplemented by these other approaches.
***
The theoretical frameworks reveal a basic dichotomy among these approaches concerning the
actors that are deemed important and the type of interests those actors have. On one side, emphases on
the state and power lie squarely in realism’s court, but are also relevant for British school pluralists as
well. In practice, constructivism lies at the opposite end of the spectrum, emphasizing the importance of
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identity, ideas, and all types of actors in the international system. Those of the solidarist school and
liberalism lie somewhere in between; they still recognize the importance of dominant states while
identifying the power of international institutions and society.
No single approach would be sufficient to describe the process of a norm life-cycle or loop.
Traditional modes of power interplay with new sources, creating a dynamic that no one framework fully
captures due to the limits of paradigmatic thinking. Paradigms are useful tools to simplify a complex
system, especially global politics, enabling scholars to focus on key variables that will aid in the prediction
of political behavior. Nevertheless, such tools are limiting when attempting to apply general assessments
to particular problems. The path to the F2C will use the insights discussed here, and by extension, may
provide a model for those researching norms related to Internet freedom.
Human Rights and Internet freedom
The norm of the F2C faces two related challenges. First, it must grapple with the history and the
natural inclination for illiberal governments to control ideas. Western governments have and continue to
struggle with balancing security and freedom, a fact that can only further justify violations of the norm by a
state that does not have this history. Second, states can claim the norm itself, and its forebearers, are
simply the product of a hegemonic culture that is inapplicable to their political structure. These
challenges can nevertheless be overcome, due in part to solidarists’ insights regarding the scope of
international society. Since illiberal states are already participating in global society, demands to loosen
controls on access will mirror the trajectory of other freedoms. To make the argument that liberal norms
are inapplicable to non-Western states is implicitly arguing that culture is static, a fact that few social
accept.
An example of the difficulties in translating these rights lies in the experience about the
relationship between the state and journalists that highlight the divide between solidarists and critics from
the Global South. The New Information World Order (NIWO) was an effort by UNESCO in the late 1970s
and early 1980s that challenged the perceived domination of Western media coverage of the Third World.
Before the growing power of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the NIWO, recounts Theberge
(1981), UNESCO represented an attempt by the UN to promote education, culture, and scientific
achievement. By the early 1980s, however, UNESCO had become overrun by critics of the West. The
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NIWO claimed that representations of the Third World were biased, negative, and monopolized by
Western and thus imperial perspectives. Further, “The role of media in the West as watchdogs and critics
of the government and other institutions are widely perceived as a luxury poor nations cannot afford
(715).” The NIWO’s mission was to support a state-centered effort to develop media outlets in the Third
World that could be alternatives to Western voices.
Criticism of the universal approach of Western advocates regarding the media continues today.
Freedman and Shafer (2010) criticize the recent “Model Curricula for Journalism Education” adopted in
2007 for being too universal in scope, ignoring the problems of non-Western academia and the
“…scarcity of profitable media organizations to attract successful graduates and reward them with jobs
that allow them to practice their new skills (136).” The model, adopted with the United States once again
a member of UNESCO, rejects the findings of MacBride Commission Report of 1978, which in part
formed the basis for the now defunct NIWO, which took the differences of the Western and non-Western
states into account.
The controversy surrounding both the NIWO and the Model Curriculum for Journalism Education
stems from the broader struggle with universalism and international society. Advocates of the Global
South’s perspectives are using cultural relativist arguments, that the hegemony of the Western culture
and its vision of political rights are simply incompatible with the realities of their states and societies.
Moreover, the pretense of universalism masks the domination of Western visions of world. Western
advocates who were against the NIWO and later the Model Curriculum argue that Global South’s
criticisms stem from a desire to continue authoritarian practices. Arguably, there are two “blocs”
regarding the formation of the Internet freedom regime and the F2C, with Russia, China, and other
authoritarian states claiming that the state needs to control the Internet in the same of security, while
advocates for freedom do so either for the sake of the expression and/or unhindered capitalism. For
advocates of the F2C, the point of the media—professional or social—should be as a check on state
power as expressed in the UNDHR (Article 19).
Cyber-Utopianism: Disentangling Scholarly Approaches to the Internet’s Impact on IR
There seem to be no scholarly voices discussing the development of the norm of the F2C at the
time of this writing, but the issue of the Internet’s impact on politics and IR has an extensive body of
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literature that grows daily. The topics they cover range from issues of state power, censorship, the role of
MNCs, privacy, and authoritarian states’ backlash against citizen-critics.
The origin of the Internet as it is understood today has some bearing on what follows. Analysis of
its history is mixed and centers around two major topics. The Internet’s development can be traced to US
military demands during the Cold War. Both Rosenzweig (1998) and Blum (2011) describe the context in
which the need for keeping mainframes connected in a time when nuclear war seemed imminent led to
the development of new communications technologies. Centralization of the control of nuclear weapons
was seen as dangerous because in the event of war because there was no guarantee of the continued
survival of a particular location or persons. The Advanced Research Projects Agency Network
(ARPANET) and related technology were developed, in partnership with the UCLA and MIT, to
decentralize control of these weapons. These early days of the Internet were highly controlled and
exclusionary. The origin of the Internet as a tool for the US military and its initial limited access to
academic elites is often forgotten today by critics who claim it has always been an open, free technology.
Keohane and Nye’s “Power and Interdependence in the Information Age” (1998) is a relatively
early study of the role of the Internet and IR, and complements their work on regimes that began decades
prior. They lament how commentators, like Henry Perritt (1998) 3, had already been overly optimistic
about the role that the Internet could play for IR, particularly because they did not sufficiently consider
“...the continuity of beliefs, the persistence of institutions, or the strategic options available to statesmen
(82).” The state and other traditional actors in IR would survive the introduction of new technology, and at
that time, three-quarters of the world’s population had no access to a telephone, let alone the Internet.
Nonetheless, the authors recognized that interaction between states and NSAs would be altered by the
new technology:
Earlier transnational flows were heavily controlled by large bureaucracies like
multinational corporations or the Catholic Church. Such organizations remain important,
but the dramatic cheapening of information transmission has opened the field to loosely
structured networks organizations or even individuals (83). [emphasis added]
While they predicted that the Internet will not profoundly change the dynamics of IR as a whole, new
power struggles would result among “…actors who cannot control one another by force (90-91).” Closed

He makes the notable claim that “The Internet is Changing International Law,” because it makes
information related to international law and the work of NGOs more accessible.
3
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states would struggle to balance the demands of a sophisticated market economy with maintaining
control of the information to which their population has access (93).
Hanson (2008) takes up the discussion of authoritarian attempts at their control information and
censorship with the case that epitomizes such problems: China and its Great “Firewall.” He labels the
problem as the “dictator’s dilemma” because of China’s attempt to control all types of content it labels as
illegal, from pornography, superstitious beliefs, to any information that it deems a “danger” to state
security (185). It has/had received support for these efforts from MNCs like Microsoft, Sun, Cisco, and
Google (at the time) that comply with the state’s demands in order to do business there (186). However,
despite the Great Firewall and the compliance of MNCs, China’s diaspora and informal Internet usage
undermines the state’s attempts to stop information flows. Ultimately, the author claims that the presence
of the Internet in China enables its citizenry to be more democratic, and may in fact to help foment a
revolution. Such a conclusion seems like wishful thinking, but is representative of some of the cyberutopianism and technological determinism that persists in the literature even with evidence to the
contrary.
Katherine Tsai (2010) examines the case of Google in China and how non-state actors are
entering the field of creating international law. The article is an important source of data for China’s
rhetoric regarding its own acceptance as Internet freedom. For example, in 2010 Xinhua, a governmentrun newspaper claimed that “China’s Internet is open.” Additionally, the story of Google’s exit from China
shows some impact of Internet freedom ideals, at least on Google. Tsai argues that Google was
disregarding its bottom-line in its advocacy for Internet freedom in China:
While Google could have remained silent regarding the cyber attacks like other victimized
companies, it instead vocally campaigned against Internet censorship. Google executives
called for the U.S. government to prioritize Internet freedom in U.S. foreign policy,
arguing that Internet censorship creates human rights violations and barriers to trade
(408).
For Google’s efforts to be successful, Tsai recalls the advice of Arving Ganesan of Human Rights Watch
about the simultaneous coordination of efforts between states and non-state actors like Google, using
diplomacy, trade policy, and “meaningful pressure,” to encourage further lifting of restrictions of Internet
use. Tsai misses the fact that as a “quasi-state”, like any state, Google pursues its self-interest (profit),
and the lengths it would be willing to take in the name of human rights would be directly limited by this
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pursuit. Nevertheless, the very fact that China remains adamant that the criticism it receives for
censorship is part of Western imperialism is a tactic that cultural relativists have been used for decades
and mirrors the NIWO.
Theorizing about the persistent power of the state, Evgeny Morozov (2011) coined the term
“cyber-utopianism,” and his book, The Net Delusion seems to be framed to establish him as the leading
scholar of Internet pessimism. He claims that the high hopes for the “end of history” and the adoption of
democracy worldwide has been dashed by the persistence of authoritarian states and the resistance to
democratic change in some former Soviet states. Cyber-utopians see the Internet as an emancipatory
tool but fail to take account of both domestic and international power structures.
Failing to anticipate how authoritarian governments would respond to the Internet, cyberutopians did not predict how useful it would prove for propaganda purposes, how
masterfully dictators would learn to use it for surveillance, and how sophisticated modern
systems of Internet censorship would become (xiv).
In their drive for new markets and profit ICT MNCs are stuck in the position of helping authoritarian states
maintain systems of censorship. If democracy promoters want democracy to flourish, they need to adopt
“a more realist posture,” and not be reliant on new technology to do the work for them. Morozov’s
commentary highlights how technology is simply a tool that can be used for “good” or “bad” things. Yet,
his analysis, like most instrumental analyses, concentrates too much on calculating the resilience of
exogenously given power structures in the face of those who see the Internet as a tool for democracy. By
doing so, he ignores the more subtle changes with regard to norms and rights about the Internet. The
struggle between authoritarian states and their citizenry over the use of the Internet makes it a contested
space in which new ideas will emerge.
Moving from analyses of actors, three articles examined describe the nature of the complex
relationship between domestic and international law, especially the role of jurisdiction. These articles
range from 1996 to 2005 and demonstrate both the growing understanding of the nature of the Internet in
general by scholars in addition to the highly dynamic nature of the technologies themselves. Knoll (1996)
and Fogo-Schensul (1997) both cite the “Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace (1996),” by
John Perry Barlow of the Electronic Frontier Foundation. The document asserts that the Internet
transcends traditional geographic boundaries and therefore the regulation of sovereign states and further
requires new forms of international law. Knoll and Fogo-Schensul tackle the complications surrounding
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the Internet’s transnational nature versus domestic and international law. Fogo-Schensul compares the
approaches of the US, Canada, and Germany to Holocaust denial that has been promoted on the
Internet. The author blames the US for too heavily conceding to domestic free speech protections, even
to the determinant to other states’ domestic policies.
Despite the Net’s phenomenal growth, we cannot continue to leave human rights behind
in a cyber-cloud of electrons. To the contrary, given the medium's unique potential, it is
more important than ever to establish in international law the principle that cyber-racists
are subject to the same restrictions under human rights instruments as their less
technologically advanced cohorts (274).
Knoll uses a survey approach, discussing how in the face of these hardships, some early Internet
companies like CompuServe (now defunct) and Deutsche Telekom censored content on their own
servers in the face of demands from particular states.
The ICT professionals’ frame of Internet freedom reveals itself in the story of the creation of
Internet governance. Mueller (2002) describes the 1998 adoption of International Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) following a conference in Reston, Virginia. “The Internet was
different, however. It seemed to call forth an entirely new spirit for collective action. It had created a
perplexing set of issues that eluded resolution by any one government or organization. There was no
suitable legal or organizational framework in place (4).” ICANN was adopted under the auspices of
stakeholders—the people and corporations interested in the registration of potentially lucrative domain
names. “Indeed, the original creators of ICANN always attempted to distance themselves from the term
‘governance.’ They preferred to say ‘technical management (7). ’” The sentiment surrounding ICANN
mirrors how some historians have discussed the creation of the Internet itself, as belonging in the realm
of technological “wizards” who operate beyond normal political channels (Rosenzweig). This type of
thinking may in part result in the cyber optimism/utopianism dynamic discussed by Morozov and did not
anticipate the wrangling over Internet governance today. Robert Damanski’s research into Internet
governance presents that each view, anarchism and the assertion of sovereignty, are in fact poles on
reality’s spectrum. Like the dichotomy between cyber utopianism and cyber pessimism, both governance
and rights are shaped by the pull among states, NGOs, human rights advocates, ICT professionals, and
the public.
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Yochai Benkler’s The Wealth of Networks (2006) takes a holistic approach to analyzing the
impact of the Internet on politics, economics, and society. Benkler argues that the Internet has the
capacity to increase the quality of democracy in developed states and enable it to consolidate in
developing ones. The shift from manufacturing to a networked information economy means that change
has occurred in not only how markets operate, but how information is accessed.
This new freedom holds great practical promise: as a dimension of individual freedom; as
a platform for better democratic participation; as a medium to foster a more critical and
self-reflective culture; and, in an increasingly information-dependent global economy, as
a mechanism to achieve improvements in human development everywhere (2).
Benkler is careful not to be too optimistic, repeating that his analysis is one of potential rather than
inevitability. Social networks based on ICT platforms can be more democratizing than commercial mass
media, but he says that it is not a cure-all. Instead, policy-makers decide the degree of democratization
that is possible, and readers have reasons to be concerned that there are several obstacles to overcome,
especially the tendency of law to respond to “old, long after the new has come” (borrowing a phrase from
Mill). It is more likely, for example, for policy to respond to the proprietary concerns of Hollywood and ICT
companies as it has done for decades than to give up its concern over copyright and assist in the
strengthening of peer-produced, crowdsourced marketplace.
Rosenau and Singh (2002) discuss identity and interest formation on the Internet and their
argument can be viewed as a reply to those like Morozov: “If we merely focus on actor capabilities and
take their identities and interests as given, as most instrumental and structural power versions do, the
transformation being brought about by information networks is missed (12-13).” The authors argue that
ICTs create new spaces of interaction in IR beyond physical territory. Essentially a post-modern
argument, they claim that traditional top-down approaches to understanding power and governance are
not practical in world that is “in a state of flux (18),” in which power is contested on multiple levels by
actors who can be official representatives, informal actors stemming from NGOs, MNCs, or even
individual advocates. They recognize the multifaceted nature of power, which blurs the lines between
domestic, international, and transnational spheres of action. Such informal bases mean that the
progenitors of new norms in IR can come from anywhere and dominant theories about norms are lacking
an appreciation for these changes.
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A study on the ties between socioeconomic status and the digital divide in the developing world
present an important thesis of what to expect the impact of Internet diffusion to be on societies with
preexisting economic inequality. Sujarwoto and Gindo Tampubolon’s 2013 study on the digital divide in
Indonesia presents two theories about how Internet access proliferates and ask which best explains it
diffusion in developing states. The “normalization” thesis argues the Internet will inevitably become
widespread and readily available to all due to improvements that make hardware cheaper and easier to
use for digital immigrants. Yet, such a viewpoint misses the socioeconomic and cultural contexts in which
the Internet is disseminated. Conversely, the “diffusion” thesis argues that long-standing social inequities
are the best predictors of Internet diffusion and use. In the case of Indonesia, geo-spatial inequalities that
already exist will be mirrored in the percentage of citizens who can benefit from Internet access, and
through a feedback loop continue to deepen socioeconomic divides. Thus, digital access could be
another divide among ethnic groups and classes in a given society (4). Although social stratification is
not inevitable depending as it does, among other things, on state intervention to provide infrastructure
and on an equitable social distribution of wealth and resources, it is likely to occur in its absence.
***
Two additional sets of literature illuminate the development of the F2C. Social movement theory,
largely the home of sociologists and those who study political activism, explains how entrepreneurs relate
to one another in their work to increase Internet diffusion and promote freedom on the web. Second, a
look into public-private partnerships (PPPs) will discuss why certain entrepreneurs promote their use in
ICT development and some of their pitfalls.
Social Movements and the Internet
Social movement theory have developed along similar lines to IR theory. The dichotomy between
structure and agency is found in the assumptions of social movement methodologies. Either rational
actors are placed at the center of analysis while assuming the existence of a relatively stable system or
the social systems in place are the primary focus that in turn shape actors’ expectations and goals
(Buechler). Resource mobilization theory mirrors realism’s assumptions of the rational pursuit of selfinterested, political goals, and authors point out that the theory fails to address why certain movements
are successful and some are not (Meyer). Breaking the dichotomy, political opportunity theory places the
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study of social movements within the political context of their societies that shape the possibilities of
recruiting and goals.
Alongside political opportunity theory, Park (2003) and Vicari (2014) both discuss hyperlink
network analysis, a social movement theory that can apply to the study of such movements on the
Internet. “A social network is a set of nodes (people, organizations or other social entities) connected by
a set of relationships, such as friendship, affiliation or information exchange (Park 50).” Hyperlinks are
viewed as virtual social nodes, and thus a virtual network can be studied in much the same manner,
seeing websites as the unit of measurement that is understood to be representative of individuals, states,
NGOs, and other types of actors. Hyperlinked network analysis represent individuals and or groups that
have more formalized presence on the Internet rather than informal nature of relationships found on
social media pages. While the ITU and Internet Society both have Facebook pages and tweet on a
regular basis, I claim that the connections represented in the hyperlinked images that are found on the
likes of WSIS’s official homepage are representative of formal working relationships.
Particularly, “new ICTs have provided early twenty-first century social movement coalitions with
new resources for mobilization, political opportunities and platforms for framing purposes, facilitating
transnational mobilization, diffused strategies and polycentric protest events (Vicari 95).” Vicari studies
the hyperlinked social networks that grew around the World Social Forum, and discovered that while the
Internet enabled connections among many actors, international nodes appeared to be more intertwined
than regional or domestic chapters of the WSF. Highly visible nodes made the forum identifiable and
supplied “master frames” that could be replicated or interpreted among other chapters. Transnational
civic engagement would be translated to local levels (downward scale shift) and domestic experiences
would also help to shape the frames from below (upward scale shift). Interaction among nodes was more
common among geographic bases, especially in the WSF’s early presence on the web. She concludes
that “Its online developing process shows that the WSF’s emergence bolstered interaction at local and
national levels and enhanced transnational exchanges on a more symbolic dimension (106).”
Turner (2013) and Schradie (2014) touch on the plethora of social movements that have
appeared in recent years and have asked what role social media have played in enabling the Arab Spring
and Occupy movements. The question swirling around these movements is their longevity given their
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amorphous organizational structure. Turner and Schradie both point out that these movements have
grown up around a marked dissatisfaction with predominant power structures, specifically “a rejection of
parliamentary and representative politics, deemed as excessively corrupt and influenced by corporations
(Turner 378).” Schradie credits the rise of a “Silicon Valley Ideology” embodied by the supremacy of the
individual along with the importance of the free markets.
The assumption is that we are all untethered individual Internet users instead of
organizational members of political movements. In this framework, we make our own
decisions about when and where to get involved politically, and we connect through
digital networks, not through a top-down organizational bureaucracy.
Turner notes that presidential nominees who were commonly viewed to be anti-establishment, e.g. Ron
Paul or Howard Dean, were early success stories of the ability to use the Internet as an alternative media
and organizational platform.
This evidence indicates that the Web lends itself to more radical and oppositional forms
of campaigning, sometimes progressive, and often unconventional and extra-institutional.
The most salient accounts in this matter emphasize the Internet's contribution to the
fostering of new models of direct democracy by creating an environment where rapid
institutional adaptation and experimentation are common. From my perspective, this
hybridization can be considered a contributory factor to this new egalitarian radicalism
(Turner 380).
Yet Schradie points out that such analyses, while important, are methodologically unsound due to a bias
in case selection. By picking the most visible and widespread movements, the everyday and more
mundane types of social movements, like those focused on Internet freedom and access in particular, are
left out. Additionally, her research reveals that digital activism often requires the “’passé’ forms of
traditional grassroots organization” in order to get people to show up to causes offline. It might be that
Silicon Valley Ideology and traditional social movements work together in the 21st century, mirrored in the
hyperlinked social network theory, in which strong attachments, both online and offline, are present
according to issue areas based on geography.
Public-Private Partnerships
Touted by the ITU and various cases in this study as an effective way to overcome the
infrastructural challenges to Internet penetration, public-private partnerships (PPPs) are a relatively
common if misunderstood public policy tool. PPPs vary according to the types of projects being pursued
and according to political climate.
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The World Bank’s PPP’s Knowledge Lab defines all PPPs as: “A long-term contract between a
private party and a government entity, for providing a public asset or service, in which the private party
bears significant risk and management responsibility, and remuneration is linked to performance (17-18).”
They are undertaken with the understanding that a certain service is necessary to economic and social
development of a given community but the free market is unable to develop them on its own due little
prospect of short-term profitability. The financial risk is therefore is shared between the public and private
sectors while the reward is shared among the participants (Hodge and Greve 2007). PPPs are commonly
used in sectors like water and electricity infrastructure, roads and transportation, and healthcare. They
are used in multiple stages of projects: design, building or rehabilitation, finance, maintenance, or even
the operation of a given project over the long-term. PPPs can improve infrastructure development by
increasing sources of funding, improving planning through private sector analysis, incorporating private
sector experience for more efficient delivery of goods, and long-term investment and planning
(Knowledge Lab 31). The World Bank discusses their pitfalls, including the most poignant for the F2C
that as political administrations change, projects can change or die away.
PPPs can be the subject of politicization as well as a “language game.” For example, the frame
of “privatization” or “contracting out” is unpopular with some constituents, likely due to the idea that
certain public services should not be subject to market demands. Instead, “alternate delivery systems” or
PPPs are ways to frame joint projects in ways that do not raise the ire of some voters. “The Blair
government in Britain is famous for putting an emphasis on public-private cooperation and on PPPs
especially (Hodge and Greve 548),” as in the case with National Health Service hospitals. The
preference for public stewardship in Britain is opposite from the necessary frames in the United States,
where there is a general disdain for public intrusion into the previously private markets; broadband rollout
is something envisioned to be a task for Verizon or AT&T, not the FCC. Additionally, the US has
commonly relied on the municipal bond market to fund public expenditures, so it has little experience with
PPPs compared to other states. A recent case in Virginia that used a PPP to expand a highway (both
under budget and on schedule) highlighted that its success was due in part to having a dedicated PPP
office. Even better according to Holeywell is to have an independent company like Partnerships BC run a
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PPP, which acts like a “consulting firm,” that assesses cost, risk, and providing realistic timetables and
budgets.
The WB’s Knowledge Lab also points out the usefulness of PPPs to address markets that face
monopoly or quasi-monopolistic conditions. Instead of relying on government regulators—which are
sometimes inadequate to overcome the abuse of market power—PPPs offer a direct alternative to service
providers that may be costly or inefficient. In many cases in this study—Mexico, the Philippines, China,
Russia, and Cuba—telecom and ISP markets are dominated by one player, typically a state-run, or
formerly state-run institution that has market shares exceeding 50%, often reaching levels near 70%.
Mexico has begun to combat the dominance of América Móvil through PPPs and other public policy
measures, but other governments struggle, or appear to be content with, the dominance of one player.
Two studies published in 2013 examine the roles of PPPs in broadband delivery, exploring
successful and unsuccessful examples first in the US and second internationally. Fortunato et al. look at
the problem in the US, focusing on the digital divide between urban and rural communities. While access
is approaching universality, a significant gap remains between customers who can enjoy state-of-the-art,
or even standard broadband speeds4 versus those that can only get subpar service. They surmise the
problem:
For instance, in 2000 the National Exchange Carriers Association estimated that it would
cost $10.9 billion to upgrade the 3.3 million rural telephone lines that would not already
be capable of carrying broadband by 2002. With such a high initial investment, private
Internet providers are not able to recover their costs in a reasonable time frame. In short,
there is little financial incentive for private companies to extend high speed Internet to
remote locations. (163)
Additionally, there is an aversion to local entrepreneurship, with customers usually more comfortable with
well-known providers. They study how municipal and PPPs broadband projects compared in
effectiveness and customer perceptions in three rural communities in Maine, Pennsylvania, and
Wisconsin. The results provided both qualitative and quantitative data showing that the projects were
successful in multiple areas beyond the basic provision of broadband. This included increased
community revenue streams, better public service with more consistent service while saving $6,000$8,000 per month, educational outreach programs, and increased customer satisfaction. Nearly 70

4

The FCC defines these as 25 megabits per second (Mbps) downstream and 3 Mbps upstream as of January
2015.
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percent of survey respondents supported public or PPPs as ISPs. Their suggestions, in addition to
overcoming the legal and educational barriers, included framing PPPs as limited ventures with the goal of
going private. This last suggestion overcomes of the political bias that Americans show in the provision of
certain infrastructure as will be discussed in its respective chapter.
Roetter looks at best practices of broadband projects globally, making the observation that the
best projects include complementary actions among central government, municipalities, and the private
sector, noting that governments can choose among policies that will effectively encourage or discourage
further broadband rollout. While there is no one best practice, they claim the most successful projects
involve “sustained commitments over a period that is much longer than the typical life of an individual
government administration (622).” Common themes that governments can undertake in broadband policy
include: making policy that encourages a competitive marketplace, pursuing mobile broadband, and
investment in “commercially unattractive areas” through both the marketplace and PPPs. They note that
while mobile broadband is a popular tool, it has its physical limits; when the number of users increase,
speed and quality deteriorate. He also notes that governments can frame broadband in a way that sees it
as a tool for the betterment of the economy and political services, and allow a “bottom-up” projects to
“aggregate the supply of the services needed to support the capital-intensive build-out of broadband
infrastructure (630-631).”
PPPs in this study take on numerous shapes, including explicit projects to increase broadband
rollout in underserved areas to arrangements with ISPs and other private sector corporations to provide
service to underserved communities through public facilities. Each project, as the authors suggest, will
be representative of the political climate and goals of the government in the case.
***
In reviewing the discussions on the relationship between ICTs and IR, a basic dichotomy
emerges. On the one hand, quixotic enthusiasm of the transformative capacity of the Internet has invited
much critique. Realist analyses have revealed the persistent role of the state and its desire to reign in
any independent sources of power and to exploit technology to its own ends. On the other, liberal
analyses have shown the multitude of actors that have a hand in shaping policy, and that while state
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power persists, it does not do so in a vacuum. Analysis of the normative development surrounding
Internet rights and freedom is absent, and the role of the international society is left to be discovered.
Some insights from sociology can illuminate the development of the Internet within states and
how demands are shaped on the Web. The digital divide is in large part predicted by existing inequalities,
and threatens to perpetuate them without intervention from outside the market. PPPs are one of the
ways in which the private and public sectors can achieve gains, but their success is not guaranteed.
Social movement theory, like IR theory, has the ability to take into account both structure and agency,
and has revealed that there are different types of relationships to be analyzed on the Web.
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Chapter 2: Research Methodology
Klotz and Lynch’s (2007) work informs the research methodology for this dissertation.
Throughout their text, they emphasize that despite our best intentions to be impartial social science
researchers, we are inevitably influenced by our values and beliefs. This study requires a general
acceptance that the system of human rights, regimes, and norms are universally applicable regardless of
regime type or culture. This position has powerful opponents and consequences for how the F2C is
interpreted by states.
The study uses is a non-experimental, qualitative research design. As there are two hypotheses
to be tested, two different methods will be used. First, discourse analysis will be used on a variety of
actors to examine who the proponents for the F2C are and what impact they have in their fields. Second,
a comparative case study will examine how the norm of the F2C has developed in each of the states
examined, using process-tracing to track the development of the norm’s impact on state policy.
Klotz and Lynch recommend that practitioners familiarize themselves with the various
manifestations of discourse analysis, which looks at texts to demonstrate the existence or dominance of a
particular understanding or “frame” of a norm or belief. In particular, a framing methodology is used when
researchers want to explore something like norms and how “…actors construct meanings [which]
broadens our understanding of both goals and means to include attempts to alter language in policy
debates (51-52).” What frames exist regarding the rights surrounding the Internet, including the F2C, and
are any becoming dominant and embodied in the status quo? Sources for analysis include states’
archives, IGOs, and NGOs, press reports and outcome documents from international conventions.
Additionally for the F2C, discourse analysis includes blogs, Internet forum posts, and other forms
of digital expression. These sources reveal countless frames of the concept of connectivity, access,
and/or the F2C, and how each advocate frames the general problem in relevant local contexts. ICT
professionals often express their opinions in optimistic language that reveals their view of the Internet as
an open forum for the exchange of all kinds of ideas. Western states couch Internet freedom within
broader ideas of civil and political rights, seeing the Internet as an extension of the struggle for freedoms
of the press, speech, and assembly. ICT MNCs are motivated by markets and the drive for profit, but
their advocacy tends to adopt frames that are appropriate to particular problems or contexts.
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Authoritarian states balance the need to control their population in the name of security or protection with
the need to be connected in a globalized economy. Each of these frames’ particulars is dependent on
political contexts and short-term events or crises.
Other theories and approaches discussed complement the framing methodology. While some
scholars within the British school argue that studies might benefit from empirical approaches, Bull outlines
in 1966 why the classical approach to IR, relying on perception and intuition and utilizing philosophy,
history, and law are superior to limiting empirical approaches. He anticipates Klotz and Lynch’s emphasis
on the recognition that studies are often premised on the researchers’ biases, a fact that Bull implicitly
embraces and that I disclose above. The effect of international society on the question of Internet
freedom in general and the F2C will be a reflection of the acceptance of these values and how they will
benefit the community’s core interests. Regime theory will be especially pertinent when analyzing the
effect the norm has on the cases selected. How the norm of Internet access has been accepted in the
cases is correlated to the wider acceptance of Internet freedom regime; particularly, characteristics like
regime type, political economy, and their experience with liberal norms will be important.
Robert Yin (1984) discusses comparative case studies in terms of “holistic” or “embedded”
methods of dealing with independent variables. A holistic approach discusses the independent variable
as one phenomenon, while an embedded approach evaluates the “sub-units,” of the larger phenomenon.
By using an embedded approach, this case study will be more focused and will make comparing each
case easier for the reader. Instead of tackling the problem of Internet access as a whole, I will investigate
some of the key components found within the larger framework, including statics, policy, financial
incentives, relations to NGOs, and more.
Process-tracing will be instrumental to proving that the norm of the F2C has an impact on
selected cases. This involves looking at the development of state policy regarding the control of the
Internet from its introduction over the course of its existence. David Collier in “Understanding Process
Tracing” (2011) lays out that technique’s benefits, which includes identifying new phenomena, evaluating
causal claims, addressing problems “such as reciprocal causation, spuriousness, and selection bias
(824),” and its ability to bolster the validity of small-N designs in the absence of other quantitative
analysis. As this dissertation uses just nine cases, this technique would necessitate the description of the
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“snapshots” of state Internet polices regarding infrastructure and citizen access and comparing them over
time. Subsequent analysis would allow for the F2C to be placed within existing or new theoretical
frameworks.
Cases
The cases selected for study of the first hypothesis include states, traditional norm entrepreneurs,
and non-traditional norm entrepreneurs. The study of norms and norm entrepreneurs generally centers
around advocates acting on international platforms like the United Nations or INGOs. These types of
entrepreneurs are not absent, but are supplemented by those working regionally and transnationally.
It is my contention that the norm of the F2C is new and is being developed from both above and
below the state level. The study of this independent variable poses a challenge. If indeed the general
public is creating new standards for state behavior, how can it be measured? By its very nature, activism
on the Internet and through social media might be difficult to pinpoint. Does “The Protestor” on Time’s
2011 cover of “Person of the Year” 5 have a face? For laymen, the Arab Spring seemed miraculous in
that it sprang from relative obscurity to foment a revolution. The Occupy movements were often criticized
for their lack of leadership and concrete goals because it is organized horizontally, some seeing them as
even irrelevant. Instead, the importance of individuals manifests itself in multiple ways. Some individuals
can serve as the face for organizations’ efforts, articulating their own interpretations of freedom on the
Internet and a right to access. Additionally, crowdsourcing is a type of direct democracy, contributing to
the construction and implementation of norms on a platform that the norms are about. Hyperlinked
networks are formal connections among INGOs, local organizations, and individuals. Looking at how
individuals operate on their semi-autonomous platforms, observing the direct input of the public on state
policies, and how local and transnational movements are linked are ways to tackle the question of how to
account for entrepreneurial behavior not traditionally captured by normative analysis.
For the second hypothesis, select state cases will look at the norms’ effects on state behavior,
both in the development of their domestic policy, rhetoric, and actions in international forums. Three
archetypes have been adopted for the study of cases that are borrowed from the Freedom House’s
outline of Internet freedom: “Free,” “Partly Free,” and “Not Free.” This parsimonious categorization is

5

The image, pointedly, is of a woman covering her head and face.
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based on a score ranging from 0-100 on three measures of Internet freedom: Obstacles to Access (25
points), Limits on Content (35 points), and Violations of Users’ Rights (40 points). Countries that are
labeled as Free receive a score between 0-30, Partly Free 31-60, and Not Free 61-100. States within
these categories vary greatly, but these differences will highlight how differences in size, infrastructure
availability, and culture will affect how the F2C is interpreted. Freedom House places greater weight on
popular topics like censorship and surveillance, yet, infrastructure development and government control
of ISPs are also important indicators of if and how citizens can use the technology.
It must be acknowledged that the choice of Freedom House’s rankings is not without its
problems. Nils Steiner discusses the reputation for bias that the NGO garnered in the 1980s. Academics
suspected that its freedom rankings were skewed towards US allies, despite suspected cases sharing
characteristics with states that were ranked lower. Part of the problem was methodology; until 1988,
coding was conducted by one person using a checklist. Raymond Gastil’s judgment was the only
criterion and much like a grading rubric, it seemed to leave “a lot room for motivated reasoning.” Steiner
concludes that between 1972 and 1988, there was indeed bias, related to both the methodology and
political context.
Today, Freedom House’s coding is more sophisticated, with measures for both main aspects of
democracy—institutional and ideological—and a series of subset questions that feature an ordinal scoring
system. Freedom on the Net works much the same way, with a series of questions for each of the
elements of Internet freedom: Obstacles to Access, Limits on Content, and Violations of Users’ Rights.
The US has been a leader of Internet development, governance, and ideology, and while the changes in
coding are used in the country reports, the potential for bias remains. Polity’s Data Set will be used as
secondary commentary on the status of each case, though the Center for Democratic Peace does not
directly test Internet freedom.
Nine cases have been selected for study, three from each of the categories. More than three
regions would be a monumental task, and so for practicality’s sake, this study limits itself to three regions
and nine cases. Each case has been selected for its representativeness of similar states in their
respective category, while across these categories the cases are meant to be in some way
complementary to one another. This is a difficult task because as with any case study design, the
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inevitable unique characteristics of each case are impossible to ignore. Despite the variety, patterns
emerge that can predict how and why each state falls into each category and how they respond to the
pressure to conform to global norms.
The United States is the understandable case for the liberal states that fall within the first
category. With a constitution and ideology that enshrines liberal values and a foreign policy rhetorically
in line with this image, the US exemplifies other Western states which have similar political histories and
levels of economic development. Besides the European Union, the US is largest state in this category in
several key aspects: population (ranking 4th in the world), annual GDP (1st in the world), and sheer
physical size (3rd in the world)6. As the birthplace of Internet it would be important to examine how the
state has dealt with increasing the availability of this technology. The US is ranked second in volume of
Internet users with about 77 percent of its population using the Internet. Two other states, Russia7 and
China, have been chosen with this scale in mind.
Choosing the other two cases from the Free category is not as obvious. Most other states in this
category mirror the ideological and cultural characteristics of the US and are European. To increase the
internal validity of the investigation, cases outside the West illustrate that the Internet freedom regime and
the F2C are not simply by and for the West, and would go far for the argument that the international
society is more inclusive.
Latin America is a region that would meet the challenge of this task. For much of its history, it
has been subject to the “talons of the eagle” typified by the Monroe Doctrine, the Platt Amendment,
military interventions in the Caribbean and Central America, and American overt and covert support of
regimes of questionable popular legitimacy throughout the 20th century. Much of the rhetoric from Latin
America’s political representatives after the fall of bureaucratic military regimes has been economic and
political independence, stability, and sometimes overt anti-Americanism. Their legacy with human rights
is mixed, so the direct influence of Western liberal norms is unclear. Three Latin American cases will be
examined from each Freedom House category.

6
7

See Appendix
Between 2014 and 2015, Freedom House downgraded Russia’s ranking from Partly Free to Not Free due to
increased censorship and monitoring of citizens. I argue that it is an important case nonetheless to include
in this study due to its regional influence and unique measures it has taken to assure access to its citizens.
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Brazil has been selected from the Free category because of its size and regional importance.
The state is the first of among three of the BRICS countries examined in this study, with a population of
more than 200 million that is spread over 8.5 million square kilometers. It is also one of the most
advanced economies of the region, having an annual GDP of $2.4 trillion that ranks 8th in the world. Like
many other states that deal with infrastructure limitations, the state struggles with the capacity to bring
access to regions with sparse populations. This problem has been exacerbated by significant
discrepancies in wealth between urban and rural regions. While it has vacillated with Internet freedom
measures in recent years, the adoption of the Marco Civil da Internet, a veritable “civil rights framework
for the internet (Freedom House 2014 153),” promises to be one of the clearest and robust articulations of
Internet freedom of the last few years.
Asia is the other region selected for this study. African or post-communist states are also
relevant, but they were passed over for a region that encompasses the majority of the world’s population
and some of the most diverse reactions to the issue of access and Internet freedom.
Japan and the Philippines are the only cases in Asia that fit into the Free category. Internet
penetration in Japan is relatively high at 77 percent of the population, while in the Philippines it stands in
contrast at 39 percent. The main issue over access in Japan is excessive server loads, with populations
that use both fixed and mobile technologies so much so that they periodically cause service outages.
The Philippines’ Internet penetration is hindered by near-monopoly status of its state-owned ICT. Recent
political developments point to some ambiguity on how the Philippines views Internet freedom. The
Cybercrime Prevention Act, while suspended, would have allowed the government and arrest people
based on what they say and do online. Considering these developments, the Philippines is selected as a
test of this study’s internal validity, being the most superficially different than other cases selected in this
category.
The Partly Free category contains a spate of nation-states from various regions, size, and political
systems. Russia is the largest state in this category (see footnote 7) by several measures, including
geographic area, population, and GDP per year. It also ranks 10th in the world for the volume of Internet
users and enjoys high urban penetration of Internet access, yet only around 59 percent of their total
population because access is especially limited in the remote regions of the North Caucuses and Siberia.
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In addition to this issue, Freedom House reports that content is regularly monitored and controlled
by the state under vaguely-defined laws against “extremism.” While Russia is a republic in name, the
state's dedication to democratic values is questionable at best. The Putin regime has been effectively in
power since 1999 and elements of both domestic and foreign policies can rightfully be seen as illiberal.
Though weakened by recent economic sanctions as retaliatory measures after the invasion of the
Crimea, oligarchic forces hold more sway over the political process in Russia than the people. The
relative weakness of democracy is a somewhat common feature to states in this category, but it is not
universal.
There are only several states in this category with readily available information in Latin America:
Mexico, Venezuela, and Ecuador. Of these, Mexico is the largest with a population of over 120 million,
an annual GDP of $1.85 trillion, and covering an area of almost 2 million square kilometers. Like Brazil,
Mexico has recently passed legislation in line with the F2C—a Constitutional Reform Decree—that would
increase overall Internet access and the quality of that access. Mexico faces problems of this policy
implementation due to its ISP market. Its size, like the other states discussed so far, plays a large role in
obstacles to access, but corruption and corporate interests also have a negative impact.
Indonesia is one the many possible cases in Asia for the Partly Free category. Other states
include India, South Korea, Myanmar, and Thailand, each with distinctive geographies, histories, and
cultures. India is unique case in many respects, and while geographically located in Asia, it is arguable
that is too culturally and historically distinct from other cases from this region in this study, the Philippines
and China, to be considered. Indonesia is the largest of the remainder of the cases on a number of
measures, with the 5th largest population in the world at 256 million people, an annual GDP of $2.84
trillion (although South Korea exceeds this) spreading over 1.9 million square kilometers. It is also the
state with the greatest number of Muslim inhabitants in the world, making up over 87 percent of the
population. Analysis of the impact of human rights and Internet norms on this country promises to be
enlightening in comparison to more authoritarian Islamic states like Iran.
China, as one of the world’s foremost challengers to Western hegemony is also the state that
receives the most attention in the Not Free category. It is most populous state in the world, and like most
cases in this study, its geographic challenges inhibit Internet access among its citizens spread across 9.6
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million square kilometers. It is the final representative from the BRICS states with an economy ranked
third in world with an annual GDP of $19.5 trillion.
As is well known, its economic success stems from its break from a state-planned economy to
free trade and its support of burgeoning domestic free enterprise. It is arguable that China must have a
high level of connectivity in order to remain competitive in global trade. It is ranked first in the world for
the total number of Internet users, with an estimated 626 million in 2015—a figure that alone is almost
twice the population of the US. This number is 45 percent of their total population, but likely more than 70
percent of their urban population, as their telecommunication infrastructure is concentrated within major
cities and industrial centers. Nevertheless, the degree of political control it exhibits over its citizens is
remarkable, including in the area of access, in which there is “poor infrastructure, particularly in rural
areas; a telecommunications industry dominated by state-owned enterprises; centralized control over
international gateways; and sporadic, localized shutdowns of internet access to quell social unrest
(Freedom House 2014 194).”
Cuba is the only Not Free state in Latin America and is exceptional when compared to the other
cases in this study. Although like China it is nominally communist, it differs on almost every other
measure. It is small: a population of 11 million that ranks 78th in the world; a GDP of $121 billion that
ranks 68th in the world; and an area of 110,860 square kilometers that ranks 106th in the world.
Nonetheless, in 2015 it ranked with one of the highest score in “obstacles to access” (22 of 25) with most
citizens having little possibility of becoming connected. Cuba is unique in that the service it does provide
is mostly in the form of a government-owned and controlled intranet; unlike the Internet, this network is
closed off from the rest of the world’s websites. Access is limited to public places and is prohibitively
expensive “with hourly connection costs amounting to 20 percent of the minimum monthly wage
(Freedom House 2014 231).”
Being one of the most closed off societies in the world, Cuba’s issues with Internet access make
it superficially a difficult choice for the study of the F2C. Two reasons circumvent this problem. Cuba’s
choice to simply cut its citizens off from the world itself is worthy of study; what have been the economic
and developmental consequences? It poses a significant challenge to the strength of the F2C and norms
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of Internet freedom. Additionally and more importantly, the recent loosening of hostilities between the US
and Cuba will provide an ample test of the strength of this norms ability to transform state policy.
The last case for this study is not immediately obvious. However, states in the Not Free category
have been exceptional in how they have used the Internet to control their citizens. Iran stands out for
these reasons. The state has a large population of over 80 million citizens, a powerful economy with a
GDP of $987 billion, and one of the largest states in the region at 1.65 million square kilometers.
Comparing Iran to Indonesia, as both states are composed of a majority of Muslims, and Iran being a
theocracy, will reveal to what degree Islam or other non-Western belief systems is compatible with the
F2C and other human rights surrounding the Internet. Iran is among many states in the Middle East
ranked low in Internet freedom by Freedom House (Syria, Saudi Arabia, and small kingdom-states), but
received much attention from journalists and scholars after the state jailed its users and tracking dissent
online, especially after the “Green Revolution.” After the election of Rouhani, there has been some
loosening of these restrictions, but the case remains one of the strongest challenges to the efficacy of the
F2C.
Considering the choices laid out above, this methodology will meet both of John Stuart Mill’s joint
methods of comparative study8. By using the method of difference within each category, in each case the
norm of the F2C will have an effect in state policy. Each case is from a different region in the world that
would mean that in every case, the state’s history, ideology, political structure will be decidedly different,
erasing these factors as reasons why the effect of the F2C might be the same. By using a method of
agreement, the use of these three categories used by Freedom House will illuminate what factors cause
the norm to be adopted. (Bleijenbergh)
***
This chapter has laid out the research methodology and data collection plans of this study.
Framing methodology will explore the normative development of the F2C and Internet freedom above and
below the state level, looking at official reports and recommendations by entrepreneurs in a variety of

“If two or more instances in which the phenomenon occurs have only one circumstance in common, while two or
more instances in which it does not occur have nothing in common save the absence of that circumstance; the
circumstance in which alone the two sets of instances differ, is the effect, or cause, or a necessary part of the cause,
of the phenomenon (Mill 463).”
8
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contexts. Second, policy outputs from nine selected case studies will be explored to determine whether
this norm has had a noticeable impact on policies and users’ ability to access the Internet. It is predicted
that regime type and political culture will have strong effects on how the state provides or regulates
access and what other measures it takes to strengthen or inhibit the F2C.
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Chapter 3: Framing the Freedom to Connect
This chapter will explore the first hypothesis that the F2C is an emerging norm in the international
system that is being advanced by traditional and non-traditional norm entrepreneurs. Traditional normentrepreneurs are individuals who act through the vehicle of IGOs to convince states to enact policy
changes and this is best viewed as a top-down approach. Non-traditional entrepreneurs act outside of
the formal policy-making arenas, bypassing IGOs but nonetheless having a noticeable impact on state
behavior. This chapter will identify these entrepreneurs and discuss why they are important in the fields
of ICTs and Internet policy-making.
Some basic patterns follow: ICT professionals often couch their opinions in optimistic language of
the desire for Internet openness and its endless possibilities; Western states rely on civil and political
rights, seeing the Internet as a new manifestation of freedoms like speech and assembly and often a right
in itself. ICT MNCs are motivated by markets and the drive for profit, but their advocacy adopt frames
that are appropriate to particular problems or social contexts often using the rhetoric of human rights.
Illiberal regimes have to balance the need to control their population with the need to be connected in a
globalized economy. They have used a competing frame, cyberspace sovereignty or cyber sovereignty,
in reaction liberal actors’ demands.
Some entrepreneurs are working towards Internet freedom in general and may only touch upon
the issue of access as part of a package of proposals aimed at accomplishing other goals. Additionally,
the adoption of new norms is neither a harmonious nor a linear process; entrepreneurs work within a
framework that is constantly evolving. It is a conflict-ridden process in which contemporary issues like net
neutrality and corporate mergers are often the center of their agendas that temporarily shadow a larger
agenda supporting human rights. Especially among the individuals and the NGOs that they create, there
are networked feedback loops that support their complementary yet distinct agendas. Networked NGOs
typically associate themselves with traditional norm entrepreneurs.
This chapter will survey the norm entrepreneurs and their writings and activities, starting with the
UN sponsored activities, continuing with an assortment of INGOs, followed by the individuals working
apart from these traditional platforms, corporate activities, and finally state representatives. It will analyze
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how and why these entrepreneurs are making the arguments that they do, and what audience/impact
they intend for their message to reach.
UN or UN-sponsored Activities
The World Summit on Information Society. The World Summit on Information Society (WSIS)
is a UN activity that deals directly with Internet freedom and access. It is the product of a UN General
Assembly resolution from 2001 (56/183) for the promotion of the distribution of ICTs in line the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs). Its origins lay in initiatives from the Secretariat, ECOSOC, and the
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) and were first articulated in a 1998 ITU Plenipotentiary
Conference by Tunisia to use the UN machinery to promote Internet freedom. The ITU was named as
the organizer of the WSIS, which met in two phases: first in Geneva in 2003 and then in Tunis in 2005.
The purpose of the first session that had 11,000 participants from 75 countries was to establish a
concretized statement of purpose. An “information society” refers to the integral part ICTs play in the
economies and politics of advanced societies. All governments and stake-holders were encouraged to
contribute to the Information Society and Internet governance in particular. Bridging the digital divide has
been a pivotal goal of WSIS since 2003. Among the “action lines” discussed were the importance of
governments in the policy-making process and the promotion of digital literacy. The Summit’s outcome
document connects its larger goals to infrastructure and access:
9.
Infrastructure is central in achieving the goal of digital inclusion, enabling universal,
sustainable, ubiquitous and affordable access to ICTs by all, taking into account relevant
solutions already in place in developing countries and countries with economies in
transition, to provide sustainable connectivity and access to remote and marginalized areas
at national and regional levels…
10.
ICTs allow people, anywhere in the world, to access information and knowledge
almost instantaneously. Individuals, organizations and communities should benefit from
access to knowledge and information. (WSIS 2003, 13-14)
Governments were directed to build PPPs in order to extend the rollout of broadband and satellite
technologies (2G-4G) in order to encourage meaningful access. WSIS’s concept of access goes beyond
infrastructure to include 1) enabling citizens to access public records in ways previously difficult (akin to
the “right to information”), 2) that government should encourage municipalities to use ICTs to improve
local governance structures and democratic participation, and 3) that governments should provide
publicly accessible spaces that would have free or low-cost Internet access.
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The second session held in 2005 in Tunis had 19,000 participants from 174 countries and dealt
with implementation of the agenda outlined in Geneva. Primarily, it was concerned with the dual
problems of financing in addition to Internet governance.
The outcome document noted that older ICTs (telephone, radio, etc.) were developed by the
state, and likewise a greater partnership between the public and private sectors would be necessary for
the successful spread of the Internet. It is focused on the state but claims that corporations are
“development enablers” and should be partners in the pursuit of the MDGs. The document emphasizes
the crafting of PPPs with ICT providers so that Internet penetration can be increased and thereby foster
economic and social development. Governments are charged with helping to construct infrastructure
while simultaneously creating a policy environment conducive to profit.
Additionally, the Tunis Outcome highlights the need for multi-stakeholder governance of the
Internet: “… with the full involvement of governments, the private sector, civil society and international
organizations (6).” The F2C does not deal directly with Internet governance, but Internet freedom and
governance are routinely linked by entrepreneurs. Each stakeholder is envisioned as having different
tasks, such as policy-production (states) technical management (MNCs), and policy-coordination (NGOs).
WSIS recognizes illiberal states’ interests framed in the issue of national security by acknowledging
problems like terrorism and cyber-attacks, but generally human rights and development remain priorities.
It is suggested that the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) is the correct institution to deal with the tenuous
area between security and openness on the Internet, but the IGF is a source of contention among Internet
advocates in the private sector. ICT corporations and professionals are remiss at the idea of a
multilateral international organization coordinating efforts to regulate the Internet instead of a
decentralized entity, and fear it will lead to the loss of openness and freedom on the net. The IGF model
has lost out to a revision of ICANN.
Every year since 2010, the WSIS has produced stock-taking documents reflecting the plans
made in the Geneva and Tunis stages. Over a decade since Geneva, it is easy to recognize how the
network surrounding WSIS has ballooned, much like the professional networks among NGOs and other
individual entrepreneurs. In its latest installment, the WSIS+10 Outcome document of 2014 reads like
many other assessments of the UN actions surrounding the MDGs—promise but little progress. The
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greatest success has been achieved in areas like awareness and the increase in the availability of
information; the “Partnership on Measuring ICT for Development” under the auspices of the UN Statistical
Commission has provided the structural indicators of ICT development. The challenges remain far more
numerous; most significantly among them are a recognition of the disparities in ICT development between
North and South, and the digital literacy gaps between rural and urban, youth and the elderly, and men
and women.
The WSIS Outcome document of 2014 is a reflection of the lessons learned from the previous
decade about the types of digital divides that exist within states and the connection to equitable
development. Meaningful access and human rights were reaffirmed as guiding principles. It also restates
the principle that market structures must be competitive and states should use Universal Service Funds
(USFs) to attract investment:
…to connect and cover rural and remote areas with affordable Broadband information
and communication infrastructure. To attract private investment, competition and
adequate market liberalization policies to develop the infrastructure, financing, and new
business models need to be studied and deployed, taking into account national
circumstances (WSIS 2014 35).
As others from the Western perspective do, they explicitly connect such freedoms to broader
universal human rights norms such as expression and association. By taking this stance from the very
beginning of their mandate (WSIS 2003 2-3), WSIS leaves little room for competing ideas about Internet
governance and what role the states could or should play in enabling access. It is clear that states should
enable access to citizens either directly or indirectly by inducing ICT companies to invest in infrastructure
and to be a boon to new companies. The UN’s take on Internet freedom is largely in line with the US and
other Western states’ understandings of human rights due to the affinity for liberal norms.
In asserting that all states and other stakeholders should have a role in Internet governance,
WSIS and the UN step away from the diffusion model the US had operated under since the Internet’s
inception. Gjeltn notes that:
Resentment over the perceived U.S. control of the Internet surfaced at the World
Summit…In a direct challenge to the United States, the participating WSIS states
resolved that "all governments should have an equal role and responsibility for
international Internet governance," and they affirmed that states had a "sovereign right" to
enact their own Internet policies (35)
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WSIS would like to adopt a more equitable model of Internet governance than the US and ICT
professionals had previously been accustomed. The WSIS is a reflection of a process that includes
newcomers to ICTs, and it reasonable to expect that while they would desire some of the same goals as
early adopters of the Internet, that it would be a reflection of states’ desires to accommodate their own
security interests. As previously stated, such a state-led model has lost to a new multistakeholder model
to be implemented sometime in 2016-2017.
The International Telecommunication Union. The ITU was given direct oversight of the WSIS
and its agenda because of its long history with the development of ICTs and their adoption on the global
scale. It traces its roots to 1865 when it was International Telegraph Union that was the result of an
international effort to standardize telegraph transmissions across the globe. It bears some resemblance
to ICANN because its origins lay in the technical management of a developing transnational technology.
Among the oldest surviving international organizations, the mission of the ITU has expanded over time to
accommodate the adoption of new technologies like radio and telephones. It became the International
Telecommunication Union in 1934 and a specialized agency of the UN by 1947. Because of its long
history with emerging ICTs, the ITU is considered by the UN as perfectly poised to coordinate global
efforts to increase Internet penetration and to deal with technical issues. From its earliest history, the ITU
encourages the use of PPPs to develop infrastructure and enable the adoption of new technologies.
The ITU is made up of three “sectors” with different agenda that include the regulation of
radiocommunication (ITU-R), standards of ICTs (ITU-T), and a development sector (ITU-D). The final
sector is the most relevant for this study’s purposes, and works much like other development programs by
having a list of “areas of action” in various developing states. Buried within the list of eleven areas lies
two of particular interest to the F2C: human capacity building and infrastructure technology development.
The former aims to increase the capacity of the public and IT professionals to keep abreast of rapidly
developing technologies through established programs, special projects, and partnerships with local IT
institutions which provide learning opportunities. The latter seeks to increase infrastructure development
in developing states and economies in transition through workshops, conferences, expert training, and
the creation of tools and training guides. The ITU aims to improve broadband and mobile technologies,
increase the prevalence of rural connectivity, and wants to anticipate how developing states can adapt to
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newly developing technologies and networks. It is in the process of creating the world’s first map of
terrestrial fiber optics—key to understanding how the Internet is accessed by millions and how it might be
made more efficient. The visualization of the inequalities of access is compelling, but the map remains
tantalizingly incomplete.
Along with UNESCO, the ITU established an international conference and commission in 2010 in
accordance with the Millennium Development Goals, and in September 2015, with the newly minted
Sustainable Development Goals. The Broadband Commission for Sustainable Development takes the
position, much like the World Bank will argue, that development and access are intertwined. One of the
Commission’s main goals is encouraging states to prioritize the development of broadband infrastructure
through the use of USFs.
The ITU’s 2014 Plenipotentiary Conference introduced the “Connect 2020 Agenda,” which similar
to many national broadband plans, set targets for broadband and other ICT penetration for the year 2020.
It has four goals. First is increasing Internet penetration, with a goal of 60 percent of the global population
being able to use the Internet (the current rate is approximately 40 percent). The second is increasing
broadband penetration, a goal that signals an appreciation for meaningful access. Targets vary based on
a state's level of development and include considerations for rural populations, gender, and people with
disabilities. The third target is about sustainability, including considerations regarding environmental
impact and cybersecurity. The final target seems purposely vague and noncommittal; “Innovation &
Partnership” encourages market environments that would continue to allow ICTs to be innovative while
forming partnerships among stakeholders.
Despite its apparent appeal, the ITU has vociferous critics. Both from the American blogosphere9
and from MNCs10, there are allegations that the ITU’s actions are at best ineffective and even dangerous.
Blue quotes a former ITU chief, Anthony Rutokowski, "The reality is that other than ITU radio spectrum
management work, the rest is a worthless institution that does nothing more than flush money into the
Geneva economy.” She recounts that the ITU has close ties to Russia and Arab countries, intimating that
the agenda of ITU that includes the greater involvement of national governments in ICT regulation is

9

Blue, “Exclusive: ITU ‘failed,’ says former policy chief.” (2012)
BBC, “Google attacks UN’s internet treaty conference.” (2012)

10
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really a mask for illiberal state interests. This relates to the accusations surrounding WSIS’s agenda,
which would take the Internet out of the hands of the ICT professionals and put it into the hands of states.
The hint in the accusations that the UN is planning a takeover of the Internet at the dictate of anocratic
and authoritarian regimes is extreme and inaccurate. Such accusations about the UN in general have
been prominent since the 1950s (see the John Birch Society). As the ITU argues, it will not—and
physically cannot—take actions regarding governance or development without the support of powerful
states; such attempts would be fruitless without support. As Inis Claude argued many decades ago, the
UN is a function of its member states, and seldom acts independently of them.
In a more significant critique, the BBC recounts Google officials’ remarks regarding the
conference that would set international standards on Internet technical specifications. Some of the
“leaked” proposals concerned the issue of censorship and sensitive concept of net neutrality11, and that
there was the possibility that users would pay “tolls” for popular websites like Facebook and YouTube.
Google officials remarked that the ITU, as a UN specialized agency, can only have nation-states as
members, leaving the important and powerful players outside the formal decision-making process.
Despite assurances as outlined above that WSIS and ITU works with both nation-states and various
stakeholders, without the recognition that the state-centric system is outmoded in this field, Rutokowski’s
assessment proves valid. Brazil’s vision of multistakeholderism and its influence upon the reorganization
of ICANN shows how Internet governance necessarily differs from other transnational issues.
Human Rights Council (HRC). Other UN organs and agencies have made similar claims about
the importance of the F2C and Internet freedom including the HRC and Special Rapporteurs on human
rights.

11

To clarify the concept of network neutrality and neutrality theory, Tim Wu compares the principle to
the development of the electric grid. Innovation was possible because it treated all requests the
same no matter the level of demand on the system. As a result, “The electric grid worked for the
radios of the 1930s works for the flat screen TVs of the 2000s.” Violations of neutrality can take
on several forms including, blocking, “playing favorites” as is most familiar in this debate, or a lack
of transparency on service parameters. Net neutrality is based on the premise that providers
have a choice: use an exclusive, private network where one can discriminate against content and
users or use a public network like the Internet. The choice of the latter has spillover effects to the
rest of the system. Wu claims it is this problem that led to the spontaneous creation of the norm
of neutrality (Wu).
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Similar themes run throughout the data available such Special Rapporteur Frank La Rue’s 2011
report to the HRC and a 2014 declaration. Each document recognizes that Internet access is
fundamental human right that is connected to the realization other rights like the freedom of expression,
equality, and socioeconomic rights. La Rue goes further, stating that Internet access can be means to
achieve the impossible in illiberal societies; as a relatively cheap technology, the Internet can enable
citizens to bypass restrictive, government-monitored and controlled media. He does note that the Internet
also enables government to intrude upon their citizens’ privacy in new ways (see Morozov), and calls on
states to discontinue the practice. Both documents touch upon the issue of digital literacy and calls upon
states to provide education, both in schools and beyond, to enable citizens to participate in the digital
world in a meaningful way.
La Rue also notes that the digital divide would be perpetuated if states do not develop
infrastructure and technology transfers plans. He states:
Without concrete policies and plans of action, the Internet will become a technological
tool that is accessible only to a certain elite while perpetrating the ‘digital divide’…The
Special Rapporteur is thus concerned that without Internet access, which facilitates
economic development and the enjoyment of a range of human rights, marginalized
groups and developing States remain trapped in a disadvantaged situation, thereby
perpetuating inequality both within and between States (16-17).
These broad and perhaps loose conceptions of human rights are not without detractors. Maurice
Cranston, in addressing the concept of the validity of socioeconomic human rights in 1967, wrote that
they are philosophically misguided and politically distracting in that they “hinder the effective protection of
what are correctly seen as human rights (164),” which are for Cranston political and civil rights.
Moreover, many critics doubt the feasibility of the argument that the F2C could be seen as essential as
expression or food. The criticism that the F2C and Internet as a right receives is generally based on this
basic needs argument. In reality, as the movement to define security and development in contextual
rather than absolute terms by people like Amartya Sen makes the view of access as right in the 21st
century not only plausible but logical. As the entrepreneurs at each level of this norm’s production argue,
access is necessary for the realization of many other rights: political participation, education, and work.
Perhaps the UN is framing it as a right so that it cannot be arbitrarily removed by governments.
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. The UN is not the sole IO that acts in the name of the
F2C. A regional economic forum, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), seeks to increase the
45

sophistication of the ICTs of its member states through its Development Steering Group. Among its
goals:






Expansion of networks to achieve universal access to broadband in all APEC economies by
2015;
Development and dissemination of strategies to assist developing economies to deploy
broadband networks;
Making ICT more accessible to people with special needs;
Development/Implementation of advanced technologies ( e.g. IPv6, grid computing, and cloud
computing) ; and
Promotion of ICT applications for socio-economic development (e.g., green ICT, smart grids,
disaster management, e-Government, e-Health and e-Education).

It is telling that such an organization, which straddles the line between East and West, will openly state
that its purpose in promoting the F2C is socio-economic in nature. In a 2011 document, the working
group outlines an infrastructure sharing plan that would enable less developed states to access
broadband by 2015. Additionally, the 2014 Beijing declaration reaffirmed the importance of ICT
development to economic growth and the importance of free trade generally.
World Bank. Though officially affiliated with the UN, the World Bank is not dependent upon the
UN for either membership or funding. It has published annual development reports since 1978, and in
2016 the theme was “Digital Dividends,” a study on the effect of the digital divide and what policies states
could adopt to overcome it. For the report, the digital divide refers to several related but distinct
phenomena concerning the uneven distribution of technology and opportunity based on demographic and
geographic factors. Divides are most common among urban and rural populations, men and women,
young and old, the wealthy and impoverished, and the educated and uneducated.
The World Bank reports that while some forms of technology are becoming diffuse, inequality is
becoming greater. While nearly 70 percent of the bottom fifth of the world’s population owns a mobile
phone, they lack dependable access to clean water and electricity. “Not surprisingly, the better educated,
well connected, and more capable have received most of the benefits—circumscribing the gains from the
digital revolution (3).” The report reviews the economic benefits that an increase in access would bring
through the expansion of markets to cyberspace and reduced information asymmetries. Beyond growth,
the Bank’s report also touts the political benefits, with citizens better able to track civil service
malfeasance and curtail voter fraud.
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The report recommends three steps that governments should take in order to bridge the divides
and evenly extend the “digital dividends” of Internet diffusion. While the report maintains that the Internet
is not a public good (since it is excludable), it argues that it is a club good which benefits anyone that can
actually get online. “…public investment or intervention is sometimes justified where the private sector is
unable to provide affordable access (27).” Like WSIS/ITU, the report recommends governments use tools
like PPPs and USFs to channel investments into areas where the private sector fails to develop
necessary infrastructure.
NETmundial. Hosted by Brazil in May 2014, the Global Multistakeholder Meeting on the Future
of Internet Governance, or NETmundial was an initiative that was offered as way for states to address the
issue of Internet governance. The topic is tangential to the F2C, but has become increasingly divisive
among states that see US dominance as a challenge to their own power (as China and Russia do) or a
threat (as Brazil does). The non-binding outcome document connected human rights to the Internet,
arguing that they should be the same whether people or online or off. Importantly, it states that
“Everyone should have the right to access, share, create and distribute information on the Internet,
consistent with the rights of authors and creators as established in law.”
The document also argues for a multistakeholder model of Internet governance (as opposed to a
multilateral model) that includes governments, ISPs, ICT professionals, academics, and users. Such a
model is also partially a challenge to the current mechanisms of government, which includes the private,
American-based nonprofit ICANN, formerly overseen by the US Chamber of Commerce. Oversight was
slated to be turned over to an international body in September 2015, but was delayed because the
Obama Administration wanted “more time to work out the specifics (CNBC).” While the CNBC video
claimed that such a move may put freedom of expression online in jeopardy, NETmundial argues that the
desire to de-Americanize the control over the technical aspects of the Internet stem from the Snowden
disclosures and concerns over privacy and security.
The NETmundial initiative’s website contains information and links that substantiate the
multistakeholder model. Authors highlight the connection between human rights universal access. A
Coordination Council, organized among the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee (CGI.br), the World
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Economic Forum, and ICANN, met in February 2016 to take stock of the progress of the NETmundial
initiative and consider extending funding past the inaugural phase that ends in June 2016.
The Council reviewed the activities and practices to date, noting how the crowdsourced
nature of its endorsed activities, in particular the NETmundial Solutions Map and
Collaboration Platform, have the potential to contribute to innovation in bottom-up
engagement and information sharing in the Internet governance ecosystem.
The efforts to link individuals, organizations, and the private sector and the attention given to the bottomup approach is evidence of how norms regarding the Internet can be developed in unique ways compared
to norms of the past. There are many of the traditional actors—NGOs, states, entrepreneurs/experts
acting from international platforms—as well, but the conscious utilization of the democratic potential of the
Internet presents itself through this platform.
Non-Governmental Organizations
There is a diverse range of NGOs working on the right to access and Internet freedom. Some
international NGOs are constructing the master narratives of Internet freedom, emphasizing the
importance of balancing uninhibited innovation with efforts to increase Internet penetration. Others work
regionally to tackle problems relevant within their political context. These organizations are networked
together through formal associations epitomized by hyperlinked network analysis.
Internet Society. The Internet Society (IS) is an NGO envisioned by Internet pioneers Vint Cerf
and Bob Kahn in 1992. They were among the inventors of the Internet who helped develop ARPANET
and software protocols still used today. Cerf is also one of ICANN’s founders and served on its board
until 2007. The vision of the Internet Society is that “The Internet is for everyone” and works on a range
of issues, including the open development of Internet infrastructure and technology education in
developing countries. It also serves as a forum for the coordination of international efforts for both
technical and practical information about the Internet and its potential, but most importantly, their mission
includes: “Foster[ing] an environment for international cooperation, community, and a culture that enables
self-governance to work (emphasis added).” Unlike the UN’s vision, ICT professionals frame Internet
freedom through the lens that its development and governance are best left to experts rather than policymakers and bureaucrats.
Internet development is one of their key areas of work, but it differs in tone from UN approaches.
While there is some superficial discussion in WSIS documents about the need for the Internet to be
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localized and relevant to cultural contexts its overall approach is dependent upon government policy and
encouraging outside investment. The IS insists instead that:
The Internet works because its governance is distributed, open, inclusive, collaborative,
and transparent. We work to keep it this way. Smart Development aims to strengthen
this idea. It represents a positive, inclusive, and proven alternative to policies that can
stifle innovation and network development. It offers an apolitical, non-interventionist
method of building Internet connectivity and engagement that is accessible anywhere in
the world and offers proven, cost-effective and replicable results (Internet Society).
In elaborating their approach to development, they emphasize the need for the Internet to be developed
by locals, who may receive training on technical infrastructure, but efforts are only successful from the
bottom-up. Development of the Internet should aim to be self-sustaining, which would imply that topdown models that depend on PPPs are at best temporary fixes to a long-term problem. The IS is wary of
making general recommendations in regard to Internet diffusion.
Within the scope of development, one of the areas of work of the Internet Society is access,
claiming that “Together we work to promote policies that sustain an Internet that’s open and has a
universally accessible platform for innovation, creativity, and economic opportunity.” They concentrate on
three aspects—infrastructure, user experience (human capacity), and cost—the latter being something
mostly ignored by other entrepreneurs explored in this section.
In 2012 they conducted a global survey of 10,000 people in twenty countries about their use and
attitudes towards the Internet. Their research revealed that 83 percent of the respondents (the vast
majority of whom had Internet access) felt that access should be considered a human right. Eighty-nine
percent felt that the Internet was important medium for the freedom of expression, and 60 percent felt that
Internet enabled greater political participation and awareness in the country. Eighty percent felt that
government had a duty to provide Internet access. While use among Americas was high (over 95
percent), the idea that access was a human right and that government has an obligatory role in its
provision was less than the global average. States that are generally wary of government intrusion in the
private sector would not be obligated to intervene on behalf of something that is seen as a luxury good
rather than a public good.
World Wide Web Foundation. Founded in 2009 by another Internet pioneer, Tim Berners-Lee,
the mission of the World Wide Web Foundation is to “advance the open Web as a public good and a
basic right.” As many NGOs working within states argue, the digital divide is a question about equality,
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not only about access, but also employment opportunities, access to medical information, and the ability
to have meaningful interaction with government in the 21st century. The Foundation has two main areas
of work, affordability and the concept of “open data.” Through its Alliance for Affordable Internet (A4AI),
they have argued that the UN’s guideline for affordability—that entry-level broadband should not cost
more than 5 percent of a household’s monthly income—is too high because of income inequality. While
the 9th SDG envisions universal access should be achieved by 2020, the deadline is fast-approaching. As
a result, the Foundation sees an even greater role for the state over the market. Such a position may be
due to the fact that as a Briton, Berners-Lee is willing to envision a greater role for states than his
American counterparts. “We believe public access options will increasingly be recognised as critical for
accelerating the availability and uptake of broadband and achieving universal access.” As some states
and commentators are pushing back against zero-rated programs as a violation of net neutrality, the
Foundation argues that they are essential to “connecting the unconnected.”
Digital Divide Institute. The Digital Divide Institute is a fairly old NGO founded by academics,
with its origins in the WTO conference of 1999 when its founder, Craig Warren Smith presented along
with Bill Gates financial proposals to solve the problem of the digital divide. The Institute settled in
Thailand’s Chulalongkorn University and has mainly worked with governments and the private sector in
Southeast Asia (Thailand, Indonesia, Cambodia, Vietnam, Bangladesh, the Philippines, and Nepal)
because of a desire “…to affect the process by which two billion Asian citizens assume their status as a
new global middle class.”
They advise numerous stakeholders on the improvement of ICT development policies, which
include providing corporations (Google, Microsoft, Yahoo) with input on how to improve corporate social
responsibility and research and development, coordinating philanthropic efforts around the world (the
Gates, Ford, and Rockefeller Foundations, etc.) with academia, advising governments on how to
implement effective broadband projects, and presenting at IGO-sponsored events like the WTO,
UNESCO, and ITU. The organization conducts five main areas of research in accordance with their work
within states which includes how government policy affects infrastructure development, and how to
improve collaboration between the public and private sectors for the development, maintenance, and
improvement of the Internet. The Institute claims the most important area of research is ethics:
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Ethics: The most important research domain to establish the Meaningful Broadband
model concerns ethics: How can a broadband ecosystem produce ethical impacts
desired by the nation? To answer this question, researchers are developing a Meaningful
Technologies Index, which measures and ranks technologies by their degree of
meaningfulness.
The Institute is attempting to gauge which types of technologies would be the most helpful for achieving
the stated goals of a particular society. Their use of the term “ethics” is different from the UN’s emphasis
on rights, and its application is far from universal. Perhaps as a consequence of the NGO’s regional
concentration in Southeast Asia, putting the F2C into the context of what local states need and want
reveals the importance of framing rights though projects that would have local relevance. There is a lack
of language about universalism and rights, and the framing of the concept of a divide and ethics may be
most amenable in these states.
World Economic Forum. Based in Geneva, the World Economic Forum (WEF) was established
in 1971 in order to expand the connections between private corporations and various elements of the
public—government, citizens, academia, etc. Its mission is a kind of corporate responsibility, stating that
“…an enterprise must serve… the interests of all stakeholders, including employees, customers, suppliers
and, more broadly, government, civil society and any others who may be affected or concerned by its
operations.” Through high-level meetings, research, and digital collaboration, the WEF coordinates
efforts on global issues much like UN, but offers itself as a neutral, apolitical platform whose chief concern
is to “Build…an International Institution for Public-Private Cooperation.”
“The New Internet World” a WEF report (2011) addressed the issue of how late-adopters view the
Internet in addition to the issue of whether people around the globe felt that Internet access was a
fundamental right. Five-thousand four hundred respondents from 13 countries answered questions
contained in the survey12, which included “an overwhelming majority (over 70 percent)” that felt access
was a fundamental right. The study makes an argument that there is a somewhat homogenous Internet
culture that is recognizable among the respondents regardless of “gender, age, education, and income
groups” across the globe (29). Such a conclusion would support the contention that there exists, at least
in some form, some articulated beliefs about the Internet that bypasses the formal policy-making process

12

The Internet Society’s survey was published one year later and covered a greater geographical range with
more respondents.
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of IGOs. Additionally, there is an emerging subculture on the Internet that is made up of late-adopters
(especially in East Asia) that are more active and engaged Internet users than those of the past. One of
the main arguments of the report is that: “Users want it all: they desire freedom of expression, privacy,
trust, and security without viewing these as mutually exclusive (3).” Often freedom and security are seen
as phenomena that are in a balance, whether in the digital world or outside it, but users across the globe
overwhelmingly desire the Internet to be a place in which they can feel safe in expressing their opinions
without the government invading their privacy while government also making the Web a secure place.
In addition to conducting studies on infrastructure and its need to be properly maintained and
upgraded in the decades to come that will result in “hyperconnectivity” (see Data Driven Development
2014) the WEF in 2015 adopted the Future Internet Initiative. Like “Digital Dividends,” it claims that the
Internet is the most important driver of growth and human progress today, and the challenge today and in
the future will be coordinating governments and stakeholders to enable the Internet to achieve its full
potential. There are five areas of the Future Internet Initiative that were announced, including policy
challenges (such as interoperability), cybercrime, the impact on business, privacy, and access. As to the
latter challenge, the WEF is interested in combating the issue of the digital divide (although not so
named) through public-private efforts, much the same as both the ITU and the Internet Society express.
Their position is not explicitly based on any of the evidence as to what degree governments should be
involved, but it is likely that any proposal would be less intrusive on the private sector than what the ITU
and the WSIS would propose.
Smaller Initiatives. The Freedom to Connect Association is a US NGO that is comprised of
diverse range of individuals, including a managing partner at a NY law firm, the director of US Institute of
Peace, a journalism and media expert, and an ICT professional who had previously worked in other ICTrelated NGOs. Its vision is based upon the UNDHR’s Article 19, “that everyone “has the right to freedom
of opinion and expression…regardless of frontiers.” Unlike the other organizations explored in this
section, its vision of physical access goes beyond having the infrastructure and technical expertise in
order for a given population to be able to “plug-in.” Instead, the goal of the organization is to enable
access when governments attempt to block it by providing and educating individuals about covert
technologies. Particularly:
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Freedom2Connect Foundation offers an antidote to this alarming trend. It helps fund
technologies—ranging from encrypted chat rooms to secure story-telling apps—that give
citizens and journalists the tools they need to circumvent government censors, protect
identities and communicate freely online. The Foundation also seeks to educate ordinary
citizens and journalists in the use of such tools, and to raise public awareness of the
importance of an unfettered Internet for people everywhere (F2CF).
It studies these technologies and funds projects through grants in order for them to be brought to fruition.
One wonders if this is a risky endeavor. Many of the issues surrounding censorship and privacy becomes
a cat-and-mouse game; while well-meaning NGOs may promote technologies that could enable
journalists and individuals to circumvent government censorship methods, it seems likely that new
technologies could enable those same governments to break through encryptions, VPNs, and other dark
areas of the web13.
The Dynamic Spectrum Alliance is a global organization founded by companies interested in
making more radio spectrum available to ISPs that depend upon it for wireless technology, thereby
increasing capacity and therefore access. Among their stated goals is closing the digital divide, enabling
the Internet of Things14, and particularly alleviating the “spectrum crunch.” Charter members include
American, British, and East Asian companies, and today include members from the Caribbean, Africa,
and much of Asia. The most celebrated projects on their website include television white space (TVWS),
“…which generates a long-range wireless Internet connection by riding empty television UHF and VHF
broadcast channels (Lovegrove).” As a coalition of technology companies, the organization straddles the
concerns of consumers and businesses.
Mexico’s Fundación Proacceso was founded by a private citizen, and views inequality and the
digital divide as inherently linked. By providing access through community centers, the Foundation
attempts to democratize access that at least partially bypasses the private sector. The training centers
teach basic computer and Internet skills and have almost half a million users; the foundation is supported
by Microsoft and Dell. Such NGOs are common in Mexico.

“Despite all the openness of the Internet, there are still places you cannot saunter into on the Web. You must
be invited. These are “darknets”: exclusive peer-to-peer networks in which membership is based on circles
of trust, whose activities are veiled from the general public (Newton 340).” They are mainly for illegal filesharing of music and other media, but the potential for other politicized uses is obvious.
14 A reference of the growing number of appliances and objects—everything from fitness trackers to
refrigerators—that are connected through the Internet.
13
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Other NGOs work toward Internet freedom in general, and fight for journalistic freedom and
against censorship in particular. In Iran, Defenders of Human Rights Center published a report on a
recently adopted Computer Crimes law in Iran, and how the requirement for ISPs to record browsing
histories jeopardizes freedoms of the press and association. The Asian Human Rights Commission
hosted an anti-censorship petition for Thailand. Advocacy for human rights is aided by the Internet,
allowing watchdog groups to report on abuses or disappearances that go unreported by traditional media.
"’Internet censorship curtails public access to information, academic research, press freedom, business
competition, and simple human discourse,’ the Bangkok-based freedom of information advocacy group
says (AHRC).” The Philippine Human Rights Information Center reported on the Cybercrime Prevention
Act in 2014, arguing that the law violated protections of free expression, due process, and equal
protection. For instance, the punishment for the crime of libel is enhanced when perpetrated through
electronic media. Other violations included mandatory “take down” orders issued to ISPs when material
is judged to be in violation of the law, and unchecked surveillance practiced by Philippine law
enforcement agencies (PhilRights). While not working for the F2C, there is evidence from the Global
South that Internet freedom is not a solely Western or American initiative.
NGOs and civil society have been challenged in Russia in recent months, but the Glasnost
Defence Foundation persists in defending expression and journalistic freedom on the web. Roman
Zakharov reported on the blocking of a newspaper’s website, Novaya of Gazeta v Sankt-Peterburge
(NGSP) because the German webhost received a complaint from an unidentified, presumably
government-connected person. The Foundation recently came under fire, as reported by Vladimir
Golubev, as an organization “performing the functions of a foreign power.” As such, they have been the
victim of harassment, further claiming that their security can be assured only by making human rights
violations public.
Not to be confused with the Internet Society founded by Cerf and Kahn, Internet Society China
(ISC) includes ISPs, institutions, and individuals charged with developing the Internet in China. Unlike
other NGOs in this arena, the focus is not primarily on civil rights, but on economic development and the
coordination of efforts to make Internet policy and infrastructure more efficient. Unlike most NGOs, which
are correctly classified as civil society in contrast with the state government, ISC is sponsored by the
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Chinese government. Such an organizational structure is unsurprising given the unique nature of civil
society in China, and functions as an intermediary among vested interests in Internet development rather
than as a check on the state’s power.
Individuals and Corporations
By the Internet’s very nature, it is difficult to pinpoint which individuals are instrumental to the F2C
regime. The disaggregated nature of the demands for increased and unhindered access through
collaborative efforts like the signing of petitions proves that the power of users as an engine of change
and a source for normative generation and spread. What makes this task more complicated is that the
demand for access is embedded in more contemporaneous problems, like the use of social media for
political activism.
Facebook and Google. Mark Zuckerberg, founder and CEO of one of the world’s most popular
social media platforms, has taken a vocal role in the advancement of universal access, the connection to
human rights, and the provision of affordable or free Internet to help bridge the digital divide. As the face
of the corporation in pursuit of profit for its shareholders, the authenticity of Zuckerberg’s message is
dubious, but he has made highly visible claims relating to the F2C and the company has undertaken
projects in the name of these motivations.
In 2013, Facebook posted the whitepaper, “Is Connectivity a Human Right?” that would serve to
justify one of its projects, Internet.org later renamed Free Basics.
For almost ten years, Facebook has been on a mission to make the world more open and
connected. For us, that means the entire world—not just the richest, most developed
countries. We’ve made good progress, and today we connect more than 1.15 billion
people through Facebook each month (Zuckerberg 2013).
Zuckerberg claims that the need to serve the unconnected may not be profitable for Facebook “for a very
long time, if ever” but is nonetheless necessary. The Internet is fundamental for economic growth and
employment and as such it has to be made more widely available. Zuckerberg argued that data plans,
which the industry uses in order to build out infrastructure, are out of reach for many. But mobile Internet
is a way for the industry’s to “serve everyone,” creating a vicious cycle. The sketch of the then-proposed
plan included cheap or free data, applications that could be accessed for free, otherwise known as “zerorated” apps, and the creation of non-data-intensive apps that would allow digital immigrants to take
advantage of what could be made available.
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The resulting Free Basics program has been rolled out in 36 countries, including the Philippines
and Indonesia. It is not without controversy; observers argue that zero-rating apps like Free Basics
violate the principles of net neutrality because choosing which apps could be accessed cheaply would be
at the exclusion of many others. In February 2016 Indian telecommunication regulators banned the app
because of its discriminatory nature (BBC 2016).
In March 2015, Facebook tested a technology that would beam Internet to the earth’s surface
from an unmanned aerial vehicle. Zuckerberg stated in his Facebook post: “Aircraft like these will help
connect the whole world because they can affordably serve the 10% of the world's population that live in
remote communities without existing internet infrastructure.”
Project Loon, so named as a tongue-and-cheek recognition of the fact that many thought the idea
ludicrous is one of Google’s “X projects,” the result of the R&D wing of its Alphabet Corporation. Its goal
is to the bring 4G-LTE technology to inaccessible areas via balloons that would to deliver Internet through
ISM bands, part of the underutilized radio spectrum of which most mobile devices make use. Unlike
Facebook’s FreeBasics, Google would be providing infrastructure rather than software. Each balloon
would cover 80 square kilometers and would rely on the spectrum to relay traffic from cellphones to highspeed connections to the greater web.
The project is still in its early stages. In 2016, it seeks to establish links around the Southern
Hemisphere to further test the reliability of these balloons. In February, the Google team tested a balloon
autolaucher in Puerto Rico named “Chicken Little.” “Portable autolaunchers allow us to move our whole
operation to places that give us access to favourable wind patterns that can help us provide Internet
connectivity around the world (Project Loon 2016).” A test has been carried out in Brazil, and
memoranda of understanding has been signed by three ISPs and Google in Indonesia.
The frame of the project is couched squarely in the F2C court. While the Internet is commonly
understood to be a “global community,” the project laments that two-thirds of the world does not have
Internet access. The switch from 3G capable balloons to 4G-LTE is that high-speed access is an
important consideration for meaningful access. The video hyperlinked above discusses the benefits of
access: primary education, access to doctors, helping farmers, and even small businesses. Such
emphases are typical of Western frames of development discourse. As some of the commentary upon
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the video illustrates, there is skepticism about the motivation behind the project and whether it is truly
altruistic or profit-motivated. For both Facebook and Google, and likewise all MNC-supported NGO work,
motivation stems from a combination of profit and corporate responsibility that serves to improve their
public image.
There is further controversy about Project Loon. First ISPs like Indonesia’s Telekom have argued
that it has the potential to disrupt their marketplace as Google threatens to replace them. Such concerns
might be unwarranted, as Google is working alongside rather than seeking to replace incumbent ISPs,
and one of its aims is to bring access to currently underserved areas (Eyerys). Telekom’s complaints
resemble arguments made by AT&T regarding municipal broadband in the US. Second, Eyerys’s authors
point out that smartphone penetration in developing countries is uneven. Much of the population that will
be served by these balloons do not own the necessary hardware to take advantage of the 10 Mbps
connections.
While MNC’s motivations are self-interested, framing the service within the scope of the F2C and
human rights is evidence of the breadth of this norm, if not its depth. While Facebook and Google fail to
mention WSIS and other hyperlinked networks within their project visions, these tactics could be used to
avoid potentially controversial political associations. Their association and cooperation with local NGOs
is evidence that they are not separate from these networks and are part of the feedback loop of the
development of the F2C norm.
David Isenberg and the Freedom to Connect. David Isenberg is the creator of the “Freedom to
Connect” conference and is one of the major entrepreneurs in the US, bringing together diverse
institutions like the Media Democracy Fund, the Internet Society, Google, among others. Isenberg, who
worked for AT&T from 1985 to 1998, gained notoriety for an article he wrote “Rise of the Stupid Network”
that subsequently “went viral.” It challenged the prevailing notion that any network, be it telephone or
Internet, would have to be diligently managed by a telecom firm. His alternative premise was that new
technologies could be managed from the bottom-up, and that there would be a gradual but inevitable
transition from the older ICTs to the new, which would require a refocusing of telecom corporations. He
made some recommendations in 1998 about what telephone companies could do to remain relevant but
Isenberg still highlights the importance of “stupid” networks in 2015. Particularly, as the Internet Society
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and ICT professionals claim, it is precisely the diffusion of power that enables the Internet to be so
innovative and its development fast-paced. The intrusion of corporations or governments into the process
would be detrimental to freedom itself.
The “Freedom to Connect” conference has a semi-annual meeting since 2005 that deals with the
some of the issues of this dissertation. They state that the “F2C: Freedom to Connect provides a platform
for understanding the social utility of infrastructure, for innovation, for creativity, for expression, for little-d
democracy. The Freedom to Connect is about an Internet that supports human freedoms and personal
security.” Isen writes:
The Freedom to Connect stands on three legs.
The first leg is infrastructure, the rights of way, the poles and conduits, the wires and
fibers and binder groups and cables, the electromagnetic spectrum, towers, antennas,
receivers and transmitters, how they work, how their economics and business models
work, and how the regulation of infrastructure promotes and impedes public
telecommunications services.
The second leg is the fundamental nature of the Internet, namely well-specified, wellunderstood public protocols, universally implemented with universal connectivity and
open to all who meet its specifications.
The third is the use of the Internet to promote bottom-up innovation and government of,
by and for the people and to counteract anti-innovative vested interests and autocratic
power.
Isenberg and the conference seem to be focused on US issues. In the latest conference in March 2015,
topics were focused on net neutrality and the idea that the FCC could institute a government-run Internet
(scoffed at by the attendees).
Declaration of Internet Freedom. The nature of the connection among these networks is
embodied by an online petition from 2012 which is the result of hyperlinked social networks, and is
authored by no one organization in particular. The document is here reproduced in its entirety:
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We stand for a free and open Internet.
We support transparent and participatory processes for making Internet policy and the
establishment of five basic principles:
Expression: Don't censor the Internet.
Access: Promote universal access to fast and affordable networks.
Openness: Keep the Internet an open network where everyone is free to connect,
communicate, write, read, watch, speak, listen, learn, create and innovate.
Innovation: Protect the freedom to innovate and create without permission. Don’t block
new technologies and don’t punish innovators for their users' actions.
Privacy: Protect privacy and defend everyone’s ability to control how their data and
devices are used.
2012 is an important year for Internet freedom, with the realization that the Arab Spring did not produce
the results initially hoped for, fights over piracy and net neutrality heating up in the US, and further
limitations of users’ rights in authoritarian states. The signers of this declaration include INGOs, regional
NGOs, ICT professionals, academics, and human rights advocates along with anyone who wishes to sign
from anywhere in the world (assuming the website is not blocked). It is unclear that it has been directly
used to influence state policy.
State-led Initiatives
Generally speaking, the actions of states are rightfully seen as policy outputs and are the
appropriate subjects of the subsequent chapters. Yet, at times states act as entrepreneurs by advocating
for certain norms to be adopted by other states. Sandholtz and Stiles point out that the process of norm
development is in no way linear, but rather is dialectical as states interpret norms to suit their
contemporaneous needs. Looking at the speeches of state officials and to a lesser degree policy output
is an important node for the perpetuation or the modification of norms like the F2C.
Then Secretary of State Hilary Clinton in 2010 articulated the phrase “freedom to connect” in a
speech at the Newseum, a journalism museum in Washington, DC. She begun by addressing the Haitian
crisis following the earthquake, and segued into the roles of information technology should have played in
mitigating the chaotic response that met aid workers in attempting to bring relief to the area.
She argued that the development of the Internet and other ICTs was unprecedented, concluding
that “information has never been so free.” Yet connectivity is not an unmitigated blessing. Like any other
technology, it can be used for good or ill, remarking that illiberal states often use the Internet as a tool for
repression and censorship. “On their own, new technologies do not take sides in the struggle for freedom
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and progress, but the United States does (3).” In addition to enabling the long-cherished American right
of expression, Clinton argued that access is pivotal to economic growth and the freedom to practice ones
religion. Disruptions to the ability of citizens to use the Internet must be combated by stakeholders—
governments, corporations, NGOs, and the international community.
The final freedom, one that was probably inherent in what both President and Mrs.
Roosevelt thought about and wrote about all those years ago, is one that flows from the
four I’ve already mentioned: the freedom to connect – the idea that governments should
not prevent people from connecting to the internet, to websites, or to each other. The
freedom to connect is like the freedom of assembly, only in cyberspace. It allows
individuals to get online, come together, and hopefully cooperate. Once you’re on the
internet, you don’t need to be a tycoon or a rock star to have a huge impact on society.
(7)
Many of the NGOs and other entrepreneurs have pointed to Clinton’s articulation of the F2C here as
proof, or at least affirmation, of its global prominence.
Another prominent politician who has advocated for the F2C and Internet freedom has been
Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff. After the Snowden disclosures, she and German Chancellor Angela
Merkel went before UN General Assembly to introduce resolutions on privacy and condemn the US
PRISM program. The circumstances and content of these discussions are analyzed in the section on
Brazil.
Some states have enacted various constitutional or legal protections for Internet freedom that are
not included in this study. These outputs are clearly intended for domestic purposes, but many
entrepreneurs have noted these outputs as proof of the strength of Internet freedom norms generally.
Estonia declared Internet access to be a right in 2000, and is viewed by Freedom House as a model for
other states who which to achieve rapid infrastructure improvements. The Costa Rican Supreme Court
affirmed the right of access in 2010, and Finland confirmed broadband access as a right in 2009.
***
This chapter reviewed the entrepreneurs shaping the various frames of the F2C. While familiar
organizations the likes of ITU, the HRC, and the World Bank are active in advocating for Internet freedom
and the increase of access, their efforts are supplemented by influential NGOs, MNCs, and state
representatives. These actors work together in various ways, including through official platforms like
WSIS and through the Web itself.
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A review of the entrepreneurs revealed that access is more than the physical manifestations of
the Internet like cables, satellites, or Wi-Fi. In addition, access takes on different dimensions dependent
on the context which includes digital literacy, speed, cost, and in what way the state intervenes upon
access, for good or ill.
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Chapter 4: Free Cases
Free states have reacted proactively to the demands placed upon them by the F2C. Each of the
selected cases has a positive association with civil and political rights and have extended protections of
expression and association to the virtual world. Each of these states face challenges to the spread of
Internet access and diffusion is largely the story of their ISPs. Although privately-owned, the
concentration of power serves as a hindrance in both the US and the Philippines despite their otherwise
considerable differences. However the Brazilian government and various stakeholders together have
taken steps to assure the marketplace is diversified in that case.
United States
The US’s relationship with the Internet penetration is complex. As its place of origin, policymakers and ICT professionals have shaped the preliminary norms surrounding Internet freedom and the
relationship among the government, private sector, and the public. Yet the case is challenged by
geographic barriers and an inhibitive market environment. It favors incumbent providers and limits the
role the state can play in the provision and extension of access to underserved communities. The ICT
professionals’ narrative grew up in the US and continues to shape Internet policies domestically and
internationally as in the area of Internet governance. Additionally, the state has directly challenged norms
of anonymity and privacy on the Internet through the PRISM program and the 2016 dispute among Apple,
the FBI, and the Department of Justice. Disparate elements of the state work towards different ends in
regards to Internet freedom and these breaches of freedom are often justified as temporary or as
exceptions to otherwise appropriate rules on the Web.
Background
Since the 1970s, the US’s identity as the world’s indomitable superpower has been challenged
but remains, as of yet, unmatched. As reported by the CIA’s World Factbook, the US has a population of
321 million (ranking 4th in the world) and land mass that spans 9.8 million km 2 (3rd in the world). The state
has an urbanization rate of 81.6 percent, with 7 major metropolises with populations approximately 5
million or more15. It has the third largest economy in the world with a $17.97 trillion GDP following China

15

New York-Newark 18.591 million; Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana 12.308 million; Dallas-Fort Worth 5.603
million; Chicago 8.739 million; Miami 5.771 million; Philadelphia 5.571 million; WASHINGTON, D.C. (capital)
4.896 million (CIA 2014)
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and the European Union. This equates to $56,300 GDP/capita, but is now second to China in purchasing
power parity.
Looking at its ICT technologies 16, the US has 129.4 million landlines, ranking 3rd in the world; one
phone is plugged in for approximately every 2.5 people in the country. The number of landlines is
decreasing in absolute and relative terms, having dropped by nearly 10 million from 2013 estimates and
causing the US to slip from 2nd to 3rd in the world. Yet, the figure escalates for cellular phones, with 317.4
million in the country, ranking 5th. Freedom House reports that 90 percent of US adults own a cell phone
and 64 percent a smartphone. In total, there are 276.6 million Internet users in the US which makes the
state second only to China in absolute totals but encompasses 86.8 percent of the population.
Broadband penetration rates, smartphone ownership, and other ICT statistics are widely available
through the Federal Communications Commission and through NGOs like the Pew Research Center.
The United States inherited much of its tradition of political and civil rights from England.
Cherished rights like the freedoms of expression, press, and association were written into the Bill of
Rights, but as in England, American interpretation of these rights has varied throughout its history.
Struggles have centered on balancing the rights of citizens with the state’s interests, especially security, a
problem that other cases in this study also consider in regards to how they frame Internet freedom.
The line between journalism and media on the Internet is becoming blurred and can be subject to
rancorous debate. Yochai Benkler wrote an extensive article, “A Free Irresponsible Press: Wikileaks and
the Battle over the Soul of the Networked Fourth Estate” in 2011, categorizing the ways in which the US
government and traditional media attempted to dismiss or discredit the site and Julian Assange. The leak
of the several hundred embassy cables in addition to the Snowden disclosures regarding the PRISM17
program were viewed as problematic by the White House. While Wikileaks continues to publish, Assange
remains under the protection of political asylum at the Ecuadorian embassy in London to avoid
prosecution regarding perhaps overblown charges of sexual molestation in Sweden. Benkler illustrates
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CIA Factbook 2015
The PRISM surveillance program was unveiled by NSA contractor Edward Snowden in June 2013. The
program is designed to track foreign Internet traffic in the name of national security through the analysis of
metadata. With the cooperation of major companies like Facebook, Google, Yahoo, and Skype and the legal
mandate of Protect America Act, surveillance of email, chats, search histories, and other such digital
communication became a tool available to the federal government. It has since received must criticism over
its lack of oversight and broad scope. (Von Drehle)
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the lengths that the US government was willing to go to discredit the “Networked Fourth Estate,” and
shows that the fight between media freedom and security is far from over.
A fruitful area for information on how a state deals with human rights is to review its periodic
reports. The US has had a meaningful dialogue with the Human Rights Committee regarding Internet
freedom and the F2C. The Committee is the UN treaty body responsible for the oversight of the
application of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) to states parties; the US
signed the ICCPR in 1977 but did not ratify it until 1992. Initial reports typically include legal and judicial
explanations of how the state already meets, or must endeavor to meet, the articles of the ICCPR. The
following articles are applicable to this study and received close attention:
Article 17.1.: No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and
reputation.
Article 19.2.: Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall
include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless
of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other
media of his choice.
Article 21: The right of peaceful assembly will be recognized.
Article 22.1.: Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others,
including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his interests.
Many states’ relationship with obligations under human rights instruments are instrumental in nature.
They often will frame their actions that might appear as violations of human rights as either temporary
aberrations or a necessity limitation of an otherwise broad concept. For example, freedom of speech is
limited in the US to the likelihood of imminent harm it can cause; the same principle is often applied to
international human rights obligations.
In its initial report, the US affirmed that US law guarantees the freedoms of expression,
association, assembly, and privacy. The US frames Internet access as a complementary right to its body
of civil rights, yet the idea of equal access to the media is not conceptualized as a right. For instance, the
Supreme Court “…has stopped short of suggesting that there is a constitutional right of access to the
broadcast media, and has never extended a guaranteed right of access or fairness doctrine to the print
media (587).” At least according to US jurisprudence, the right to media such as broadcast television or
the Internet has been seen as a “value added service” rather than something essential to full participation
in political society. While such a view may have been reasonable in 1994 when Internet access was
uncommon, today the same view might be considered outdated. As politicians’ campaigns heavily use
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social media and personal websites, as government services become available online, and as information
on public policy becomes easily accessible from the Internet, the reasonableness of the hands-off
approach by Congress and the courts is suspect. In none of the following reports does the US offer proof
that it is seeks to change its position on seeing access as a right protected by law, regardless of the
rhetoric used by US foreign policy practitioners.
The inviolability of correspondence is assured in the initial report with the exception of mail from
overseas as argued in US v. Ramsey (1977). It is reasoned that government may search
correspondence as one would search persons who physically cross borders for national security (526).
Such logic can surely be applied to electronic surveillance under the rubric of transnational terrorism.
Additionally, under article 17, the report reviews the judicial circumstances for obtaining wiretap warrants,
their limitations, and the narrow circumstances in which people can be recorded without their consent (a
“consensual conversation”). At this early stage, the US Privacy Act (1974) forbade “federal agencies
from using information collected for one purpose for a different purpose (539),” and required consent
and/or notice that computer databases containing bank records or credit scores could be shared. While
not directly linked to the F2C, the lack of sharing of information was commonly cited as one of the
missteps that allowed the 9/11 terrorists to hide in plain sight, which set the tone for the Patriot Acts.
The next available report was published in 2005. In addressing privacy, it reiterated the
standards laid out in the US Privacy Act and the inability for agencies to share computer databases while
touting the successes of the Patriot Act (2001) that allowed the intelligence and law enforcement
communities to break down the “wall” between them. It also “…updated federal anti-terrorism and
criminal laws to bring them up to date with the modern technologies used by terrorists, so that the
United States no longer had to fight a digital-age battle with legal authorities left over from the era of
rotary telephones.”
The fourth periodic report focused on infrastructure development—including broadband—to
Native American lands, stating that “[b]oth the Department of Agriculture and the Department of
Commerce have programs to do so and have awarded loans and grants worth over $1.5 billion for
projects to benefit tribal areas.” Rural, tribal lands are among the most underserved in the country. The
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US recognizes that in some circumstances the government must work to overcome marketplace failures
to provide the services necessary to bring certain populations on par with average services in the country.
In the US, the changing standards on electronic surveillance can be traced from the benchmark
case of the Katz v. US (1967) on wiretapping and privacy to the responses it gives the HRC on the Patriot
Act and its implication for Internet users. The Protect America Act (2007) was cited in the 2012 document
which extended surveillance performed by Foreign Intelligence Service Act to any person located outside
of the US.
333.
In 2007, Congress enacted the Protect America Act, P. L. 110-55, which
excluded from the FISA definition of electronic surveillance any surveillance directed at a
person reasonably believed to be located outside the United States. In particular, it
allowed the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence to authorize, for up
to one year, acquisition of foreign intelligence information concerning persons reasonably
believed to be outside the United States if the Attorney General and the Director of
National Intelligence determined that five criteria were met: (1) reasonable procedures
are in place for determining that the acquisition concerns persons reasonably believed to
be located outside the United States; (2) the acquisition did not constitute electronic
surveillance as defined by FISA; (3) the acquisition involves obtaining the
communications data from or with the assistance of a communications service provider,
custodian or other person that has access to communications; (4) a significant purpose of
the acquisition is to obtain foreign intelligence information; and (5) the minimization
procedures to be used meet the requirements of the FISA. By the terms of the Act, a
number of its provisions lapsed 180 days after the date of enactment.
The Act has been cited as the beginning of the PRISM program, which has created a maelstrom in the
world of Internet freedom and governance.
In recognizing this, the Committee, in its List of Issues (LoIs) in 2013, asked the US to explain
oversight mechanisms (CCPR/C/USA/Q/4) and to justify “roving wiretaps.” The US response claimed that
the FISC court not only authorized the collection of data, but oversaw the operations of the NSA, and that
modifications to the law “enhance[d] judicial and Congressional oversight and protect individuals’ privacy
and civil liberties.” Roving wiretaps allow officials to track the communications of individuals who often
switched providers or means, targeting the person rather than the phone. Quoting Obama, the report
claimed that such measures reflected the changing political climate that makes standards of the past
inapplicable to the present. “…in the years to come, we will have to keep working hard to strike the
appropriate balance between our need for security and preserving those freedoms that make us who we
are…” The Committee has continually questioned the legitimacy and the necessity of the extensive
measures the US has taken in the name of security, especially as they apply to Internet freedom. While
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not directly connected the F2C, the US’s policies on surveillance has led many to question its place as a
leader of Internet freedom. The argument that the relationship between security and freedom are in flux
due to terrorism and technological changes bolsters the credibility of policies in Not Free and Partly Free
states like China and Russia.
US jurisprudence has continually shown that freedoms like expression, privacy, and association
are balanced with security. No rights can ever be absolute, but the occasions when the state can rightly
intervene into individual liberty are contested. The relationship is on a continuum, with the power of the
state expanding in times of crisis, and contracting as public demand asserts itself. While the US pursues
policies to increase access under the rhetorical frames of the F2C, the state simultaneously monitors
access in the name of security in the age of sleeper cells and mass shootings. The most recent
challenge (February and March 2016) to privacy was the FBI’s demands that Apple create a backdoor to
its own security measures to access the information stored on an iPhone used by one of the perpetrators
of the San Bernardino attacks. While the FBI claimed that it cracked the phone’s security without Apple’s
help, the episode illustrates how the demands of Internet users, providers, and ICT companies often
clash with security interests.
The Internet in the US
Background. The Internet was invented in the US as a collaboration between academic ICT
experts and the US military. ARPANET was built as a network of networks so that in the case of a
nuclear attack there would be built-in redundancy of the US’s networks that would enable communication
between different locations even if a major telecommunications portal was destroyed. Blum recounts:
They weren’t only trying to get two or three or even a thousand computers talking, but
two or three or a thousand different kinds of computers, grouped in all sort of ways,
spread far and wide. This metalevel challenge was known as “Internetworking (42).”
Almost paradoxically, the military’s academic partners at UCLA were largely part of the counterculture of
the 1960s that was anti-establishment and pro-peace. The open attitude that emphasized sharing,
decentralization, and “improving the world” survived the end of the decade and came to influence the ICT
professionals’ narrative that persists today (Rosenzweig 1545). Nonetheless, Rosenzweig insists that
equating radicalism with the Internet’s pioneers would be a mistake; instead, they were young faculty and
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graduate students seeking an open technical community with a passion for ICT, not changing the world
(1547).
Cerf, Kahn, and others succeeded in meeting the challenge, and ARPANET was later joined by
other military and academic computer networks. While ARPRANET existed alongside these intranets
(some of which persist today) problems arose because first, none of these networks were able to
communicate with each other, and second, their use were relegated to academic institutions. The
invention of TCP/IP protocols in 1983 changed this some of this dynamic and allowed computers on
different networks to understand each other’s data. It was the Tower of Babel in reverse in that the
protocols granted the ability for networks to communicate rather than being wholly incompatible which
each other. The transition to TCP/IP was gradual at first, but as Blum reports the number of autonomous
networks increased exponentially after 1985, from 15 in 1982 to over 400 in 1986 (by 2011, there were
35,000 such networks). In the fall of 1985, 2,000 computers had access to the Internet, and in four short
years it grew to 159,000.
Despite the ICT professionals’ narrative that the Internet’s early and best days were entirely
driven independent of the state, the problem of exclusive availability of the Internet became apparent in
the 1980s. The technology was expensive, and only the institutions that could afford to maintain the
computing and infrastructure necessary to the Internet could enjoy the benefits. Larry Smarr, a UCSD
professor of ICT, wrote a grant proposal in 1983 for the National Science Foundation, which became
known as the “Black Proposal.” It advocated for greater coordination among federal, state, academic, and
business partners that would allow for increased access to these sought-after technologies. The
Proposal lead to the National Center for Supercomputing (NSCA) at the University of Illinois, which
helped to increase access across academia and produced one of the earliest web browsers, Mosaic.
While the browser used protocols that today are outmoded, its inventors later developed Netscape, one of
the most popular browsers in the early days of popular Internet access in the US, and its components
(better graphics, a URL loading bar, and forward/back buttons) are used by contemporary browsers like
Chrome and Microsoft’s Edge. Netscape employees also developed Mozilla’s Firefox, its “spiritual
successor.” One of the most popular web browsers today owes its existence to the NSF and the
coordination of efforts among federal, state, and private enterprise.

68

Growing up alongside the spread of supercomputing in academic and military settings in the
1980s, corporate providers were working to tap into commodity services like e-mail, news reporting,
forums, and gaming, which have become mainstays of Internet use today. Public access was made
possible when the government lifted restrictions on Internet for commercial and private use, as a
consequence of the increased capacity for telephone infrastructure:
The increasing connection speed of T1 lines brought with it increasing demand,
particularly from private sector businesses. By 1991, when all restrictions on commercial
use of the Internet were lifted, the National Science Foundation (NSF) -- who from 1987
to 1995 helped the U.S. make the transition from the ARPANET to today's Internet -- had
its entire network backbone connected to 45 Mbps T3 lines. In 1994, a year before the
private sector assumed responsibility for the maintenance of the Internet backbone, the
NSF upgraded the Internet backbone to Asynchronous Transmission Mode, 145 Mbps
(FCC).
Between 1993 and 1995, adoption of the Internet in the US began to pick up momentum
alongside the growth of personal computer (PC) ownership. In 1984, the first year the US Census asked
about PC ownership, 8.2 percent of the US population owned a PC; 15 percent of those polled reported
“yes” in 1989, 22.9 percent in 1993 and 36.6 percent by 1997. The US Census first asked about Internet
penetration in 1997, and 18.0 percent of respondents had connections in their homes (File 2013). Within
15 years, the number of PCs in households jumped almost 4.5 times, and the market was subsequently
ripe for widely available Internet access.
CompuServe, the earliest ISP, soon had to compete with America Online (AOL) which made athome Internet access its business model. While CompuServe, AOL, and Prodigy had histories that
spanned the 1980s such services were expensive. These included connectivity rates that would cost $10
for 5 hours of connection, and $3 for every hour after that (ForeverGeek). This model would eventually
be replaced by AOL’s monthly service plans; while more cost-effective, they still limited users to an
allotment of hours online. CompuServe and others switched to a monthly service plans by 1996. While
AOL began as a platform for providing email and other applications, it was also an ISP that would enable
users to access the World Wide Web through browsers like Netscape and Internet Explorer. Internet
speed, which is one of the most important markers of access’s “meaningfulness,” was maxed at 56
kilobytes per second (Kbps)18. AOL is still used today as a dial-up provider by 2 million US users who
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For example, a low-quality mp3 of 3.50 Mb would talk a half hour to download (Eha). Average broadband
today would mean that such a download would take mere seconds.
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have few other options (Pagliery). As AOL is dependent on extant telephone technology, it is one of the
only options that remain to those where broadband is unaffordable, where contemporary high-speed ISPs
have no viable marketplace, or “do not care to switch.”
Speed and cost. Broadband19 is currently the greatest measure of the sophistication of
citizens’ access. It is arguable, as seen in Finland, Costa Rica, and Estonia that meaningful
access requires broadband. Its popular adoption in the US began in the late 1990s. Today, the
FCC defines broadband as minimally 25 megabits per second (Mbps) downstream and 3 Mbps
upstream20; for relative comparison, Akamai, however, reports that in Q4 2015 the average
download speed in the US was 14.2 Mbps. When Pew (2013b) began collecting statistics in
2000, just 3 percent of US households had broadband while 34 percent used dial-up; in a little
over 13 years, those figures jumped to 70 percent and 2 percent, respectively. While the US is
enjoys speeds that far exceed most other cases in this study, it trails behind its Western
counterparts; for example, France enjoys 43.8 Mbps downstream, Romania 69.0 Mbps, and
Japan, 100.3 Mbps (Ookla). The 25/3 Mbps standard replaces a 2010 benchmark of 4/1 Mbps,
something which at the time could be considered substandard.
The following are some observed speeds among large and small cities spread throughout
the United States.

“Today’s common definition of broadband is any circuit significantly faster than a dial-up phone lines. That
tends to be a cable modem circuit from your friendly local cable TV provider, a DSL circuit, a T-1 or an E-1
circuit from your friendly local phone company. In short, the term ‘broadband’ can mean anything you want
it to be so long as it’s ‘fast.’ In short, broadband is now more a marketing than a technical term (Newton
209).”
20 Download speed and upload speed, respectively.
19
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Table 1 Reported Internet Speeds in US cities
(testmy.net 12 April 2016)
City, State

Downstream

Upstream

Los Angeles, California

25.5 Mbps

6.8 Mbps

New York, New York

24.6 Mbps

7.6 Mbps

Chicago, Illinois

24.4 Mbps

7.9 Mbps

Anchorage, Alaska

18.0 Mbps

4.2 Mbps

Mountain View, Wyoming

8.6 Mbps

1.1 Mbps

Heyburn, Idaho

8.6 Mbps

3.1 Mbps

Navajo Utility Authority, Arizona

8.1 Mbps

8.1 Mbps

Hatton, North Dakota

5.3 Mbps

1.8 Mbps

Summersville, Kentucky

2.4 Mbps

435 Kbps

Major cities with populations in the millions enjoy the best average speeds while small
communities in rural areas or tribal lands fare poorly, far below the minimum definition of 25/3
Mbps.
Freedom House reports that broadband penetration among US households is low among OECD
countries, ranking 16th, while it had been 7th just a year prior. The FCC took note of this trend in its
January 2015 report, stating that 17 percent of the US population has no access to broadband and rural
Americans make up 53 percent of that total. Tribal lands are most adversely effected, with a total 63
percent of people living there lacking broadband access, and 85 percent of rural tribal lands lack highspeed (FCC 2015). The lack of broadband in schools is another statistic that sets US students back from
their counterparts in developed states.
Approximately 35 percent of schools lack access to fiber, and thus likely lack access to
broadband at the Commission’s shorter term benchmark (adopted in its July 2014 E-rate
Modernization Order) of 100 Mbps per 1,000 users, and even fewer have access at the
long term goal of 1 Gbps per 1,000 users (FCC).
Numbeo21 provides statistics for broadband costs across all states in this study. The
price for 10 Mbps downstream serves as the baseline for comparison. In the US, this speed will
cost a consumer $50.03 per month, or 1.82 percent of the average net salary. The UN
established a benchmark cost for broadband of less than 5 percent of a monthly salary, and so
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A website reliant on crowd-sourced data on consumer prices. For the United States, the number of
contributors is close to 16,700. Each other case has at least 350 contributors.
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while the US average cost is below UN standards, such a broad stroke does not take into account
either income inequality or projected speeds versus experienced speeds.
National broadband plan. The US has adopted a long-term program designed to increase
access, and the US case, broadband in particular. The FCC published “Connecting America: The
National Broadband Plan” in 2010 after Congress mandated a plan be drawn up in late 2009 so that
every American had “access to broadband capability.” It is also a reflection of the F2C norms articulated
by WSIS. This mandate emphasized the importance of last-mile access and community broadband,
which reflected an appreciation for the socioeconomic causes of the digital divide. The plan has four
nodes: robust competition, ensuring efficient use of extant infrastructure, funding through universal
service mechanisms22, and increased broadband availability at public locations. In addition to connecting
broadband to other needs, like first responders and the monitoring of energy consumption, the plan
includes two hortatory long-term goals. First, having 100 million US households with 100/50 Mbps
speeds, colloquially known as 1002 (“one-hundred squared”), and second creating the “biggest mobile
network in the world.” Such concerns reflect the realization that the US is behind much of the developed
world in broadband deployment according to availability, top speeds, and cost. The report assured
readers that the measures are not believed to cost taxpayers or ISPs extra money; instead, by expanding
radio spectrum for mobile broadband use, new and increased business—and profits—were expected to
result.
Internet penetration and geographic divides. The F2C is challenged by the geography of the
US, but there are other factors at work. Both the US Census Bureau and the Pew Research Institute
argue that demographic characteristics are predictors Internet access and use. As of 2015, Pew (Rainie)
records that while 87 percent of adult Americans use the Internet that number declines according to two
predominant factors: socioeconomic status and age. For example, this number declines to 78 percent for
those earning less than $30,000 per year, and climbs to 97 percent for households that earn $150,000 or
more. Less than half of households that earn $25,000 per year have Internet in the home, at 48.5 percent
versus 94.5 percent for their richer counterparts. Educational attainment, as one of the markers of SES
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Similar to Universal Service Funds. Funds collected from telecommunications companies to increase service
availability for low-income users, rural users, and community institutions. Companies may choose to pass
on this cost to consumers.
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also shows a great gap: those with less than a high school degree use the Internet daily far less than
those with a college degree, 68 percent versus 97 percent in 2015. In some cases, this might be
correlated with literacy. Rainine also reviewed reasons people gave for not using the Internet; while 34
percent of respondents stated they did not see it being relevant for their lives, 32 percent claimed it was
the lack of know-how that was inhibiting use. Price and lack of availability were also significant reasons,
at 19 percent and 7 percent of non-Internet using survey respondents. Sixty-three percent would need
assistance if it were made available to them, while only 13 percent would not want to begin using the
Internet. The digital divide continues to impair the economic and political viability of the Internet as tool
for development.
Smartphones have enabled many Americas to access fast Internet in areas where fixed
broadband connections are unavailable. Pew (2015a) reveals that among US adults, 64 percent own a
smartphone but 10 percent have no fixed broadband service in their home. Fifteen percent have limited
options for access other than a cell phone, and 7 percent of US adults have no viable options beyond a
smartphone data plan to access the Internet.
This brief look at Internet access across a range of US geographic and demographic spectrums
reveals a new problem: how to account for the variability in meaningful access for the country that
invented the Internet. As some F2C entrepreneurs would argue, PPPs would be instrumental to
improving the equality of access. Indeed, it is the ISPs that reign supreme in the US dictating who can
buy—and afford to buy—reliable, fast service.
The FCC published its “2016 Broadband Progress report,” as a reflection on the progress made
to the long-term goals of the National Broadband Plan. Unlike other cases whose reports tend to be
optimistic about how infrastructure rollout is approaching stated goals, the FCC is critical of the significant
gaps that remain. While 10 percent of all Americans lack access to minimum speeds, that percentage
climbs according to location: 4 percent of urban Americans compared to 39 percent of rural Americans,
41 percent living on Tribal lands, and 68 percent living on tribal rural lands. US territories have it the
worst, with 66 percent lacking access to 25/3 Mbps and 98 percent of those living in rural areas in US
territories. Chairman Wheeler’s statement on the report is illuminating:
When Americans increasingly rely on broadband for job opportunities, healthcare,
education, public safety, and civic participation, but nearly 34 million Americans couldn’t
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get high-speed fixed broadband even if they wanted it; when rural Americans are nearly
ten times more likely than their urban peers to be bypassed by online opportunities; when
47 percent of our students don’t have sufficient bandwidth at school to use the latest
digital learning tools, we cannot say that we are meeting the standard Congress set forth.
We have a moral and statutory obligation to do better.
Internet Service Providers
At this point, it would seem appropriate to attempt to gauge the availability of access by detailing
the Internet’s infrastructure—the nationally-operated US Internet backbones, data centers, networks,
servers, storage, and applications—which make up the “tubes” of the Internet that allow it to operate. It
would then be useful to compare such statistics to the other cases selected for this study. However, such
information is difficult to come by, mainly because these records are not in any centralized database and
this equipment is regulated by the ICT industry and is associated with trade-related secrets. While they
could prove indicative of the quality of access in a given case, the market characteristics for ISPs is
predictive of the level of access and disparities that persist.
ISPs provide the Internet to consumers’ homes, businesses, and mobile devices by connecting
their servers to the national servers or gateways that connect PCs and other devices across the globe.
ISPs own the infrastructure and networks upon which the Internet is dependent, but they typically have
arrangements that allow traffic to be shared on particular cables or lines. According to Freedom House,
five ISPs dominate 70 percent of the fixed-line US market: Comcast, AT&T, Time-Warner, Verizon, and
CenturyLink. Sixty million customers are served by these five companies, but such numbers are
deceiving, as not every service is available in every location, even in urban and suburban areas. Most
consumers actually have as little choice of 2 or 3 broadband providers, if any at all.
For example, in my own suburban town of Linden, New Jersey, 13 miles from Manhattan, three of
five fixed ISPs—Time Warner, AT&T, and CenturyLink—are outside of the service area. The two major
ISPs available that provide broadband are Verizon’s FiOS service and Comcast’s Xfinity service, each
with comparable service plans. As of July 2015, entry-level broadband service of “up to” 25 Mbps/5Mbps
(the minimum standard as defined by the FCC) would cost $44.99 and $34.95, respectively, while the
fastest plans, 500 Mbps for FiOS and 105 Mbps for Xfinity, would cost $274.99 and $59.99 per month.
These speeds are state-of-the-art, and consumers pay hefty sums for them. Yet they fall short of those
that Finland seeks to guarantee for its citizens in the near future. The only other option for central
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suburban NJ is a local ISP, Optimum Online from Cablevision, whose plans cost $39.95/month for 25/5
Mbps, and $94.95 for 101/35 Mbps. While it is comparable to other providers at lower broadband
speeds, it simply cannot compete with FiOS or Xfinity for state-of-the-art connectivity. Service areas are
determined at the discretion of the provider, and that this service is directly correlated to SES and
demographic indicators. This location illustrates the limitations that result from little competition. Only one
provides a service that would be considered sophisticated; more reasonable speeds that range from 50100 Mbps downstream would cost a subscriber over $700 per year. For minimal speeds, the cheapest
rate is $419.40, and the cost of this service is only likely to increase with perhaps marginable increases in
speed.
Competition in the mobile ISP market is also hindered by a small number of players. Fierce
Wireless reported that in Q3 2015, Verizon Wireless and AT&T had the largest number of subscribers
amounting to 35.3 percent and 32.4 percent of the total market, respectively. Far behind are T-Mobile
and Sprint with 15.7 percent and 14.9 percent, with US Cellular, C Spire, Shentel, and NTelos each
serving less than 1.5 percent of the market. Unlimited data plans cost the average consumer between
$75 and $100 per subscription, not including set up, the price of a smartphone, and other fees and taxes
(Sprint), but average revenue per user ranges between $40 and $51 per month (Fierce Wireless).
Anyone dependent upon wireless broadband might be forced into the higher priced plans or will have to
limit their use. More problematic is the issue of the sustainability of such practices. Eli Noam (2011)
warns that while governments are dependent upon wireless technologies to fill in the gaps of the digital
divide, wireless broadband speeds and dependability will be adversely affected as the number of users
grow, and that the ability to upgrade the infrastructure lags behind wired connections, “…fiber and cable
are 20 to 100 times as fast as optimally projected 4G rates (475)...” While both governments and
providers might see wireless as a the most efficient way to provide access to less economically appealing
areas, Noam asks “Would rural areas accept for long the 4G mobile communications as their broadband
platform–at a lower speed, higher price, and with less openness (481)?”
Public Provision of the Internet in the US
Public-private partnerships have been stressed by F2C advocates, especially from the UN, as a
way to address problems of access but PPPs have largely been bypassed in the US. There are two main
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ways in which the government assists in providing Internet to citizens. First, public libraries provide free
access and training for citizens across the country. Yet this access is purchased from the ISPs at the
cost to taxpayers, and funding for such public institutions continually decreases. Second, municipalities
have attempted to provide their own broadband access directly to their constituents, but this process has
had multiple legal, financial, and political setbacks.
Bertot et al. conducted a nationwide survey of Internet access and use in public libraries. A trend
that began in 1990s with the spread of Internet use in general resulted in the fact that by 2011, 100
percent of public libraries were providing free access to their patrons. Over 90 percent offered free Wi-Fi.
While these statistics seem promising, the rest of what the report has to offer is less optimistic. Sixty-five
percent of public libraries report that they are the only provider of free Internet access in their
communities, and 60.2 percent reported increased usage of workstations, which on average amount to
16.4 stations per library. With increased demand, 64.1 percent of libraries reported shortages of available
workstations while simultaneously facing cutbacks in funding and hours. While they offer free access, the
meaningfulness of that access is compromised because of low connection speeds; in 2012, 61.9 percent
of libraries reported speeds of 10 Mbps downstream or less, with 6.9 percent of having less than 1.5
Mbps. While these numbers are better than previous years, by 2012 less than one third of public libraries
had speeds greater than 10 Mbps downstream meaning that these institutions are still well under the new
standard broadband speed of 25 Mbps. Taken together, the limitations in hourly availability, workstations,
and speed adversely affect the meaningfulness of public access.
Some municipalities currently underserved by private ISPs have attempted to establish
government-owned networks (GONs) through municipal broadband projects. Like infrastructure
development of the past such as electricity and telephones, these projects are neither initially profitable
nor viable for private enterprise to undertake alone, but nevertheless serve private citizens and corporate
long-term needs. They face numerous limitations and barriers, including practical issues like financing
and a lack of technical expertise, but more importantly, there is pushback from ISPs and lobbyists against
the projects. What could become a meaningful public provision or PPP is largely absent in the US. ISPs
contend that municipal broadband would adversely affect the private sector by reducing incentives for
efficiency and competitive pricing and hurting the job market. Brodkin (2013) recounts the many legal
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and policy barriers that ISP lobbies have been successful erecting that hurt PPPs in this area: laws that
would require municipal broadband only to serve government purposes (Kansas), laws to protect privatesector jobs (North Carolina), and laws that require short-term profitability (Florida). There are dozens of
other examples in Brodkin’s reports, including Virginia, where one of the most successful municipal
broadband projects, in Bristol, took place.
In 2010, BVU added 388 route miles to its current 10Gbps fiber network, building out a
middle-mile network to eight rural Appalachian counties thanks to a $22.7 million BTOP
grant. Seven of those counties were classified as economically distressed; bringing highspeed broadband to those areas could be the economic boost they need (Fierce
Telecom)
The rest of Virginia faces similar legal hurdles to that of other states, such that its municipal broadband
providers must offer competitive rates to private ISPs, but Bristol’s GON was grandfathered in before
those laws came into effect. FreePress’s 2005 report on the subject argues that ISP’s arguments against
GONs are faulty: municipal broadband is not overly costly, and that as with other “market failures,”
government can provide broadband to citizens who would otherwise not be able to purchase these
essential services (Scott and Wellings 2).
A 2014 report by Allan Holmes reveals the fiscal and legal extents to which AT&T has gone to
gain legal protections against municipal broadband. A municipal broadband project in Tullahoma,
Tennessee met with extensive lobbying efforts to block the proposal. A Republican state senator
remarked that “We don’t quarrel with the fact that AT&T has shareholders that it has to answer to…and I
believe in capitalism and the free market. But when they won’t come in, then Tennesseans have an
obligation to do it themselves.” Instead, AT&T blocked the measures as a hindrance to the free market.
An unidentified lobbyist remarked “On a scale of 1 to 10 on who is the most powerful lobbying presence in
Tennessee, AT&T is a 12,” and is evidenced by the millions of dollars the company has spent
campaigning in Nashville and around the country.
That same year, AT&T submitted commentary on GONs to the FCC, asking that the FCC apply
standards developed in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 that limited state assistance to encouraging
private sector development of ICT infrastructure. Heimann, Philips, and Fink state that “AT&T shares
petitioners’ desire to ensure that all Americans, including, but not limited to, those living in and around
Chattanooga and Wilson, have access to world class broadband infrastructure.” While this rings of the

77

F2C, the representatives emphasize that the private sector is better suited to deploy new technologies
and innovate in general, and that municipalities are not well-suited to upgrade networks on a consistent
basis. While the commentary concedes that there are cases that the free market fails to deliver
broadband, allowing municipalities to provide buildouts must come with “safeguards:” a right of first
refusal, GONs would operate according to the same laws and regulations, and that they would receive no
preferential tax rates. “Without these protections, there is a real risk that the deployment of GONs will
harm competition and consumers by deterring private sector investment that otherwise would occur.”
Brodkin reports on the continuing difficulties faced by municipal broadband projects (2016b).
Efforts in Chattanooga, Tennessee to extend the broadband provided by its electric utility, for example,
have been prevented by state law, as has been the case in 20 other states. State senators Todd
Gardenhire and Kevin Brooks are a part of bipartisan efforts to overturn the law but face pressure from
incumbent ISPs. While AT&T contends such schemes would put them at a “competitive disadvantage,”
politicians warn that we must not “…fall for the argument that this is a free market versus government
battle. It is not.” While the Tennessee House Speaker Beth Harwell is not supportive of project as of yet,
she argues that if the market fails to deliver to the rural areas, “then I do think it becomes necessary for
the public to enter [the market]…" Why Harwell is willing to give the market more time than it has had
already is not explained in the article. Instead, Brooks argues that “This is about Tennesseans having
access to the 21st century.”
GigU, a project maintained as a collaboration between research universities and local
communities, released a report in 2015 regarding the viability of municipal broadband. Grant Gross of PC
World magazine initially misleads readers describing municipal broadband as an unviable option for
unconnected communities because of long-term costs and inefficiency. The bias from an industry-related
magazine aside, what the report and the article reveal is an alternative type of public-private partnership.
Publicly built municipal networks can be subsequently leased to ISPs. Such arrangements are not
unusual in other industries, in which a municipality or state may subsidize corporations in order to
encourage growth. Such a model would undoubtedly be appealing to the tech industry, but does not
circumvent the problem that ISPs are primarily motivated by profit; if such an arrangement could not
promise to make money, it would be unlikely that it would take place.
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Challenges to the Norm of the F2C
The increasing availability of publicly provided high speed Internet connections through libraries is
among the obvious ways in which the US complies with the spirit of the norm of the F2C. As paltry as the
offerings at these locations at times can be, they reveal the power of the idea that everyone is entitled to
be connected, and that government should help to provide that access. The fight over municipal
broadband projects illustrates the difficulty of state involvement in the provisions of services normally
provided by marketplace. Such a limited view of who should provide access results in infrastructure
development driven by the pursuit of mainly short-term profit. In this case, the American affinity for
private enterprise and the pursuit of profit trumps the ideologies of equality and the enrichment of political
rights in the 21st century.
ISPs’ pursuit of profit has led to two major controversies in the realm of access. First is net
neutrality, a term that describes efforts to control which types of traffic should receive priority and that the
sources of this traffic should pay premium prices for that privilege. The concern, in short, is that ISPs
could speed up or slow any website according to their ability to pay and the amount of traffic they use.
Second are the mergers among major ISPs in the US, first the attempt between Comcast and TimeWarner, and second, the successful 2016 merger between Time-Warner and regional ISP, Charter
Communications. The debate continues to rage about whether increased competition or reduced
economies of scale would give the market the impetus to increase efficiency, speed, and customer
service.
Net Neutrality. At first glance, the controversy over net neutrality in the US is unrelated to the
F2C. In the absence of net neutrality, “…ISPs such as AT&T, Comcast, Time Warner, and Verizon to
charge content providers for access to a ‘fast lane,’ enabling some websites to load more quickly than
others (Rassool).” Yet, net neutrality is a story of both content and access; if undermined it would allow
providers to pick which content could be accessed in meaningful ways. It could also be a template for
illiberal states to slow down undesirable content and thus inhibit meaningful access to its citizens.
The story of net neutrality also exemplifies the relationship between government and private
enterprise. The FCC struggled to establish itself as the legitimate oversight agency of ISPs’ pricing,
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quality of service, and other policies, and while it has succeeded in giving itself authority, its impact is not
guaranteed. There are two schools of thought; on the one hand, it is believed that ISPs and ICTs should
be free from government oversight under the belief that such regulation would lead to significant
compromises in innovation and competition. On the other, the FCC claims since 2010 in multiple
documents that it intends to enable innovation and an open Internet that would not be unfairly dominated
by the few powerful ISPs and established “edge providers” like Netflix and Skype that could afford to pay
for the faster service.
Efforts to control the flow of the Internet resemble a cat-and-mouse game between ISPs and the
federal agency. It began in 2007 with Comcast’s efforts to slow peer-to-peer file sharing and the FCC’s
attempt to block these actions. A federal court declared in 2010 that the FCC did not have jurisdiction,
and ever since the agency has been trying to redefine its relationship to ISPs. In the same year, the FCC
adopted the “Open Internet Order” based on normative standards it outlined for consumers in 2005 which
were meant to ensure freedom of speech on the web (balanced of course with the needs of law
enforcement). In 2010, these normative ideals were joined by the premise that ISPs could not limit
access or content in any way, and were transformed from promises into law. These laws were
challenged on multiple occasions, and were dismantled in yet another series of court rulings.
Verizon v. FCC (2014) ruled that most of the provisions of the Open Internet Order were
inapplicable to private ISPs as they were scheduled under Title I of the Communications Act of 1934.
ISPs were classified as information rather than communication services, and thus not under the
jurisdiction of the FCC, and that the only providers subject to the 2010 rules were “common carriers” like
municipal ISPs. The court upheld the transparency provision of the Open Internet Order, maintaining that
plan prices had to be made easy to understand and publicly available. In reaction, the FCC released a
statement in 2014 that in part read:
Today, there are no legally enforceable rules by which the Commission can stop
broadband providers from limiting Internet openness. This Notice begins the process of
closing that gap, by proposing to reinstitute the no-blocking rule adopted in 2010 and
creating a new rule that would bar commercially unreasonable actions from threatening
Internet openness (as well as enhancing the transparency rule that is currently in effect).
Despite the ruling, the FCC continued to pursue net neutrality (or to wrest control of the Internet from
private enterprise, depending on one’s interpretation). By February 2015, the FCC narrowly adopted new
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rules to reclassify ISPs under Title II of the 1934 act, classifying them as common carriers and a public
utilities rather than an at-will information service. By considering it a telecommunication service, the ruling
from Verizon v. FCC becomes null, and that:
…the new rules are an à la carte version of Title II, adopting some provisions and
shunning others. The F.C.C. will not get involved in pricing decisions or the engineering
decisions companies make in managing their networks. Mr. Wheeler [FCC chairman],
who gave a forceful defense of the rules just ahead of the vote, said the tailored
approach was anything but old-style utility regulation. “These are a 21st-century set of
rules for a 21st-century industry,” he said. (Ruiz and Loeb)
Many members of the Internet-related business community in the US, including Google and Facebook,
considered the ruling a win for protecting innovation. ISPs like Comcast and Verizon challenged the
reclassification but have been unsuccessful as of June 2016.
Much of the rhetoric surrounding the Title II ruling, including Wheeler’s, is a reflection of the belief
that the policies on net neutrality the US adopts are going to influence the relationship between providers
and governments elsewhere in the world. While some see the intervention of the government into the
private sector as a model that should not be emulated, others see it as a necessary component of
responsible Internet policy:
Freedom on the Net project director Sanja Kelly notes, "In less democratic countries,
where most online content providers are state-owned and censored, authorities would
have the perfect excuse to begin giving faster lanes of access to pro-government outlets,
skewing the ability of democratic opposition to get their message across (Rassool)."
The outcome of the US-centered debate over net neutrality directly affects content and meaningful
access. Cyrus Rassool of the Huffington Post in his editorial “The United States Must Lead in Upholding
Net Neutrality,” argues that failing to do so would undermine the “United States as an international leader
on internet freedom,” and that “as the birthplace of the internet, the United States has a special duty to
preserve equal access.” Associated with Freedom House, Rassool expresses a new version of a
century-old idea of American exceptionalism; this strand of thought that defines the US’s role as setting
the bar for state behavior survives today in Internet policy.
The reassignment of ISPs as common carriers in the US, allowing the FCC to extensively
regulate them under Title II, was supposed to be the end of the fight over network neutrality. Indeed, one
of the NGOs fighting for the open Internet has a page that has not been updated for six months; the issue
about encouraging the reclassification is now moot (see CommonCause.org). Instead, ISPs are working
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to find ways around the reclassification that would nevertheless result in the promotion of particular
websites over others. T-Mobile introduced its “Binge On” program in December 2015, which “throttles
nearly all video content” to 480p and does not count the streaming service towards users’ data caps
(Brodkin 2016c). Users enjoy lower quality video, but streaming content does not count towards monthly
data allowances. Such “zero-rating” policies resemble Facebook, Google, and other providers’ free but
limited web browsing that is prevalent in developing states. T-Mobile in the words of its senior VP for
Government, that
…the [FCC] has to tread lightly—and certainly more lightly than it would in the wired
world—in the wireless space when there is so much experimentation happening, so
much differentiation happening, and a lot of it customers responding to," T-Mobile Senior
VP of Government Affairs Kathleen Ham said at an event in Washington, DC. "We do
have to be transparent about it, we do have to make sure that the customer has choices,
but I think it's wise to tread lightly in this environment when there's so much going on that
I think customers are benefiting from."
While customers seem to like the program (92 percent according to T-Mobile’s own statistics) and can
turn it off, signifying an ability to choose whether to take advantage of the free data, others claim it still
violates the spirit of net neutrality. Barbara van Schewick, Director of Stanford Law School’s Center for
Internet and Society, claims the policy has "substantial technical requirements" in order for content
providers to qualify, leaving less established, more innovative efforts out of the loop.
Mobile ISPs are fighting against proposals that would increase competition and enforce net
neutrality. Preimesberger of E Week noted in March 2015 that the FCC has included mobile ISPs under
their net neutrality rules, which means that zero-rating practices will soon fall under the scrutiny of the
regulators. AT&T was cited for having ‘deceptive business practices’ for throttling customers who had
been grandfathered into unlimited data plans. Dano remarks that the industry has been slow to adopt
services that would allow users more efficient means of communication, including Wi-Fi calling and
making video calling services interoperable. Wi-Fi calls would use wireless Internet services to place
mobile calls, much like VOIP does for landlines. Dano is dismayed:
And what did most other wireless carriers do? Generally they argued their networks were
so great that users didn't need Wi-Fi calling...In the meantime, Wi-Fi users with poor or
no cellular coverage simply couldn't place voice calls from their phones -- despite the fact
that Wi-Fi calling technology has been around for eight years. Eight years! It's difficult to
listen to operators extolling the benefits of 20 Gbps 5G technology when they have a
history of being unable to make relatively simple concessions to coverage solutions
outside their direct control.

82

Companies are reluctant to make services like FaceTime and WhatsApp (a messaging service now
owned by Facebook) interoperable, forcing users to adopt certain technologies or services over others
and thereby limiting choice.
Despite that the FCC’s announcement that it would be looking into zero-rating practices, Verizon
announced that it would be providing its own streaming service, Go90, through its FreeBee Data 360
program. “…it will exempt its own video service from mobile data caps—while counting data from
competitors such as YouTube and Netflix against customers' caps (Brodkin 2016d).” Such a practice
incentivizes subscriptions to a particular service and simultaneously discourages subscription to others.
Additionally, “If those rivals in the video market want the same benefits afforded to Go90, then Verizon
would still benefit by taking money in exchange for data cap exemptions.” Readers of the Ars Technica
article reveal that users are skeptical about such arrangements: isparavanje asks “Would this not breach
anti-trust regulations even without net neutrality rules?” 0megapart!cle writes:
This is absolute bs, and the Comcast stream thing is even more BS. The effect on
competition is the same whether the data goes over the public internet, or over Comcast
pipes only. The effect on competition is what the FCC is looking at when deciding if a
policy is legal or not. Therefore, whether it goes over the public internet or over Comcast
pipes only should have no effect on whether it is legal or not.
Reviews of the commentary on such articles yield similar results: there seems to be little support for the
idea that corporations should be able to throttle or control content flows without significant considerations
made for consumer opt-outs or alternatives. They also recognize that the ISPs are directly challenging
the FCC and are cautiously optimistic that the latter will declare zero-rating policies illegal.
Brodkin (2016f) reports on the case of US Telecom Association v. the FCC that was decided on
June 14, 2016 in the US Court of Appeals in the District of Colombia. The decision upheld the FCC’s
reclassification of fixed and mobile broadband providers as a telecommunications service under Title II.
The court also upheld steps taken by the FCC to protect edge providers like Netflix in the name of net
neutrality. Wheeler said:
Today’s ruling is a victory for consumers and innovators who deserve unfettered access
to the entire Web, and it ensures the Internet remains a platform for unparalleled
innovation, free expression and economic growth," Wheeler said in a statement issued
shortly after the ruling. "After a decade of debate and legal battles, today’s ruling affirms
the Commission’s ability to enforce the strongest possible internet protections—both on
fixed and mobile networks—that will ensure the internet remains open, now and in the
future.

83

AT&T has already promised to appeal to the Supreme Court.
While largely being a story of the struggle between ISPs and government regulation, net
neutrality is also one manifestation of the F2C in the US. Should providers be able to control the speed of
content, thereby making it possible for certain organizations or individuals to make meaningful access
possible? More generally, the question becomes whether or not private entities are able to determine the
quality of content for consumers, and is a reflection of whether or not equitable Internet access is a right
for both users and innovators.
Mergers. Mergers among ISPs and cable providers also receive tremendous attention among
the proponents of the F2C and Internet freedom in the US. Those in favor of such mergers view them as
avenues for increased efficiency and wider service areas. Opponents see them as a threat to competition
and fair pricing. If the industry became too consolidated, then there would be little incentive for ISPs to
put fair pricing and equitable infrastructure rollout before profits.
In 2014, Comcast announced a bid to purchase Time-Warner Cable for $45 billion in stock
exchanges. As two of the five largest ISPs, this meant that consumer choice would have been narrowed
in locales where both of these ISPs operate, or that expansion into new territories to increase competition
would halt. FreePress, an Internet freedom advocacy group, supported efforts to stop the merger that
would have “consolidated power against consumers.” The Department of Justice opened an investigation
against the merger in 2014 and announced that it would bring an antitrust lawsuit against Comcast in
April 2015. The suit indicated that Comcast’s justification of improving DSL speeds to current TimeWarner subscribers was a fraudulent claim, and that there was no meaningful way to invest in the
infrastructure of a sub-par technology. Comcast announced that it would abandon its bid that same
month.
Soon thereafter, Charter Communications announced plans to acquire Time-Warner. Unlike the
Comcast deal that emphasized both improved Internet and cable television services for its customers, this
merger asserts that it would increase broadband availability to new consumers. Charter’s customer base
would be quadrupled by such a deal, and Steelmay reported that it will give the merged companies “more
resources and incentives to introduce innovation and competitive services.” The idea of a near-monopoly
status may be far less acute: “The Charter acquisitions would give it control of less than 30 percent of the
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country’s high-speed Internet market, compared with 57 percent for Comcast.” However, the outcome
would still mean a duopolistic broadband national marketplace, with Comcast and New Charter controlling
70 percent of the 25 Mbps and up broadband market (Brodkin 2016a). The deal has been approved by
the FCC and Department of Justice on April 29th, 2016 with Charter paying $56.7 billion for Time Warner
and $10.4 billion for Bright House, a content provider and ISP. One of the blockages from the ComcastTime-Warner “mega deal” has been overcome with pledges that the merger will not result in the
tightening of restrictions on content providers, specifically video-streaming platforms like Netflix and Hulu.
The result of the merger is too soon to tell, but like the Comcast deal, it has proven divisive.
Time-Warner’s May press release argued that there would be multiple benefits: faster speeds, better
video products, more affordable phone service, increased competition, and faster customer and financial
growth. The latter two things would benefit both employees and shareholders. Free Press CEO Craig
Aaron is quoted as saying that these benefits are window-dressing. Instead:
“Thanks to this merger both Charter and Comcast now have unprecedented control over
our cable and Internet connections," he added. "Their crushing monopoly power will
mean fewer choices, higher prices, no accountability and no competition. Conditions
won’t lower the monthly bills for those who’ll be hit hardest by these rate hikes: lowincome households and communities of color (Farivar)."
The sincerity of the belief that that the merger will result in better service is impossible to prove. Yet the
intersection between to the main issues related to ISPs in the US, mergers and neutrality, within the
FCC’s caveats to this deal signals the necessity of ISPs to use the language of the F2C even if solely
pursuing profits.
The story of the F2C in the United States is highly connected to its ISPs. Even considering the
US predilection for free markets and unencumbered free enterprise, telecom companies have a
remarkable amount of power. The spread of broadband will be largely determined by markets and
profitably, but efforts to increase access to broadband also recognize that it is a necessity in the 21st
century and an inherent right. There has been an honest attempt by the FCC to realize this dream, but it
is a battle that will be played out in the courts for years to come.
Frames and Action on the F2C
The following section discusses some of the rhetoric that US politicians, corporations, individuals,
and NGOs have used in discussing the F2C and Internet Freedom in general, for both international
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relations and domestic policy. These entrepreneurs routinely connect access to civil rights and liberties in
addition to arguments about equality of education and employment opportunities.
Politicians’ Rhetoric. President Obama held a town meeting in China in November 2009 which
addressed students whom he called “China’s future leaders.” In a carefully-worded speech, he remarked
on the uniqueness of Chinese culture as compared to the US; the former ancient and rooted in tradition,
the latter a relative newborn that is setting out to continuously define itself. One of the principles
underlying America’s political vision is its foundational documents, and how they in turn reflect the
relationship between the people and its government that is based on inalienable human rights. The
president danced between universalism and cultural relativism by stating that the US was not trying to
enforce a belief system on others, but that these rights are broadly applicable. One student asked about
the use of Twitter in particular and China’s Great Firewall in general. The president’s response is lame in
its lack of more open critique but nonetheless indicative of the type of government-citizen relationship he
outlined in his speech: “I actually think that that makes our democracy stronger and it makes me a better
leader because it forces me to hear opinions that I don't want to hear.” He argues that like every right,
openness is in a balance with other governmental interests like security. The good of openness, he
claims, outweighs the bad.
President Obama’s sentiments were taken up by the First Lady in 2014, when she argued in a
speech during a goodwill tour to China that Internet freedom was fundamental to the relationship between
citizen and state. Only by having the Internet freedom and free speech is it possible to “…learn what’s
really happening in our communities, in our country and our world.” Additionally, the newly minted
Ambassador to China Max Baucus also commented on the “virtues of Twitter and Facebook,” and their
ability to hold governments accountable.
Legislators have also promoted Internet freedom in the international realm, if not as a domestic
manifestation of the F2C. Former Representative David Wu (D-Oregon) introduced the Internet Freedom
Act in February 2010, which would have directed the National Science Foundation (NSF) to establish the
Internet Freedom Foundation to promote Internet freedom through education, advocacy, and research.
The bill died in Congress, but more interesting subsequent bills with the title of the “Internet Freedom Act”
have taken on very different purposes. As recently as 2015, the Internet Freedom Act, sponsored by
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Marsha Blackburn (R-Tenn.), would seek to roll back the regulations on ISPs recently enacted by the
FCC, with similar bills dating back to 2011.
Senator Dick Durbin (D-Illinois) sought to introduce an Internet Human Rights Bill in March 2010,
which would seek to impose penalties on US-based companies that violated the rights of users abroad:
With a few notable exceptions, the technology industry seems unwilling to regulate itself
and unwilling even to engage in a dialogue with Congress about the serious human rights
challenges that the industry faces," Durbin said. "In the face of this resistance, I have
decided it's time to take a more active position (Kang).”
It is unusual for sitting American politicians to frame their agendas in terms of international human rights
as they tend instead to emphasize domestic values. Nevertheless this bill, which also died in Congress,
appears to be a step in the right direction, especially ahead of the Arab Spring.
Senator Chris Coons (D-DE) endorsed Clinton’s remarks in an editorial for the Huffington Post in
2012 that ran under the headline “Internet Freedom is a Human Right.” His thoughts did not focus on
access per se, but instead on the popular issues of censorship and repression. Like Clinton, he sees
Internet freedom as fundamental to the exportation of democratic values abroad, and adds that the US
has invested “tens of millions” of dollars into attempts to allow those who sought to get around
government censorship to do so through technological innovations, much like the Freedom2Connect
foundation. Additionally, he noted complementary caucuses in the House and Senate for Global Internet
Freedom.
Lifeline Program. In addition the discussed National Broadband Plan, the FCC has undertaken
plans to spread access to underserved populations. In March 2016, it announced that it would be
extending its Lifeline program. Established in 1985, the program has provided poor Americans with basic
phone service. Wheeler and Clyburn acknowledge the program has had its problems, including
burdensome administrative requirements alongside fraud and waste. The newly designed program has a
National Verification Program with a nationwide database so companies cannot admit unqualified
applicants. In line with the F2C, the program extends free voice and broadband service vital for
employment, healthcare, and education, at speeds that other citizens are lucky enough to enjoy through
the marketplace. Reader commentary on the plan is mixed, with some accusing the FCC of wanting to
provide “broadband welfare,” and misconstruing the original purpose of the Lifeline program, which was to
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provide access to emergency services. Yet others are more welcoming of the move, arguing that
government has an appropriate role to play in providing access:





Broadband allows access to goods and services at reduced rates because the "Internet
ecosystem" is based on competition. Among other things, lack of affordable broadband makes it
harder for poor citizens to spend their limited income more efficiently...because they can't access
the competitive market. Bravo on this initiative! (Ivan Stephanovich)
And the mobile telephone...All citizens in this country should have inexpensive and easy access
of Wifi. It should be a right in our nowadays society where you cannot participate in our
Democracy without a computer and Wifi. (liaisonsus)
(Wheeler and Clyburn 2016)

Domestic Attitudes on Internet Use and Internet Freedom
Two methods are used to determine whether there is evidence of support for Internet freedom
among the larger US population. First a review of survey results with questions can paint a fuller picture
of typical Internet users in the US and how they feel about how the Internet can or should be regulated 23.
Second, a unique source of dialogue can be found in commentary by readers of these survey results.
While sometimes the online commentary on news articles can be a morass of partisan rhetoric, those who
comment have shown to an apparent professional and informed interest in the technical policy analysis
offered by these surveys. While this commentary is not meant to be representative of general American
opinion, it can reveal how industry experts feel about issues like Internet freedom and net neutrality.
Pew and Gallup perform extensive surveys that normally center around American attitudes on a
multitude of subjects. One way to gauge the importance of the Internet to Americans is to reflect upon
how often it is used and how indispensable it is believed to be. Perrin reports that 73 percent of
Americans go online daily, 21 percent reported almost constant connectivity while only 13 percent of
adults report going online several times a week or less. The digital divide between SES indicators also
predict frequency of use, with those earning more than $75,000, with at least a college degree, or living in
urban locales reporting even higher rates of “constant” connection, with 28 percent, 29 percent, and 23
percent figures, respectively. In the commentary on this poll, “Carol F.” recounts that while her mother
does not use the Internet herself, she indirectly takes advantage of the technology when Carol acts as her
proxy user. “So I’m wondering how many of the 13% of adults that never go online are like my mother,
who doesn’t go online herself but enjoys all the benefits that being online can provide?” The scenario
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reflects some of the causes of the digital divide, with users unable to use the technology due to their lack
of know-how or their inability to access the necessary hardware.
The questions in Pew’s poll, “US feelings on the Internet: the Internet at 25” (2014a), reflect how
users feel about the importance of the Internet in their lives. For the question of how hard it might be to
give up the Internet, the percentage reporting “very difficult/impossible” substantially grew between 2002
and 2014, from 31 percent to 53 percent. Only 12 percent of the respondents said it would be “not at all”
difficult to do so. When asked why, survey participants answered either that it was essential for work or
some other reason (61 percent), that they really enjoyed being online (30 percent), or both equally (7
percent). The trend shows that the percentage of US Internet users seeing it as essential to life and work
continues to grow, and those that see it as a luxury or amusement decreases. The survey also queried
the meaning of the Internet, asking whether it was a good thing for both society and the respondents
themselves. Seventy-six percent saw it as good thing for society and 90 percent saw it as a good for
themselves, the difference reflecting perhaps a more optimistic view of personal habits than perceptions
of society at large.
Horrigan and Duggan (2015) of Pew reported on the perceptions on broadband at home. Nearly
7 in 10 Americans feel that “not having a home high-speed internet connection would be a major
disadvantage to finding a job, getting health information or accessing other key information – up from 56
percent who said this in 2010.” Forty percent felt that it would inhibit access to government services, and
37 percent said it would mean missing out on “learning new things that might enrich their lives,” up nearly
15 percent from merely 4 years earlier. Taken together, these surveys reveal that Internet penetration in
the US has brought with it the belief that access is a necessity for life in America, at least among those
who are able to access it in the first place. Many who are constantly connected would find it difficult to
give up, and view the lack of meaningful access as inhibiting their rights as citizens and as human beings.
World opinion surveys conducted since 2008 have included American beliefs about the
connection among Internet access, use, and human rights. GlobeScan (2010) reported that 76 percent of
Americans viewed access as a fundamental right, and Internet Society’s “Global Internet User Survey”
(2012) recorded this percentage as 72 percent. Only 8 percent strongly disagreed with this sentiment.
Surveys also included inquiries about the connection of the Internet use and civil rights. GlobeScan
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found that 55 percent of respondents believed that the Internet better enables free speech (versus 48
percent worldwide), while 78 percent believed it should be guaranteed on the web in 2012. Sixty-eight
percent saw social media as an enhancement to the rights of assembly and association. In 2015b, Pew
reported that 91 percent of respondents believed it was either very or somewhat important that Internet
use should be unhindered by censorship. In the Kull et al 2008 study, 27 percent of respondents said the
government had the right to hinder freedoms to assure security, while the Internet Society 2012 poll
recorded that only 23 percent would accept control or monitoring of the Internet if it increased security,
with 38 percent saying that would accept little or no such action. Many thought the government should
intervene more into the market, with 63 percent saying that the government is obligated to provide access
and 67 percent arguing it should provide cheaper computers. Sixty-three percent also said the
government should encourage competition among ISPs.
There are some disagreements about the viability of labeling Internet access as a human right,
despite the large public support of doing so. Vint Cerf, one of the creators of the ARPANET and an active
norm entrepreneur through the Internet Society, penned an editorial in the NY Times after the Special
Rapporteur’s report on Internet access was published. In in the opinion, Cerf draws a distinction between
human rights and civil rights, saying that human rights are intrinsic to being human, while civil rights are
conferred by law. While Cerf admits that if the US government tries to guarantee “universal service” for
the Internet as it has done with telephony, which should be available in the most remote regions in the
country, than it might be safer to label it as a civil right. Nevertheless, the point of Cerf’s argument was
that “technology is an enabler of rights, not a right itself.” Further, he sees the role of engineers—and not
the state—as central to ensuring the protection of users’ rights online.
Scott Edwards of Amnesty International criticizes Cerf’s position from a philosophical perspective,
arguing that such an interpretation of rights is “exceptionally narrow.” Because culture, technology, and
politics are not static, the understanding of human rights must expand accordingly. While the denial of
access may be an annoyance in the US, for sub-Saharan African users it can be “an immediate threat to
their lives and their livelihoods,” the direct result of financial dependence on mobile technologies. He
draws a parallel to other rights, arguing that while the denial to access of a town square through martial
law or a curfew is not a direct violation of human rights, it does severely limit the meaningfulness of rights
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of association or assembly. Edwards draws a parallel to the enumeration of human rights in instruments
like CEDAW and the CERD despite the existence of the ICCPR and the ICESR, explaining that the latter
were not enough to guarantee the rights of women or children: “Because someone, somewhere said
‘that’s not a human right.’” In the commentary on Edward’s article, many readers expressed sympathy for
Cerf’s position, while others argue that considering the Internet as right is appropriate considering the
direction of technological progress. Robert Alberti, a long-time ICT professional who helped to pioneer
email, chatting systems, and interactive gaming in the 1980s with GamBit MultiSystems and Internet
protocols,24 commented in support calling access a right. “Asking Mr. Cerf whether Internet access is a
human right is as foolish as asking Gutenberg whether a free press is a human right.” Comparing Cerf’s
narrowmindedness to his own experiences, Alberti is adamant that such labels are at best premature and
that users of new technologies will take it in directions unforeseen by their creators. “Internet access is
simply COMMUNICATION, and the ability to communicate… widely, IS a human right, or else speech is
the domain of the wealthy and powerful and the rest of us are muttering to ourselves in a closed room.”
That Internet access appears to be a “first-world problem” is an acknowledgement of economic injustice
rather than remarking that access itself is unimportant.
There have also been polls that query the substance of Internet policy in the US regarding the
PRISM program and the fight over net neutrality. First, Frank Newport of Gallup (2013) reported on the
respondents’ feelings about government surveillance programs that monitor citizens’ communications,
including email and social media. Snowden’s leak to the Guardian was reported on 9 June 2013, and the
survey was conducted over the following two days. Only 37 percent of all adults approved of the
program, while 53 percent disapproved and 10 percent had no opinion. The results were partisan, with
more Democrats (49 percent) approving of the program and most Republicans and Independents
disapproving of the program (63 percent and 56 percent). Those who approved of the program mostly
argued that terrorism was more important than civil liberties (23 percent of all respondents), while only 11
percent thought it did not violate civil liberties. Of those who disapproved, 21 percent argued there could
be some circumstances that would justify its existence, while 30 percent of all US adults thought there
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would be no circumstances that could be dire enough to justify the violation of such civil liberties 25. The
participants were split about Snowden’s actions (44 percent to 42 percent), but more thought that once
the information was available, newspapers had the right to publish the story (59 percent to 33 percent).
Newport remarked that “Results from the Gallup poll indicate that Americans have somewhat flexible
views about the government's surveillance program and/or that they are still forming their opinions on the
issue.”
The question is taken up again in January 2015 by Pew (Ranine and Madden). In the
approximate year and a half that elapsed since the Gallup poll, 87 percent of the respondents had heard
about the surveillance program, with 31 percent saying they had heard “a lot.” Men and college
graduates were more likely to have answered the latter.
In this survey, 17 percent of Americans said they are “very concerned” about government
surveillance of Americans’ data and electronic communication; 35 percent say they are
“somewhat concerned”; 33 percent say they are “not very concerned” and 13 percent say
they are “not at all” concerned about the surveillance.
The proportion of those who were very concerned was high among those who also reported knowing
more about the program. The survey also looked for qualitative responses. Those who were concerned
expressed that it was over privacy; for example: “The fourth [amendment] originally enforced the idea that
each man’s home is his castle, secure from unreasonable search and seizure by the government.” Those
who showed little concern emphasized two major points. First was the “nothing to hide” sentiment, which
argued that surveillance in itself is not harmful to those citizens who are law-abiding. Second was the
idea that the impingement upon civil liberties was a necessary price to pay for security. “Terror” or
“terrorism” was often a term used in these open-ended responses. The survey also asked under what
circumstances it would be acceptable to monitor a citizens’ communications and Internet use; the majority
see it acceptable for certain groups. For instance: 82 percent saw it acceptable to track suspected
terrorists; 60 percent saw the monitoring of leaders, both foreign and domestic, as acceptable; 54 percent
said the tracking of foreign citizens was acceptable; 68 percent thought monitoring someone who had
exchanged emails with an imam who preached against infidels was acceptable, and 49 percent saw it
acceptable for those who had friends or followers on social media that used “hateful” speech against
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American leaders. Such exceptions paint an uneven portrait of how Americans feel about surveillance
and the relationship between the Internet and civil rights. While in the abstract, over half of the
respondents were somewhat or very concerned over surveillance, almost all would accept the monitoring
of suspected terrorists. Large portions also support the surveillance of powerful politicians or foreign
citizens. While such opinions do not speak directly to the issue of access, they do reflect a larger belief in
the need to balance meaningful access with apparent security demands from the state.
In addition to the opinions on access and the importance of privacy and security, there are also
polls on the issue of net neutrality. These polls were not conducted by Pew or Gallup, but on the behalf
of two business coalitions, the Internet Association and the Internet Freedom Business Alliance. Made up
of members such as Netflix, Yahoo, Dropbox, Uber, Linked In, and others, the Internet Association asked
550 individuals their opinions on wireless net neutrality in 2014. Only 24.6 percent of the respondents, of
whom 80 percent were white and earning between $50,000 and $99,999, reported ‘very or extreme
familiarity’ with the concept, with almost half reporting that had no familiarity with it. Nevertheless,
respondents strongly disagreed with the idea that ISPs should have arbitrary power over consumer
choice of the websites they visit, saying they should neither able to block access to legal websites (56.1
percent) nor be able to slow websites that are not preferred (76.4 percent).
A similar poll for the Internet Freedom Business Alliance was conducted by Vox Populi Pollling.
Eighty-one percent of voters agreed that “’it is critical to maintain’ an Internet where service providers
cannot block, discriminate against, slow down, or charge content providers.” Eighty percent agreed with
the FCC Chairman’s proposal that there should be rules in place that say “no blocking, nor throttling, or
paid prioritization.” While conservative voters generally dislike government interference in the market,
they are willing to seek protection from large ISPs like Comcast and Verizon due to the concentration of
power these companies enjoy. In an opinion submitted to the FCC on the reclassification of ISPs as
common carriers, the group highlighted how there was unprecedented public participation embodied by
four million comments from people, companies, and groups interested in preserving net neutrality.
Culbertson argues that “…the Internet has become an essential platform for innovation, investment,
competition, and democratic discourse as well as the importance of unfettered access.”
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NGOs and Norm Entrepreneurs
Connecting for Good is an NGO serving the Kansas City metropolitan area that straddles the
states of Kansas and Missouri. The city was the first to benefit from the Google Fiber program that
provides 1 Gbps connections to users for $70 a month, or basic broadband for free. The organization
was founded in 2011 by Michael Liimatta to combat the digital divide, claiming that “it is one of the most
important social justice issues of our day,” demonstrated by 25 percent of the city’s residents not having
broadband at home. They frame meaningful access as enabling economic and social opportunity,
allowing users to look for jobs, connecting with family, access virtual libraries, having access to health
and medical information, and access to online education. Their core values contain three related
premises:




Internet connectivity equals opportunity. It is an absolute necessity in order to fully
participate as a productive citizen in a digital society.
Education is the number one thing that lifts people from poverty. In a digital society it
is impossible to pursue a quality education without access to the Internet.
In-home Internet access is as essential as any modern utility; like phone service,
electricity and running water.

In addition to Wi-Fi, the foundation also provides community technology centers, sells low-cost,
refurbished computing equipment, and offers free digital literacy courses. Of the 2,000 participants in
these courses, 25 percent had never used a computer, 75 percent had incomes under $20,000, 75
percent were 50 or older, and 80 percent were minorities, all traditionally disadvantaged segments of the
population in terms of digital literacy. Two-thirds in these classes were comprised of women, half of
whom were 60 or older with minor children living with them. Because the ConnectforGood program
emphasizes the pivotal role of digital access and literacy for education, connecting these women would
help to assure that she could pass on that knowledge to the children with whom she lived. Parental
involvement and what happens outside of school are well-known to be one of the most important factors
in educational outcomes; enabling access helps to close widening opportunity gaps for the urban poor.
Google Fiber also oversaw another first for Kansas City in February 2016, wiring housing projects
with 1 gigabit fiber Internet connections—for free—through HUD’s ConnectHome program. HUD
Secretary Julián Castro commented that “For families here, at West Bluff, the days when young folks had
to research a paper using the Wi-Fi at McDonalds, or research a paper using a library computer, are over
(Morris).” Kansas City was chosen as the first among 28 pilot cities and one tribal nation due to its history
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with Google and trying to combat the digital divide through ConnectforGood. In November 2015,
Liiamatta was appointed manager of the program. Castro connects the program to the issue of equality
of opportunity, claiming that it will help more citizens achieve the “…high-speed access to knowledge and
opportunity that millions already enjoy.” The program reveals the disparities among those of various
socioeconomic status of access to broadband and how that gap can be narrowed through similar means
in Kansas City. The gap could be narrowed first, by making broadband accessible in public housing
through discounted or free terms; second, by training in digital literacy; and third, by providing computers
and technical support. HUD argues that poverty in the worst-off communities in the US, so-called
“Promise Zones,” can be partially alleviated by broadband. “As the President has said, ‘Today, highspeed broadband is not a luxury, it’s a necessity.’”
American hypocrisy?
The F2C and Internet Freedom are challenged by two dominant themes. First, official policy
appears to belie messages promulgated from the upper echelons of the Executive branch. The widelycriticized PRISM program undermines the notion that a citizen’s conduct online is free from government
intrusion. Second, the continued debate over the state’s role in providing access is contradictory to the
model supported by the UN and other F2C entrepreneurs. The relationship between the public and
private provision of access in the US is highly skewed to the private sector, leaving consumers vulnerable
to the limitations and whims of the market.
Unveiled to the public in 2013 by National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden,
the legal (Protect America Act) yet covert program that allowed the NSA to collect “metadata”—email,
texts, video conferences, and the like—in order to uncover threats to US national security, especially
radical, religiously-motivated terrorism. In the time after its initial disclosure, it was revealed that the US
government was collecting information not only on its own citizens, but also on foreign governments,
including long-standing US allies. Von Drehle describes the metadata collection as a process in which
virtually all data from participating providers would be collected and later analyzed looking for key terms
or markers that could be indicative of security threats. Such data would not be connected to individuals,
and if threats were discovered, there would be judicial oversight. Despite assurances that the
government was not looking for minor crimes, that US citizens were not valid targets, and the argument
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from President Obama that security and privacy are in a balance (Baker and Sanger), the PRISM
program is seen as an affront to the idea that the US can rightfully claim to be a leader in Internet
freedom. Access itself could be compromised by those who may fall into the category of suspected
persons, thereby discouraging the technology’s use.
Attempts by the FCC and municipal ISPs to further integrate the public and private sectors in the
realm of Internet access also challenge the view that the US is a leader in Internet freedom. Unlike other
states with public oversight the provision of access and its diffusion, the US has taken the opposite
approach. Because of a long history of market liberalism, coupled with the industry’s rapid-paced growth,
a culture among Internet and ICT professionals and those in favor of private enterprise have long been
wary or defiant of government policy and oversight of the industry. ICT professionals favor the idealist
notion that unhindered innovation is the best way to continue along the path of faster and better access,
but such a narrative ignores the real connections the Internet’s development has had with government,
from ARPANET in the 1960s, the “Black Proposal” to the NSF in 1983, to legislative moves to further
allow the NSF to assist in funding technological innovation. Private enterprise, including corporate ISPs
often argue that government intrusion hurts the industry’s ability to provide ideal service, and perhaps
more importantly, profit. Left to its own devices, however, the industry has been slow in providing
customers in unprofitable regions reasonable speeds.
Martyn Roetter (2013) comments that broadband development in the US has been hindered
because of the “…failure to appreciate the need to blend and integrate business entrepreneurialism and
public sector stewardship (632).” The government should be “referee, loan guarantor, source of grants,
and anchor tenant (632)” in order to assure the market is viable for competition. He also recounts that the
FCC is in itself due for introspection, given that Commissioners and senior officials often are grossly
intertwined with the corporations they are meant to administer. Despite Chairman Wheeler’s extensive
history working for the telecommunications industry, he has done remarkable work putting the F2C first.
***
Despite being the origin of the Internet, study of access in the US reveals a complex relationship
among the state, ISPs, and NGOs. While the Internet is largely seen as indispensable for everyday life, it
is seldom conceived of as a right in itself, and the state’s role in the provision of that access is minimal,
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lest “Internet welfare” be the result. The preference for the free market and lack of regulation has allowed
several ISPs to dominate the broadband market, largely able to determine who can have what type of
speeds and at what price. Nevertheless, while chasing after their bottom lines, ISPs must clothe their
demands in the context of the F2C if but skimpily. Additionally, Internet freedom is seen as an extension
of civil rights entrenched in the Constitution and the violations of these rights in the PRISM program are
framed as temporary aberrations of otherwise valid principles.
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Brazil
Brazil is positioning itself to be a leader in Internet freedom as evidenced by its rhetoric and
policies to increase access and to promote privacy and net neutrality. Fallout from the Snowden
revelations and US spying on President Dilma Rousseff has cemented Brazil’s place as a defender of the
F2C and Internet freedom. The multi-stakeholder approach to Internet in Brazil dates back to the
adoption of commercial Internet in 1995 and the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee (CGI.br) and
forward to the five-year public debate resulting in the Marco Civil da Internet (Civil Rights Framework for
the Internet). As a result, the provision of Internet is considered a public good which could be considered
one of the most direct manifestations of the F2C in which the state is held directly responsible for citizens’
access.
Background
Brazil is a large and powerful state by most measures. It has a population of 204,259,812 (6th in
the world), and takes up an area of 8,515,770 km 2 (5th in the world). As is common among BRICS states,
it is has a high urban population, totaling 85.7 percent, with 6 major metropolises with populations of 3.7
million or more,26 including São Paulo, one of the largest cities in the world. The state is characterized by
a diverse topography, with major cities concentrated on a narrow strip of coastline, and is divided into 26
states within five officially designated regions. Regions are associated with important differences in
demographics and economics. While the Brazilian economy is quite large, with an annual GDP of $3.276
trillion, ranking it 8th in the world, São Paulo accounts for nearly one-third of that total. GDP per capita is
$16,200, ranking the state 100th in the world.
Brazil has 44.1 million landlines, ranking 8th in the world; one phone is plugged in for
approximately every 22 people in the country. The figure escalates for cellular phones, with 280.7 million
in the country, placing it 6th in the world. In total, there are 108.2 million Internet users in Brazil which
ranks 6th in absolute numbers, and totals 53.4 percent of the population. Users are concentrated in major
cities where infrastructure is widely available.

26

São Paulo 21.066 million; Rio de Janeiro 12.902 million; Belo Horizonte 5.716 million; Brasilia (capital) 4.155
million; Fortaleza 3.88 million; Recife 3.739 million (2015)

98

As a former colony and part of the 20th century Latin American experience of bureaucratic military
regimes, Brazil has a complicated history with liberal norms. The 19th and 20th centuries were
characterized by a string of military leaders that at times coopted peasants, political bosses, bureaucrats,
and labor. By the 20th century, military leaders faced mounting pressure to release control due poor
economic performance and hyperinflation, and the economy was liberalized in 1995. The Brazilian
experience with human rights norms is a mixed bag. Recent efforts to increase Internet penetration and
meaningfulness are part of greater effort to balance the needs of economic growth, foreign interests, and
the alleviation of poverty. The Workers’ Party has had some success lifting people out of poverty and
creating social safety nets under former President Luiz Lula da Silva, but economic recession has
reversed some of these successes during the administration of Dilma Rousseff. Many Latin American
countries are trying to come to terms with legacies that include oligarchy, repression, and violence.
Additionally, the influence of the US, especially its role as a co-conspirator in Brazil’s military coup of
1964 and as part of the greater global economic institutions like the IMF and the World Bank, is the
backdrop for analyses of contemporary problems like the PRISM program.
The Internet in Brazil
Background. The development of early informatics in Brazil was hindered during the 1970s and
1980s by the bureaucratic military regime. In 1975, Embratel, a subsidiary of the state-owned telecom
Telebras, had exclusive control of nation-wide data transfer systems, and could have as a consequence
signaled a similar path that other authoritarian states had taken in the development of their Internet.
Further, under the guise of import controls, TCP/IP, which had been widely gaining acceptance elsewhere
in the 1980s was banned by the government in order to develop domestic industry. This technonationalist sentiment was not to last. The collapse of the regime signaled the spread of the Internet, and
in 1987 the first connections to hosts in the US were made possible by the research foundation FAPESP.
At the behest of the academic community in São Paulo, the Ministry of Science and Technology set up
the National Research Network (RNP), which similar to CGI.br, coordinated efforts for increasing Internet
access in Brazil. The RNP made the first connections within eleven of Brazil’s states, with points of
presence (POP) in their capitals. The RNP faced hurdles because it was dependent on state funding for
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infrastructure development and its task of creating Internet backbones took longer than expected, and
only first became operational in 1992.
That same year, Internet development received a push in the lead up to the Earth Summit. The
presence of thousands of journalists prompted Embratel to make investments in TCP/IP infrastructure
and for the first time enabled non-academics to use the Internet in Brazil. In the following years,
infrastructure development increased and the RNP backbone had 10,000 hosts by 1995. That year was
also the first for commercial Internet by Embratel. Then President Fernando Cardoso and the Minister of
Communications Sergio Motta were concerned that Embratel would have a monopoly on Internet service
in Brazil, and established Norm 004-1995 that stated that Embratel could not charge higher fees to
Internet users. In turn it encouraged the development of small and medium-sized ISPs which have come
to define access in Brazil. The same year, the CGI.br was established to monitor infrastructure
developments and coordinate privatization and increased access. It is comprised of members of the
government, telecom companies, backbone operators, ISPs, universities, and users (Virtual Brazil) and to
this day provides extensive reporting on access, quality, and innovation.
In 1997, Brazil created Anatel under law 9472 “as the regulatory agency charged with defending
the interests of the State and the citizen, encouraging competition, universalizing telecommunications
services, and updating telecommunications technology (Knight 829-831).” When Embratel was
privatized, MCI purchased the company and expanded backbones at a much faster rate. Commercial
Internet quickly expanded, and Peter Knight, author of the Internet in Brazil (2014), explains what the
Brazilian ICT market today looks like:
There is considerable competition between the four major mobile providers (Oi, TIM,
Vivo, and Claro), and in some states smaller operators. But for fixed-line telephone and
internet service the regional incumbents, Vivo/ Telefônica and Oi, enjoyed near
monopolies in their regions for some years, having extensive fiber and microwave
backbones and last mile copper networks in the richest markets. Like incumbents in the
United States and many other countries, they find ways to resist “unbundling”, to maintain
market share, despite legal obligations to do so. (849-853)
Instead, Anatel has encouraged the development of small and medium-sized ISPs in order to provide
service in markets that otherwise would go underserviced. Both Anatel and CGI.br carried out
consultations on the Marco Civil da Internet.
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Internet Penetration and geographic divides. Freedom House (2015) reports that while
access in Brazil is increasing rapidly, it is still relatively low compared to OECD states. Estimates among
different agencies report similar figures; the ITU reports a rate of 57 percent in 2014 compared to the
CIA’s estimate of 53.4 percent. The CGI.br’s 2015 report (Barbosa) on Internet access gives a base
figure of 50 percent of households having Internet access. These figures have grown considerably; in
2014 the ITU reported 51 percent, a significant increase from 40 percent in 2009.
Mobile broadband is gaining traction in Brazil as the preferred method of access, with only 2
percent of users dependent on slower dial-up service (a figure comparable to the US). Fifty-three percent
of users had 3G connections, with 6.8 million lines capable of 4G-LTE. By May 2015 mobile phone use
grew at a rate four times the global average, increasing 12.5 times between 2010 and 2015
(Mediatelecom). While the state touted the rollout of 4G in anticipation of the 2014 World Cup, the
success of such advances were limited. Instead, it was used in mainly urban centers like São Paulo
because of the lack of available infrastructure and the fact that users would have to purchase new mobile
phones in order to take advantage of 4G.
Internet penetration is hindered by various manifestations of the digital divide. Alexandre
Barbosa of the CGI.br reports in 2014 that significant portions of the Brazilian population are excluded
from meaningful access “due to barriers such as cost of access, lack of coverage and lack of skills (175).”
Increasing numbers of Brazilian youth and rural populations are becoming connected through mobile
devices; 76 percent of the population uses their phones to connect to the Internet, and 84 percent of
those users access the Internet almost every day. Socioeconomic status (SES) is a good predictor of
access:
Inequalities by social class and areas persisted: In class A, the percentage of
households with Internet access was 98%; in class B, 82%; in class C, 48% and in
classes D and E, 14%. In urban areas, the percentage of households with Internet
access was 54%, while in rural areas this figure was 22% (176) 27.
Geographical barriers to access are compounded by SES markers that exacerbate the digital divide.
Figures for Internet penetration are based on the five regions in Brazil that date back to colonial
times. The North is the second least populous state, characterized by an agrarian economy that
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Social classes are based on gross monthly income. Class A: over 10.200 BRL ($2,717), Class B: over 5,100
BRL ($1,359), Class C: 2,040 BRL ($543), Class D 1,020 BRL ($272), and Class E: below 1,020. (Novais)
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contributes the least to the GDP and is comprised of indigenous tribes. The Northeast was important in
Brazil’s early history, with Portuguese colonists traveling there to harvest sugarcane using slave labor.
Today, its economy stagnates but like the North region, industries are migrating to the region in search of
tax breaks. The Center-West is least populated with a mixture of indigenous populations and
bandeirantes, or scouts, that came in search of gold in the 19th century and depends on commercial
livestock. The Southeast is the economic heart of Brazil, comprised of both São Paulo and Rio de
Janeiro, “operating in segments of steel, metallurgical, automotive, computer technology, food,
petrochemical, and many others (Duran).” It is also ethnically diverse, being the destination of
immigration flows from Europe through the 19th and 20th centuries. The South was controlled by
landowners, and is still characterized by agricultural production along with other forms of industrial
production.
Table 2 Brazil ICT Household Survey with Access to the Internet 2014
(Barbosa 322)
Yes
No
Household access of the Internet?
Total for Brazil: 50
50
Area
Urban
54
46
Rural
22
78
Region
Southeast
60
40
Northeast
37
63
South
51
49
North
35
65
Center-West
44
56
Family Income Up to 1 Minimum Wage (MW)
17
83
More than 1 and up to 2 MW
37
63
More than 2 and up to 3 MW
59
41
More than 3 and up to 5 MW
89
11
More than 10 MW
95
5
Social Class
A
98
2
B
82
18
C
48
52
DE
14
85
Base: 65, 129,753 households. Data collected between October 2014 and March 2015

With the background of these regions accounted for, analysis of the proportion of households with access
begins to come into focus. The region with the largest percentage Internet access, 60 percent, is the
Southeast, comprised of many of Brazil’s major metropolises (São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte,
along with 7 others with populations ranging from approximately 700,000 to 1.2 million). The next is the
South, with 51 percent, that has traditional sources of wealth and sophisticated industrial capacity. The
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North, Northeast, and Central-West regions comprise large swaths of land with underdeveloped
economies and large portions of their population falling into “C” social class and below. Combined, these
factors easily predict these regions to have lower rates of access.
Wood and Mourão pose several questions regarding digital inequality in Brazil, highlighting the
indispensable nature of Internet access and technological literacy to employment and political
participation. They ask: “Has the increase in computer ownership and Internet access widened or
narrowed the digital gap between geographic regions of the country, and between the rich and the poor
subgroups of the population (120)?” Such a question reflects the disparate theories of Internet
penetration from Sujarwoto and Tampubolon (2013), particularly the diffusion thesis that theorizes
differences in SES will be reflected in Internet access rates. While Wood and Mourão concede that
geographic and SES disparities in access remain intact during the course of the longitudinal study
(between 2004 and 2009), the gap is decreasing. The authors’ apparent positive bias is shown in their
argument about Brazil’s emerging role in global trade and a harbinger of Internet freedom characterizing
the “breathless excitement” that surrounds outsiders’ perspectives of Brazil, at least until 2013. The
validity of such a study’s conclusions is therefore questionable.
Speed and cost. Knight reports that the price of access in Brazil is relatively high for the region
and the globe. The average cost per megabit of data is $25, while in the US it is $3.33. Additionally,
quality is often at issue with dropped calls and slower speeds than advertised. In 2012, the state
intervened on the behalf of consumers, and by 2014 ISPs are required to provide 40 percent of
contracted download and upload speeds at any given moment (called instantaneous speed), and 80
percent of the contracted speed on average as measured over a month (Knight 1615). Numbeo reported
that a 10 Mbps wired connection, either through cable or DSL, would cost $19.80, or 4.3 percent of an
average salary. Costs may have gone down since Knight’s study, or the self-reported nature of Numbeo
statistics might be skewed to urban populations.
Akamai reported average speeds in Brazil to be 4.1 Mbps (Q4 2015), which is far below the
recommendations made by the FCC. Peak speeds for users topped at 30.3 Mbps, which was a 38
percent increase from the previous year.

103

Table 3 Reported Internet Speeds in Brazilian cities
(Testmy.net 12 April 2016)
City (Region)

Downstream

Upstream

Rio de Janeiro (Southeast)

8 Mbps

1.5 Mbps

Belo Horizonte (Southeast)

7.9 Mbps

1.8 Mbps

Curitiba (South)

7.9 Mbps

1.8 Mbps

Fortaleza (Northeast)

7.4 Mbps

938 Kbps

Manaus (North)

5.9 Mbps

632 Kbps

Natal (Northeast)

5.0 Mbps

862 Kbps

Campo Grande (Central West)

4.4 Mbps

625 Kbps

Araripina (Northeast)

1.1 Mbps

1.1 Mbps

Ipatinga (Southeast)

899 Kbps

303 Kbps

Speeds for fairly populous cities remain rather consistent, though they are in fact slower in traditionally
disadvantaged regions. Users running a 5.0 Mbps connection in Natal may not notice much of a change
if they found themselves in Rio. Cites observed with smaller populations generally have connections that
are poor with average speeds of 1 Mbps or less.
State Policy Regarding Internet Penetration and Use
Despite the digital divide that persists in Brazil, is it possible to account for its dramatic narrowing
and the relatively uniform and fast speeds of which Brazilian infrastructure is capable? There are many
government-directed or coordinated initiatives that address these issues, including a National Broadband
Plan, tax incentives, a rural broadband campaign, and partnerships with social media giants like
Facebook. As a preliminary comparison, the difference between Brazilian and the US’s political culture is
evident in the acceptance of the enlarged role of the state in assisting the private sector.
National Broadband Plan. The Ministry of Communication initiated a “National Broadband Plan”
(Programa Nacional de Banda Larga [PNBL]) in 2010, decree number 7,175/2010. Its goals were to
increase broadband access in rural and remote areas and to incentivize ISPs and telecoms to make
appropriate investments to make 1Mbps available for R$35 for 40 million households by 2014. By June
2014, they report 3,406 cities with broadband access and 118 cities with 4G. The relative success
appears impressive if slightly uneven, with growth ranging from 702 percent increase in the South to 969
percent increase in the North (Ministry of Communication 11-12). Critics state that while the plan had
good intentions, only 7.9 percent of the increases in broadband availability could be traced back to
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contracts with participating ISPs to PNBL and only 0.6 percent through mobile phones. According to a
lawyer for a consumer watchdog group, these plans were “hidden” because they were economically
unappealing to ISPs, and that it is the direct responsibility of the state, rather than telecoms, to provide
meaningful access to its citizens (Bruno). It is unsurprising that the Brazilian ISPs might balk at the plan
that promises users increased access at the potential expense of providers (Knight 1474-1479).
Tax incentives. The state has used the power of taxation in ways that are meant increase
innovation and access. Part of the PNBL’s methods to increase access using tax incentives; early 2013
the REPNBL28 reduced taxation on ISPs that were building infrastructure. A decree further used taxes to
incentivize the increase in hardware ownership through a decree (7981/2013) that exempted select
smartphone technologies from taxation at their point of sale. In order to encourage ISPs to make
meaningful connections available to public schools, cost deferment and lowered tax obligations are
provided by the state in order to connect both underserved urban and rural schools (Knight).
A rural broadband plan was launched in July 2015 in order to introduce 4G in the isolated areas
of the state of Goiás and the Federal District, both located in the Center-West region. While Brasilia was
created in this region in 1960, it is in an otherwise desolate place in Brazil. Access is carried out by Oi,
one of the country’s leading ISPs, and matches efforts in other states of the country, including Maranhão,
Rio Grande do Sul, Mato Grosso and Mato Grosso do Sul, at a total cost R$526.4 million, or $141 million.
Under the PNBL, this project is projected to serve 1,611 municipalities (Grossman).
Free Basics. Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg made an agreement with President Rousseff in
April 2015 to introduce Free Basics into one of São Paulo’s populous but poor areas, Heliópolis. By
offering free access to basic services like e-government, e-health, and social media, Facebook would
benefit from increased advertising revenue in addition to perceptions of corporate social responsibility.
“[T]he Minister of Science and Technology, Aldo Rebelo, said the initiative is one of the symbols of
democratization efforts must be made to transform science, technology and innovation in accessible
services to the population (Castro).” But as elsewhere, the program is criticized for violating the principles

28

Regime Especial de Tributação do Programa Nacional de Banda Larga para Implantação de Redes de
Telecomunicações
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of net neutrality, and perhaps even the control of powerful actors (be it state or social media giant) over
what users can access for free. Such a model could be replicated by states to limit users’ experiences.
PPPs. The Brazilian state, along with other stakeholders, has taken steps to overcome the digital
divide in rural settings. The “Piraí Digital City” project celebrated a 10-year anniversary in 2014, which
transformed the small city (population 24,000) that struggled with economic crisis and unemployment to
becoming “one of the world’s most fascinating Intelligent Communities (Jung 2014).” The municipality
partnered with educational centers, federal, municipal, and business entities to improve digital literacy
and provide access to necessary technologies. Intel provided 5,500 Intel classmate PCs and worked with
school administrators and teachers on how to transform pedagogy to teach students to use and innovate
with technology (Coelho et al).
In the same year, Carvalho et al report on the experience of a public-private partnership in
Northeast Brazil. The Cinturão Digital do Ceará Network (CDC), or Cinturão Digital Belt was an
infrastructure project aimed at building out a WiMax fiber cable system capable of speeds between 30-40
Mbps. Since the government financed the cable’s construction, the usual private industry concern of cost
outlays and immediate profitability were not present. The arrangement called for small to medium ISPs to
lay new cable for last-mile service, provided they conformed to technical standards. By 2014, “the
network initiated by ETICE has been expanded by about 25 percent through this type of arrangement (1112).” The authors argue that such arrangements can be replicated outside Brazil in order to overcome
geographic divides.
Due to economies of scale, the larger the number of partners between the public and private
sector the easier and cheaper it is to provide infrastructure to underserved areas thereby increasing
Internet penetration. Knight relates the story of Adilson Klaffke, who runs a small-scale ISP in Nova
Guarita, a town of 2,500 in the Central West region.
“I provide better quality service than Oi”, says Adilson. “With this I can win clients in the
agrovilas.” Even the Transportation Department (Detran) in the town uses my service.
Previously, Detran would not issue documents because it had no access to the Internet.”
Now the farmers use their connections to order agricultural inputs and to access technical
information, weather forecasts, news of Brazil and the world and to maintain contact with
relatives and friends in the South of Brazil (987-991)
By purchasing licenses from Anatel—the independent government agency in charge of granting,
regulating, and supervising telecommunications in Brazil—entrepreneurs are able to provide service in
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areas that otherwise go unnoticed. While Knight implicitly argues that this model could also be replicated
in the US, he fails to account for the limitations in American ideology regarding political economy.
Marco Civil da Internet
For nearly two years, the Civil Rights Framework for the Internet had been the topic of discussion
for Brazilian Internet policy and its implications for the world. Conceived in 2007, the bill entered into law
in April 2014 and is called by some “The Internet Constitution” of Brazil. While it has received some
criticism, it is viewed as a new model for domestic Internet policy that champions net neutrality, privacy,
and a multistakeholder approach into ICT development and governance.
The push for the law came from an article by Professor Ronaldo Lemos of the Rio de Janeiro
State University Law School that criticized steps being taken by the Brazilian government regarding
cybercrime. The proposed bill would have criminalized certain activities on the web that he theorized
would have had a spillover effect into the entire industry. Without a civil framework in place he argued the
bill would harm entrepreneurs and end users, crushing innovation and efficiency.
…it is increasingly clear that the criminalization and the restriction of "access", as does
the bill in question, is contrary public and collective interests. Consumer protection
associations worldwide, together with librarians, universities, companies and academic
institutions, among others, have spoken out consistently in raising the barriers and red
tape access. One example is the successful consumer pressure exerted on the Apple
company, which is progressively abandoning the use of measures that hinder access to
your content (so-called "technological protection measures") (Lemos).
Lemos questions the legality of surveillance and finally suggests that any new measures that could
threaten Internet freedom should require multistakeholder input. The law’s initial proposals were the
result of coordinated efforts between the Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 29 of which Lemos is member, and the
Ministry of Justice.
While the draft of the Civil Framework contained extensive protections for users, its exceptional
nature is due to the invitation for direct public input. It consisted of two rounds on Pensando o Direito30
that were not supposed to be either “chats” or referenda. Instead, it called for meaningful contributions to
the various axes of the laws regarding Net Neutrality, Privacy, Data Log Records and Other Topics
(Pensando o Direto; Gatto). The dedication to liberal norms on the Internet was explicit and
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A nearly 70 year-old institution, the Getúlio Vargas Foundation mission was to prepare for public and private
administration, economics, psychology, accounting, education, and ICTs (FGV).
30 Thinking Directly/Right/Straight. Run by the Ministry of Justice.
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unmistakable: “Once more, we count on your contribution to strengthen internet democracy!” The first
round took place in 2009 and received 800 comments, while the second phase took place in the following
year and received over 1,200 substantive comments (Pensando o Direto 2015). On the one hand, these
numbers are low considering that they are worldwide statistics and that São Paulo has a population of 21
million people alone. But on the other hand, the call from the Ministry of Justice was for substantive
commentary that would be seriously considered when drafting legislation, and typically such responses
were to be from stakeholders or those that truly cared about the outcome of the bill. Despite the relatively
small amount of comments, even with thousands of page hits, the potential for public input on Internet
legislation is remarkable.
Different articles received varying amounts of attention. For article 2 on guaranteeing the
freedom of expression, citizens were concerned that privacy and anonymity should be aligned with other
high-level civil rights like the freedom of expression. By aligning freedom of expression with privacy,
users emphasize a frame articulated by Frank La Rue and the Human Rights Council in 2013 that aims to
guarantee that freedom of expression is protected from state intrusion.
After these two rounds of consultations, the law was enacted in April 2014. The timing was in line
with the revelations that the US was monitoring Rousseff and her aides’ communications through the
PRISM program. Demanding both an apology and an explanation but receiving neither, Rousseff
cancelled a diplomatic trip to Washington, DC planned for November 2013. During the Brazilian-led world
forum on Internet governance, NETmundial, the law was enacted in an apparent attempt to set Brazil
apart from other global leaders. The resulting law, 12.965, was enacted on 23 April 2014. Article 2
states:
The discipline of internet use in Brazil is founded on the basis of respect for freedom of
expression, as well as:
I – the recognition of the global scale of the network;
II – human rights, personality development and the exercise of citizenship in digital
medias;
III – plurality and diversity;
IV – openness and cooperation;
V – free enterprising, free competition and consumer protection; and
VI – social purpose of the network.
Significant for this study, the framework asserts a multitude of rights and duties surrounding the F2C.
These include: a right to access (Art. 4§1.), the diffusion of new technologies and types of access to all
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(Art. 4§3.) which addresses the digital divide, inviolable rights to privacy except by express consent (Art.7
§2, §7.), that the maintenance of quality of access are part of what makes access meaningful (Art.7 §5.),
and that the state is obligated to develop and promote the Internet and ICTs (Articles 27 and 28). The
document further provides protections for net neutrality, data retention including foreign entities, and
judicial requests for records.
The development of the Marco Civil continues as the state encourages public input for advancing
strategies for implementation of the laws. The proposals were open between February and May 2015,
and encouraged “Any person, institution, company or government agency… [to]…make a proposal on
how to be the regulatory decree Civil Marco.” The Secretary of Legislative Affairs Gabriel Sampaio called
for implementation to be a similar democratic process. According to “The Debate by the Numbers,” 339
guidelines were proposed and 1,109 comments were received over 17 weeks. The largest concerns
reflected the issues of privacy and user safety, followed by inclusion and net neutrality. Concerns over
the guarding of records ranked only 9th, perhaps evidence that safe harbor rules and who has control of
whose information is a concern of states and international relations, and has little apparent direct impact
on users.
Soprana reports that in April 2016, a new proposed cybercrime bill could “mutilate” the legislation.
Like the Stop Online Piracy Act that was before the US Congress in 2011, the bill is meant to protect
intellectual property but extends police powers on the web. The proposed bill is the result of the
parliamentary commission and demonstrates a pluralistic tendency highlighted by liberal IR theories
generally. It is possible to have the Marco Civil da Internet and such a bill develop in the same country.
Tim Berners-Lee wrote an open letter encouraging the tabling of the bill, and if the development of the
Framework is any indication, it is likely that this bill will receive extensive revision to bring it in line with the
greater vision of Internet freedom in Brazil.
The Marco Civil da Internet is one of the most direct articulations of the Freedom to Connect and
larger Internet freedom concerns in the world. It expressly guarantees access, places the duty on the
government to overcome the digital divide, and encourages the equal development and implementation of
new technologies. Moreover, it forbids the powerful actors—the state and ISPs—from controlling the net
or circumscribing access by assuring privacy, guaranteeing net neutrality, and encouraging fair
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competition. The successful implementation of these guidelines is far from assured—politics has a
stubborn way of intruding into the utopian world of norms—but the multistakeholder approach has invited
public participation at nearly every step of this process. It may lead to feedback loops that would allow
space for continued public critique of government failings to live up to the Framework. “…the real
challenges come in interpretation and enforcement. It’s up to Brazil’s engaged citizens to make sure that
the law and upcoming legislation upholds the high standard its creators set (Pinho and Rodriguez).”
Domestic attitudes
There is something inherently unique about Internet policy in Brazil, including its early history of
ICT professionals promoting coordinated multistakeholder efforts to develop the Internet in the 1990s and
more recently the Marco consultation process. Most analyses have focused on government policy to
coordinate these efforts, but have not touched directly on the source of the apparent public enthusiasm.
Knight (2016) suggested in response to this query that “multistakeholderism in Brazil is the result of early
efforts of Internet pioneers which reflected “the best of the vision of the Internet's founders in the US and
Europe.” They were able to force reluctant government embodied in Embratel to provide the necessary
linkages to the Internet at an early point in its history in Brazil. CGI.br, as a multistakeholder institution,
was created three years before ICANN, and is reflected in continued efforts to incorporate private
enterprise, NGOs, and the government.
While there were notable efforts in the US against controversies like net neutrality and ISP
mergers, the inclusion of the public in Internet policy is absent. Indeed, Forbes reported on a WSIS+10
meeting taking place in December 2015 discussing Internet governance, subtitling the story “But Nobody
Seemed to Care.” The inattention may be the result of contemporary high-level events, terrorist attacks
and climate talks, but also may be the result of the lack of concern on the part of the American public
about Internet governance. What makes Brazilians apparently so different? Knight argues that the US
and Brazilian models are not so different, as both pursued Internet development under the
multistakeholder model. Yet such a broad view ignores the lack of NGO and governmental input on later
Internet infrastructure development in the US as there has been in Brazil, and the fact that no such
framework of Internet rights has been proposed in the US still begs the question of why. Knight indirectly
argues that the NETmundial and the Marco Civil da Internet was enabled by the window of opportunity
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presented by the Snowden revelations, but the fact that they were pursued at all is left unexplained by
mere circumstances. An examination of survey data proves helpful.
The CGI.br, in conducting its analysis of Internet access in Brazilian households determined that
the growth in Internet access, particularly via mobile phones, meant primarily that people would be more
connected with each other through instant messaging and social media outlets like WhatsApp and Skype.
While receiving phone calls, taking photos, and sending text messages are the most common activities,
more users are using their phones to access the web and send emails. The only other useful indication
of how users in Brazil use the technology was how many used e-government services. Unfortunately,
such studies do not appear to conduct surveys about how people feel about the importance of access or
policies that the state undertakes concerning access.
Two other sources are tangentially relevant. First, ahead of the World Economic Forum in Zurich
in January 2015, Microsoft Executive VP Mark Penn presented a survey of 12,000 Internet users across
the world. His conclusion was that there is a clear dichotomy between Internet users in the developed
and the developing world, with users in the latter tending to be more optimistic and trusting of the
information. For Brazil, Penn reports that 63 percent felt the Internet had a positive impact on social
bonds, 42 percent thought it had a positive impact for trust in the media, 54 percent thought technology
negatively impact privacy, 53 percent thought current legal protections were insufficient, and 76 percent
felt they were not aware of all the activities associated with collecting personal information. Thus, while
Brazilian Internet users, like the rest of the developing world as labeled by the study, were optimistic
about the role of the Internet in improving everyday life, they were increasingly wary of the risk it poses to
civil liberties.
Several studies dating to 2010 touch on Internet users’ appraisal of the importance of the Internet
in their lives, its relation to human rights, and the role of government that facilitates access. GlobeScan’s
2010 survey revealed that most Brazilians felt that Internet access should be considered a human right,
with 91 percent of respondents saying they agreed with the idea. Unlike Mexico, however, in that 71
percent said they could cope with out it (compared to Mexico’s 17 percent). Fifty-three percent argued
that the Internet’s content should never be regulated by the government, a similar figure to those who
argued it was “Very important” in the Internet Society’s 2012 survey. In that same survey, Brazilians
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revealed their belief in the appropriate proactive role of government provision of access, with 91 percent
arguing that government should provide or enable cheaper computers, 90 percent arguing that it should
encourage competition among providers, and 87 percent arguing that “My government has an obligation
to ensure that I have the opportunity to access the Internet.” In relation to rights, 86 percent argued that
that access should be considered a right, 85 percent agreed that expression should be protected on the
medium, and 87 percent saw social media playing a positive role in assuring freedoms of association and
assembly. Slightly less than half (49 percent) would accept any or significant increases in government
control in the name of security, and 70 percent thought that the government had the right to govern the
internet the way it sees fit, making Brazilian opinion about average. In surveys in both 2014 and 2015, 31
Brazilians consistently expressed the idea that content should remain uncensored, at 80 percent and 84
percent, respectively.
Pew (2015c) asked directly about American spying. Overwhelmingly, Brazilians disapproved the
collection of data by the American government on them (94 percent), their politicians (83 percent), and on
American citizens (84 percent). Most approved surveillance on terrorist suspects (67 percent), and in the
wake of the string of terrorist attacks across the world in recent months, that number would likely increase
if users were polled again.
Ruling the Internet? Domestic and International Rhetoric Surrounding the Internet in Brazil
USA Today published an article “Why Brazil May Rule the Internet” in June 2014. Such a
provocative title may grab a reader’s notice, but the idea of “ruling” is in itself misleading. One state
cannot rule the Internet as it functions today, but the frame harkens to state-centric analysis of
international relations. Instead, Brazil is presenting a challenge to states that claim norms of cyber
sovereignty like Russia and China in addition to the apparently hypocritical policies of openness
proclaimed by United States and the United Kingdom alongside extensive surveillance programs.
Although not examined in this study, Internet governance is often aligned between the multistakeholder
model of ICANN and the state-centric model of the ITU. Brazil is presenting itself as a champion of norms
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surrounding Internet freedom, unsullied by accusations of spying and itself a victim of the disparity of
power on the web, at least for now32.
While Brazil has a long history of trying to conform to Internet freedom norms—Cadei points back
to early popular adoption that was enabled by Brazil’s ICT professionals in 1992—it was the Snowden
revelations that set Brazil’s alternative apart from dominant views. For many states, including Russia and
China, the NSA’s spying and the lack of apparent privacy protections on the perceived US-dominated
Internet was a window of opportunity to take action. For illiberal states, this action reinforced cyber
sovereignty norms under the rubric that the US was pursuing its own national security interests on a
relatively open network which needed to be reined in and controlled directly by states. Brazil, and
particularly Rousseff, took an alternate approach, calling for stronger protections to Internet freedom in
the face of its violation by powerful states.
In September 2013 of Rousseff and Angela Merkel, another high-profile victim of PRISM
surveillance, went before the 68th session of the UN General Assembly to decry the US program and call
for the protection of Internet freedom norms. They asserted first that privacy was directly related to
freedom of expression, and that in its absence it would severely inhibit democracy. Second, the pursuit of
national security aims never justifies the violations of human rights in another country (Donahoe and
Canineu). They introduced the first resolution on privacy in the General Assembly in 25 years (68/167).
In April 2014, Brazil hosted NETMundial in order to establish a multistakeholder model of Internet
governance. Cadei reports that the substance of such an argument is not much different from the model
of ICANN, but perhaps a more sincere one which invited true discussion and critique of the abuses by
other states.
By November 2014, another resolution was adopted (69/166) relating to “privacy in the digital
age.” Minárik reports that this resolution coincided with other reports that had been filed the UN, like La
Rue’s reports to the HRC, and that it took tentative steps chastising the “Five Eyes” of the Internet 33. The
resolution connected privacy on the web to the UNDHR, the ICCPR, the ICESCR, the Vienna
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A bill entered the Brazilian Congress in October 2015 that would increase penalties for libel and defamatory
speech on the web and allow prosecutors access to users’ personal data. It has not entered into law (Aviles
et al.)
33 An intelligence sharing arrangement among the US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand based on the
collection of metadata typified in the PRISM program.
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Declaration, and an HRC resolution from June 2014 call for the protection of human rights on the web. It
called upon a need to analyze how rights can be protected in the digital age, the need for domestic
oversight, and the lawfulness of surveillance. Even the F2C is directly commented upon: “Stressing the
importance of full respect for the freedom to seek, receive and impart information, including the
fundamental importance of access to information and democratic participation.” Finally, the resolution
calls upon states to assure that domestic legislation, particularly on surveillance, conforms to international
human rights law.
As a critic of powerful states’ surveillance practices by sponsoring these resolutions, speaking
before the General Assembly, hosting NETmundial, and finally passing the Marco Civil da Internet, Brazil
is positioning itself as champion of Internet Freedom. Several journalists agree 34, calling it a “leader,”
“ruler,” and “champion,” in turn. Alves reports that Rousseff claimed that the Obama Administration itself
was not to blame for the lapse in human rights in the wake of the Snowden revelations. She recognized
that the policies that enabled surveillance were put in place in the post-9/11 era of legislative disregard for
civil rights. It is common for many to consider civil or human rights as secondary concerns in an age
where national security is placed in the forefront.
***
Brazil is a global leader in Internet freedom and the F2C due to its long history of partnership
among the state, private sector, and NGOs. The Civil Rights Framework, the continued importance of the
Internet steering committee, its record of collecting Internet penetration data, and tax incentives are all
measures that illustrate the effects of the F2C. One can attribute the success of Internet freedom in
Brazil to the social democratic norms that characterize the Brazilian economy and relationship among the
government, private sector, and citizens. However, while many sectors of Brazilian society champion
freedom on the web, there are others that move to strike it down. The April 2016 cybercrime bill could
harm the implementation of the Marco Civil da Internet, but first, the outcome of this legislation is
uncertain, and second, Brazil would not be alone as state whose disparate agencies worked at crosspurposes. The US, the Philippines, Mexico, and Indonesia all, in different ways, go through similar
processes.

34

See Bertoni (2013) Cadei (2014a 2014b), Engel (2014)
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The Philippines
While the Philippines is categorized as Free in Freedom House’s ranking, there are numerous
challenges that inhibit Internet access across the state. Unlike cases in the Partly Free and Not Free
categories, with some minor exceptions, the Philippines does not regularly limit content or violate users’
rights. Instead the limitations on Internet penetration that plague every case examined are exacerbated
in the archipelago, as a consequence of geography, duopoly, and government malfeasance. Partly a
result of history, and partly the effect of the continued concentration of power and the lack of government
regulation, the Philippine telecom industry is inefficient, unreliable, and ultimately inadequate for the
state’s economic development goals. Nonetheless, there are signs that both the government, and more
importantly, Filipinos themselves, are demanding more access, better speeds, and lower costs.
Background
The Philippines is a relatively small and developing state, struggling to overcome the dual
legacies of colonialism and two decades of martial law. It has a population of 100,998,376 (13 th in the
world), and takes up an area of 300,000 km 2 (73rd in the world). It is an archipelago with more than 7,000
islands, much like Indonesia, which complicates the dispersion of information technology. It has the
lowest urban population in this study, totaling 44.4 percent, with only four major metropolises with
populations of about 1 million or more35, although metro Manila dwarfs other cities with a population of
nearly 13 million. The administration of the state is complicated, with 81 provinces composed of cities,
municipalities and barangays (villages), 145 independently administered cities, and one autonomous
region of Muslim Mindanao. Additionally, the state is informally divided among three island groups
(Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao) along with 18 nongovernmental regions. Its annual GDP is $693.4
billion, ranking it 31st in the world with a GDP per capita is $7,000 ranking 153rd in the world.
The Philippines has 3.09 million landlines, ranking 47th in the world; one phone is plugged in for
approximately every 3 people in the country, a figure that has vastly improved in the past several
decades. It escalates for cellular phones, with 111.3 million in the country, placing it 13th in the world.
There are 112 subscriptions to mobile service for every 100 people, and the Philippines has been
colloquially referred to as the texting capital of the world. There are 39.2 million Internet users in the
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Manila (capital) 12.946 million; Davao 1.63 million; Cebu City 951,000; Zamboanga 936,000 (2015)
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country which ranks the state 17th in absolute numbers, and totals 39.4 percent of the population. Users
are concentrated in major cities where infrastructure is widely available. The World Bank reports that 63
percent of Internet users in the Philippines rely exclusively on mobile connections for access.
Human rights in the state have a mixed history. As first a colony of Spain and then ruled by the
US in the 20th century, it is a state long associated with and influenced by the West. The 20th century was
marred by a “soft” dictatorship that truncated rights in the name of stability and security from the threat of
violence posed by communists, Muslims, and Christian extremists. Today, the Fifth Republic is rife with
criticism: politicians promise much and deliver little. Accusations of corruption and a tendency to be more
responsive to entrenched interests continue the legacy of cronyism that has existed since before the
Marcos regime. The failure of the Ramos, Estrada, and Arroyo administrations to meaningfully address
poverty and inequality are correlated to the nature of the ICT market today. The legal structure for
substantive democracy and the protection of human rights exists in the Philippines, but it is up to its
citizens to demand the necessary changes in order to break down the system that keeps small portions of
the population rich and powerful. Indeed, things seem to be getting worse: “… most countries in SouthEast Asia, including Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines, saw their scores [on our crony-capitalism
index] worsen between 2007 and 2014, as tycoons active in real estate and natural resources got richer
(The Economist 2014a).” This legacy is also reflected in the telecom industry.
The Internet in the Philippines
Background. The Philippines is unique in this study where computing was not pursued under
the auspices of a university or even as the hobbies of ICT enthusiasts. Instead, IBM introduced the first
computer system to the Philippines in 1960 for a government office, the Bureau of Lands, “to handle the
country’s land survey computations.” In the following decades, IBM installed computers in some
university settings, but largely in the industrial and financial sectors. In 1969, Marcos and IBM World
Trade Chairman Arthur K. Watson officiated at “the dedication of a new headquarters for IBM Philippines
in Makati, outside Manila,” suggesting some personal connection or benefit for the dictator.
The Internet was preceded by online bulletin boards, the first of which went online in 1986.
FidoNet Exchange was created one year later to connect several boards across Manila. In 1990, the
Ateneo Computer Technology Center of Ateneo University in Quezon launched an initiative exploring the
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possibility of setting up an academic network among Philippine universities and government offices, but it
was never pursued. Between 1991 and 1993, email gateways and UCCP protocols were introduced by
MNCs like Intel, Motorola, and Texas Instruments. Initiated in 1993, the Philnet project connected
university students via email through Ateneo’s gateway, preparing for the launch of the Internet in 1994.
Jim Ayson of the University of Ateneo recounted the first connection to the Internet on his blog. Philnet,
the Department of Science and Technology, and the university joined the Internet through SprintLink’s
connection in California.
Subject: The Philippines is In!
As of March 29,1994 at 1:15 am Philippine time, unfortunately 2 days late due to slight
technical difficulties, the Philippines was FINALLY connected to the Internet via
SprintLink. The Philippine router, a Cisco 7000 router was attached via the services of
PLDT and Sprint communications to SprintLink’s router at Stockton Ca. The gateway to
the world for the Philippines will be via NASA Ames Research Center. For now, a 64K
serial link is the information highway to the rest of the Internet world (Ayson).
Internet penetration and geographic divides. As reported above, Internet penetration in the
Philippines is slightly less than 40 percent of the total population, the lowest overall rate in all the cases
explored, save Cuba. The CIA and ITU figures agree, at 39.4 percent and 39.69 percent respectively.
The total has grown considerably since 2000 when the ITU reported a rate of just 1.98 percent; it climbed
to 5.4 percent by 2005, and to 25 percent by 2010. While mobile penetration is high, smartphone
penetration is low at 15 percent.
“Nonetheless, the term ‘unlimited’ needs a qualifier,” according to Ferraz, “the internet is naturally
limited by a given person’s relative patience for its stop-and-go, spotty nature (Ferraz).” In 2011 Smart
Communications controlled 52 percent of the mobile market, which is a subsidiary of the Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company (PLDT), followed by its closest competitors, Globe and Digitel each having
a 16 percent share of the market. When PLDT acquired Digitel, PLDT’s market share grew to 67 percent
of the mobile market (Paul Budde Communication Pty Ltd), nearly mirroring its control of landlines. There
is a possibility of a shakeup of this situation. Venzon reports that San Miguel, one the Philippines largest
corporations, bought Vega Telecom with the hope of challenging the duopoly. It plans to launch mobile
broadband early in 2016, and “[a]mid rising smartphone usage, PLDT and Globe have offered free
Internet access to win subscribers in a market where there are more mobile phones than users.”
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Due to the complex structure of the Philippine state, it is difficult to the pinpoint the areas of
weakness of Internet penetration across the archipelago. The Philippines Statistic Authority presents
statistics for Internet penetration in cities, provinces, and municipalities and the level of its sophistication,
reproduced below.
Table 4 Internet penetration and sophistication in the Philippines
(Mitra and Miraflores)
Percentage of cities with web presence
2011
2012

2013

2014

PDP target
for 2016 36

85.42%

87.5%

100%

At least Stage 2
53.73
53.73%
56.25%
(enhanced)
At least Stage 3
22.39%
22.39%
15.97%
(interactive)
At least Stage 4
2.24%
0.00%
5.55%
(transactional)
Percentage of provinces with web presence
2011
2012
2013

56.94

N/A

15.97%

N/A

5.55%

N/A

2014

PDP target
for 2016

At least Stage 1
(emerging)

65.85%

68.29%

100%

At least Stage 2
51.25%
51.25%
36.60%
(enhanced)
At least Stage 3
18.75%
23.75%
24.39%
(interactive)
At least Stage 4
1.25%
0.00%
1.22%
(transactional)
Percentage of municipalities with web presence
2011
2012
2013

39.02%

N/A

23.17%

N/A

1.22%

N/A

2014

PDP target
for 2016

At least Stage 1
(emerging)

23.47%

34.02%

35.72%

37.51%

100%

At least Stage 2
(enhanced)
At least Stage 3
(interactive)
At least Stage 4
(transactional)

10.76%

16.00%

16.80%

17.64%

N/A

1.74%

3.42%

3.60%

3.78%

N/A

N/A

0.00%

1.50%

1.56%

At least Stage 1
(emerging)

36

72.39%

73.75%

80.85%

76.25%

Probability of
reaching PDP
target

Probability of
reaching PDP
target

Probability of
reaching PDP
target

Philippine Development Plan, 2011-2016
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Sophisticated web presence37 is nearly absent in all of the Philippines, and the division between urban
and rural is pronounce. Cities appear to have the most sophisticated web capabilities in the state. The
images of frowny faces are a unique attribute to an official government document, and are meant to
indicate whether or not the projected figures developed in the Philippine Development Plan will be met by
2016.
There are no statistics for Internet usage according to province; a close approximation exists
between fixed landlines located in rural provinces. When comparing poverty percentages to the ratio
between population and the number of fixed lines, the correlation coefficient was 0.34, indicating a
moderate relationship between poverty and fixed line availability—and therefore the prospects of having
dial-up or broadband Internet connections (Tambasen).
Speeds and cost. Mobile access plans are relatively inexpensive and have unlimited access,
with less than 3 percent of users paying more than $41 per month and nearly a third paying less than $12
per month. On the other hand, wired 10 Mbps broadband is far more expensive, averaging $44 per
month or 14.28 percent of the average net salary (Numbeo)
Internet speeds in the Philippines are among the worst in the world and especially Southeast
Asia. Akamai reports that the average speed in Q4 2015 was 3.2 Mbps, an 18 percent improvement from
the previous year, while peak speeds topped out at 27.0 Mbps, which would meet the FCC’s minimum
standard for broadband. Only 0.8 percent of users regularly enjoyed speeds of 15 Mbps or more.

“United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) studies the idea of connected governance as
the means to achieve maximum cost savings and improve service delivery. The concept of connected government
looks towards technology as a strategic tool and an enabler for public service transformation, innovation and
productivity growth.
DESA identifies five stages for connected government:
(1) emerging, (2) enhanced, (3) interactive, (4) transactional, and (5) connected.
According to DESA definitions, the “emerging” stage includes a basic web presence.
The ability to present documents or forms would be more advanced and, therefore, be part of the “enhanced” stage.
During this second stage, users are not yet able to interact electronically with the administration. The establishment of
interactive portals, websites or mobile applications would be representative of the third, “interactive” stage, while
“transactional” relations would be part of DESA’s fourth stage. The final stage of e-government combines vertical and
horizontal integration with other capabilities, such as interoperability and the establishment of connections among
several stakeholders (government, businesses, academic institutions, NGOs and civil society). E-participation – that
is, the involvement of different individuals and groups in forming opinions and the decision-making processes through
electronic means – is representative of the final “connected” stage (ITU OECD 27).”
37
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Table 5 Reported Internet speeds in Philippine cities
(testmy.net 12 April 2016)
City (Region/Island Group)

Downstream

Upstream

Manila (National Capital Region/Luzon)

2.9 Mbps

1 Mbps

Quezon (National Capital Region/Luzon)

2.5 Mbps

787 Kbps

Davao (Region XI / Mindanao)

2.2 Mbps

573 Kbps

Baguio (Cordillera Administrative Region / Luzon)

2.2 Mbps

573 Kbps

Cebu City (Region VII/Visayas)

1.9 Mbps

705 Kbps

Dumaguete (Region XVIII / Visayas)

994 Kbps

286 Kbps

Cotabato (Soccsksargen / Mindano)

482 Kbps

193 Kbps

The major cities of Manila and Quezon enjoy the best speed capacities. Despite the size of Dumaguete
and Cotabato cities with populations over 120,000 and 270,000, respectively, they lack of even minimal
broadband speeds.
The Philippines has numerous submarine fiber optic cables (as with Indonesia), with ten landing
points that connect with foreign sources and one domestic cable with thirteen landing points, owned by
the PLDT. The landing points are concentrated in or around major cities like Manila, Cebu, and Davao.
The PLDT owns the domestic cable linking Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao, and it touts both this project
and underground cables as ways to enhance its own network and offer little in the way of seeing these
improvements as a manifestation of the F2C. Underground cables were adopted because of the
prevalence of natural disasters, especially typhoons that routinely threaten the network and potentially
disrupt communications in times of national emergency (Rapper). In 2014 and 2015, the PLDT rolled out
separate networks in Northern and Southern Luzon along with submarine cables totaling approximately
1,000 kilometers (Agcaoli). The improvements are also framed in terms of competitiveness, “Nazareno
said 2014 brought home the message that transformational shifts are taking place in the industry as the
PLDT Group faces price competition in the cellular business as well as the impact of a new digital
communications services offered by over-the-top players.” It is not likely that the PLDT upgrades,
perhaps reflected in speed capacities recorded in Table 5, will benefit other telecoms or their customers.
The World Bank’s “Digital Dividends” report suggests three reasons why the Philippines lags
behind the rest of the world in speed and availability. First, OECD countries had the advantage of
preexisting fixed line access, with infrastructure that could be adapted to address changing needs. As
shall be discussed, the ICT market in the Philippines has lagged in terms of infrastructure development
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due to the nature of the marketplace. Second, while the government has taken steps to reform the ICT
market, it is not enough for the World Bank, which advises making increasingly favorable conditions for
competition. Third, the digital divide persists because of the lack of both basic and technological
education. “...teaching advanced cognitive and critical thinking skills and foundational training in
advanced, technical information and communications technology (ICT) systems will be key as the Internet
spreads (Ordinario).”
Internet Service Providers
As has been argued elsewhere in this study, one of the keys to understanding access in
particular states is to analyze its providers—who they are, whether they are privately or publicly run, or
some combination thereof, and the ways they are regulated. The answers are often a reflection of the
nature of the government and a state’s political economy. When the ISP is the state, as is the
circumstance for many states in the Not Free category, meaningful access is circumscribed for a
multitude of reasons: political and economic control, cultural unity, etc. In the case of the Philippines, the
ISPs are a reflection of the cronyism that typifies many sectors of the Philippine economy. The PLDT
currently controls 70 percent of the telephone and ISP market.
Mary Mirandilla-Santos presents the story of the reformation of the telecom industry since the
Marcos regime. Between 1967 and 1985, the PLDT was a de facto monopoly of the telecom market and
was owned by an influential family with connections to the government. The PLDT was partially owned
by an American company that helped rebuild the industry after WWIII, and in 1967 was set to sell 28
percent of its controlling shares to Pedro Cojuangco, the brother-in-law of Benigno Aquino. As the latter
was Marcos’s rival, he blocked the sale and instead sold it to Cojuangco’s cousin, a political ally and
crony. The PLDT’s dominance was assured by this arrangement as “…its competitors were kept at bay…
(101).” In particular, it owned 94 percent of the telephone network, and all other companies had to use
this infrastructure for any voice calls. Others could try to compete with the PLDT, which proved fruitless,
or developed niche businesses, like pagers. “PLDT would choke calls to other telecommunications
companies…driving smaller companies into bankruptcy (101).” Under a presidential decree, users were
forced to “invest” in the company—by paying a tariff of 900-1500 pesos—in order to get a line installed.
While some in Congress tried to regulate the PLDT as a public utility, Marcos and the PLDT argued that it
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was natural monopoly that could best provide and expand service based on the faulty interpretation of the
American experience with AT&T.
After Marcos resigned, some reform was possible. Congress was empowered to enfranchise
new operators, and the freedom of the press enabled freer criticism of the lack of efficiency and progress
in the industry. Developments in mobile technology allowed “cracks in the dam” to appear, and new
licenses were granted to Global and Eastern Telecom. However, in 1992 while companies like Islacom
were selling GSM technology cheaply, PLDT clung to its fixed line service and had not expanded mobile
technology beyond car phones, which cost users $6,000. By the time Fidel Ramos got in office, he had
lobbied to liberalize the industry, and had Congressional support:
In civil society, Ramos’s government encouraged the formation of the Movement for
Reliable and Efficient Phone Service (MORE Phones), a broad coalition formed in 1993
that gave a face to the disorganized public uproar against PLDT’s poor performance and
drummed up the consumer clamor for better telecoms services. (107)
Additionally, he instituted two executive orders that encouraged connections among local telecoms, lower
subscription rates, and mandated that service be provided in remote areas. In 1995, the Philippines
enacted Republic Act No. 7925, still in place today, to promote the development of the industry:
Section 4. Declaration of National Policy. - Telecommunications is essential to the
economic development, integrity and security of the Philippines, and as such shall be
developed and administered as to safeguard, enrich and strength the economic, cultural,
social and political fabric of the Philippines.
The act claimed that telecoms must expand into underserved areas, that the public would regulate radio
frequencies, that the industry must be competitive and that it was providing a public good, not just a
value-added service. It empowered the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC), established in
1979, to qualify service providers, assure interoperability, and investigate unfair practices, monopolistic
powers, and customer complaints.
Nonetheless, the PLDT stuck to its ways, concentrating on urban populations with fixed lines,
letting companies like Globe and Smart develop the mobile phone market. This prompted a buyout of
PLDT and the dislodging of the son of Cojuangco as director of the company. He was also stripped of his
shares in PLDT by a special anti-graft court because they were considered “ill-gotten” and were awarded
to the Philippine government. Despite the changing of the guard, a dispute between Globe and PLDT
arose over mobile interoperability. Globe and PLDT customers could not call each other, with the latter
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accusing the former of not paying mandatory fees, which resulted in the intermittent stopping of
connections of Globe customers to PLDT landlines. Then-President Joseph Estrada solved the matter
rather ingeniously: “Both Pangilinan and Ayala were reportedly caught flat-footed in the press conferencestyle meeting, where Estrada asked the two to resolve the interconnection impasse ‘as soon as possible’
in front of the media (116).” Rather than proceeding with lengthy court battles—and bad press—the
stalemate ended that day in November 1999.
Despite the progress achieved—teledensity increased 800 percent in the ten years after the
reforms that took place after Marcos’s departure—the Philippine telecom industry remains a duopoly with
the PLDT as the dominant player. New ISPs have a convoluted process to navigate in order to launch
their business: obtaining a Congressional license through parliamentary hearings, a certification from the
NTC, and the requirement that the company be 60 percent Filipino-owned (Freedom House 2015 642).
This discourages foreign investment in the industry, which has bolstered the dismantling of monopolies in
other states, as with Mexico’s América Móvil.
The Internet, unlike telephony, is considered a valued-added service, so it remains under
regulated, and speed and availability are left to the discretion of providers. Attempts to reform the
industry further had languished in the Philippine legislature since 1987. House Bill 5286, the Philippine
Fair Competition Act (PFCA), is commonly referred to as anti-trust legislation, was undertaken under the
premise that it would better prepare the Philippines for highly technological industries that dominate
Southeast Asian economies (Dalangin-Fernandez). It passed in the Senate in December 2014, and was
set to create “a Fair Competition Commission will be created to oversee all matters related to fair trade in
the country (Sy).” There is no evidence that the Commission has been created or the law has had any
effect on the industry thus far.
Instead, controversy over the telecom industry continues. A journalist for the Manila Times
claims that the “PLDT mocks the Constitution” because the makeup of PLDT’s ownership. The Supreme
Court determined that the company violated the requirement that 60 percent of any public utility be
Filipino-owned. Instead, the company argued that the non-voting shares were owned by enough Filipinos
to justify the company’s structure, but in reality “According to PLDT’s disclosures to the US SEC, all these
firms [six interlocking companies owned by First Pacific] are represented by only one man: Manuel V.
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Pangilinan, who owns only less than 1 percent of these firms, but is Salim’s [Indonesian owner of First
Pacific] chief representative (Tigalo).”
Additionally, the merger of PLDT with a former rival, Digitel, was controversial but permitted by
the Congress. Neal Cruz argued that it was the Congress’s duty to regulate radio frequencies so that no
one company controls the entirety of a range in a particular region, but by purchasing not only Digitel’s
equipment but also its franchise, PLDT was violating the spirit of RA7925. Further, Neal argues that the
state did not prepare smaller providers to compete with entrenched companies. Without an open-ended
transition period with price controls, new competitors are forced to use the infrastructure and purchase
services from the leaders of the industry, essentially becoming customers rather than rivals.
Shahani Ramos (2015), in an opinion piece for the Philippine Star, offers additional reasons why
the Internet is “so bad” in the Philippines. She begins by citing the 2011 HRC report, asking if it is a
human right “…shouldn’t Filipinos be more outraged with the quality—or lack—of service we get from our
internet providers?” She outlines several glaring problems. First, in most states that have multiple ISPs,
providers practice peering38 in order to make the flow of information efficient. Instead, providers in the
Philippines use tolls, even for its IXs, and the “PLDT…resists efforts to dismantle for-profit IXs—to
maintain private control of these connections.” Therefore, all ISPs, including Globe, must pay PLDT for its
IX services. Second, the influence of the PLDT on the government and the regulation of the ICT market
stagnates growth of the sector. The unfriendly and lengthy process for entry into the sector discourages
competition, and Ramos attributes the influence of the PLDT on the NTC for keeping it this way. Third,
she cites the NTC itself as pursuing projects that will not solve speed, cost, or dependability issues.
Unfortunately, rather than mandating a national broadband program or even demanding
IP Peering between Globe and PLDT, the legislation now taking shape looks like a
disappointing, stop-gap measure: mandating a service minimum of a mere 256 kbps—
that’s .256 Mbps, ten times less than the public expectation for a 2 Mbps standard!
38“Once

upon a time America’s entire phone system was run by AT&T and a bunch of independents who served
subscribers in areas AT&T wasn’t. Essentially the whole gigantic thing was a monopoly, with monies for transmission
and switching changes hands under rulers run by government regulators and essentially administered by one
company. The Internet is different. There are many companies providing telecom and switching service. These
companies have to move traffic of the Internet between them. Hence they established something called peering. It’s
a relationship between two or more ISPs for the purpose of exchanging traffic directly, rather than doing so through a
backbone Internet providers… (Newton 847).”
“So the Internet is public because it’s handmade. New links don’t just happen according to some automated
algorithm, they need to be created: negotiated by two network engineers, then activated along a distinct physical
path…Peering allows information to flow freely across the Internet— by which I mean both liberally and at low cost.
Without peering, online videos would clog the Internet’s pipes— YouTube might no longer be free. (Blum 118-119).”
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While there are others pursuing decentralized Internet access, she suggests that peering agreements
would be the most effective way to increase speed and quality. In an advocacy paper, the Joint Foreign
Chamber summarizes what is wrong in the Philippines:
In particular, the country fared very low in terms of infrastructure environment and
readiness of the government to modernize its entire structure. Burden of government
regulation, length of procedures in starting a business, performance of legal
institutions, education investment, and quality of research institutions are cited as
major dampeners to its relative global position (168).
Efforts to Increase Access and Overcome the Digital Divide
Like Mexico and Brazil, the Philippines is concentrating on providing additional access through
government programs, public-private partnerships, and NGOs.
Government programs. The ICT Office, part of the Philippine Department of Science and
Technology, runs several projects relating to the implementation of technologies for “development, policy,
infrastructure development, research and development, capacity building of the public sector, and the
administration of the E-Government Fund.” The most noteworthy among its several projects is the
Tech4ED project, whose motto is “A Community eCenter [CeC] in Every Municipality.” Taking shape in
the barangays, priority is given to areas where public Internet facilities are absent. The program ties
Internet access to education, such as in San Carlos City, “to provide its citizens a more accessible
education, and more entrepreneurship opportunities, hence demonstrating what a progressive society is.”
Among Tech4ED’s proclaimed “successes” are numerous conferences and workshops, the training of
CeC personnel and the mapping of 153 CeCs. The latter refers to putting these facilities into widely
available database, but it appears that this is not currently available. The ICT also highlighted the
recipient of the first DigiBayani [Digital Hero] Award from the Foundation for Information Technology
Education and Development, a Philippine NGO. Dr. Mary Ann Cortado “a simple lady from North
Cotabato whose advocacy is to help her humble town to become a digitally literate community, was
recognized as one of the outstanding champions in the digital realm,” runs one of the CeCs and started a
digital literacy program in 2009 with 20 enrollees. That number ballooned since, with 1,500 graduates
including special programs for women and children.
PPPs. In “Shared Prosperity: An ICT Manifesto for the Philippines,” (2015) authors from a
Singaporean school of public policy and Microsoft examine the problem of low levels of Internet
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penetration and speed and offer their suggestions for a way forward. They argue that the workforce will
have to catch up to the digital revolution in order to compete, and that means education and technology
must be pursued together. They advocate for increased use of PPPs so that the Philippines can “leap not
walk” towards more complete Internet penetration. States that are developing new ICTs are not
dependent on the methods of access that others had gone through decades before, citing the explosion
of 2G in lieu of the PLDT’s failure to expand landlines. Their suggestions include: the promotion of
peering, cost-efficient infrastructure rollouts (if building a road, add a telephone line), incentivizing Internet
exchange point39 (IXP) production, releasing more radio spectrum, and updating and improving
regulations and the responsible institutions. Connecting provincial cities would have a spillover effect in
the Philippines’s rural areas, creating jobs and helping to alleviate poverty.
One of these PPPs is an effort spearheaded by the government to use TV White Spaces
(TVWS). In a method that is becoming more common among developing states, “The [SSG] Partnership
deployed Microsoft’s TVWS technology, which generates a long-range wireless Internet connection by
riding empty television UHF and VHF broadcast channels (Lovegrove).” It was first tested in 2014 in the
province of Bohol to coordinate efforts to reduce overfishing (PNA). The Department of Science and
Technology Secretary Mario Montejo headed the project and planned to provide 600 towns with free
Internet access in 2015, serving 20,000 people. The Secretary indicated that it plans to make use of the
TVWS for future attempts to increase the levels of connectivity in the Philippines. Such attempts are
logical facing the difficulties surrounding attempts to reform the marketplace.
MNCs and NGOs. Facebook has its own initiative to provide access in developing states, its
Internet for All campaign. For Filipinos Free Basics is a downloadable app for smartphones that allows
users to freely access select websites: healthcare, educational websites, job listings, Wikipedia, Filipino
newspapers, weather, sports, and of course, Facebook. It partnered with Smart Communications, one of
PLDT’s subsidiaries, and through a freely supplied SIM card since March 2015 users can have access to
the listed sites. The project is not without criticism, with many citing that it violates net neutrality; in India,
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“An internet exchange point (IXP) is a physical network access point through which major network providers
connect their networks and exchange traffic. The primary focus of an exchange point is to facilitate network
interconnection through an exchange access point instead of third-party networks (Technopedia).”
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this viewpoint led to the service being declared to be illegal, but so far it has been well-received in the
Philippines.
Efforts to establish norms about Internet freedom have been undertaken in the Philippine
legislature. The controversial Cybercrime Law of 2012 outlawed online libel, and for Freedom House,
signified possible future abuses of users’ rights. The Magna Carta for Philippine Internet Freedom is the
result of an initiative begun by a group of Internet freedom advocates made up of lawyers, bloggers, and
human rights activists gathering commentary from social media platforms. They state:
We are no different from you. We are Filipinos from all walks of life. Some of us are
gamers. Some of us are parents. Some of us are software designers. Some of us are
bloggers. A number of us are on Twitter and Facebook. We are Filipinos.
We believe in Democracy. A place; a shared idea where rights and obligations are crucial
parts of society for it to grow and prosper (Democracy.Net.Ph)
Much like the Marcos Civil da Internet of Brazil, the bill seeks to strengthen freedoms on the Internet. It
contains provisions for the freedom of expression on the Internet, the advocacy of universal access,
defines cybercrime and in what circumstances the state can intervene into the use of the Internet, the
promotion of innovation, the right to privacy, and the promotion of better governance though transparency
and freedom of information. It contains criticism of the current state of the ICT market, claiming that the
Internet should be an open network and affirming the importance of net neutrality. The bill has been
introduced to both the House and Senate, but has not been voted upon.
Domestic Attitudes towards the Internet
Filipino-conducted research or surveys on the demand for Internet access in are difficult to come
by, yet global surveys have included the Philippines among other states, and data is available highlighting
the digital divide along lines of urban/rural residence, education, and socioeconomic status. There is
ample evidence that Filipinos care about Internet access and quality. First, quantitative evidence is found
in GlobeScan’s 2010 survey and Internet Society’s 2012 survey. Compared to the US and Latin
American states, few Filipinos view the Internet as a fundamental right, at 73 percent, and 79 percent
report that they could manage without it. Most view social connections—enabled by the likes of
WhatsApp, Skype, and Facebook—as the most valued by survey respondents at 48 percent. The figures
were higher as reported by the Internet Society in 2012, with 88 percent of respondents claiming that the
Internet should be considered a basic human right, 86 percent arguing that freedom of expression should
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be guaranteed on the Internet, and 91 percent saying their rights of assembly and association were
enhanced by the technology. Filipinos view the state taking a proactive role in the spreading of access,
with 96 percent arguing that it should consider ways to provide cheap computers, 92 percent arguing that
competition among private ISPs should be encouraged, and 85 percent arguing that the state is obligated
to assure citizens’ ability to access the medium. Only 60 percent would accept increased control in order
to assure security, and 86 percent argue that the state has the right to govern the Internet as it sees fit.
Second, qualitative evidence is available from several sources. As discussed, the Magna Carta
bill was a crowdsourcing effort that involved not only NGOs but input from the public—at least those that
had Internet access. Like the Marcos Civil da Internet, it is evidence of how the public perceives the
importance of Internet freedom and the relationship among customers, ISPs, and government regulators.
Journalists in the Philippines have interviewed users on their perceptions about the status of the
Internet in the Philippines. Michelle Toh, reporting for the Christian Science Monitor, interviewed a selfdescribed “gamer” in Manila:
“Our country's internet speed isn't 'slow' in an absolute sense,” says Isaac Javellana...
“Emails, social networking and some light streaming isn't an issue. In a relative sense
though, we pay more for what we get. This is where the problem lies. HD streaming and
quick gigabyte downloads are luxuries only accessible to a select few.”
Javellana is correct in asserting that current average speeds are adequate for basic Internet use—email,
web surfing, etc.—and connects it to the larger problem that most developed states have moved past
basic Internet, and that in order to remain competitive, basic is not adequate. Senator Francis Escudero
is correct in asserting that “The state of Internet speed is pathetic, and unless we remedy this situation,
our IT sector is likely to suffer in the long term," because the lack of IT readiness will inhibit economic
growth in the coming decades. Several articles have discussed the integral field of business-process
outsourcing (BPO) to the Philippine economy (See Ordinario, Joint Foreign Chambers, Montenegro and
Araral). Javellana also points out how the lack of competition and technological know-how of local
technicians inhibits meaningful growth of the Internet.
There is also evidence of both the dissatisfaction with the service in the Philippines and the idea
that users are entitled to better speeds and more responsive providers. Toh cites two tweets from
Filipinos regarding Internet speed complaining about its unreliability and slowness. Such examples are
easy to find when reading the commentary on articles about the PLDT and other matters related to the
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Internet access in the Philippines. In response to the Ramos Shahani’s article that discussed the lack of
peering amongst Philippine ISPs, many users seemed well-versed in what ails the Philippine ICT
market—and what could fix it.
the ultimate solution is for the government build a national broadband system (a very fast
one and huge capacity) and let the players (PLDT, Smart, Globe. etc.) compete for
access for their network service system -and pay toll fee to the government. PLDT and
Globe can no longer monopolize network access and at the same time do away with the
toll fee when calling from one network to the other. all players will be using a singular
network controlled and managed by the government. NTC as is, is useless and can not
even dictate on the two giants (Globe & PLDT) (User ed1151, Shahani).
This is a timely article, slow and high cost internet is affecting our country's productivity. I
just hope the government, through the National Telecommunication Commission will do
something concrete to address this problem. As mentioned by Ms. Shahani, internet
access is a basic human rights. Effective internet plays an important role to human and
economic growth (User GWC, Shahani).
Anchoring on UN's declaration that internet access is a basic human right, we should be
outraged at the current situation of the internet in the Philippines. Asec Lila here has
pointed out necessary policies that should be legislated if the Senate truly wants to
improve our internet. Props to Asec Lila for shedding light on PLDT's apparent
"monopolistic opportunism." It is our duty as netizens of the Philippines to demand for our
right to a decent (minimum of 5Mbps) and inexpensive (at Php243 per Mbps) internet
service (User Pierre-Luc, Shahani).
While formal domestic surveys do not seem to be available, in a country that used to be known as the
texting capital of the world, social media and the interaction between readers and journalists provides
evidence of how local people view the Internet, ISPs, and their rights. Using the UN’s declaration that
access is a human right shows that the feedback loops of normative development.
It also appears the love of social media translates well into Filipino politics. Zuckerberg hailed
President Aquino’s signature to a Connectivity Declaration on December 10, 2015, which happens to be
International Human Rights Day. The following day the President’s page posted a video, likely produced
by Facebook, which told the story of how a college graduate used Internet.org to complete her thesis in
computer science while marooned on an island after a typhoon. There is an argument to be made that
pursuing PPPs is easier, or more politically feasible, than reforming the ICT industry.
***
The Philippines is a challenge to its Freedom House categorization. While it does not regularly
violate civil rights on the net, it faces some of the most problematic issues in terms of the F2C that are not
directly a consequence of state activity. Nevertheless, there is ample evidence that the state is not
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violating the spirit of the developing norm, and that Filipino demands are line with the idea that access
should be equitable and that it should be conceived as a right.
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Chapter 5: Partly Free Cases
States contained within this category are largely moving in one of two directions, either towards
greater meaningful access on the heels of the F2C’s normative development or are being pursed simply
for economic development. Regime type and political culture are good predictors of this reaction. Mexico
and Indonesia’s placement within this category are the result of malfeasance and asymmetric
marketplaces, but there is evidence of the acceptance of the F2C by both states and their societies.
Conversely, Russia is moving away from Internet freedom.
Russia
Russia has a complicated history with human rights and democracy. Spanning two continents
but finding its identity firmly planted in neither, it has been moving away from the promise of democracy
begun in the era of glasnost and perestroika toward increased authoritarianism. In the period since this
study began, Russia’s scores for Freedom on the Net have deteriorated, moving it from Partly Free to Not
Free as of October 2015. In 2009, the state scored an overall score of 49, with Obstacles to Access
totaling 11 out of those 49 points and Limits on Content totaling 16 and Violations of Users rights totaling
22. By the 2015 report the score had jumped to 62, with limitations on content and violations of users’
rights increasing while the score for Obstacles to Access, 10, remaining static from 2014. This change in
their rank serves as an illustration of the development of the F2C. States have approached Internet
diffusion as part of the greater regime of Internet freedom or tried to maintain firm state control over users
and content. Russia has taken the latter approach as a consequence of the change in its political identity
and regime type. As an anocracy that is marching towards authoritarianism, its scores predictably
decline. Steps to test the viability of shutting off parts of the Internet, whether realistic or not, is only likely
to further devolve Russia’s score on both the Freedom House index and Polity’s data set.
Background
Demographics
Russia is among the largest and most powerful states in the world. Its status as a superpower is
questionable today after the fall of the Soviet Union, the “shock therapy” of the 1990s, and the current
economic crisis it faces. Its fall from power is being countermanded by the efforts of the Putin regime
since the late 1990s. As reported by the CIA’s World Factbook, it has a population of 142,423,773
(ranking 10th in the world) and land mass that spans 17.1 million km 2 (1st in the world). Seventy-four
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percent of its population lives in an urban area, with 6 major metropolises with populations of
approximately 1.2 million or more40. It has the 7th largest economy in the world with a GDP of $3.5
trillion. This equates to $23,700 per capita, which means that despite the size of its economy,
GDP/capita ranks 79th in the world. The country’s GDP fell between 2014 and 2015, and the GDP per
capita slipped by nearly $1,000, raising its ranking from 69th to its current position. There is a notable
disparity between the masses and the elite in the state, and government is often characterized as an
oligarchy. There have been some reports that the sanctions applied to Russia have been effective.
Instituted in response to Putin’s actions in the Crimea, the indirect pressures of sanctions against Russia
have inconvenienced many of the elites upon which Putin’s rule depends.
Looking at its ICT technologies 41, Russia has 39.4 million landlines, ranking 7th in the world. The
figure escalates for cellular phones, with 221 million in the country, placing it 7 th in the world. Freedom
House (2015) reports that the cell phone penetration rate is 155 percent, 50 percent of which are
smartphones. In total, there are 84.4 million Internet users in Russia which ranks the state 7th in the world
and totals approximately 59.3 percent of the population.
Russia has a complicated history with traditional liberal civil and political rights. Its history as an
empire and later as the Soviet Union necessitated the repeated violation of civil and political rights, and
was followed by the democratization of the state during the 1990s. The dominance of the Putin regime
since 2000 has coincided with the increasing limitations on expression and association.
The Human Rights Watch reported that in 2013 the Russian government had cracked down on
civil rights that year more than any other in all of Russia’s post-Soviet history:
The authorities have introduced a series of restrictive laws, harassed, intimidated, and in
several cases imprisoned political activists, interfered in the work of nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) and sought to cast government critics as clandestine enemies,
thereby threatening the viability of Russia's civil society," it said (Human Rights Watch
2013).
Demonstrations are technically allowed by the Kremlin but must not interfere with government business
and must be explicitly sanctioned. Internet controls were highlighted in the report, saying that the
government’s justification of censorship came from the desire to limit access to dangerous sites related to
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Moscow (capital) 12.166 million; Saint Petersburg 4.993 million; Novosibirsk 1.497 million; Yekaterinburg
1.379 million; Nizhniy Novgorod 1.212 million; Samara 1.164 million (2015)
41 CIA Factbook 2015
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assisted suicide and child pornography. Another example of Russia’s contemporary attempts to curb
dissent was its very public example of the detention of the three members of the feminist punk rock band
Pussy Riot, who were accused of hooliganism after staging protests at Orthodox cathedrals that directly
challenged the increasingly resurgent Russian Orthodox identity. Anti-propaganda bills were signed that
same year banning speech that could be used to disseminate homosexual lifestyles to minors and “the
other bill…targets religious offenders and promises to punish actions ‘demonstrating disrespect to society
and done with the goal of offending the believers' religious feelings’ (AFP).”
Despite having a long history of ties to the West and a historical desire to be considered part of it,
Russia’s relationship with civil rights little resembles its counterparts. Tracing back its relationship with
serfs, the condemnation of peasants and bourgeoisie alike in the Soviet era, and recent developments
over LGBT rights, Russia’s relationship with civil rights is highly circumscribed. Although Putin makes the
argument that citizens should be free to express their opinions, even against unpopular ideas, any
criticism or dissent must be lawful. Laws restricting rights are not limited to the potential actual harm it
might cause others, as it might be in the US under “likely and imminent” standards. Since Pussy Riot
chose the wrong place for their protests, Putin argued that their actions are legitimately curtailed by the
government (AFP). But such justifications belie other possible motivations presented by media critics, as
there is a significant resurgence of Russian nationalism, evidenced in Adi Ignatius’ biographical article42
on Putin and the regime’s justification for actions in the Crimea to protect “Russian citizens and
compatriots.” Ignatius’s portrait of Putin as a religious, patriotic leader may be a reflection of many of the
leaders of the Russian Federation and a sentiment shared by its citizens. Just as many US citizens are
willing to compromise freedom for security, contemporary Russian ideology appears to be willing to
sacrifice some of the substantive values of democracy for economic prosperity, security, and national
pride.
In terms of the F2C, the analysis is somewhat mixed. The importance of access for economic
growth is undeniable, but like some other cases in the Partly Free and Not Free categories, Russia
weighs the benefits of openness with the risks. Unlike Not Free states, Russia has not banned major
Internet search engines or social media outlets, but piecemeal censorship and other restrictions to the
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Time’s Person of the Year cover story, “A Tsar is Born (2007).”
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freedom of expression on the Internet are commonplace. This is not unlike its history with others such
norms, and calls into question the meaningfulness of access when it is provided.
The Internet in Russia
Background. As with the United States, Russia’s history with networked computing begins with
military applications. Projects in the 1950s set out to automate Soviet missile systems across the
expanse of Soviet territory. In 1961, Gerovitch (2008) reports that the Cybernetics Council of the Soviet
Academy of Sciences presented a paper regarding the potential of computing, networking, and
automation for the Soviet economy at the 21st Congress of the Communist Party. The proposals made at
the Congress were initially well-received, and “[t]he popular press began to call computers ‘machines of
communism (335).’” Similar proposals made over the course of the following decades never achieved
networking at a national level, and the “machines of communism” never manifested. Gerovitch’s purpose
in “InterNyet” was to discount common accounts given for this failure, such as the obstacles like poor
infrastructure and a lack of innovation in the ICT sector.
After Stalin’s death, the party under Khrushchev attempted to decentralize much of the Soviet
economy based on belief that innovation and competiveness were stifled in the past by the state. In
pursuing this course one of the major advantages of centralized planning—efficiency—was lost. Supply
chains became muddled, bureaucracy swelled, and output decreased. Like many Internet utopians
today, cybernetics (akin to ICTs in contemporary jargon) appeared to be a panacea. Some cyberneticists
argued that military systems that coordinated weapon deployment should be connected to the larger
Soviet infrastructure and institutions. Engineer Colonel Anatolii Kitov suggested “to link them together to
form ‘large complexes,’ or networks, and ultimately to create a ‘unified automated management system’
for the national economy (339).”
The problem became political. Reluctance stemmed from two important sectors of Soviet politics:
on the one hand, industrial managers and the government, and on the other those would have liked to
liberalize the Soviet economy further. The former feared that computerized automation would expose
inefficiencies, show managers to be redundant, and remove a fundamental basis of the government’s
power. The latter feared that increased automation would be successful at increasing efficiency, and the
re-centralization of the economy would make their argument for decreased state-control toothless.
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Nonetheless, there was pressure to continue to develop the technology in response to the parallel
developments in the US, particularly of ARPANET. The compromise did not the completely abandon the
technology, but used it in piecemeal attempts in order to make its impact less far-reaching and profound.
Ministry officials realized that there were many ways to skin the cybernetic cat without
necessarily losing their grip on power. Each ministry built its own computer centers and
developed management information systems for their internal needs. In 1971–75, the
number of such systems grew almost sevenfold, but they often used incompatible hardware
and software and did not form any cross-agency network…By accelerating the
development of branch-based incompatible systems, the ministries effectively blocked the
idea of a national computer network (Gerovitch 346).
Even early in the development of computer networks in the Soviet Union, politics and the concerns of
officials to maintain their hold on power trumped considerations of the benefits technology would bring.
Politicians and bureaucrats had as much to say on the use of technology as ICT professionals. Gerovitch
concludes that the pace and the spread of the Internet in the US were related to its political economy as
much as to its technological innovators. While the US government sponsored the creation of packetswitching, which enabled large amounts of information to be transmitted across the country, it was private
industry, free to operate beyond the scope of the government that created new uses and markets for
internetworking. Since innovation and development were shaped by Soviet politics, an equivalent
technology never developed.
Larry Press of the Information Sciences Institute of the University of South Carolina, published an
account of the role of ICT in the coup against the Soviet state in 1991. He reports with pride how a
message enabled by American technology spread the news about the deployment of Soviet tanks that
threatened that nascent movement, ending with the missive “Communists cannot rape the Mother Russia
once again!” The sentiment spread from the Demos Cooperative in Moscow to over 70 computers across
Russia in a matter of hours. This was possible because the computers were connected through
RELECOM, based in Finland. Soviet authorities attempted to stem the tide of information, the
involvement of tanks, and possible violence, but Press maintains that such attempts were abated by the
Internet, and the entire world would soon learn about the coup as it unfolded in real time. Despite pleas
from RELECOM to abate the sudden spike in traffic, messages ranging from conflict reports to missives
to loved ones peaked during these crucial hours. Press recounts that beyond the hard facts, the
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emotional support and the knowledge that the actions of the Soviet Union were being broadcast globally
were of real comfort to those living through it.
Why the Soviets did not simply unplug RELECOM is a pertinent question. “When a friend asked
why they didn't, Polina [a friend of Press in Moscow] replied "Thank Heaven, these cretins don't consider
us mass media!” In assessing the impact of the network, Press comments upon the poor communication
infrastructure in less-developed states (something that Russia certainly qualifies as during the period),
and how email/digital messages were cheap alternatives available for young professionals. Further:
As such, RELCOM may be a good model for other countries with poor telephone and
postal systems, little capital, and well educated, motivated young professionals.
Networks like RELCOM, probably using satellite technology, may change the face of the
earth in peace time as well as helping to keep the peace.
The analysis in 1991 is typical of what Morozov characterizes as Internet utopianism as such enthusiasm
is typical for that time period. Relatively new technologies that are popularly available invites hopeful
analysis of the potential of them to bring about change in ways that were unfathomable before its
availability. Yet analyses of the impact of “revolutionary” technologies like the telegraph, radio, television,
etc. reveal that governments have a learning curve. It may take time for states to realize the threats
posed by new technologies to the status quo, but will adapt as they see fit. “The cretins” may not have
seen the impact of RELECOM in 1991, but authoritarian and semi-authoritarian governments have a way
of catching up.
It took the implosion of the USSR to bring the Internet as we know it today to Russia. The
gradual replacement of the incompatible UUCP with TCP/IP allowed computers in Russia to be able to
network with the greater World Wide Web. The Internet gradually became available during the 1990s in
major Russian cities.
One of the most important lessons of this look into Soviet/Russian history with networked
computing is its fierce relationship with the state. Gerovitch writes:
Recent scholarship on the “co-construction” of users and technology emphasizes the role
of users in defining, modifying, redesigning, and resisting new technologies, and also
explores the effects of technology on the definition and transformation of the user (347).
The introduction of technology is not linear, but operates in a feedback loop. Like the cyberneticists of the
Soviet Union, the users of technology in Russia today are met by those who would desire to transform the
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technology to their own ends. This is especially evident in Russia’s actions in violations of users’ rights
and limitations on content, but also in regard to access.
These sentiments are echoed in an article from 2005 analyzing how the Russian state interacted
with the development of popular Internet usage in the country. Alexander sets out to answer the question
of how states like Russia as an anocracy—avoiding the extremes of actual democracy and its former
authoritarian status under the Soviet Union—makes use of the potential liberalizing effects of media like
the Internet. The expectation shared by many Internet utopians was that transitioning states like Russia
would benefit from the increase in the availability of information which would weaken state control of the
media in the short-term and increase demands for civil and political rights. In actuality, Freedom House
reported that between 1995 and 2003, increased popular use of the Internet coincided with decreased
freedoms for Russian citizens.
Alexander outlines two methods the Russian Federation has used to “control” the Internet. Initial
response was Soviet-esque: reactionary attempts to regulate the medium through the lens of national
security and evading foreign influence.
…the laws set up a precedent of the government’s justification for active control of the
Internet by the process of registration, the creation of government bodies to monitor and
guide development of the industry, and the delineation and qualification of rights (even
constitutional) when applied to the Internet (615).
ISPs that could not meet the Federal Security Service’s demands to install expensive “spying hardware”
were made ineligible for licenses that allow them to provide services to citizens. Some 90 percent of the
360 ISP subproviders were made ineligible in 1999. By limiting the number of providers, the state made
Internet penetration slower and ultimately left the development of the Russian economy in the lurch.
Since Putin took office, the Russian Federation has taken a more proactive approach to
controlling its citizens’ relationship with the Internet. Trying then to join the WTO, Russia’s Internet
regulation was necessary in order to achieve the levels of penetration that would lead to economic
growth, but such expansion required government involvement. Examples include anyone seeking a
domain name with .ru would require to have it registered through Rospatent which also handles things
like trademark and patent applications. The Kremlin also adopted the E-Russia plan in 2001 that would
use $2.1 billion to promote the growth the Internet in key areas like security, e-commerce, and equal
access to ICTs in the classroom (Nefedov and Boreiko). Alexander reports that few Russians surveyed in
137

2003 either cared or even knew about the plan, while Nefedov and Boreiko report that the sector of
Russian society most excited by the plans was the business community. "’It is excellent that the program
has finally been adopted. It sets out how the country should use IT to increase the effectiveness of the
economy,’ said Olga Dergunova, head of Microsoft's local representative office (Nefedov and Boreiko).”
The survey respondents in 2003 indicated that users were relatively uninterested in whether the state
could provide further at home computer or Internet access, but were primarily concerned with going
online in schools and hospitals.
In 2000, the Kremlin developed Internet Security Doctrine. The state should not just become one
half of a PPP as the UN describes, but should instead be the engineer of Internet development in the
state and this principle is used in Russian attempts to expand broadband penetration to this day.
Second, there were to be clear limits of Russian citizens’ rights on the Internet; the possibility of
liberalization of the media or freedom of expression on the web was limited. Alexander concludes that
Russia does not have to use tactics like overt censorship (although it certainly does), but represents a
new type of relationship between the state and the apparent nebulous medium: “The development of
Russian Internet policy shows that transition regimes have a third option: to promote Internet access and
ISP proliferation, and then use the Internet for direct and indirect propaganda (624).”
Speed and cost. Today, access in Russia is expanding but its meaningfulness is hampered by
speed. Twenty-seven percent of the Russian Federation’s population had access in 2008 versus 61
percent by 2013. Over half of the population accesses the Internet on a daily basis, but this number is
significantly below the number of US households that have access (72 percent). Costs are relatively low
with speeds of 51 Mbps costing users $14 per month. Numbeo confirms this figure; 10 Mbps costs
approximately $5.71, or 1.08 percent of a monthly salary. In all, Akamai reports that in the fourth quarter
of 2015, average speeds across the country were 11.6 Mbps, placing Russia 33 rd in the world and
increasing its speed 30 percent from the previous year. A new law enacted in March 2014 required
telecommunication access in every Russian settlement with a population of over 250 people. Such
moves appear to be in accordance with the norm of the F2C, but is realistically a consequence of the
realities of the global economy. Despite the law, Freedom House reports that 1,343 settlements have no
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Internet in 2015. While this statistic is likely to decrease, it is a contributor to the Russia’s score for
Obstacles to Access.
Broadband is widely available in major Russian metropolises. Some of the results of testmy.net
as of April 2016 are laid out below.
Table 6 Reported Internet speeds in Russian cities
(Testmy.net 12 April 2016)
City (Region)
Moscow
Omsk
Novosibirsk (Siberia)
Vladivostok (Primorsky Krai, Far
Eastern Russia)
Yakutsk (Sakha (Yakutia) Republic, Far
Eastern Russia)
Norilsk (Krasnoyarsk Krai, Arctic Circle)

Downstream
13.7 Mbps
6.5 Mbps
4.7 Mbps
2.8 Mbps

Upstream
6.5 Mbps
6.4 Mbps
2.8 Mbps
1.9 Mbps

2.2 Mbps

775 Kbps

373 Kbps

404 Kbps

As with other cases, the father from cities one travels in Russia, the slower the speeds.
As reported by the Internet and Democracy Project (see Epstein et al 2009), the Public Opinion
Foundation (FOM group, Фонд Общественное Мнение) has collected statistics on Internet penetration in
Russia since 2003. In its most recent report (Spring 2015), the digital divide between major metropolises
and Russia’s vastness still dominates the statistics.
Table 7 Dynamics of Internet penetration by Russian federal districts
FOM report, “Internet in Russia” (2015)
Dynamics of
Internet
penetration by
Federal
Districts in%

Type of settlement

Central

Northwest

South and
North
Caucasus

Volga

Uralian

Siberian

Far
Eastern

Spring 2003

11

14

5

5

9

5

7

Winter 20142015
Spring 2015

65

69

63

58

66

62

63

67

71

65

61

67

63

66
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Table 8 Dynamics of Internet penetration by Russian settlement type
Reproduced from FOM report, “Internet in Russia” (2015)
Dynamics of
Internet
penetration by
type of
settlement, in
%

Type of settlement

Moscow

St.
Petersburg

Cities
>1
million+

Cities
500,0001 million

Cities
100,000500,000

Cities
>100,000

Villages

Winter 20142015
Spring 2015

76

75

69

66

69

63

51

77

80

70

71

70

64

54

FOM is the only source of up-to-date statistics of the Internet’s penetration inside the Federation. While
access has increased since the first report, two problems are evident. First, nowhere in the report does
the FOM qualify the type of Internet access; whether citizens rely on broadband, mobile, or dial-up access
determines the meaningfulness of access, and such concerns would acknowledge the recognition of the
problem of meaningfulness of access. Second, the FOM group itself is a subsidiary of Russian Public
Opinion Research Center, a government-owned and run institution. Statistics may be inflated or there
may be other inconsistences for which no account can be made.
Another piece of the puzzle to be examined is smartphones. Google’s Our Mobile Planet
reported that in 2013, 36.2 percent of the total Russian population owned a smartphone, up from previous
years at 19.4 percent in 2012 and 25.1 percent in 2011. The percentage in 2015 was 50 percent
according to Freedom House. From a respondent base of 1,000, the report indicates that 86 percent of
users with smartphones use them to access the web daily. The report indicates that while 66 percent use
Wi-Fi to connect in their homes, 57 percent of those users use their mobile data service plan. While the
study is enlightening, 96 percent of the 1,000 respondents were from urban areas. Most were welleducated with university degrees, employed, and middle class. Additionally, the World Bank reports that
smartphone penetration is not a good indicator of Internet penetration, as it might be in the US. “…the
ratio between mobile telephony subscriptions and mobile broadband subscriptions indicates that not more
than 40 percent of total mobile telephony subscribers are signed up for mobile broadband services in
Russia (Rossotto et al. 20).” While the reports continue to say that there is potential in this market to
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expand broadband and Internet adoption among the high rate mobile telephone users in Russia, so far
ownership is not a good indicator of access.
Information on the cost of broadband in different parts of Russia is difficult to ascertain, and what
is available is somewhat outdated. Alexey Sidorenko produced a 2010 study on the cost of broadband in
Russia’s provinces and territories and found that cost varied widely. Unlike in the US, where ISPs
generally charge the same amount of money for equivalent connection speeds due in part to the FCC’s
initiatives in 2005, there is no such government direction to do so in Russia. Central and western parts of
Russia enjoy Internet speeds of 1 Mbps at considerably lower rates than provinces that are far removed
from major cities or transit lines. Cities with cheap broadband had greater competition and multiple ISPs.
In 2010, the city of Norilsk in Russia’s Far East had the highest cost of broadband at $180 per month and
had only four ISPs. Some of his cases were instead using 256 Kbps connections (dial-up speeds), but
the report does not indicate what percentage. Since the US case has shown that dial-up persists in
remote areas, it is safe to presume that the percentage mirrors or exceeds the American case of 2
percent. Sidorenko also measured costs of access in relativity to average citizens’ salaries. The most
populous areas have the most meaningful access at the best prices. ICT infrastructure is often built
alongside preexisting infrastructure, especially rail lines. If a village is traditionally underserved by
infrastructure, and there is no financial incentive for private enterprise to invest in a particular locale, it will
be relatively ignored.
Unnamed broadband plan. Russian policy aimed towards increasing broadband availability
began in 2012 with a plan enacted for the proceeding five years. Based largely on the work of Russia’s
largest ISP, Rostelecom, the plan relies on the extension of existing fiber-optic infrastructure, stating they
would lay out 200,000 kilometers of new fiber lines. Satellite and mobile technologies would be put in
place for rural and remote regions that would enable mobile broadband. Nikolay Nikiforov, the Minister of
Telecom and Mass Communications, presented Russia’s plans to expand connections at a speech at
Moscow University, and plans were made into an infographic reproduced below:
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Figure 1 Infographic of unnamed Russian broadband plan
(Ministry of Telecom and Mass Communication)

The highlights of the plan are the assertions that by 2018, 5 million households would have access to
state-of-the-art speeds of 100Mbps, and that 80 percent of the population would be ‘”satisfied with
connectivity.” The latter is vague; one might assume this satisfaction would be in response to protests
over the digital divide that erupted in the 2000s (see Asmolov). The plan calls for a simplification of
regulation of the ICT industry (further centralization?), allowing radio frequencies to be adapted for mobile
technologies like 4G, and 97 percent of localities with at least 250 people would have broadband by 2019.
Five new ICT-oriented development complexes or “technoparks,” would be built that would increase
Russian programmers employment from today’s 350,000 to at least one million.
Nikiforov’s remarks about the importance of the increase in availability is largely economic in
nature. He paid lip-service to the importance of access to information, social networks, and
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entertainment, but these were largely eclipsed by the main thrust of his argument43. He remarked that a
10 percent increase in Internet availability would equate to a 1.5 percent increase in the state’s GDP
which is at the heart of many broadband projects in liberal and illiberal states. He said that “due to the
fast development of information technologies the youth has huge prospects for personal development and
self-fulfillment and it’s important not to miss these opportunities.” Such sentiments echo the pragmatic
necessity of the Internet to make global competiveness feasible in the 21 st century, but the rights
component of the F2C is largely absent.
In a May 2015, Nikiforov updated the Federal Agency of Communications (Rossvyaz) on the
deployment of broadband and satellites to deal with digital inequality. The intended audience was
bureaucrats, but the speech centered around two ideas regarding the effort: cost and technological
nationalism. Part of the allocated budget for universal telecom reform for the buildout of cable had been
redirected to other purposes but the Minister promised those funds would be replaced. Further, the
dependency on foreign-constructed satellites has been due to the uncompetitive pricing made by
Russian-made ones; “Our country posses [sic] significant power in sphere of space communications and
it should assume better position on the global stage.“
Internet Service Providers
The characteristics of Russia’s ISPs are indicative of the quality and meaningfulness of access
for Russian citizens. Russia’s ISP market share is highly skewed, with only handful of companies with a
lion’s share of the marketplace:
According to the most current data available, the six largest providers occupy 77.1
percent of the market: the state-owned provider Rostelecom controls 38.6 percent of the
market, while the rest is divided among ER-Telecom, VimpleCom, MTS, Trantelecom and
AKADO. The mobile communications market is even less diverse, with the four biggest
operators—MTS, Megafon, VimpleCom and Tele2—together controlling 92 percent of the
market (Freedom House 2014 644)
Additionally, a 2013 concept paper from the Ministry of Communication would require ISPs to purchase
foreign Internet traffic directly from state-controlled service providers. The centralization of transboundary
traffic would further ensure state control of content, and would indirectly limit the number of ISPs due to
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“’The Internet provides not just an access to information, social networks and entertainment. It’s also an
opportunity to get public services in electronic form, to organize business and interact with business
partners, sell your production throughout the world and increase the quality of education,’ said the Minister.”
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the burdensome financial requirements. By the time of the Freedom House’s report 2014, only
Rostelecom could meet these standards.
Rostelecom is a state-owned ISP that provides not only Internet, but telephone and cable
services across Russia and other European states. It has the greatest market share of all ISPs in Russia
(36 percent) and is owned by the Russian state despite being a publicly-traded company. Much of the
spread of connectivity in the next few years is dependent upon the infrastructure that Rostelecom owns.
Their website reports on several “strategic projects” whose interests are more in line with those of the
government than their customers. Among these include a “Digital Government” project that attempts to
streamline citizens’ access to government services, running the information systems of many of Russia’s
public institutions, the Sochi 2014 Olympics, and web monitoring of polling stations. Unmentioned on its
website (which is curiously outdated), Rostelecom also takes part in blacklisting websites ordered by the
central government, as the discussion below will detail.
ISP and ICT sector regulation is carried out by executive decree that gives regulators extensive
authority. The Ministry of Communication and Mass Media, which is headed by Nikolay Nikiforov,
controls the Federal Service for Supervision in the Sphere of Telecom, Information Technologies, and
Mass Communications (Roskomnadzor). Freedom House states that “The regulatory body has the
authority to determine if a website should be blocked based on whether or not the site contains material
that is restricted by the law; these decisions do not require prior court approval (645).” The head of the
agency (currently Alexander Zharzov) is appointed by executive decree, and generally the appointee
follows the dictates of the Kremlin.
State Restrictions of the Internet
Von Twickel remarked in 2009 that the web was one of the final bastions of free speech in an
environment in which other telecommunications media like television and newspapers were becoming
increasingly brought under the control of the Kremlin. As in China and Iran, ISPs in Russia are regularly
used as tools by the government to regulate content. The Moscow Times, an English-language
newspaper started for foreigners living in Russia, reported in 2009 that the central government had
already been regularly blocking sites that it defined as extremist. While not strictly related to the F2C, the
control of content providers resembles historical actions to restrict the press. “In November, we got an
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order from prosecutors recommending that we close access to extremist sites,” [WiMax chief executive
Denis Sverdlov] said in e-mailed comments. “Since we are a law-abiding firm, we put the order into
practice.” Blocked sites include advocates of the Bolshevik Party and Chechen rebel website
Kavkazcenter.com.
Licensing regulations further illustrate how the government uses its authority to limit the
meaningfulness of access. Freedom House (2015) reports that:
Under current legislation, in order to receive an operating license, ISPs are required to
install equipment that allows security services to monitor internet traffic. ISPs that do not
comply with SORM system requirements are promptly fined, and may have their license
revoked if problems persist. Russian authorities are technically required to obtain a court
order before accessing an individual’s electronic communications data; however, the
authorities are not required to show the warrant to ISPs or telecom providers, and FSB
officers have direct access to operators’ servers through local control centers. At the
same time, experts note that there is no information about government efforts to bring to
account security officers who abuse tracking methods. ISPs and mobile operators are
required to provide network access to law enforcement agencies in conducting search
operations, as well as provide other information requested by the prosecutor’s office, the
Interior Ministry, the FSB and the Investigative Committee (660).
Unlike the US case, where the PRISM program is enabled with the voluntary cooperation of ISPs and
search engines, the monitoring equipment is a requirement for providers under the mandate of FSB. The
Guardian reports in “Inside the Red Web” that SORM further differs from the PRISM program in that it
dates back to the days of the KGB. Before Putin came to power, journalists and Internet media activists
attempted to contact FASPI workers for further information. In 1998, cryptologist Vika Egorova obtained
a draft document that was marked “approved” that described SORM and through her private contacts had
it published online by a Russian libertarian Anatoly Levenchuk. It was discovered that SORM was really
SORM-2, successor to the KGB program that tapped telephone lines.
“Big, old-fashioned tape recorders turned on at the beginning of a conversation and
started recording,” [SORM expert Boris Goldstein] recalled. “All of this was done in
secret… In other words, the methods of Sorm directly descended from when no one
thought of court-approved warrants — from the Soviet system of phone wiretapping.
ISPs have put up little resistance to the SORM project, and mostly complained of the financial burdens of
the required equipment rather than the violations of their consumers’ rights or the autonomy of their
business. Levenchuk gave up the crusade against SORM when none of the ISPs resisted, tacitly
accepting the limitation of democratic freedoms on the web.
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Monitoring practices continue. “The lack of precise guidelines sometimes leads telecom
operators, which are responsible for complying with blocking orders, to carry out the widest blocking
possible so as to avoid fines and threats to their licenses (Freedom House 2015, 654).” Operated by a
search engine owned by the Russian state, Sputnik News reported in 2013 that three smaller ISPs were
brought to Supreme Arbitration Court and fined 30,000 rubles (US$1,000) for “violating the terms of a
license for entrepreneurial activity.” They had violated a 2012 law that blacklisted websites that
threatened the safety of citizens, including those related to drugs, suicide, and child pornography.
Rostelecom controls the blacklist, but Novosti notes that it is only half-heartedly enforced and these small
ISPs may have been made examples of to serve as a warning. The concerns over these websites and
the downloading of copyrighted content is not the responsibility of the user; instead ISPs and search
engines must control how the content they provide is used.
These policies are indicative of larger patterns among the government, ISPs, search engines,
content providers, and the public. Moskvitch reports in 2013 on the backlash against such anti-piracy
efforts mirrored the debate surrounding the US’s now defunct Stop Online Piracy Act. US lawmakers
were pressuring Russian law enforcement to crack down on piracy where sharing entertainment files for
free is as prevalent as Netflix is in the US. Torrent Freak, founded by an independent activist who
identifies himself as Ernesto Van Der Sar, comments that the law was really a new means of censorship.
The Russian Pirate Party stated "Access to online content should be free and global, because it is
people's right to freely receive and distribute information, as well as it is their right to consume art
(Moskvitch).” The Russian-based Pirate Party a bottom-up normative venture to fight the censorship and
fight over artistic intellectual property including movies, music, and the like—has affiliates in many other
states. Yandex comments that the censorship measures are "directed not at fighting pirates, but at the
internet itself - and it's almost like permanently closing down a highway where one accident occurred
(Moskvitch)."
The Guardian also reports policy proposals circulating about a Russian intranet 44 that would
unplug Russia from the greater World Wide Web. The rhetoric justifying the moves is anti-American and
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An intranet is “[a] private network that uses Internet software and Internet standards. In essence, an Intranet is
a private Internet reserved for use by people who have been given the authority and passwords necessary
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techno-nationalist, asserting a need to ensure that an integral part of Russian infrastructure remains
under state control. Cyber sovereignty, a norm emerging from authoritarian states that can be seen as a
reaction to the F2C, was not stated by the Russian state but is evident in this scheme. Despite being
reminiscent of the Cold War, it was uncovered that the US’s PRISM program had spied on world leaders
(Germany, Brazil, and several others), and as such fears of American actions on the web are not
unfounded. Nevertheless, it can be seen as a window of opportunity to again increase state control over
the Internet regardless of the scope of the threat. Combined with the fact that many of the state’s ISPs
are state-owned or highly tied to the state, like Rostelecom, and that Russia has relatively few IXPs, it
would be fairly easily to greatly restrict the Internet in Russia. However, as many smaller ISPs have
purchased access from the outside it could not do so entirely. It would also take over direct control of
national domains from .ru, .su, and Cyrillic .рф; today domains must be registered through the Russian
bureaucracy for approval.
Freedom House (2015) reports that in the summer of 2014, the Ministry of Communication, along
with the Ministries of Defense, the Interior, and the FSB conducted a joint experiment to test if they could
disconnect Russia from the global Internet. Domains ending in .ru and .рф were shut off at their server
locations in Moscow, Novosibirsk, NY, Amsterdam, and Hong Kong. Officially the tests were to develop
policy in the case the Internet was cut off from the outside, citing fears over US control of the Internet, but
journalists uncovered that the experiment was also meant to test the feasibility of turning off the Internet
from the inside. According to Harding, the impetus for such tests is concerns over possible civil unrest
stemming from oligarchic abuses and a floundering economy. The influence of the Arab Spring—and the
resultant chaos—is impossible to ignore.
Domestic Attitudes towards Access and Policy
The global surveys reviewed in this study all address the opinions of Russians dating back to
2008. Kull et al. (2008) show that 64 percent of Russians believe that it is important that the news can
publish what they want without governmental control, 57 percent believe that they should be able to read
whatever they want on the web without restriction, and that 56 percent argue that the government should

to use that network. Those people are typically employees and often customers of a company (Newton
612).”
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not be able to restrict these rights arbitrarily. GlobeScan (2010) showed that Russian Internet users are
technology-dependent, 71 percent reported they could not live without being connected and that 58
percent of them believe that the most important use for the medium is to find information. Fifty-two
percent believe that the Internet should not be subject to any regulation. Internet Society’s 2012 survey
revealed yet again that public had great expectations for the government and the provision of access,
with 83 percent remarking that it should provide cheaper computers, 82 percent arguing that should
encourage competition among providers, and 81 percent saying that the government had an obligation to
provide access.
Eighty-seven percent of the survey respondents argued that Internet access should be
considered a right, 88 percent argued that freedom of expression should be guaranteed, and 81 percent
said that freedoms of association and assembly were enhanced by access. Only 49 percent would
accept increased controls in exchange for safety, and 62 percent argued for the right of government to set
whatever Internet policies it wished. In Pew’s 2015 survey on the freedom of expression on the Internet,
79 percent of Russians agreed that it was either somewhat or very important to maintain the principle. It
is apparent from these surveys that government policy and citizens’ beliefs about the role of Internet in
their lives and the government are divergent.

***
The move of Russia from Partly Free to Not Free was predictable, and is tied more to its efforts to
censor ideas and control discourse on the web than its efforts directly related to the F2C. Its assertion of
cyber sovereignty and its testing of shutting of parts of its Internet infrastructure are symbolic of the
greater moves away from democracy and towards authoritarianism. Yet, unlike cases in the Not Free
category, the state utilizes some of the language associated with the F2C, which includes not only
equality of opportunity but also the freedom of expression, even if only half-heartedly.
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Mexico
Mexico’s experience with the Internet resembles Brazil, Indonesia and other states that have
attempted to increase overall levels of access and to bridge the digital divide between urban and rural,
young and old, and the wealthy and impoverished. The state has taken measures including amending its
constitution in 2013 to recognize Internet access as a civil right. Yet the telecommunications market is
dominated by six ISPs, one of which is owned by the second richest man in the world and enjoys de facto
monopoly status. Another major problem concerning Internet freedom are digital journalists who cover
drug cartels that often become targets of retribution. While the government signed a law to protect them
in 2012, it is not strictly enforced, which lowers Mexico’s Freedom House score. The desire to become a
technological “hub” in Latin American is overshadowed by the concentration of power and the plague of
violence that threatens the lives of activists, journalists, and politicians.
Background
Mexico is a moderately large and powerful state. It has a population of 121,736,809 (12th in the
world), and takes up an area of 1,964,375 km 2 (14h in the world). It has a large urban population,
encompassing 79.2 percent of its population, with six major metropolises with about two million people or
more45, including Mexico City, one of the largest city proper and metropolitan areas in the world. The
state is characterized by socioeconomic divisions among its 32 states/districts, with the richest including
the Federal District and those located along the US border and the poorest concentrated in the south.
Mexico’s annual GDP is $2.149 trillion, ranking it 12th in the world, with a GDP per capita is $18,000,
ranking the state 90th in the world.
Mexico has 21.1 million landlines, ranking it 14th in the world; one phone is plugged in for
approximately every 18 people in the country. The figure escalates for cellular phones, with 102.2 million
in the country, placing it 14th in the world. In total, there are 49.5 million Internet users in Mexico which
ranks the state 12th in absolute numbers, and totals 41.1 percent of the population. Users are
concentrated in major cities where infrastructure is widely available.

45

Mexico City (capital) 20.999 million; Guadalajara 4.843 million; Monterrey 4.513 million; Puebla 2.984 million;
Toluca de Lerdo 2.164 million; Tijuana 1.987 million (2015)
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Mexico had a tumultuous history with democracy in its early years and had been dominated by a
single, sometimes corrupt, political party for the majority of the 20th century. Liberal norms have
nonetheless developed, first having been used instrumentally since independence in 1821 and developed
and matured as evidenced by its various constitutions. Since the 1917 revolution, protected rights have
been largely socioeconomic in nature, including environmental protections, rights to health and education,
and indigenous rights. Johnston admits that protecting cultural rights against globalization is more difficult
in the concrete than the abstract, but nonetheless Mexico should be considered, at least legally, as a
bastion for “lovers of liberty.” More difficult is implementation: “Even though every Mexican has at reach
procedural tools such as the amparo, recourse before the Human Rights Commission, claims for
patrimonial responsibility of the State, etc., the reality proves that there is a big gap between the letter of
the law and its implementation (Johnston).” Instead, poverty and underdevelopment hinder the
meaningful application of human rights standards. The “will and opportunity” for people to implement
human rights is largely missing in an undereducated, underemployed populace. The political climate of
Mexico has been a challenge to the application of human rights throughout its history. The near total
dominance of the PRI, and the current overwhelming corruption of the political and police systems due to
the influence of drug cartels, creates a vast divide between what human rights have been articulated and
what can actually be achieved.
The Internet in Mexico
Background. Mexico’s history with the Internet begins in academia. The National Autonomous
University of Mexico (UNAM) had the first computer in Latin America in 1958, and its purpose was to
support computation for intensive fields like applied mathematics, physics, and engineering. The
geographic advantage of proximity to the US allowed the institution to rent the computer for 25 pesos per
month from the University of California, the same institution that would be instrumental in the creation of
ARPANET. Unlike other cases explored, such as Indonesia, UNAM institutionalized the use of computers
not only for academic computations but also administrative purposes, bypassing the tradition of
networking being a pastime for academic ICT experts and enthusiasts.
In 1982 UNAM connected to ARPANET. By 1986, UNAM had networked computers across
academic facilities that is generally the precursor to further international connections. In 1987, the
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University of Monterrey was connected to BITNET, and by 1990 UNAM established a 56 Kbps satellite
link to the Internet with the University of Colorado, Boulder. By the early 1990s, academic institutions
came together to promote the Internet and establish some of the necessary infrastructure; MEXNET, AC
established the first national backbone and began to shape the idea of the popular use the Internet
outside academia. By 1994 the Internet was legalized for commercial use, and the Centro de Información
de Redes de México (NIC) was given the task of assigning domain names, .mx, starting with 150
addresses in academia and later expanding to businesses.
Mexico’s expansion of the Internet into residential and commercial markets included the
consolidation of what became hundreds of ISPs into Telmex, which at the time was the government-run
monopoly of telecommunications industry. Today, it is a subsidiary of América Móvil, owned by magnate
Carlos Slim who incidentally studied civil engineering at UNAM when computers and networks were
getting their start.
Speed and cost. Access is limited in Mexico according to several criteria: geography, education,
and age. The CIA reports the total penetration rate of 41.1 percent of the population, while the ITU
(based on the statistics provided by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI)) reported
44.39 percent in 2014. Speeds in Mexico appear to be slow but not crippling, with an average download
speed of 5.9 Mbps in Q4 2015 and an average peak speed of 29.9 Mbps, with each statistic improving
about improving between 20 and 30 percent over the same quarter in 2014 (Akamai). Speeds vary
greatly according to one’s location in Mexico. Below are reported cities across the country:
Table 9 Reported Internet speeds by Mexican city
(testmy.net 12 April 2016)
City (State)

Downstream

Upstream

18.1 Mbps

5.1 Mbps

Hermosillo (Sonora)

7.2 Mbps

1.5 Mbps

Tijuana (Baja California)

6.4 Mbps

1.1 Mbps

Veracruz (Veracruz)

6.2 Mbps

1.9 Mbps

Chilpancingo (Guerrero)

4.4 Mbps

498 Kbps

Tuxtla Guiterrez (Chipas)

3.5 Mbps

293 Kbps

Oaxaca (Oaxaca)

1.6 Mbps

345 Kbps

Mexico City (Distrito Federo)

Numbeo estimates costs to be $21.89 per month for 10 Mbps, or about 3.79% of net monthly income,
within range of the UN target.
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Penetration and geographic divide. Mobile penetration in Mexico is relatively good for a
developing state but is far less than most developed states; 83 percent of Mexicans have cell phones,
while 40 percent have access to mobile broadband, usually 3G or better. Smartphone use is increasing
because of lower costs and the gradual introduction of competition like Nextel and AT&T. A subsidiary of
América Móvil Telcel introduced 4G-LTE capability in late 2012 in partnership with Ericsson in nine major
cities. Today, more than fifty cities use 4G service from Telcel, but rural areas of Mexico remain
underserved (Sensorly). AT&T announced coverage plans in five cities in 2015. In its announcement,
the AT&T CEO in Mexico framed the extension of service as positive for economic growth. Nonetheless,
mobile penetration remains concentrated in major cities with industrial capacities; outside, it appears that
2G coverage or above is difficult to come by (Sensorly).
The INEGI published a raw data set on Internet use that was the result of a survey of Internet use
across Mexico in early 2013. Los microdatos del Módulo sobre Disponibilidad y Uso de Tecnologías de
la Información en los Hogares (MODUTIH)46 survey was published in 2014 and contained data on almost
130,000 respondents, including questions relating to both computer and Internet use, frequency, location,
and reasons for use. To begin, of the total number of respondents, 50.24 percent answered they had
used the Internet within the last 12 months, while 49.76 percent had not. Of those that did, nearly half
(49.66 percent) used it on a daily basis, meaning they likely had a direct connection in their home or used
a smartphone. Forty-three percent used it a least once a week, while 6.68 percent had accessed the
Internet once per month. Less than 1 percent reported using the Internet infrequently when they had
reported using it at all, with 0.83 percent reporting use at least once every six months and 0.22 percent at
least once a year. The report also outlined where they accessed the Internet:

46

Availability and Use of Information Technologies in the Household.
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Table 10 Location of Internet access in Mexico
(INENGI)
Location
First Choice
Second Choice*
Third Choice*
Home
56.84%
13.00%
3.94%
Work
10.91%
30.99%
2.19%
School
5.90%
24.76%
11.42%
Public site (for a fee)
22.52%
19.96%
24.51%
Public site (free)
0.92%
4.16%
26.92%
In the house of another 2.58%
5.96%
23.17%
person
Other
0.32%
1.18%
7.85%
*Only 37.12% of survey respondents had a second choice for where they access the Internet and only
4.13% had a third avenue of access.
Public sites, free or otherwise, are common avenues of access for those of lower socioeconomic status.
They are supplied both by NGOs and government initiatives.
As has been explored in other cases, Mexico faces a geographic divide among its states. There
is a reported 26 percent difference between people who have accessed the Internet in 12 months among
the 31 states and the federal district in Mexico—a considerable range—summarized below:
Table 11 Survey participants reporting on Internet use in the last 12 months, by Mexican state
(INENGI)
State
Sonora
Distrito Federal
Baja California
Colima
Baja California Sur
Nuevo Léon
~~~
Oaxaca
San Luis Potosí
Veracruz de Ignacio de Llave
Tlaxcala
Guerrero
Chiapas

Yes
62.54%
61.64%
61.28%
59.39%
57.57%
57.16%

No
37.35%
38.36%
38.57%
40.49%
42.26%
42.84%

43.36%
41.90%
41.04%
40.74%
39.95%
36.47%

56.49%
57.19%
58.89%
59.19%
60.03%
63.51%

States that reported high rates of Internet use tend to be among the richer ones in Mexico that
specialize in industrial production and the service industry over agriculture. Sonora and Baja California’s
proximity to the US mean that maquiladoras47, a contentious albeit popular area of employment are rather

47

“…a factory that enjoys special tax breaks. When Mexico set up the first maquiladoras half a century ago, they
were sweatshops that simply bolted or stitched together imported parts, then exported the assembled
product north across the border to the United States. America got cheap goods; Mexico got jobs and export
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common, and could explain both the availability of the Internet and the high rates of use. The Distrito
Federal is made up of Mexico City proper and its metropolitan area, and is known to be Mexico’s
“economic and cultural hub (History 2010),” enjoying a GDP per capita that is the highest of any city in
Latin America. The states reporting the lowest use of the Internet—Tlaxcala, Guerrero, and Chiapas—
share two important features. First, they are economically driven by agriculture, a feature that many
under-connected regions share amongst all the cases examined in this study. They also have minor
manufactures (textiles) and are supported by tourism. Second, they are populated by indigenous,
traditionally marginalized groups which is another feature of poor Internet access that is shared across
the cases in this study. Indeed, Guerrero and Chiapas are continually plagued by violence perpetrated by
both drug cartels in pursuit of profit and guerilla Zapatistas in pursuit of autonomy.
The survey also included a question addressing why people do not use the Internet. As has been
explored in much of the literature on the digital divide, access is not simply about the physical existence
of infrastructure, but includes concerns over speed, cost, and ability for users to understand computers
and software.
Table 12 Mexican survey participants reporting why they do not use the Internet
(INENGI)
State

Do not know
how to use

No access

Other

50.30%
57.63%
50.04%
46.58%
45.82%
57.00%

No need/
Usefulness
unknown
40.88%
35.41%
39.53%
63.84%
41.39%
28.83%

Sonora
Baja California
Distrito Federal
Colima
Baja California Sur
Nuevo Léon
~~~
Oaxaca
San Luis Potosí
Veracruz
Tlaxcala
Guerrero
Chiapas

8.01%
6.43%
9.51%
9.71%
11.56%
12.94%

0.67%
0.52%
0.92%
1.37%
1.07%
1.22%

48.79%
49.53%
56.39%
43.25%
64.14%
60.08%

45.62%
41.77%
36.34%
46.19%
29.26%
33.01%

5.192%
8.35%
6.81%
9.74%
6.43%
6.78%

0.40%
0.34%
0.39%
0.87%
0.16%
0.10%

Unfortunately, the survey did not address the issue of prohibitive cost. The lack of direct access is not a
primary cause of why people do not use the Internet; it presumes that the other two reasons most often

revenues. [Today,] the maquiladoras are having to up their game, moving into more sophisticated types of
manufacturing and doing more product design (The Economist 2013b)

154

reported—digital illiteracy and lack of interest—were overcome. There are slightly more people that
reported digital illiteracy in states that reported low access frequency, but the number of people who had
little interest or need in the Internet remained remarkably similar across the states. There is a correlation
in the US among age, socioeconomic status, and the desire to use the Internet; in 2015 Pew reported 39
percent of adults did not go online were 65 or older compared to just 3 percent between ages 18-29
(Whitney). Presumably this relationship between age and desire for access exists in Mexico as well.
Additionally, with the increase in availability, more people will find uses for the Internet in ways than are
currently unimagined. The lack of knowledge is one of the most important barriers to be overcome, or as
Sujarwoto and Gindo Tampubolon (2013) suggest, proliferation of the Internet will exacerbate, rather than
reduce socioeconomic inequities thereby putting those with deficiencies in education, language, or skills
further behind their counterparts.
Humberto Merritt studied the digital divide in Mexico (2011), discussing the factors that primarily
and secondarily affect Internet diffusion and the hits and misses of the Mexican government’s efforts to
reduce it. Reviewing the literature, Merritt recounts much of what this study has already discussed:
affluence, urbanization, and education levels all have great predictive power about people’s access and
use of the Internet. The more symmetrical the marketplace and the lack of burdensome regulation, along
with factors like age and ethnicity, also have roles to play in determining Internet diffusion. The important
barriers in Mexico in particular are the following:
1) Lack of any digital experience caused by individual (or collective) apathy, computer
fear and unattractiveness of the new technology.
2) No possession of computers and network connections.
3) Lack of digital skills caused by insufficient user-friendliness and inadequate education
or social support.
4) Lack of significant usage opportunities (127).
The temptation to paint the first barrier as temporary and isolated is compelling, particularly to think that
disinterest lies with the elderly, housewives, the illiterate, or the unemployed. But such estimations are
largely due to biases from a developed state’s perspective. Nonetheless, the e-Mexico program was
undertaken during a time when few people desired or could realize the benefits of access to the Internet.
The usefulness of access was questioned by Merritt and Bill Gates (2005), and the applicability of
“Knowledge Centers” for the illiterate, or the use of satellite mapping of schools of fish for fisherman who
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do not the possess the equipment to take advantage of the information. “Far better, it would appear, to
spend scarce resources on combating AIDS, say, or on better sanitation facilities (Merritt).”
Such concerns, despite being put forth over a decade ago, remain relevant for Mexico.
Nevertheless, there is a growing recognition that development without taking into account the importance
of technology do citizens a disservice, because economies will only become more reliant on technology in
the coming decades. As the MODITUH revealed, a great number of people report unfamiliarity with using
the Internet, either know-how or its possible applications to everyday use. The programs below have had
different approaches to bridging these gaps.
National Digital Strategy
In 2013, the government of Mexico adopted a national digital strategy as part of the common
practice encouraged by the WSIS to establish short, medium, and long-term targets for Internet
penetration and use. States have framed their vision regarding access in these policy documents often
relating to the tenets of the F2C. While Mexico’s plan does not establish specific targets, it envisions the
increase in Internet penetration as essential to the economic and social development of the country.
The plan contains five objectives:
1. Government Transformation: Build a new relationship between society and government,
focusing on the experience of the citizen as a user of public services through the adoption of
ICTs in the government.
2. Digital Economy. Develop a digital economy ecosystem that will contribute to achieving a
prosperous Mexico, through the assimilation of ICTs in economic processes, to stimulate
increased productivity, economic growth and formal job creation.
3. Quality Education: Integrate ICTs into the educational process, in both educational
management and teaching and learning processes, as well as teacher training and the
dissemination and preservation of culture and art, to allow people to be successfully
inserted into the Information and Knowledge Society.
4. Effective Universal Health: Create a comprehensive digital health policy to harness the
opportunities offered by ICTs with two priorities: on the one hand increase coverage,
effective access and health service quality and on the other, make more efficient use of
installed infrastructure and the resources allocated for health.
5. Public Safety: Use ICTs to prevent social violence, by coordinating the efforts of citizens and
authorities around common objectives to promote safety and prevent and mitigate the
damage caused by natural disaster (16).
None of these objectives are framed in terms of rights, and instead contain a largely utilitarian vision of
what an increase in use and knowledge about ICTs can bring to users in Mexico.
Nevertheless, the plan acknowledges that human rights will be bolstered by the increase in ICT
availability. First, because some elements of governance will brought online, people will be better able to
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obtain services and second, that the use of ICTs is a human right in itself (32). Each of this goals are
listed under “inclusivity” heading, indicating that the plan must come to terms with the digital divide in
Mexico. Elsewhere, digital literacy is emphasized in order to make equitable use of ICTs.
Public-Private Partnerships and NGOs
To combat the low levels of access and bridge the various digital divides that exist in the state,
NGOs and government initiatives work alongside each other to increase both physical and meaningful
access. One of the state’s methods for bridging the digital divide has been to remove barriers from the
marketplace and increase public spaces rather than get directly involved with infrastructure development.
It may be that this is case as a consequence of a strong belief in the liberal market system, and also the
concentration of power that allows América Móvil to keep profits ahead of efficiency. While Carlos Slim
sits as one of the co-chairs of the International Broadband Commission, the sincerity of his commitment to
the Commission’s goals is questionable. Perhaps like illiberal states that sign onto human rights
instruments to improve their perception, a bit of corporate goodwill could deflect some of the criticism his
company receives.
Public access. Government efforts date back to 2002. Like its successor, the e-Mexico
program focused on the construction and the running of community access centers. Then-President
Vicente Fox pledged $68 million to install 3,200 community Internet access centers in schools, libraries,
and town squares, and had promised 10,000 such places by the end of 2004 (Anderson). These pledges
proved successful, as Mexico Conectado reports that by 2015, 70,000 public spaces provide free Internet
access. Run by the Ministry of Communication and Transportation, Mexico Conectado’s mission was
bolstered by the recent amendments to the Mexican constitution that guarantees access as right. In
order to achieve it, the website claims that through economies of scale and preexisting infrastructure,
250,000 public spaces can be ready to provide free Internet to the public by the end of 2018. The
program frames access as both a right and an enabler of other rights like work, education, and even
participation in the public policy process.
Mexico Conectado won the “WSIS Project Prize” in 2015, which is meant to showcase programs
that have shown success in increasing access that could be replicated by other developing states. While
not a PPP, the cooperation among the state, NGOs, and ICTs is representative of the model that WSIS
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espouses. Hughes Communications provided satellite equipment and service in conjunction with the
Mexican Ministry of Communications and Transport, which runs the Mexico Concectado program and
operated by a decentralized government office Telecomm Telegrafos. The program was going to include
11,000 broadband terminals, and even used solar power to support the equipment.
Huerta and Sandoval-Almazán study the problems of these telecenters in 2007. While outdated,
the study surveyed users in the state of Mexico largely from lower income villages. The authors reviewed
the skillsets necessary that allows users to make use of computers and the Internet, and users in this
study new to computing could overcome some of the limitations by user-friendly interfaces that were easy
to navigate. They determined a plethora of problems facing digital immigrants in Mexico: lack of English
proficiency, the inability to expand searches for related information (the “branching” skillset), they did not
critically assess information that was provided (information skillset), and that they saw no use for the
technology beyond recreation or chatting. The primary telecenter users were students, who regularly
copied and pasted information from encyclopedia entries, and did not learn to synthesize the information
they found in any new way. Users in the telecenter saw the use of the Internet with only a limited
functionality, and either did not know or did not bother to develop other skills that would be important in
the global marketplace. Even more telling was the study’s observation that operators of these telecenters
suffered from many of the same limitations as users; partial digital literacy would grossly underserve
those who use these facilities, and simply training someone on how to turn machines on would not be
enough to make the telecenters have an impact beyond rudimentary access.
An NGO attempting to bridge the digital divide in Mexico, Fundación ProAcceso takes into
consideration some of the weaknesses of the older models of community centers to heart. It was
founded by Aleph Molinari in 2008, an entrepreneur who having experienced Mexico’s inequality
firsthand, who having “studied economics and critical theory abroad and returned home with the idea of
doing something to narrow the country’s socioeconomic divisions (Villagran).” The group frames their
mission of increasing Internet access—both physical and meaningful access—to the larger issue of the
equal education. This mirrors the Kansas City NGO Connect for Good sentiment that connects economic
opportunity with access. By democratizing access, it would have a positive impact on disadvantaged
groups. In collaboration with the government, ProAcceso began with 10 training centers that specialized
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in teaching computer skills to increase educational opportunities and employment, and initially expected
to attract 50,000 users. It exceeded that figure by 25 percent, and gained the support of foreign partners:
“Microsoft donated $1.7 million in software licenses; Google donated its Labs, AdWords and educational
programs; Dell donated the equipment to outfit two learning centers (Villagran).” They work with local
NGOs, MNCs like Google, Nokia, and, the international organizations like the World Bank and UN
Information Center.
These Red de Innovación Aprendizaje (REIs)48 now total more than 70 with 420,000 users and
127,000 graduates in the State of Mexico. The foundation also funds digital libraries and microenterprise
centers. While the majority of these centers are located in dense, urban locales—which already ignores
one of the fundamental digital divides—it teamed with Dell to open its first rural location in San Felipe del
Progreso in the state (territory) of Mexico. It partnered with Nokia to create a REI with something they
called a “Makers Lab” that included three-dimensional printers, laser cutters, and sophisticated metal
routers (Canal AR). These partnerships among public, NGO, and the private sector is emblematic of the
types of relationships touted by the UN community.
Internet Para Todos49 is the result of a hyperlinked network of NGOs working on Internet, whose
purpose is using its resources to enable free, unhindered access to the Internet. It was used in 2013 to
gather signatures for a petition to lobby for the inclusion of Internet access as a civil right to be articulated
in the Constitution. Its blog highlights other efforts to increase penetration, including online courses to
familiarize learners with Internet use, wireless charging technology, statistics on the usage habits of the
young, and touting 5G as the “network that will connect all.” They link the cause of telecommunications
reform to the norms of the F2C:
Those involved in the project share the diagnosis of centralization and monopoly of
traditional media (particularly television) as well as the violation of human rights that this
situation causes, so we decided to build a project that seeks to force, to through
constitutional and legal reform, the State to use the existing infrastructure to create a
network of free Internet in virtually the entire country [emphasis added].

48
49

Learning Innovation Networks
Internet for all
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Internet Service Providers
The shape of Mexico’s telecommunications market has dramatically shifted in the past few years
due to government intervention, forbidding any company from controlling more than 50 percent. This
stems from the recognition that the state must enable conducive conditions for the private sector to
function properly. First, President Enrique Peña Nieto issued a decree to amend the constitution to
recognize the following as human rights: “(i) information and communications technology, and (ii)
broadcasting and telecommunications services, including broadband and the Internet (Arroyo).” The law
forbids the government from limiting access or censorship in any way, and reimagines
telecommunications and broadcasting as public services, rather than simply valued-added services.
The Mexican Senate in 2013 approved a bill to de-monopolize the telecommunications market
that was made up of 6 companies but was dominated by América Móvil. The legislation passed by an
overwhelming margin, 103 to 3, and was accomplished in coordination with the PRI’s traditional rivals that
stemmed from a series of social reform laws in the areas of labor and education that was dubbed “Pact
for Mexico (Al Jazeera).” Providers cannot refuse to provide certain services and requires the installation
of infrastructure that would increase mobile access.
The Law provides a new kind of public/private network structure, called “public
telecommunication networks with public participation.” The concessions for commercial
use to public bodies under a public-private partnership scheme have the character of
“shared network of wholesaler telecommunications services.” Such networks cannot
provide services to final users (Arroyo)
Carlos Slim’s company at the time controlled 80 percent of the landlines under Telmex (which
had been privatized in the 1990s) and 70 percent of the mobile market under Telcel. Freedom House
reports that Axtel, the next largest supplier, had only six percent of the landline market and Movistar
claimed 20 percent of the mobile market. In anticipation of government mandates, Slim sold enough of
the company’s assets in order change América Móvil’s status as a “preponderant economic agent
(Estevez 2014).” The effect has been harmful to the company, contributing to the fall of its stock price
and Slim’s personal wealth (Estevez 2015). “The legislation aims to increase foreign investment, allowing
non-Mexican companies to own 100 percent of the capital of a telephone firm - compared to 49 percent
today - and almost half of radio and television broadcasters - compared to zero today (Al Jazerra).” These
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efforts seems to have paid off; AT&T bought the mobile provider Iusacell in late 2014 and Nextel in early
2015.
The new law also created Federal Institute of Communication (IFT), whose mission was to guide
competition in the restructuring of the ICT market and was given constitutional autonomy. In recent
months, the IFT has taken up cause to force Telmex to open up its “last mile” portion of network to
competitors (Keane, Sarmiento and Barrera), meaning the portion of Telmex’s ICT infrastructure that
connects to customers. It was ordered to make it available after 60 days in June 2015, but got a 20 day
extension in October. As of April 2016, it is unclear what degree Telmex has turned over control to other
suppliers.
An article in PC Magazine provides the only other discussion of ISPs in Mexico besides the
ongoing efforts to unmake Slim’s empire. Critical of the constitutional reforms, the article repeats the
dubious claim that the amendment gives the government sweeping control over the Internet, users, and
an “ON/OFF switch.” Nevertheless, it profiles the competitors to Telmex and what they have contributed
to the increase in Internet penetration and meaningful access. Axtel was the one of the earliest
competitors to Telmex, and provides the best service in Mexico with average downstream speeds of 44.5
Mbps. In order to compete, Telmex offers packages that include 200 Mbps and 20Mbps at $44 per
month, but because service is unreliable, the magazine does not see the Telmex offerings as worthwhile.
Unfortunately,
Once you move past third place [in the rankings], things drop precipitously again; none of
the bottom six make it past a PCMag Index Score of 10.0. These ISPs represent the
past, the older services that grew out of the privatized government utility companies and
grew rich by offering pitiful and overpriced Internet service to a country that had no other
options (Sosa).
It is apparent that despite government efforts to curb the monopoly of Telmex, Mexican users, like their
American counterparts, face limited choices. Yet considering the attempts to wrest control from Telmex,
encouraging foreign investment with the likes of AT&T, articulating access as a civil right, and opening
last-mile services to competitors, the government has taken steps in the right direction to reshape the
telecommunications market.
The IFT also provides reporting mechanisms for customers about poor quality or speeds, using
language that is remarkably similar to net neutrality norms. “Your operator must respect the
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characteristics of the service you hired regardless of content, origin, destination, terminal or application
that you want to access, as well as services that are provided over the Internet!” If the ISP fails to comply
with the promised speeds, the IFT can impose sanctions upon them. Such a policy mirrors the efforts
taken by Brazil in 2014.
The IFT announced that it would be investing into infrastructure along with the Federal Electricity
Commission. Since the switch to digital television, the 700 MHz band had been freed for mobile phone
use, with goal of increasing the size of the market and lowering the price for consumers. The National
Digital Strategy articulates the desire of the state to enable the market to provide access by eliminating
“prevailing extraordinary agents” that hold the industry back, especially for “sectors of the historically
disadvantaged population.”
Domestic and International Rhetoric
Mexico City was host to the Ministerial Conference on the Information Society in Latin America
(eLAC) in August 2015, a bid to continue its pursuit of being a “hub” for digital technologies in Latin
America. Mexico Conectado boasted that:
The signatories pledged to continue to strengthen regional cooperation in digital matters
with regional projects, activities aimed at promoting innovation, the formation of digital
capabilities, the spread of new technologies and promotion of best practices, especially in
an environment of inclusion and sustainability (Mexico Conectado 2015b).
The declaration stemming from Mexico City tied the efforts of eLAC to the wider Internet freedom
community, including WSIS and the UN General Assembly and recognized the right to privacy in the
digital era. The Digital Agenda for eLAC (2018) contains 23 objectives within five general areas, and
includes first a commitment to increasing access and bolstering infrastructure, which includes the creation
of community networks, IXPs, next-generation broadband networks, keeping in mind “vulnerable groups”
and even the “gender perspective.”
There are several survey reports on Mexico available, dating back to 2008. Kull et al. report that
Mexico had the highest percentage of respondents that argued for the media to publish information
without government control, while only 17 percent argued that the government should be able to restrict
access and content in the name of stability. GlobeScan (2010) reported that only 14 percent of Mexican
Internet users would be able to cope without it, the lowest percentage in the world. Ninety-four percent
argue that it should be considered a human right. Pew (2014b) reports that in 2013, 79 percent of
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Mexicans argued for uncensored Internet, and the percentage climbed according to youth, with 85
percent reporting such an opinion between the ages of 18 and 29. Forty percent reported freedom being
a very important issue surrounding Internet use, 39 percent stated it was somewhat important, 13 percent
said not too important, while only six percent argued that it was not at all important. By 2015, Pew
(2015b) reports that 83 percent of Mexicans believed it was important to use the Internet without
censorship.
***
Mexico’s barriers to access include burdensome geography, a monopolistic telecommunications
market, and entrenched inequality that has an unfortunate tendency to perpetuate itself in the digital
realm. The state has taken great strides to become a “hub” of Latin America and has been influenced by
the metanorms of the IS, WSIS, and other entrepreneurs involved in the construction of the Internet
freedom regime. Its measures to increase public access spaces, to dismantle the Slim empire, and add
Internet access as a right to its constitution all signal the strong impact of the F2C.
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Indonesia
As with the Philippines, Indonesia’s Internet penetration is hampered by a populations spread
across many islands that enhances the socioeconomic causes of the digital divide. The state and private
sector have worked to bridge the digital divide—sometimes together, sometimes, separately. There is
evidence that the state is moving toward norms relating to the F2C, but such moves are hampered by the
cronyism that is endemic to Indonesian politics.
Background
Indonesia has the world’s largest Muslim population, making up 87 percent of its total of 256
million people (July 2015 estimate), ranking the country 5th in the world in overall population. Iran has a
larger percentage of Muslim citizens, but a discussion of how Indonesia accommodates the presence of
the Internet in the face of religious beliefs is enlightening. It is a large state, comprising 1,904,569 km 2
(15th in the world), and is the world’s largest archipelago-state with 6,000 inhabited islands. Access is
greater surrounding large cities on Borneo, Java, and Sumatra rather than those on less populated
islands. Fifty-four percent of its population lives in an urban area, with 6 major metropolises with
populations of 1.4 million or more50. It has the 10th largest economy in the world with a GDP of $2.84
trillion, yet this equates to $11,300 GDP/capita, which means that despite the size of its economy, it only
ranks 131st in the world.
Looking at its ICT technologies 51, Indonesia has 29.67 million landlines, ranking 11th in the world;
one phone is plugged in for approximately every 8 people in the country. There are 319 million cell
phones in the country, placing it 4th in the world; like China, mobile phones are often seen as a viable
alternative to wired Internet connections. In total, there are 42.4 million Internet users in Indonesia which
ranks the state 14th in the world in total numbers, but amounts to approximately 16.7 percent of the
population. While the CIA and the ITU report Internet use at 16 percent of the population, the Association
of Indonesian Internet Service Providers (APJII) reports the same figure to be 28 percent. In all
likelihood, the former figure is closer to the truth; it is unsurprising that a domestic organization would
inflate statistics in order to offer a positive reflection of the association’s members’ activities.

50

Jakarta (capital) 10.323 million; Surabaya 2.853 million; Bandung 2.544 million; Medan 2.204 million;
Semarang 1.63 million; Makassar 1.489 million (2015)
51 CIA Factbook 2015
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It is difficult to disentangle the impact of cultural norms of former colonies from their colonial
masters’ legacies, and Indonesia had been ruled indirectly or directly by the Dutch for almost 350 years.
It is necessary to frame their contemporary relationship with human rights with this backdrop of
Indonesia’s relationship with modernity. While Indonesia is the world’s largest Muslim-majority
democracy today— perhaps providing a model of democratic norms within Islam—its relationship with
democracy is less than two decades old. It is within these rather uncharted waters that the applicability of
Internet freedom and the F2C must be analyzed.
Carnegie describes the vast patrimonial networks that persist in Indonesia. “A major post-colonial
legacy of the Dutch was…patrimonial networks of political elites who had acquired conditional power as
colonial proxies (46).” Both the Guided Democracy and New Order periods were characterized by these
patrimonial systems that relied on favors and pay-offs to get things accomplished. Under Suharto,
“[p]olitical competition among the elite did not involve policy, but power and the distribution of spoils (55).”
The situation persists today as the government’s policy implementation is characterized as being at best
inept and at worst corrupt. Local elites misappropriate money intended for local-level village projects, and
it is not difficult to see what impact that would have on Internet infrastructure projects, especially those
undertaken by the state.
Earlier in its history, the influence of human rights did not appear to have strong predictive power.
Instead human rights were instrumentally used to challenge the state without directly doing so, mainly by
radical student groups during the Suharto era. The belief in the content of the human rights discourse
may be strong, but seeing them carried out in practice is not easy.
One thing is for sure: the politics of pragmatic change is anything but smooth. At the
village level, formal political rights are one thing, exercising them is another. Corruption
is still rife especially among local elites, with money appropriated from village projects,
land certificates overcharged, public land privatized and public social safety nets misused
(Carnegie 130).
Citizen Lab reports on more recent developments with human rights, recounting how the
constitution was amended several times between 1999 and 2002, changing the language of the
document from asserting the ‘the existence of the principles’ of human rights to legitimate implementation.
In a decree (XVII/MPR/1998), the state now affirms rights to expression, association, and even
communication. The latter includes guaranteed and protected rights to communicate using all available
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channels for “his/her personal development and social environment.” A law adopted in 1999 (Law No. 39
on Human Rights) affirmed that as a member of the UN, Indonesia had an obligation to apply the rights of
the UNDHR to its policy and law. However, while these protections are now firmly rooted in place in
Indonesian law, it is often curtailed in practice. Partly due to pressures from conservative groups, content
in Indonesia is circumscribed, with pornography and gambling sites being regularly blocked. A law that
would grant the state power to control content on the Internet was challenged in 2014 by the Press
Council because of its vagueness and unconstitutional nature (Freedom House 2014 407). These
developments show the government’s practical inclination towards controlling Internet content despite
orations about freedoms like expression and association, and the recognition that communication
technologies are critical for development in the 21st century. This is a consequence of the mix of
influences with which the Indonesia must deal, specifically a multi-ethnic society that at times threatens to
ignite in conflict and promote separatism rather than unity, and the forces of both moderate and
conservative Islam.
The Internet in Indonesia
Background. The Internet in Indonesia began in an academic setting with amateur radio in the
Institut Teknologi Bandung (ITB). Onno Purbo of the ITB describes early Internet pioneers at the
institution that experimented with radio packet switching in 1986 and 1987. Early Internet in Indonesia
made use of a different protocol, UUCP rather than TCP/IP, for email and access to the rest of the Web
and used a sort of intranet, UNINET, among major universities in the country. Describing these early
days, Purbo is not immune to the ICT professionals’ narratives that are dominant in his field:
At that time in the early 1990s the Internet network in Indonesia is better known as a
community network. The spirit of cooperation, kinship and mutual cooperation is very
warm and felt among the perpetrators. Somewhat different from the atmosphere of
Indonesian Internet these days that feels more commercial and individual in most of their
activities primarily involving Internet commerce (Purbo).
Indonesians living abroad sparked interest beyond these relatively isolated connections. The list serve
indonesian@janus.berkeley.edu allowed for discussion about the sophisticated Internet users enjoyed in
California between those living abroad and those in the ITB. Indonet was the first ISP that set up
business in Jakarta in 1994, but the state intervened into its service. Purbo recalls that like earlier ICT
companies in the 1960s, ISPs in Indonesia would be required to get licensed by the Department of Post
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and Telecommunication Services. Speeds were at a respectable 1024Kbps, or 1 Mbps, but required the
utilization of undersea cables owned by Sprint and Singapore’s SingTel making costs prohibitive for users
outside of universities.
The combination of the potential profitable marketplace, the high costs, and relatively slow
speeds encouraged 27 licensed ISPs jointed together to create the APJII in 1996. This private-sector
association is still highly influential in Internet access and policy in Indonesia. Its stated objectives are to:
1. Assist members in providing quality Internet services for the people of Indonesia.
2. Popularizing Internet to support human resource development in Indonesia.
3. Support the creation of business opportunities Indonesian businessmen by providing
global information and communication facilities.
4. Assist the government in an effort to economic equality in this country through the
opportunity of access to information and communication evenly throughout Indonesia.
5. Assist members in providing sources of information about Indonesia.
6. Indonesia to increase community participation in international cooperation.
(APJII)
The APJII was responsible for the first Indonesian IXP. “Without funding from the government the
[Indonesian Internet Exchange] IIX was promoted by the APJII, a non-profit organization which seek
sponshorship [sic] with international vendors to build the much needed internet exchange (Alam 2).”
Utilizing partnerships with the likes of Cisco, Hewlett Packard, and Microsoft, among others, the
Indonesian Internet Exchange (IIX) was built so private and government-owned ISPs like Telkom and
IndoNet would not be dependent on foreign-owned infrastructure. Alam estimates that the project saved
ISPs on average $70,000 per month in fees that would have went to Sprint or SingTel.
The IIX along with another Internet exchange OpenIXP, do not directly hook into the greater
Internet. Instead, Indonesian governments require ISPs use network access providers (NAPs) for global
upstream, and moreover local IXPs serve only domestic functions for networks located in Indonesia
(Citizen Lab). Is this an attempt that like China, the Indonesian government has established a means to
crackdown on users’ rights by controlling one of the most important avenues to meaningful access? Such
a comparison seems ill-conceived as is evidenced by, a) the licensing scheme that ISPs must adhere to,
b) the tariffs on end-users that the APJII is required to collect at the state’s behest, and c) the culture of
bribery and corruption that is endemic to Indonesian political culture; this final requirement is more likely
an attempt by the state to extort fees and create dependency on the government for the purpose of
extrapolating wealth, not control. If the Minister of Telecommunication and Technology Rudiantara can
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be taken at face value, the government fails to understand the technical aspects of ICT infrastructure and
it is best left in the hand of the ICT professionals: “’The Internet [space] in this country is very dynamic –
the Government will not pretend that we understand the technical details,’ he said. For me, the best
regulation is actually less regulation52.’”
Contrary to the narrative above, John Savageau constructs his own optimistic assessment of how
far the Indonesian Internet has come. He recounts that by 2010 Indonesian Internet had transformed
itself from his experience in the country in the mid-1990s when he had worked for Sprint in Jakarta setting
up X.25 networks53 that used the Sprint-owned Internet backbone. Savageau exclaims that “Jakarta is
wired,” while ignoring the depth of the digital divide throughout the country and within the city as well. He
claims that its competitive ISP market has enabled progress in infrastructure investment, like the Palapa
Rings and the IXPs like the IIE.
Today, the issue of the increase in Internet access looms largest for those with stakes in Internet
policy in Indonesia. What follows is a discussion about the limits of Internet penetration and attempts to
rectify the disparities within the country and particularly how geography poses serious limitations to
access Indonesia. This is coupled with divides perpetuated by SES and literacy.
Internet penetration. There are various figures for the number of citizens who have Internet
access in Indonesia. The CIA and the ITU cite similar figures of 16.7 percent (2014) and 17.14 percent
(2013) respectively, but the domestic ICT ministry, Kementerian Komunikasi Dan Informatika, or the
Ministry of Communication and Informatics (MCI) sites 73 million users, making Internet penetration
nearly 30 percent of the population (Freedom House 2015 414). At nearly double the institutionally
reported statistics, the MCI’s report is suspect.
Wired broadband, as in other cases, is becoming the less popular mode of access in favor of
smartphones. While mobile phone penetration is 127 percent, only 21 percent of the population owns a
smartphone (Freedom House 2015). As recommend by the ITU, the Indonesia Bureau of Statistics
began collecting extensive data on Internet penetration in 2010. They report the number of households

Such claims of ignorance calls to mind Machiavelli’s exhortation “That on occasion it is wise to feign Folly
(Discourses on Livy, Bk III, Chp II).”
53 X.25 protocols, set up by the ITU-T, is a packet-switching network that commonly used throughout the 1980s
and 90s that was eventually standardized into TCP/IP (Newton 1246).
52
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with mobile phones has increased over a four-year period, from 72 percent in 2010 to 86.09 percent by
2013.
In March 2015, the Wall Street Journal reported a discrepancy in Internet access in Southeast
Asia. A study revealed three clusters of Internet penetration in the region:
Cluster 1 covers countries where more than 60% of the population has access to the
Internet – Singapore (73%), Malaysia (67%) and Brunei (65%). In Cluster 2, Internet
penetration is between 25% and 50% – Vietnam (44%), the Philippines (37%) and
Thailand (29%); and Cluster 3 accounts for penetration rates below 25% – Indonesia
(16%), Laos (13%), Cambodia (6%) and Myanmar (1%) (Larano)
Most indicators of access are correlated to GDP, except for Indonesia and Thailand. Jakarta was
reported to have promised to use significant funds for infrastructure projects like the Palapa Ring projects
and others to little avail. The study claims the continuance of the digital divide is a consequence of
governmental malfeasance and interference in the private sphere. Yet it ignores some other independent
variables. For instance, Malaysia and Brunei are comparatively much smaller than Indonesia, with
concentrated rather than disperse populations. The reality of Indonesia’s geography—an archipelago
spanning some 6,000 inhabited islands—hampers efforts to expand access by both the public and private
sectors.
Indonesian penetration rates vary greatly between urban and rural areas. Access in concentrated
on the most populous islands like Jakarta and Sumatra. Freedom House reports that of 41 Internet
backbones in the state, 60% are located in Jakarta alone, while less than 2% where located on Bali and
Nusa Tenggara (415). The latter’s populations are relatively small, having less than 10 million people in
both provinces and also comprised of minorities, Hindus and Sasaks, which are traditionally underserved
populations.
Freedom House claims that the gap is exacerbated by private Internet providers, particularly 3G
providers. Base transceiver stations (BTS)54 are concentrated on populated islands with extensive urban
centers. “The highest concentration is in West Java, where there are nearly 10,000 stations, followed by
Jakarta with 6,800. There are less than 1,000 3G BTS in Papua, Kalimantan, and the Mollucan Islands
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“The electronic equipment housed in cabinets that together with antennas comprises a PCS facility or ‘site’
(Newton 173).”
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combined (Freedom House 2015 415).” While total mobile penetration is 128 percent, less than 40
percent of Papua residents owned a cell phone compared to 97 percent of Jakarta residents.
In accordance with the recommendation of the ITU, the Bureau of Indonesian Statistics has been
compiling extensive statistics on Internet penetration rates using different indicators province, age, use,
etc. Despite the dangers of inflation from official ICT Indonesian statistics, there is a wide variance in
Internet use in Indonesia according to province. Highest among these is Jakarta, reporting 63.4 percent
in 2013 and the lowest being the province of Papua at a mere 11.0 percent. The average reported
percentage for all of Indonesia was 32.2 percent.
This map, although dated, is correlated to socioeconomic status. Districts with important urban
centers have greater amounts of access, and these disparities persist today.
Figure 2 Distribution of digital access across districts in Indonesia
(Sujarwoto and Tamubolo 8)

Sujarwoto and Tampublolo conclude that the diffusion thesis has far better explanatory power in
Indonesia than the normalization thesis about the diffusion of Internet, and that the digital divides along
socioeconomic status, gender, and education will persist unless there are adequate ICT strategies put in
place. The authors see the government, rather than the private sector, taking on this role.
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Other divides. Other forms of the digital divide are apparent in Indonesia. Freedom House
(2015) reports that the Internet use has shifted from older, urban residents—who presumably had the
money and a purpose for Internet—to younger demographics. Today, 70 percent of Internet users are
under 35. Most people get to use the Internet as a result of ubiquitous cheap hardware in major cities.
There is a gender gap in Indonesia in terms of both access and use. The Indonesian Bureau of
Statistics reports in 2013 that 55.67 percent of Internet users were male while only 44.33 percent were
female, similar to levels one might find in China. Moreover, D’Urso reports that the way in which the
Internet gets used by women is different than men as it is mainly used for social media and staying in
touch with friends and family. “They are 25 percent less likely than men to use it for job hunting, and 52
percent less likely to express controversial views online.” Gender equality is one of the SDGs and seeks
to have women use technology in a more meaningful way, like economic independence and political
participation.
Such opportunities are reported by Bold and Davidson (2012) that chronicle the use of extant
SMS and 3G technology to enable micro-franchise. The technology is made available by Village Phone
Operators, a micro-franchise in itself run by women who sell airtime, and commercially available mobile
technologies. The results appear promising:
As of January 2012, over 10,000 entrepreneurs have served more than 1 million unique
customers. An estimated 47 percent of the entrepreneurs who stay in the portfolio for
more than four months have moved above the poverty line, which the World Bank defines
as US$2.50 per day. Currently, more than 83 percent of the businesses are owned by
women and 100 percent are profitable (74).
These micro-enterprises are carried out in collaboration with NGOs, in this case the Grameen
Foundation. This foundation became a darling in the international community because of their
development of microfinance and its impact on developing countries. Geared towards women,
microloans increase entrepreneurship and had low rates of default. The movement to integrate
microfinance with cheap Internet makes sense but has to overcome issues of availability and literacy.
Average speeds in Indonesia are low compared to the rest of the region at 0.8 Mbps downstream
in 2013 (Pribadi), or 1.7 Mbps (Chandra). Akamai claims that by Q4 2015, Indonesia’s average speed
was 3.9 Mbps, ranking the state 92nd in the world, but with admirable peaks speeds of 79.8 Mbps,
marking a 495 percent increase from the previous year.
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Table 13 Recorded Internet Speeds by Indonesian cities
(testmy.net 12 April 2016)
City (Province)
Pontianak (West Kalimantan)

Downstream

Upstream

10.1 Mbps

1.2 Mbps

Jakarta (Jakarta)

7.6 Mbps

8 Mbps

Bandung (West Java)

5.4 Mbps

4.1 Mbps

Surabaya (East Java)

3.8 Mbps

1.3 Mbps

Jambi (Sumatra)

1.4 Mbps

304 Kbps

Ambon (North Maluku)

790 Kbps

215 Kbps

Banjarbaru (South Kalimantan)

463 Kbps

118 Kbps

Parepare (South Sulawesi)

151 Kbps

53 Kbps

Jakarta, Bandung and other cities in Java had the best tested speeds. The farther from the economic
and cultural hubs of Jakarta and Bandung, the poorer the Internet. Parepare, a city of moderate size
(130,000) is located on Sulawesi and has the worst reported speeds at the equivalent of 0.15 Mbps. The
city’s economy is based primarily on agriculture and fishing and has little industry, and is made up of
numerous ethnic minorities. Costs are relatively high in Indonesia as well. Numbeo records that a 10
Mbps wired connection would cost $26.37 per month, or 8.58 percent of a net monthly salary.
Palapa Ring Projects
As long as I have not united the archipelago, I will not enjoy the palapa [spice]. Until I conquer the island
Desert Island Seram, Tanjongpura, Haru Island, Island Pahang, Dompo Island, Island of Bali, Sunda,
Palembang, Tumasik, I will not taste the palapa.
Palapa Oath - Patih Gajah Mada
The Palapa oath, purportedly spoken by 14th century military leader, politician, and national hero
of Indonesia, symbolizes the desire for unity among the inhabitants of the Indonesia archipelago. Invoked
by early nationalists like Sukarno, it served an important role in shaping the identity of Indonesia in the
early 20th century in the wake of colonialism and ethnic tension. It is fitting that the submarine cables
meant to link major and minor cities in Indonesia would be named after this symbol in the hopes that such
projects would lessen the digital divide that creates such disparities in access across Indonesia.
Eueung Mulyana, a professor at ITB recalled on his personal blog55 in 2008 that the Palapa Ring
project has deep roots going to Nusantara-21 (N21), a broadband network proposed by Jakarta in 1988
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This form of social media appears to be highly popular among Indonesians, and includes many
academics and scholars.
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inspired by similar Singaporean and Malay initiatives at the time. Despite the recognition of such needs
nearly 30 years ago, the state failed to accomplish much. In an official statement from 2008, the
Indonesian government claimed that "The combination of a much higher demand for telecommunication
services, ICT applications and reduced costs due to the further development of technology has improved
the financial feasibility" of carrying out the project. But the facile acceptance of the governmental
statement may be unwarranted.
Divakar Gowami of LIRNEasia, a regional ICT think tank paints a less rosy picture. While
Mulyana’s recollections are accurate, the dream of national-scale infrastructure was to be fulfilled with
government funds. When those funds dried up as a result of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, such largescale projects floundered. It took until 2007 for the government to take up the project again, but this time
pressured the private sector to front the cash. The consortium of the willing was initially made up of
seven telecom operators including some state-run ISPs: Telekom Indosat, Excelcomindo, and Bakrie
Telecom. The goal was to create a network of submarine cables that would connect 33 provinces across
Indonesia, partially bypassing the market and directly addressing the problem of the diffusion of the
Internet. By 2013, MCI reported that four of the seven original members of the consortium dropped out of
the project because of the worldwide financial crisis. The three members remaining were Telkom,
Indosat, and Bakrie Telecom, of which only the latter was privately owned. By 2015, Telekom makes the
somewhat questionable claim that among the three remaining consortium members, only it has made the
serious commitment to constructing the Indonesian Digital Network. Its press release pays homage to
the norms of the F2C, saying infrastructure projects are “…expected to the have a positive impact for
equitable access to broadband information and communication…” The press release also shows that
such broad and expensive projects are profitable, seeing that the company will be able to make its Triple
Play IndiHome package available in Eastern Indonesia, encouraging investors to be optimistic about
future growth. However, to date, it appears that the entirety of the Palapa Ring submarine cables has not
been completed, but progress has been made according to Telegeography’s Submarine cable maps. All
of these cables are owned by Indonesia Telekom.
Palapa Ring II was proposed by the Indonesian government in 2015. It would also operate as a
consortium that would pool resources and funds to construct submarine cables to connect the existing
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infrastructure to the eastern part of Indonesia. The government included a bidding process for this
project and would select the option that promised to conduct the project at the lowest cost. Estimated
costs are $222 million and it is hoped the project will be completed by 2018. Presumably, Papua would
be served by these connections in addition to the SMPCS cable that Telekom is apparently in the stages
of constructing.
The presence of submarine cables is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for broadband
access. The presence of the submarine cables does not guarantee how the technology will be deployed
by ISPs that will determine who eventually gets access or if users can afford connections or necessary
hardware. The Digital Divide Institute was founded in 1999 to explore financial options to solve the
problem of the digital divide. With various stakeholders—states, MNCs, local ISPs, and others, they work
at bringing “ethics,” rather than rights, to bridging the digital divide in Southeast Asia. They report in 2013
that in consultation with the World Bank, they adopted a “bottoms-up” approach within the nation’s 500
“kabupaten” (local districts). The report that the Palapa Ring is “underutilized,” and that despite its
presence, it would necessitate outside intervention to make full use of the cables’ potential. Despite
Telekom’s investment in these cables, without the market to sustain further investments in local
infrastructure, the only ones who might benefit from their presence are the investors.
Internet Service Providers
The ISPs that serve Indonesia are indicative of the types of policies one can find about access.
Citizen Lab reports on a law enacted in 1999, Law No. 36 on Telecommunications that changed the face
of the sector in Indonesia. It simultaneously privatized or semi-privatized the industry, promoting
competition and infrastructure development, and deregulating the telecommunications sector as a whole.
These were undertaken as obligations under the WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications. As a
result, there are about 300 ISPs that operate in Indonesia, but like other cases, several large important
companies dominate. Three have the largest market shares of the mobile industry, Telkomsel (a
subsidiary of Telecom Indonesia) with 60 percent of the market, Indosat (21 percent,) and Axiata (19
percent). Telkom and Indosat are semi-private entities with the state owning the majority shares. Axiata
is a Malaysian company that seeks to serve underserved areas across Southeast Asia. (Freedom House
2015 415-416).
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As mobile access makes up the vast majority of Internet use in the Indonesia, the semiautonomous Telekom is the primary provider of the Internet for all of the state, despite attempts by the
state to increase competition for efficiency’s sake and to abide by the rules of the WTO. While the APJII
has hundreds of members to date, these ISPs serve a fraction of Indonesia’s population. For example, a
random selection from the Association’s website—BitsNet—offers an array of ICT services, including
infrastructure construction and IT consulting alongside Internet service. But their service area is limited to
two neighborhoods in Java. Five Mbps will cost a business—not a household—approximately IDR
1,500,000 or $110 per month. The company also appears to be peering with Telekom, thus the service is
dependent upon the quasi-state owned infrastructure. Hundreds of these small providers may mean
better customer service, but their dependency on extant infrastructure means that no better Internet
speeds are in the realm of possibility in the foreseeable future.
Gou Eu reports on Indonesia’s plan to change a licensing model for mobile operators in order to
simplify the process of becoming a provider. Rudiantara, the minster of the MCI claimed that in the past
the state prized providers who installed more infrastructure, but since then the emphasis has shifted to
the prioritization of consumer experience. An unnamed analyst stated that “At the end of the day, the
Government can only push as far as the telcos agree. It may not be as easy as it seems to push this
through.” Details of the plan were not revealed in the article, but the importance the government places
on user experience rather than prioritizing ISPs in an important signal for the F2C.
While the state is attempting to implement policies that remove some of the red tape that must be
overcome by new ISPs, both the state and the APJII are part of the Indonesian culture of patrimony.
Licensing fees collected by the state and membership dues to the Association ensure that private ISP
startups are already burdened with the task of paying these institutions their due. This translates to
limited innovation and the poor performance of ISPs, especially outside of Jakarta and Sumatra.
However, policies are in place in attempt to rectify this.
State Policy Regarding Internet Penetration and Use
Internet freedom and F2C entrepreneurs have a direct impact on state policy on Internet
penetration. Dr. Illham A. Habibie along with Craig Smith founded a chapter of the Digital Divide Institute
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(DDI-I) in Indonesia. “[Warren and Habibie’s] collaboration resulted in the aggregation of Indonesian ICT
stakeholders in support of broadband development.”
This resulted in the “Jakarta Declaration on Meaningful Broadband,” which was adopted by
Habibie, local NGOs, the Chamber of Commerce, and the director of the MCI. The declaration is framed
within the Masterplan for Acceleration and Expansion of Indonesia's Economic Development through the
Meaningful Broadband Indonesia (MBI) group, which seeks to bring Indonesia’s economy to greater
levels of growth and competitiveness. Inherent in this vision is the need for sophisticated Internet access
which requires a “big push” of broadband deployment services guided by holistic policy. To achieve this,
the plan lays out five policies:






New Wireless Network Technologies which, for the first time, could bring provide an
affordable “last mile” broadband solution, to middle-to-low-income citizens and
enterprises currently excluded from Indonesia’s growth economy.
Cell phone upgrades: local manufacturing industry capable of developing mobile
phones, tablets, and mobile internet devices at price points suitable to lower income
citizens, able to provide access to broadband;
Completion of Backbone Infrastructure: the impending completion of the massive
fibre optic infrastructure -- a vital national asset with capacity to support increased
broadband demand,
Public Private Partnership: Plans are underway for a subsidized broadband network
which could induce market forces to serve and empower millions of users whose
income lies below the threshold of commercial markets.
Broadband as “Meta-Infrastructure”: International models that show how broadband
could be a “meta-infrastructure” – driving, boosting, integrating and enhancing social
impacts of all other infrastructures.

The push for bridging the gaps among the poor and isolated citizens and PPPs loudly rings of the F2C
norm as envisioned by WSIS. The MBI held a consortium in late 2015 about the process of
“leapfrogging” broadband among the 500+ government units in Indonesia to bring broadband to 25 million
people.
In recognition of the numerous challenges facing Indonesia to increase Internet penetration,
broadband, and meaningful access, the state developed another and more extensive policy guideline, the
Indonesian Broadband Plan in 2013. The presenter Lukita Tuwo, Vice Minister of National Development
Planning invokes the MDGs as a backdrop for the need for meaningful broadband and the challenges
including unequal penetration rates and the burdensome tariffs places on ISPs. Parroting the ITU’s WSIS
vision, he states: “It becomes mandatory for the Government together with private sectors to unlock the
potential of broadband.”

176

Figure 3 Framework of the Indonesia Broadband Plan
(Tuwo 2013)

Unlike the Russian and Chinese visions about the expansion of broadband and Internet access in their
countries, Indonesian ministry officials like Tuwo invoke some of the language and framing from the F2C
norm entrepreneurs like the WSIS’s outcome document recommendations and individuals like Craig
Warren of the Digital Divide Institute. These recommendations are specific to Indonesia’s economic
context, such as problems with burdensome regulations and the desire to find a balance between private
companies’ work alongside government intervention. Eu reports on targets that the Broadband Plan,
along with the “Master Plan” for Indonesian growth:
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Table 14 Indonesia Broadband Plan Targets for 2019
(Eu)

Household penetration rate of fixed broadband in
urban areas
Buildings connected to fixed broadband in urban
areas
Penetration rate of mobile broadband in urban
areas
Households connected to the fixed broadband in
rural area
Penetration rate of fixed broadband in rural area
Penetration rate of mobile broadband in rural
areas

Target achievement
71% at 20 Mbps
100% at 1 Gbps
100% at 1 Mbps
10% at 20 Mbps
6%
52% at 1 Mbps

While there is sufficient evidence that the F2C influences policy-making and its norm
entrepreneurs that operate in Indonesia, there is also some evidence of Internet policies being pulled in
other, more techno-nationalist and cyber-sovereignty directions. Kontan (2015) reports that the
government is incentivizing the use of domestic domain names by promising to invest 50 billion Rd, or
$3.7 million, for the creation of one million domestic domains. The purpose is to reduce the amount of
traffic that goes overseas, which is approximately 80 percent of total Internet use. The motivation for this
development was not explicitly stated in the article. It is not likely that it is the result of a desire to control
content, but instead to heighten domestic prestige and encourage domestic consumption.
There are some more concerning developments that straddle the problems of access and
content. It is well-documented that Indonesia tries to limit content like “…radicalism, hate speech, fraud,
gambling, child violence & pornography, internet security, intellectual property rights, violence and
miscellaneous (Freedom House 2015 418).” Yet, the filtering or blocking of sources of political critique or
dissent is mostly absent. An anecdote reported by Ars Technica presented a bemused American
perspective on a poorly executed example of site blocking by an Indonesian ISP. Moratel had attempted
to block Google’s services in Indonesia (no reason was given), but due to a technical glitch, managed to
redirect all searches for Google to a fake route. Because Moratel was connected through Singapore and
Hong Kong, the incorrect configuration change had a ripple effect on the rest of the web. “The error was
possible because most routing of traffic on the Internet is dependent on trust between network providers.
When networks set up "peering" relationships, they agree to trust each other’s' routing advertisements
and to propagate them (Gallagher).” Because Indonesia’s Internet infrastructure is not domestic, but
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depends on transnational connections, such mistakes are possible and reveal that Indonesia is far away
from controlling more extensive content.
Citizen Lab reported on the potential dangers of the Palapa Ring project. In particular,
Snowden’s disclosures revealed the British Government Communications Headquarters (equivalent the
US’s NSA), had been using a cable that Telekom partly owns, SeaMeWe-3, to spy on data in the UK and
Northern Europe. While not immediately relevant to the question of the F2C in Indonesia, complicity—or
ignorance—of these programs may signal future troubles for Indonesian Internet users upon the
completion of the Palapa Ring projects. The possibility of the Indonesian state collecting metadata on its
citizens does not seem out of the realm of possibility, especially in the light of Free states undertaking
similar projects in the name of national security.
Domestic Attitudes towards Access and Policy
The global surveys reviewed in this study dating back to 2008 all address the opinions of
Indonesians, even if Indonesians themselves do not appear to regularly conduct such studies on their
own. Kull et al. (2008) reveal that the majority of respondents, 56 percent, saw political stability as a
justification for the restriction of access, but 73 percent argued that the news should be able to publish
want it wants without government control and that 65 percent thought they should be able to read
whatever they want on the Internet.
As was the case in the Philippines, GlobeScan’s 2010 survey revealed that 46 percent of the
respondents felt that social connections were the most important value of the Internet. At the time, 51
percent argued that government should never restrict content, and 67 percent saw Internet as a
fundamental right. Internet Society’s 2012 survey revealed that Indonesians saw the need for the
government to step in to helping to assure access, with 96 percent arguing that the government should
find a way to provide cheaper computers, 93 percent arguing that it should encourage competition among
providers, and 94 percent arguing that the government should ensure access to its citizens. Such
statistics are remarkably similar to the Philippines. Ninety percent argued in 2012 that the Internet should
be considered a human right, 88 percent argued that expression should be protected on the Web, and 91
percent argued that social media enhanced rights to assembly and association. Fifty-seven percent
would accept increased controls or monitoring if it meant enhanced security, and a vast majority, 91
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percent, said the government had the right to govern the Internet according to the way it sees fit. Pew
reports that the percentage of those that argue that Internet should not be censored is relatively low, 55
percent in 2014 and 53 percent in the 2015 survey56.
***
It is not altogether clear what to make of the survey data that simultaneously demonstrates a
desire for stronger state control but also for Internet freedom. It could be a consequence of the same
phenomenon reported by the 2011 WEF in that “users want it all.” People do not see access and control
as contradictory demands and most Indonesians feel strongly about the centrality of access and the
state’s role in the provision of that technology. There is evidence in Indonesia that the state, despite
stops and starts, has adopted the principles of the F2C in their pursuit of regulating the ISP market and
the construction of the Palapa Ring projects. In so doing, they are addressing the issues related to
physical infrastructure and meaningful access.
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Pew 2014b and 2015b.
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Chapter 6: Not Free Cases
The states contained with Freedom House’s final category are remarkably different from each
other in terms of size, political culture, Internet use, and capabilities. Despite these differences, each
state’s regime-type is some version of authoritarianism, and as such governments are highly concerned
with maintaining order and security above the promotion of rights and equality.
China
The party has achieved something few had thought possible: the construction of a distinct
national internet. The Chinese internet resembles a fenced-off playground with paternalistic guards.
–The Economist, April 2013
As with the US and Russia, China is among the largest and most powerful states in the
international system which makes it appropriate for the final choice as the archetype case for those in the
Not Free category. It has achieved notoriety among IR and comparative scholars due to its extensive
capacity to surveil its users and filter content and in doing so has violated the spirit of liberal human rights.
Yet like other states, China faces uneven geographic distribution of the Internet and use is concentrated
among urban, middle-class youth. Efforts to bridge the digital divide in China are done in the hopes of
bringing economic prosperity while maintaining social harmony have been overlooked in favor of the
steps it takes to control its users. The Chinese government has taken a variety of steps to increase
Internet penetration and all the while has managed to maintain its firm control.
As reported by the CIA’s World Factbook, China has a population of approximately 1.37 billion
(ranking 1st in the world) and a land mass that spans 9.6 million km 2 (4th in the world). Fifty-six percent of
its population lives in an urban area, lower than the other two archetype cases, with 6 major metropolises
each with a population of 10 million or more57, with Shanghai as the largest city-proper in the world. It
has the largest economy in the world with a GDP of $19.51 trillion. This equates to $14,300 GDP per
capita, ranking China 112th in the world; much of the rural population suffers from underdevelopment.
China has 249.4 million landlines, ranking first in the world. The figure escalates for cellular
phones, with 1.3 billion in the country, placing it again as first in the world. In total, there are 667.69
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Shanghai 23.741 million; BEIJING (capital) 20.384 million; Chongqing 13.332 million; Guangdong 12.458
million; Tianjin 11.21 million; Shenzhen 10.749 million (2015)
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million Internet users in China which ranks the state first in the world, but totals only 48.8 percent of the
population (China Internet Watch).
Its history with human rights is antagonistic. While the state is party to six human rights
instruments and a signatory to the ICCPR, it derogates from those rights in the name of order and social
harmony. Throughout the 19th century, China was indirectly controlled by the West but was never a
colony, and as a result it is both distrustful of the West and its elites did not absorb a liberal tradition in the
way India and African countries had done. In a telling bit of history, nationalist Chinese scholar John C.
H. Wu attempted to synthesize the liberal tradition with Chinese political culture into a national
constitution. The rights enumerated in the proposed constitution included rights to property, speech,
religion, association/assembly, residency, privacy of correspondence, to vote, to call for referendum, to
recall politicians, to petition government, and habeas corpus. Yet these rights were highly circumscribed
by other elements of the Chinese Nationalist Constitution, which allowed the legislature or the executive
to abridge or revoke these rights when it was deemed necessary. Wu summarizes the new relationship
between rights and duties in the document he drafted:
... Rights are entrusted to the individual by society; the society is the fountain which
produces rights. It can be said that if an individual leaves society he is without rights.
Since society can confer rights in times of necessity, can also strip away rights; at least it
can limit the scope of rights. Therefore, minquan zhuyi advocates that all rights are
relative; they are decidedly not absolute (Grieff 461).
The Western tradition argues that rights are given either by natural law (social contract), or through
rational consensus (Kant), both of which are meant to protect citizens from arbitrary government action.
Within a Chinese framework, these liberal values are made subservient to the state because rights
stemmed from society in the first place. The failure to separate individual rights from the state and society
continues today.
China is widely cited as a violator of human rights and especially those associated with the F2C
and Internet freedom: expression, assembly, association, and press. In its Universal Periodic Review,
China has one of the few dialogues with the UN regarding its practices on the web and its connections to
its human rights obligations. It proclaims it continued to invest in information facilities and the growing
number of Internet users among its citizens, a common boast for China in order to claim that it is
technologically progressive. It maintains that at many stages of the law and policy-making processes the
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public is encouraged to consult with national and local lawmakers. The public’s views are solicited during
the drafting process but it is unclear whether such views have direct impact on the policy-making process
and hence could be considered crowdsourcing. The only recognition to the limitations on content or other
violations of users rights comes in the form of the admittance that it has taken measures to “strengthen
the management” of the Web. Content that incites violence, pornographic content harmful to children,
and Internet fraud are all areas in which the state admits to “cracking down,” with no admission that it
does so to encourage social harmony and unity. Instead, these actions are framed as necessary
exceptions to an otherwise free Web.
The Internet in China
Background. Most official accounts of China’s first venture on the Web focus on an email heard
around the world—“Across the Great Wall we can reach every corner in the world”—sent in September
1987. Its source is a joint team of Chinese and German academics in Beijing’s Institute of Computer
Applications in communication with the University of Karlsruhe in Germany. Other reports state that
another academic partnership led to the first connection of the Internet in China was in fact a year earlier.
In August 1986, Wu Weimin from the Institute of High Energy Physics of Chinese Academy of Sciences in
Beijing remotely logged into the account of Wang Shuqin on a machine located in CERN of Geneva via
the satellite link, and sent an email (CNNIC 2012). Despite the debate, as with almost all other cases in
this study, it was academia that took charge of the introduction and later the spread of the Internet.
In subsequent years, Chinese academics worked to build the infrastructure that spread access
throughout the country’s universities. They developed the X.25 protocol to enable email communications
between academics in China and their counterparts in Germany, which meant access to the World Wide
Web was not yet possible. In 1989 after a loan from the World Bank, the National Computing and
Networking Facility of China was created to develop China’s Internet backbone and other necessary
infrastructure. In 1990 they gained the top-level domain of .cn, thus creating a Chinese intranet.
Connecting it to the greater Internet was the next hurdle, but was not without its barriers.
At the INET'92 annual conference [Internet Society, an NGO; see Frames Chapter] held
in Kobe, Japan in June 1992, Researcher Qian Hualin from Chinese Academy of
Sciences met with the person in charge of International Network Department of National
Science Foundation of the U.S., and for the first time officially discussed the issue of
China's access to the Internet. However, he was told that there was political barrier for
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China's access to the Internet because there were many American government organs
online (CNNIC 2012)
Tsinghua University adopted the first network that used TCP/IP in December 1992, but it took until April
1994 for China’s “Golden Bridge Project” to successfully connect China to the World Wide Web. It had
taken several years for the Internet backbone, servers, and other infrastructure to be completed. The
development of this infrastructure was assisted by Sprint through a special 64 Kbps connection (a stateof-the-art speed at the time). Little information is available that details the deal between the Ministry of
Posts and Telecommunications (MPT) and Sprint; Reuters published a brief on the project, stating
nothing other than the “Financial terms of the memorandum of understanding were not disclosed.” Until
1995, the Internet was relegated to universities and academic centers in China’s major cities of Beijing,
Shanghai, Guangzhou, Nanjing, and Xi’an. Public access was enabled through the national X.25
protocols in January 1995. CHINANET was the nationwide backbone that was put into service by
January 1996, and the bureaucracy that surrounds Internet penetration and usage today began to
emerge.
By 2000, Goldkorn reports that anonymity on the Internet became a norm in China as it had been
across the Web before the rise of social media. Yet as these practices became widespread, they did not
remain unnoticed by the authoritarian government. Goldkorn states “The government uses increasingly
sophisticated technologies to block and filter certain foreign websites, and starts regulating Chinese
websites more strictly as Internet use grow.” One famous incident was the arrest of journalist Jiang Lijun
in 2003 with the assistance of Yahoo. “On Nov. 18, 2003, Lijun was found guilty of ‘subversion’ and
ordered to serve four years in prison for allegedly planning to use ‘violent means’ to push democracy
(CIO).” Yahoo had provided the government with the information that traced his email account back to
him. The push against anonymity is discussed by La Rue (2013), who argues that it is fundamental to the
security of citizens on the web because it protects their privacy and freedom of expression. China’s
moves against anonymity discussed below are inimical to this sentiment.
Becky P.Y. Yoo explores the dynamics of Internet development in her 1994 article
“Telecommunications reforms in China,” developing an analytical framework of the forces at work. She
claims that at different stages, there were three forces that shaped the Internet’s development in China
which are presumably in place today:
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(1) government concerns (including the state’s desire to provide universal coverage, to
control the telecommunications industry and, more recently, to improve the efficiency of
state-owned enterprises)
(2) the call from foreigners (sometimes made through their governments) to open China’s
telecommunications industry and
(3) the overwhelming market demand of the Chinese population and the business sector
(including foreign firms operating in China) to have freer and more rapid movement of
information (especially on the Internet). (698)
Early stages meant a large amount of state direction and control. China desired inclusion in the WTO,
and faced pressure to reform state-controlled industries between 1994 and 1997, and by 1998-1999
domestic competition was being encouraged simultaneously by state policy and market forces. “There
were repeated calls from respondents of CNNIC surveys for lower charges, better services and more
choice (Yoo 706).” By 2000, she reports that the state took on a number of significant roles, including
balancing three problems: encouraging domestic competition, dealing with the inefficiencies of state-run
enterprises, and dealing with threats that would alter the state’s ability to control the Internet. The state
developed a series of licensing laws to counteract political and pornographic content, and owners of
Internet cafés would be required to monitor and report their customers’ illegal activities. Use of public
venues for Internet access has declined today, but the latter regulation is emblematic of authoritarian and
semi-authoritarian governments in general. Middlemen, like Internet cafés and ISPs, are put in the
service of the state to police their users or face the loss of their businesses.
China faces the dichotomous challenge of growing Internet penetration for use among its
wangmin, or netizens, to enable growth in the global economy while simultaneously monitoring this
access to assure stability and order. It is not an easy challenge, and some saw these as incompatible
goals whose pursuit would ultimately weaken the regime (see Taub 1998). Instead, the state has earned
a reputation for being adept at this balancing act by enlisting domestic and foreign ICTs to help expand
and monitor the web simultaneously. The possibility of voices that challenge the state using the Internet
is inherently difficult as the infrastructure is controlled by the state. As Herold and The Economist report,
Beijing controls the gateways to the greater World Wide Web. “…the Chinese government owns and
controls the access routes to the Internet, and only allows private enterprises and individuals the rental of
bandwidth from state-owned entities (Herold 2).” This built-in limited access to private ISPs means that
few alternatives to the state-owned Internet are available to users.
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Freedom House (2014) reports the state’s desire to control the medium is growing; “The Internet
has become the main battlefield for public opinion struggle,” (General Secretary Xi Jinping) said in the
speech, which provided the ideological underpinning for the internet freedom decline.” There was
controversy over the August 2013 speech by the Communist Party official, but from some commentators
noted that it harkened back to the party’s darker days:
This editorial implied that there were some who were avoiding the “public opinion
struggle,” but after the editorial came out there was a rebuttal from Cao Lin in the August
27 edition of China Youth Daily. Cao’s piece was headlined: “The Term ‘Public Opinion
Struggle’ Makes People Uneasy” “Using the term ‘public opinion struggle’ to characterize
the current ideological conflict ushers us back into the past,” Cao wrote, referencing
China’s tumultuous Cultural Revolution (Gang).
Gang argues that the party was no longer seeking only to manipulate public opinion as it had done in
traditional media, but also make sure the party’s voice was front and center. “’Public opinion channeling’
focused on the need not just to control, but also to grasp discourse power. It wasn’t enough to muzzle
the voices of others — the Party’s voice had to be heard and accepted as well (Gang).”
Despite the Internet’s birth in China as an academic venture whose purpose was the
development of science and technology, its spread is characterized by the intense interest of the Chinese
state. Though developed in partnership with private sector MNCs, it was the design of the Chinese state
from the outset to develop the Internet’s infrastructure in ways that would allow it to control access and
content as soon as the tool stretched beyond universities.
Internet penetration and digital divides. A whitepaper by China Internet Watch (CIW) provides
statistics on Internet penetration since June 2015, and regularly reports on these in six month increments
(2015a). It is part of a private Singapore-based firm Incitez Pte, Ltd. whose purpose is provide data for
“digital strategy consulting and digital development.” It is curious if not uncommon phenomenon that the
private sector is driven to provide up-to-date data for infrastructure development that is pertinent for both
the private and public sectors58. The China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC) is the
government agency of the Ministry of Information Industry that deals with the Internet. Its annual reports
also provide such information, but the former was chosen for being the most current.
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The ICT sector is not alone in this phenomenon. The International Maritime Bureau, for example, is a privately
run institution from the International Chamber of Commerce which provides the most accurate and up-todate statistics on maritime piracy, primarily for those who own ships or pilot them.
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CIW reviews changes over a four-year period, from June 2011 to June 2015. Total Internet
usage in China rose by 12.6 percent to 667.69 million users. This means that 48.7 percent of the
Chinese population was online in 2015, below both the US and Russia. As elsewhere in East Asia,
Internet usage is highly skewed towards mobile technologies; 88.9 percent of users used smart phones to
access the web in 2015 which represents more than a 20 percent jump from four years prior. These
percentages are in themselves evidence of the poor performance of Chinese Internet access; the large
state, while growing rapidly, scores such a low score on Freedom House’s scale because less than half of
their population is connected. 3G technology that enables mobile access in major Chinese metropolises
is no longer the state-of-the-art today, and in part this is a consequence of techno-nationalism discussed
below.
The digital divide manifests itself within these statistics shown in areas like urban rates, age, and
socioeconomic status. The urban-rural divide, which affects much of China’s development, is pronounce
in ICTs and Internet usage. There was little change between 2011 and 2015: 72.5 percent of Internet
users lived in cities in 2011, and 72.1 percent by 2015 (recall that the entire urban population is 55.6
percent). Age is another good predictor of Internet use. For the young, ages 10-29, urban use of the
Internet 85 percent while rural use is 69 percent. For the elderly, the gap is the most extreme; in cities,
13.3 percent use the Internet while in the countryside a mere 2.5 percent use the web. Education is a
predictor as well, with only 12.4 percent of users of having primary education or less having Internet
access; such numbers are partly a reflection of literacy. Socioeconomic status, which at least in the US is
highly correlated to education level, is also a predictor of Internet access, with middle-income earners
making up the majority of Internet users.
The question of where netizens access the Internet is covered by the CIW survey. Ninety percent
of users can access the Internet at home, comparable to levels found in the US. Thirty-four percent
access at work, 18.6 percent at cybercafés, while 14 percent get access through school and 18 percent
through other public means.
CIW (2015b) (2015c) reports on smartphone trends, which are also on the rise in China. As
elsewhere, mobile phone usage is common among young people and those who have no other means of
access. They report by the third quarter of 2015, there were 1.25 billion active smartphone users in
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China (smartphones are therefore the majority of all mobile phones); a number that is rising, albeit more
slowly now than in recent years. People 25 and under account for 36.6 percent of the total. Nearly 530
million people have smartphones in China or a penetration rate of 38.6 percent. In cities with the most
sophisticated infrastructure, penetration among ages 16-59 is a whopping 94 percent, while in rural areas
it is 32 percent.
Internet penetration rates within Chinese provinces are unavailable, but Freedom House reports
that while access has been expanding for years, it is now slowing. Urban markets are reaching nearsaturation levels; most people who can afford access to the Internet either through broadband or mobile
technologies already do so.
Like the CIW, the CNNIC publishes regular statistics on Internet penetration. The report
acknowledges that there is a considerable gap between urban and rural populations. While the authors
are pleased to report that gaps within provinces have improved since 1997, the gaps between mainly
urban and rural provinces remains substantial. Beijing and Shanghai each have usage rates above 70
percent, while ten provinces have rates below 40 percent. “…unbalanced economic development among
regions was the root cause [of the penetration gap]. How to narrow such a digital gap needs further
research and exploration (2).” Bildner reports in 2013 that Jiangxi’s Internet penetration was actually less
than 30 percent, so while overall penetration continues to grow in China, inequality remains a significant
problem. Why this divides persists is a more pertinent question. Both of the other archetype cases face
similar problems of how some regions, especially rural or indigenous are under connected or
disconnected from the Internet. Guizhou and Jiangxi are both rural, landlocked, and dominated by
agriculture, but the former especially is characterized as having significant ethnic minority populations.
Political ideology that emphasizes the centrality of Beijing and ethnic Han Chinese may be one of the
roots of this gap.
Another piece of the puzzle is economic. Bildner reports that ICT infrastructure development is
tied to a province’s main economic base. The impetus to rapidly improve ICTs is absent in Guizhou and
Jiangxi because their economies are primarily agricultural. By contrast, while Inner Mongolia has a
relatively sparse population, its relatively higher rate of Internet penetration is due to its richness in coal
and rare metals. Unlike Russia and the US, China does not make rhetorical pronouncements that
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Internet access is important for all of its citizens. While it does acknowledge the importance access to
government services and the promotion of e-commerce, this rhetoric remains centered on urban
populations with the means to make use of them. There is little acknowledgment of a rights-based
approach to the Internet for those who have little meaningful access. The narrative is couched in
economic necessity and global competitiveness, and even the rudimentary courtesies that Russia pays to
how the Internet enables human rights are absent. As a result, Bildern suggests that there are two
Chinas, the Connected China where the relatively wealthy have potential access to outside information,
and the Disconnected China that more fully resembles the state-controlled media of decades past. The
latter suffer more acutely from the paltry availability of information not directly provided by the state.
Speed and cost. Speed is limited in China. Freedom House reports the average download
speeds in China are 3.2 Mbps, while Akamai reports 4.1 Mbps in Q4 2015, an increase of 20 percent
from the previous year. For comparison’s sake, the following are what testmy.net reports for some major
and minor cities in China:
Table 15 Reported Internet speeds in Chinese cities
(testmy.net 12 April 2016)
City (Province)

Download

Upload

Beijing (Beijing)

7 Mbps

2 Mbps

Shanghai (Shanghai)

6.7 Mbps

3.9 Kbps

Guangzhou (Guangdong)

4.9 Mbps

1.6 Mbps

Chongqing (Sichaun)

4.6 Mbps

1.1 Mbps

Guiyang (Guizhou)

3.9 Mbps

1.3 Mbps

Nanchang (Jiangxi)
No city available (Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region)

3.7 Mbps

1.9 Mbps

2.5 Mbps

601 Kbps

Xi'an (Shaanxi)

2.2 Mbps

493 Kbps

Hothot (Inner Mongolia) (few results)

1.1 Mbps

N/A

At such speeds that the average citizen in Beijing, for example, falls far below developed countries’
standards for Internet access. Recall that the FCC now requires 25/3 Mbps as a minimum criterion for
broadband since 2015. Figures for Guiyang and Nanchang, cities that fall into the underserved provinces
discussed above, are lower than the central cities that lie within the outer provinces in China. Inner
Mongolia and the Uyghur Autonomous region experience the worst speeds observed.
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Costs are relatively expensive, with 1 Mbps wired broadband on average costing 469 times more
on mainland China as compared to Hong Kong (Freedom House 2014 195). Yet in Beijing, China
Unicom’s 10010 monthly 4G mobile service package costs a user ¥50, or about $7.88 per month. Such
prices are in line one might find in Moscow and is a relative bargain compared to American counterparts.
Numbeo records that a 10 Mbps fixed connection would cost $17.37, high for Asia, but still only 1.83
percent of the average citizen’s salary.
Internet Service Providers
Internet service in China is provided exclusively by the state in one of two manners. First,
“private” ISPs that serve businesses with telecommunications service must rent bandwidth from stateowned infrastructure like IXPs. Such arrangements are not uncommon—most American ISPs likewise
share infrastructure by utilizing peering—but the infrastructure is privately-owned by large corporations.
Second, the three largest ISPs in China, the China United Network Communications Group Co., Ltd.
(China Unicom), the China Telecom Corporation Limited (China Telecom), and the China Mobile
Communications Corporation (China Mobile), are all state-owned enterprises.
The viability of these ISPs is manipulated by the state. A virtual monopoly by China Telecom was
challenged in a 2008 anti-trust suit59, and the rearrangement of the entire telecommunications industry
was the result. Since 2008, these three providers of broadband and/or mobile Internet service have been
orchestrated to compete against one another to increase innovation and efficiency. While provincial
branches of these ISPs operate semi-autonomously, they are still engines of the state and are
responsible for carrying out state policy about availability, regulation, and censorship.
Despite the encouragement of domestic competition the domination of these ISPs stems from
techno-nationalism. Hong, Bar, and An (2012) review the development of ICT industries in China and
how the country is attempting to reverse a long-standing trend of foreign-direct investment that enabled
the development of Chinese ICT infrastructure. Three decades of dependency upon this model of growth
for this sector meant that China was reliant on foreign-developed technology to modernize their economy,
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The Tenth People’s Congress passed in 2007 and began enforcing in 2008 vast anti-trust legislation
throughout various sectors of its economy. The purpose as stated in Article 1 is as follows: “In order to
prevent and combat monopolistic behavior, to protect fair market competition, improve economic efficiency,
to safeguard consumer interests and public interests, and promote the healthy development of the socialist
market economy, the development of this Law (NPC).”
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and simultaneously meant that there was little technological accumulation and innovation. “There has
been an outburst of techno-nationalist discourse,” the authors note, “expressing the shared concept of
‘Chinese national, as opposed to foreign, control’ over rapidly changing information network infrastructure
(914).”
Such concerns over the foreign origin and control of technology are common. Recall that the
Guardian reported Russian policy of looking into ways to “unplug” the Internet, which has since been
tested in 2015 and justified as a response to the perceived threat of American control of the Web. Such a
sentiment was echoed after another “email heard around the world.” Morozov reports on an incident that
took place during Iran’s Green Revolution that involved an email from a member of the US State
Department to Twitter executives to postpone scheduled maintenance. The maintenance would have
interrupted the ability of the protestors to stay connected, and the official published the email in solidarity
with the pro-democracy advocates in the country. On the other hand, Iranian officials—and the
Chinese—saw the email as evidence of American meddling in domestic affairs utilizing the medium they
indirectly control, and soon cracked down on social media users in their own countries.
Accordingly, China has formed its own standards for mobile technologies. TD-SCDMA air
interface60 is a 3G technology that is designed for exclusive use in China (Hong, Bar, and An 915). As
mobile ISP providers are required to get licensed in order to be able to provide services, Chinese mobile
netizens are forced to use state-developed technologies incompatible with the rest of the world’s
standards. Simultaneously, this new standard has been marketed abroad to encourage innovation and
profit-motivations for all three of China’s top ISPs. “As Ji Zhengkun, Director of the Standardization
Administration, pointed out, technical standard-setting constitutes a key national strategy (Hong, Bar, and
An 919).” By establishing national proprietary standards—and ones they could sell to markets
overseas—China’s ICT development policy attempted to consolidate control on the most commonly used
device for Internet access and attempted to provide an alternative to the Western-originated standards
like GSM and CDMA.

60

“Air interface is a cellular industry term. It refers to the system that ensures compatibility between equipment
(cell phones) and the base stations (Newton 113).” Essentially, it the particular type of technology which
allow cell phones to access the Internet and other types of data.
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Continuing along the lines of attempting to bring efficiency, innovation, and state control in line,
Hart discusses developments in China’s mobile technology markets in 2013. First, all three major ISPs
were awarded licenses to sell 4G service61. The prices of broadband reflected above from China Unicom
are monthly 4G plans. Such technology is the next step in a country that is largely reliant on wireless
technology for access. Hart remarks that similar to 3G technologies, China is licensing this home-grown,
proprietary technology before the internationally-licensed competition: the Frequency Division DuplexLTE (FDD-LTE). Additionally, China Mobile is trying to encourage domestic consumption (and
presumably foreign sales) by pushing for phones that would cost less than 1,000¥ ($158). Finally, a new
element of competition was being introduced in 2013, Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs) which
enter into agreements with established mobile or ICT companies to buy network services wholesale and
subsequently sell plans to consumers62. Hart and Xiang report that by the end of 2013, eleven different
companies received licenses to provide these services, some of which are mobile phone distributers, but
others that are Internet infrastructure and/or solution providers and retailers. Xiang points out that “Five
of them will work with both China Unicom and China Telecom,” and doubtless the rest will work with one
of the main ISPs or telecom companies. While China is trying to encourage domestic competition to
enliven innovation and efficiency (something which Hong, Bar, and An report has had mixed success in
past), all licensees are dependent on state-controlled infrastructure in addition to the direct requirements
of the government to control content and limit users’ rights.
Internet gateways (IXPs) are directly controlled by the state. “Despite these signs of
liberalization,” the Freedom House report notes, “six state-run operators maintain China’s gateways to the
international internet, giving authorities the ability to cut off cross-border information requests. All service
providers must subscribe via the gateway operators under MIIT oversight (Freedom House 2014 196).”
Thus, a cut-off from the rest of the world—for a legitimate Chinese intranet—is a real possibility. The
scenario would endanger China’s economy which is dependent on foreign trade, so its likelihood
increases only with the rising threat to Chinese national security.
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Time-Division Long-Term Evolution [TD-LTE]
Examples in the US include Boost Mobile (Sprint) and Consumer Cellular (AT&T, T-Mobile).
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As a preliminary analysis, comparing Russia and China’s attempts to control the Internet through
their ISPs is of interest. From the beginning of popular use of the Internet in China, the state has been
ever-present. Partly, this is a consequence of the illiberal nature of its economy in particular. For
instance, China Mobile took over fixed-line operator China Tietong in 2008 after the shakeup of anti-trust
legislation. Yet China Tietong was formally China Railcom, which had been part of the now defunct
Ministry of Railways PRC. Railcom was primarily developed for the country's railway communications
industry, and later expanded to residential and other users (China Daily). In short, the competition that
the state seeks to introduce is still very much controlled and is in a way artificial. What exists today as the
Chinese ISP and mobile technology markets are directly linked to its past. While the Internet began in an
academic setting, it has always had a distinctive Chinese quality, with state ventures cooperating with
foreign companies to expand the Internet beyond academia to businesses and the general public. In
comparison, Russia’s ability to control the Internet today is hindered by its quasi-liberal economy and how
the Internet got initially dispersed through private enterprise. While the state-owned Rostelecom is the
largest ISP in Russia, it controls only 35 percent of the market and the state still has to deal with the
reality of nominal democratic values. The roots of China’s intranet were built into the system from the
beginning, which can be seen as an advantage of long-standing authoritarianism over quasi-democratic
authoritarianism.
State Policy Regarding Internet Penetration and Use
Broadband Targets. The 12th Five-Year Plan was adopted in 2011 and promised the
construction of a greater degree of broadband for the “safe and ubiquitous” use for its Internet users, and
subsequently the “Broadband China Strategy and Implementation Scheme” was published in August
2013 (Hart). Forbes magazine and Hart reported that the Chinese government had announced an
infrastructure upgrade to increase urban centers’ speed to up to 20 Mbps and rural speeds to 4 Mbps by
2015. Such speeds have yet to be achieved. By 2020, the State Council’s “Broadband China” strategy
would have 50 Mbps in urban centers and 12 Mbps in rural areas. Rapoza poses two interpretations of
the meaning of further broadband penetration: “To build out its internet infrastructure, Beijing will be
toying with opening its society to the rest of the world…or cracking down and censoring a highly
populated internet even further.” Chinese officials are adept at opening technology while simultaneously
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strengthening state control, so Rapoza’s glimpse of openness may be merely a specter. Rapoza’s
pessimism, on the other hand, might be warranted. The image below is from a presentation from the
China Academy of Telecommunication Research of MIIT (the government ICT branch).
Figure 4 Main tasks of the Chinese national broadband strategy
(Yu 13)

The rhetoric that surrounds the F2C is absent of any advocacy of increase meaningful access in China.
While the MIIT acknowledges that increasing broadband to the countryside would improve the “social
livelihood of people” it is simply a furtherance of what the state has claimed to provide since 1949. The
state will play key roles in increasing broadband availability, encouraging domestic competition, and
establishing new national technological standards for the purposes outlined above, all while controlling
content and excluding users from potential threats to national security and harmony. It is apparent that
China is moving to create a more sophisticated “fenced-off playground;” faster, more widely available, but
still fundamentally limited.
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Shut downs. In both Xinjiang and Sichuan, the state has shut down all Internet access or mobile
phone services in the wake of conflicts with ethnic minorities, usually in connection with violent clashes
with police. It is in these cases that the normative content of the F2C is most directly challenged.
In July 2009, Internet access in Xinjiang province was shut down for 10 months. The Uyghurs
living in the province, who are of Turkish decent and mostly Muslim, are facing growing tensions with
ethnic Han Chinese. Andrew Jacobs of the NY Times reports that tensions had flared due to the internal
migration to the resource-rich region of Han Chinese in search of employment. There had been growing
restrictions on freedom of religion, including campaigns against religious mandates on modes of dress
(headscarves for women and beards for men). Required political education classes and raids on
unauthorized schools illustrated the state’s desire to achieve “social harmony.” By the time Internet was
restored, only two official news websites were available; anyone wanting access to the rest of the Web
had to travel to a neighboring province. The announcement of the Internet’s restoration also came with a
warning “…that anyone using the internet to spread harmful information would be punished severely
(Hogg).”
In the summer of 2013, nearly 50 Uyghurs died in clashes with police. Official reports, when such
incidents are reported nationally, paint the protesters as separatists and terrorists, but Jacobs argues that
those who killed were not heavily armed. When the reporter arrived in Hotan, an isolated city in the
Uyghur-dominated southwest Xinjiang, these clashes had resulted in the cut-off from mobile Internet
access. There are other ways in which the state limits the meaningfulness of access for Uyghurs,
including using the Arabic script for the few websites that exist (6,000 versus some 400,000 in Beijing
alone) when most Uyghurs are familiar with the Latin script. It is possible to bypass the restrictions and
censorship through virtual private networks63 (VPNs), but Olesen reports that most are unwilling to use
such a method.
In March, Xinjiang’s top Communist Party official, Zhang Chunxian, told reporters at the
annual meeting of the National People’s Congress, China’s legislature, that 90 percent of
"violent terrorists" use virtual private networks, which obscure a computer’s location, to
circumvent China’s web controls and watch extremist videos.
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“A VPN has the look and feel of a private network to a user. But it’s really part of the Internet with heavy
security—so no one on the Internet can see what’s going on in the VPN…it exhibits at least some of the
characteristics of private network even though it uses the resources of public switched network (Newton
1210).”
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Like the rest of the China, Uyghur webmasters are pressured to report the activities of their users,
especially anything associated with separation or independence.
These tactics are not solely found in Xinjiang. Olesen reports that censorship and monitoring—
and cut offs—occur most frequently in areas that exhibit ethnic hostilities and poverty. In Sichuan
Province, the state cut off mobile phone and Internet access in areas of unrest that were tied to the
Tibetan ethnic minority. Three were killed by police after what Branigan reports as peaceful riots, and
access was cut off in a 30-mile radius of the events in Ganzi, Sichuan. Like in Xinjiang, officials often
blame outside influence for the unrest to justify the cut off from the Web, saying that Uyghur and Tibetan
diaspora and Western supporters were instigating protest from the outside.
Censorship and surveillance. Censorship and violation of users’ rights by the Chinese state
are well-documented by Freedom House, Amnesty International, the HRC, and many other international
institutions. Like Russia, China’s ICT corporations including ISPs and content providers are responsible
for carrying out state policies. And like Russia, providers of content are expected to monitor and
otherwise comply with state policy for achieving social harmony. Baidu, the nationally-owned search
engine, Sina Corp, owner of Weibo (a Facebook/Twitter hybrid), and Youku, (You-Tube equivalent) all
meet with government officials to harmonize new censorship efforts as a consequence of current events.
For example, Reporters without Borders recounted in 2011 that there was a coordinated effort to block
any searches or tags with a combination of “Occupy [city]” as a result of the fear of the influence of the
Occupy movement from elsewhere.
Other measures. In addition to being veritably all controlled by the state, and used to cut off
entire populations’ access, ISPs have been recruited into directly reporting on the actions of its netizens.
Xinhuanet and Grant Brunner report on the legislation approved in December 2012 about new
requirements for ISPs. Users must register with their ISPs and other telecommunication companies using
their real names and contact information, “even a copy of their passports or IDs (Brunner).” The purpose,
as explained by Xinhua, is the protection of public interest and users who had been increasingly the
victims of Internet scams, fraud, identity theft, and libel. As the policy is meant to protect the public from
thieves, ISPs are barred from using that information for any other purposes; real identities would be held
“backstage” while users could still post comments anonymously. Yet, as Brunner highlights, the
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responsibility for ISPs to delete illegal or subversive content and record the users that participate is
indeed “scary” for users that would wish to remain truly anonymous. Frank La Rue, in his 2013 report to
the HRC, comments on the trend of states using technology to violate users’ privacy. While the US, the
British, and Russian data-collection programs (PRISM, Tempora, SORM) are carried out behind closed
doors, albeit with the acquiescence of ISPs and other ICTs, the more blatant mandate of collecting real
data on users takes the violation of privacy to whole new, and perhaps more honest, level.
Deep-packet inspection allows ISPs to detect the use of VPNs, so even one of the most
commonly used methods for circumventing censorship and detection is not a viable option. As Olesen
recounts, the use of such tools to shield users from the eyes of the government can quickly become
evidence of guilt. As a consequence of the government’s ability to identify users, and the harsh
sentences some users have received for their actions, Freedom House reports that self-censorship in the
broader public is now largely common.
Domestic ICTs are not alone in these tasks. Recently, Baidu, China’s most popular search
engine partnered with a San Francisco-based company CloudFlare to bring cloud services to Chinese
businesses. Named Yunjiasu, or “fast cloud,” the service would create a “unified content delivery network
that makes foreign sites more easily accessible in China, and for Chinese sites to load faster in
destinations outside the country (Hamilton).” Cached sites would download faster for Chinese netizens
and for foreigners trying to load Chinese business websites also cached by CloudFlare. The fact that
Baidu, a Chinese content provider that is required by Chinese law to report illegal behavior to authorities,
would have access to potentially harmful information stored in the American-owned cloud is a cause for
concern for Hamilton. Yet, CloudFlare states such concerns are unwarranted: “customer identifiable
information such as email addresses, password hashes, and billing information are never stored in the
China network or shared with Baidu (Hamilton).” Bejtlich is dubious, claiming that the joint venture that is
touted by some as a model that can be duplicated by other Western firms is exactly what the Chinese
state wants. Motivated by China’s techno-nationalism, this sharing of technology would allow the
Chinese state to learn how to copy and circumvent the protections afforded to users by companies like
CloudFlare.
With technical IP [intellectual property] in Chinese possession, domestic companies can
build national champions to rival, and eventually replace, Western firms. China can also
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better understand, and eventually defeat, CloudFlare’s security services, having firsthand access to IP and operational details.
For instance, CloudFlare has helped political movements keep websites operative during distributed
denial of service64 (DDoS) attacks. Bejtlich argues that by collaborating with Baidu, the company’s IP can
be used against others. Already, China’s censorship is leaking through from domestic to international
DDoS attacks; the “Great Cannon” was fired against a private website reporting on censorship in China,
GreatFire, and against an open source code platform, Github. Each website could be seen as a threat to
Chinese national security, but the attacks on sites hosted outside of China were unprecedented.
Yunjiasu could also be used to censor content for netizens; the government could tell Baidu to censor
some of the pages hosted by the cloud service in China. There is a growing tension when foreign
companies do business with China; Google famously stopped doing business with the state in 2008
because of pressures to carry out censorship policies and hacks to its source code. But such decisions
by MNCs to cut themselves off from one seventh of the world’s population are bad business. It is likely
that the CloudFlare and Baidu deal is a prototype that will be emulated, with the assurances from
American companies that they will not be party to policies that are aimed at dismantling human rights. If
Bejtlich is right, such beliefs are at best naïve.
Public Opinion on the Role of the Internet
There is a Western predilection, well-recorded in Morozov’s account of the outsiders’
perspectives on the Green Revolution, to look for the transformative capacity of the Internet in social and
political life. The narrative in the United States is that the Internet grew to be the integral, global
technology it is today because of the absence of the state and the freedom of anonymity, allowing for
open discourse about a plethora of topics. Often, Western media focus on the violations of users’ rights
as seen through the lens of universalism; for example, the Chinese artist Ai Weiwei was featured in Time
in 2011. He was painted as a sort of local hero who had the courage (and the Twitter followers) to
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Newton’s definition of a Distributed Denial-of-Service attack: “You’re a horrid person with mean intentions.
You ping a website 400 or 500 times a second. Or, even worse, you create a virus and use email
attachment to infect a lot of networked computers, which become Zombies under your control. You
command them all to go to that website, which is then overwhelmed and no longer able to serve legitimate
customers. Hence the term Denial of Service attack. Such an attack is very hard to prevent, since
sometimes it’s done from computers all over the country or the world. This is called a Distributed Denial of
Service Attack, or (DDoS)… (Newton 357).”
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discuss controversial and potentially embarrassing government actions, like collapsing schools and the
murder of Shanghai police by an abused former inmate.
While routine crackdown on dissidents offer important accounts of how China abuses human
rights, the cultural relativist notions of varying expectations is largely absent. How do the netizens of the
“fenced-off playground” see the Internet?
The CNNIC reported in June 2015 that
According to a survey conducted in December 2014, the proportion of Chinese netizens
who believed the country’s network environment was safe or very safe, who trusted
Internet information, who took a positive attitude toward Internet sharing, who liked
posting comments on the Internet, or who depended or heavily depended on the Internet
was respectively 48.6%, 54.5%, 60.0%, 43.8% and 53.1%.
Such numbers are fairly typical, but do show a higher than expected percentage of netizens trusting the
information (and perhaps the source of that information) on the Web, up from 35 percent in 2007. The
official report categorizes trust as a sort of post-modern problem; as urbanization rates climb, traditional
sources of trust are abandoned in a “society of strangers.” Trust in cyberspace not only improves
peoples’ interaction on the Web but also in real life. Yet, the report also states: “Although network
security incidents occur frequently, netizens’ overall level of online trust and inclusiveness is improving.”
The authors do no clarify what they mean by the “network security incidents.”
Moreover, the CNNIC reports that the Internet functions as a “relief valve” in which users can post
comments and suggestions for the state that in turn promotes socialist democracy. The fondness of its
users, especially digital natives ages 10-29 for posting comments about state policy “…mitigate[s]…social
conflicts, and therefore promote[s]…social harmony (40).” Over fifty percent of the survey respondents in
that age group reported liking to post online comments, while the rate drops to the nevertheless
respectable 35.4 percent for respondents aged 60 or over. The authors also remark while the Internet
can help develop young peoples’ personalities, it is also a vulnerable time in which reality and virtuality
become distorted, and “…where polarization of speech may produce some negative effects on young
people’s social cognition (40).” The extrapolation from “posting comments online” to political discourse
may be an exaggerated one. At least in the US, youth interest in online political discourse in the last ten
years has been low, with the possible exception of the Bernie Sanders campaign. It is an indicator of
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some rhetorical recognition by the state of a positive political role for the Internet, albeit shaped by
distinctly Chinese values.
Other global surveys confirm some of the optimism reported by the CNNIC, but not all. Kull et al.
(2008) report that 42 percent of netizens thought the government should have the right to limit access to
preserve stability, leaving the majority of respondents not in favor of such measures. Eighty-five percent
wanted to read unfiltered or uncontrolled news, and 71 percent reported a desire to read whatever they
wish on the Internet. GlobeScan (2010) reported a prevalent belief in access as a right, with 87 percent
of respondents answering affirmatively. Forty percent argued that content should not be controlled by the
government, while 55 percent said it was not a safe place to freely express oneself. The final available
survey was conducted by Internet Society’s Global Internet Survey 2012. Eighty-four percent of
respondents said that access should come without data or content restrictions, 93 percent said that
freedom of expression should be guaranteed on the Internet, and the same percentage argued that social
media enhanced rights of assembly and association. Ninety-two percent argued that the Internet should
be considered a human right. While many argued there were numerous roles for the government to play
in access and availability (government should provide cheap computers 92 percent, government should
encourage competition 93 percent), 88 percent argued that the state had the right to govern the Internet
as it sees fit, one of the highest percentages of all states (though eclipsed by Indonesia in this study, at
91 percent). Netizens are often nationalistic in nature, and support for the cyber sovereignty here is
unsurprising.
David Herold’s 2012 article “Escaping the World” paints a stark portrait of young wangmin.
Overall, Chinese users see Internet spaces outside of China as rather uninteresting; access to these sites
from China is slow with many time-outs, and content is dominated by foreign languages. The nationalist
streak that is present in state policy concerning infrastructure and access is present even in netizens’
perspectives about the web.
Different from F2C frames and instead of seeing online spaces as real extensions of their social
and political lives, some Chinese Internet users view it as an escape from the conformity and drudgery of
the real world. The metaphor Herold uses is that of the 19th century carnival, in which the line between
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performer and observer is blurred. The carnival was exaggerated reality where regular rules did not
apply.
“Chinese Internet users, whatever their background, are strongly influenced by their
cultural context", as "the 'relational self' and mianzi (face), which are core elements of
Chinese culture, are reinforced via ICTs (W. Chu)." In other words, Chinese Internet
users like to connect to other netizens and place a great value on their online identity or
presentation, which is, however, separate, different, and not easily connected to their
offline identity as Farrall pointed out (2).
The disconnect between reality and virtuality is engrossing; netizens spent on average 19 hours a week
online in 2012 [by 2014, this became 26.1 hours; 56.4 percent use the Internet for gaming, 66.7 percent
watching video (CNNIC 2015b)]. “Online they can play games, watch movies, get married or divorced,
take part in 'virtual' manhunts, engage in the harassment or bullying of 'evil' people, and be entertained by
it all, before returning to their 'real' lives (12).” At times, the line between reality and virtuality can be
blurred, as the CNNIC indicated; Herold recalls the case of the Kaiping Girl of Guangdong Province who
was the victim of kidnapping and rape in 2008. Video of the crime was posted online, apparently without
any consideration of the real life consequences it could have for the perpetrators. As Herold explains, the
incident “provides a strong example of the reckless behavior of young Chinese who believe they can do
anything online, but ignored that their 'real' misdeeds had occurred offline (8).”
What one should extrapolate from the carnivalesque quality of Chinese netizens’ views of the
Internet in their political lives is not immediately clear. On the on hand, increased Internet access would
mean more accountability for the government. Particularly, that the inhibitions against posting criticism of
the government could be reduced because what they do in the virtual world would have little
consequence for the real mianzi, or face, of an individual or his family. On the other hand, the fantasy
aspect of the netizen’s virtuality could mean that any political discourse might not be serious or have
consequences in the real world. The disconnect between real world actions and posting a video online of
the Kaiping incident may not be the norm, but just the most extreme expression of this concept. Instead,
if the Internet is seen as nothing of consequence beyond an escape from reality, one could conclude that
looking for real political discourse or change in such places would be nothing but ephemeral farce. This,
coupled with the state’s strong monitoring of its netizens, further discourages how the Internet could
viewed as a transformative tool in China.
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The Economist’s Facebook post from 23 March 2016 about the lack of meaningful respect for
human rights by the Chinese government illuminates some of the tension that the Chinese diaspora and
Taiwanese feel about the techno-nationalism, social media, and the role of the Chinese state. User SY
Chan is located in Taiwan and claims that even Facebook itself should be considered a human right. Ian
Meng and Hu Ru Zhu who claimed that Chinese social media was just as acceptable to use as an
alternative to Facebook were located in the US at the time of their reactions but from originally from
Beijing and Guangzhou, respectively.
Another line of inquiry for future research is revealed in this data: to what degree does the
Chinese public represent the rhetoric of China about techno-nationalism and cyber sovereignty?
To play a devil’s advocate, it is fair to say that you cannot know what the mass of users would
think or do were they able to access the World Wide Web in a meaningful way. Since many Chinese
users have never been connected without censorship or monitoring, nor do they exhibit signs that see it
as an avenue for political discourse other than as a suggestion box, looking for signs of the viability of the
Internet to challenge the government in a meaningful way may merely be a Western illusion.
International Rhetoric
The norm of the F2C is not evident in China. While there are policies in place to extend access
and to establish state-of-the-art speeds, their aim is global economic competitiveness, not political
participation. Instead, China’s response to the F2C is nationalistic in tone and aims instead at the
harmonization of interests among the state, the people, and the business community.
The first articulation of cyberspace sovereignty by the Chinese is found in a White Paper
published by the People’s Daily in 2010 (Liang). The document reveals an expansive vision for the
Internet in China, viewing it as a cornerstone of economic growth, scientific and technological innovation,
and “livelihood improvement.” The government is required to create conditions conducive to its
development and regulate it so that the Internet remains in line with the community’s goals. The white
paper promotes its successes mostly in terms of statistics, boasting about increases in network
infrastructure, including optical and submarine cables, the number of netizens, and increases in speed.
They acknowledge the digital divides that persist among its regions and between urban and rural centers,
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but the importance of closing those gaps is framed within the pragmatic benefits of the Internet:
economic, technological, and cultural progress.
A cursory glance at the contents of the white paper suggests that the government is sincerely
grappling with civil rights, including “Guaranteeing Citizens’ Freedom of Speech on the Internet” with
cybersecurity threats (real and imagined). The rhetoric contained within the paper sidesteps traditional
understandings about the freedom of expression, instead framing it in terms of the ability of users to stay
abreast of news and interact with the government. “The Chinese government has actively created
conditions for the people to supervise the government, and attaches great importance to the Internet's
role in supervision.” This “suggestion box” feature is a mechanism through which the Chinese state
interacts with Internet users. Further, while privacy of correspondence is something protected by law, it
cannot interfere with the overriding interests of the state, collective interests, or other users. Such
conditions easily justify the intrusion of the state on its users’ actions on the Internet. The state also faces
threats from abroad, which means that the government must safeguard against any that would impinge
upon the honor of the state, incite ethnic tension, jeopardize the state’s religious policies, or spread
rumors or slander. Finally, the white paper mentions that while China cooperates with the WTO and
WSIS in order to protect foreign MNCs and to improve technological capacity, Internet policy is ultimately
a domestic affair. “Though connected, the Internet of various countries belongs to different
sovereignties.”
This belief is articulated in a letter to the UN General Assembly dated in September 2011. Also
signed by Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, the letter confirms the need for cooperation among states
for the development of the Internet, including overcoming the issue of digital divide and cybersecurity, but
reaffirms the primacy of the state in this networked arena. The letter reaffirms “…that policy authority for
Internet-related public issues is the sovereign right of States, which have rights and responsibilities for
international Internet-related public policy issues.” The General Assembly responded to this assertion in
2013, confirming that states have sovereignty authority to ICT-related activities and infrastructure within
their borders, but also added that sovereignty must respect human rights. “State efforts to address the
security of ICTs must go hand-in-hand with respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms set forth
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international instruments.” The report from

203

General Experts in ICT also admonished states not to use proxies in cyberattacks, referring to the fact
that states can act with relative impunity when hackers or state ICT experts can cover their tracks adeptly.
Shannon Tiezzi reports on the development of the cyber sovereignty norm, noting that Chinese
officials are quick to point to, first, their compliance to WTO, WSIS, and efforts at technological
cooperation, and second, the UN’s affirmation that states have the right to develop ICT policy which gives
credence to their global policies and crackdowns on netizens. In its justification, Chinese representatives
ignore the admonitions of the UN that ties ICT policies to human rights. Instead, Chinese representatives
tie ICT policy to security, and claim that their perspective on the relationship between state law and the
Internet is meant to challenge the dominance of the United States, whose position as the leader of global
Internet policy is a threat to everyone due to cyber-espionage and cyber-attacks. Tiezzi states that:
China’s goal for this dialogue would be to codify its own interpretation of “Internet
sovereignty” into international law, much as Western countries have been able to codify
their idea of “universal values.” The People’s Daily article sees cyberspace as a
contested zone where the U.S. wields too much influence; it seeks to combat this by
pushing for international consensus modeled on its own vision for the Internet.
MIIT Minister Miao Wei asserted the Chinese position on the Internet related to domestic and
foreign policy. In an October 2015 press release titled “The Big Picture: Big Data as a competitive
resource,” Wei argues that technology, specifically big data 65 will be the most important aspect of power
for the remainder of the 21st century. He compares it to other modern contests over resources among the
great powers: coal, gas, gold, etc.
Big data analysis through data integration and depth of excavation, find the law, create
value, and thus establish a seamless link from the physical world to the digital world and
the online world. Large data era, online and offline, virtual and reality, software and
hardware overlapping staggered, cross-border integration, to reshape our understanding
and practice mode, open a new industrial breakthrough and economic restructuring.
By 2020, Wei predicts that global data usage will be about 44 zettabytes (ZB), or 44 trillion gigabytes.
Whoever has control of this capital resource will determine where economic growth takes place and at
what rate. Wei insists that Chinese councils and the legislature intend to be ready to take advantage of
this capital resource. “Internet +” and “Made in China 2025” plans are meant to build a development
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“The amount of data in our world has been exploding, and analyzing large data sets—so-called big data—will
become a key basis of competition, underpinning new waves of productivity growth, innovation, and
consumer surplus… The increasing volume and detail of information captured by enterprises, the rise of
multimedia, social media, and the Internet of Things will fuel exponential growth in data for the foreseeable
future (Manyika et al).”
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strategy to strengthen China’s domestic Internet and information infrastructure along with cultivating
business leaders who will be sophisticated enough to use these technologies and be innovative in the
field. Unlike the F2C and even the ITU’s visions for the development of Internet access and technologies
via entrepreneurs or public-private partnerships, China views the development as essential to foreign
policy and economic growth and emphasizes its techno-nationalistic standpoint.
In line with these goals, Chinese officials are not shy about exporting the technology elsewhere.
First, early in 2015 the Xiahua news network touted Internet infrastructure investment in West Africa. It
loaned Benin $69.14 million for a broadband project, and the Chinese Ambassador who coordinated the
project noted it would achieve two aims: strengthening ties between the countries and fostering economic
and social development. The ties between African states and China are both longstanding and growing,
with The Economist reporting in 2014b that China gave $62.7 billion in loans to African states between
2001 and 2010, totaling 20 percent more than the World Bank. The authors of the 2014 article comment
that it is difficult to ascertain what China’s intentions are in Africa: to mold its ideology in the fashion of the
Chinese as Westerns have done in the past, or simply that entrepreneurial Chinese citizens see
opportunity in these markets. The latter seems more likely as tensions are apparent, and racism and
bitterness is shown on both sides.
In Guinea, writes Mr. French [a NY Times journalist] , “there was mounting resentment
over the way China was seen to be…despoiling the environment, dispossessing
powerless landholders or flouting local laws, fueling corruption, and, most of all,
empowering awful governments.”
It is unlikely that the Chinese deal in Benin is motivated by an earnest desire to mold an African Internet
in the fashion as a Chinese one. Instead, it is more likely that such deals are done with the desire to do
business there more efficiently. Broadband is seen by China as vital to economic growth, and so deals in
Benin would mirror the same impulse to enable broadband in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region.
Just follow the resources.
In moves that might be guided more by the prospect of profit, growth, and innovation rather than
ideology, China also sells its surveillance technology to other states. The majority of its DPI technology is
powered by the American MNC Cisco’s and its routers. China buys $2 billion worth of Cisco equipment
per year despite the criticism that Cisco has received for supporting the illiberal tactics of the regime.
Nevertheless, Huawei, a Shenzhen-based company also manufactures its own DPI suite, the SIG 9800.
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Insider Surveillance reports that while the technology is marketed as a “network management system,” it
is also adept at surveillance tasks which include monitoring peer-to-peer networks (like file-sharing), voice
over Internet protocols (Internet phones), instant messaging services, videos, as well as applications like
Skype, Facebook, MSN, among others. The suite can monitor more than five million URLs in multiple
languages, “including not just Chinese, but also English, Russian, Arabic, French and Spanish.” Huawei,
in addition to ZTE and Sempetian, sells this technology to others including “a number of states in Central
and South-East Asia, eastern Europe and Africa, including Kazakhstan, Vietnam, Belarus, Ethiopia and
Zambia (Economist 2013).” Stecklow reports that Huawei was brought before the State Department
about whether it violated US sanctions against Iran by selling them equipment in 2011. Some of the
articulation of the cyber sovereignty norm is indirect; nevertheless implicit in the marketing of these
products is the full-fledged acceptance of the right that governments possess to control and monitor
citizens’ access.
Such deals signal the incompatibility of the Chinese view of the role of the Internet and the F2C.
As noted elsewhere, Western states support ICANN and what they view as a more dispersed view of
Internet governance. Russia and China would like the ITU to gain more power in the area, which would
bring newcomers to the Internet equal players in a system that was by and large created by America.
***
As the archetype case in the Not Free category, China demonstrates the various ways that a
state can circumscribe Internet freedom and the F2C. While increasing Internet penetration is important
for economic purposes, it has done so while keeping the needs of unity and social harmony in balance.
As such, it controls ISPs and the policies they have for users while artificially creating a competitive
marketplace to improve costs, speed, and efficiency. It has shut off parts of the country from the Internet
either as a punishment or as a preventative measure aimed at curbing nationalism and other challenges
to the state. Additionally, it has helped develop cyber sovereignty as an exception to the F2C in both
practice and rhetoric. But it has not directly challenged the goals of Internet openness as invalid or
openly opposed human rights on the web, only framing state intervention as necessary for immediate
state interests.
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Cuba
…the wild colt of new technologies can and must be controlled.
Ramiro Valdés, (former) Communications Minister International Conference on Communication and
Technologies in Havana, February 2007
Cuba is the extreme case in this study. While all of the states face rapid changes to their ICT
sectors, as of late Cuba has been the focus of much scholarly and media attention since the thawing of
the remnants of Cold War tensions with the US in December 2014. Well-known throughout the world as
one of the least connected states, there are hopes that as restrictions are eased—or the embargo is
lifted—political repression will be lessened. Yet these hopes ring of the cyber utopianism about the
transformative capacity of technology. First, the Cuban government fears both the loss of sovereignty in
the face of ICT MNCs and the loss of control over media and expression. Second, the Internet’s
immediate ability to affect change will be hampered by Cuba’s ICT infrastructure that has not been
updated since before the invention of the Internet. It is clear that Cuba’s reason for technological
backwardness can no longer be blamed solely on Havana’s inability to purchase ICT infrastructure
because of the embargo. The state will no doubt find new justifications to perpetuate its stranglehold on
information and technology.
Background
Cuba has the smallest population of this study with approximately 11 million people, ranking the
country 80th in the world. Cuba’s geography is also a condition of its Internet access. While it consists of
110,860 km2, ranking somewhere in the middle of all nation-states at 106th in the world, it is the proximity
to the US—90 miles from the coast of Florida—has influenced its social, political, and economic
development since independence and even before. Seventy-seven percent of its population lives in an
urban area, but it has only one major metropolis, Havana (2.137 million), with other cities with populations
of 425,000 or less. It has a mediocre economy, accruing $128.5 billion in 2014 placing it 76 th in the world.
While being a communist state in name, it has largely depended on foreign aid to supplement its
economic model, which is highly dependent on agricultural exports like sugar. Cuba’s GDP equates to
$10,200 GDP per capita, 131st in the world, two rankings above Indonesia.
Statistics regarding ICT technologies (CIA Factbook 2014) are well below global averages. The
country has 1.26 million landlines, ranking 67th in the world; one phone is plugged in for approximately
every 11 people in the state. The figure escalates slightly for cellular phones, undoubtedly also hindered
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by the embargo, with 2.5 million in the country, placing it 144th in the world in 2014. There are 3 million
Internet users in Cuba which ranks the state 85th in the world in number of total users and totals 27.5
percent of the population. The statistics in part reflect a concerted effort by the government to hamper
Internet access among the broader population apart from government officials and healthcare providers.
Such a policy directly challenges the norm of the F2C. Unlike China and Iran, Havana has chosen a path
that differs from the cyber sovereignty model in which a government choses to exert varying degrees of
control over Internet access and use and instead, Cuba has purposefully kept its citizens off the Web, a
method that comes with serious economic consequences.
Cuba had a relatively short-lived democratic experience, and its brief foray into the political
arrangement was marked by citizens’ dissatisfaction and political corruption. Like all of the other nonarchetype states of this study, Cuba’s history is marked by outside influences, first by Spanish colonialism
and second by direct American intervention after 1898. Its lack of any adherence to the freedoms of
expression and association, along with arbitrary arrest and inhumane prison conditions draws the ire of
HR NGOs and the Cuban diaspora. With reference to HR norms related to the F2C, the 1976
Constitution (amended in 2002) pays lip service to these ideas:
Article 53: Citizens have freedom of speech and of the press in keeping with the
objectives of socialist society. Material conditions for the exercise of that right are provided
by the fact that the press, radio, television, cinema, and other mass media are state or
social property and can never be private property. This assures their use at exclusive
service of the working people and in the interests of society. The law regulated the
exercise of those freedoms.
Article 54: The rights to assembly, demonstration and association are exercised by
workers, both manual and intellectual, peasants, women, students and other sectors of the
working people, and they have the necessary means for this. The social and mass
organizations have all the facilities they need to carry out those activities in which the
members have full freedom of speech and opinion based on the unlimited right of initiative
and criticism.
Article 57: Mail is inviolable. It can only be seized, opened and examined in cases
prescribed by law. Secrecy is maintained on matters other than those which led to the
examination. The same principle is to be applied in the case of cable, telegraph and
telephone communications.
The term “social property,” while making good use of socialist ideology, is another term for governmentowned. The power of the state is evident in the entire document, claiming it to be the sole representative
of “the power of the people and for the people,” and the organizational vanguard of revolutionary leaders
like nationalist hero José Martí along with Marx and Lenin.
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The question that is pervasive among media outlets and interested parties is whether such a
regime can survive the opening of diplomatic relations and trade. As argued by Larry Press of the
Information Sciences Institute of the University of South Carolina (see Russia chapter) and others, one of
the main justifications for the failure of Cuba to keep pace with technological advancements is the inability
for the state to get the materials it needs to update its infrastructure. Once it is lifted, there is little reason
to expect that the Castro brothers will loosen restrictions on expression or access. Instead, as Lillian
Guerra explains, the Cuban government is seen domestically as el Sistema, and the norms that helped
the Castros cement power during the Cold War live on today. “…the will to police oneself and others in a
surveillance culture went hand in hand with deference to leaders' higher will and allegedly higher political
consciousness (Guerra).” The fact that by 2011 Raúl Castro had opened up the Cuban economy for
foreign investment has assured that those who are part of the el Sistema will continue to hold their power
long after the brothers are dead.
…without the right to organize politically, let alone lead a march down any Havana street
or start a chess club without permission, they enjoy little or no influence over their
government and their leaders enjoy little accountability.
In all likelihood, the members of the military or Castro’s regime will make Cuba look like its past in that
leaders (elected or not) will benefit from foreign direct investment without much opposition from the
people.
The Internet in Cuba
Background. Cuba had some early history with sophisticated computer technology, getting its
first computers from the US in the 1950s. This relationship dissolved after 1959, but together with the
Soviet Union and Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CMEA), Cuba trained technology experts and
had a “modest” microcomputer industry through the 1960s and 70s that sold its hardware to other CMEA
countries (Mesher et al 1992). It could not sell it domestically because there was no market. By 1992,
Mesher et al. report that the industry was “in very deep trouble,” because of the lack of funds that could
keep the industry—and the rest of the Cuban economy—afloat. Cuban economic planners at the time
realized the potential of a successful computer software industry and what it could bring: “hard currency
income, employment for an oversupply of university graduates, technology transfer into Cuba,
international visibility, applications to other sectors of the economy, and modest requirements for initial
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capital investment (Mesher et al 1992).” The government planned to train a new labor pool alongside an
educational program that would improve computer literacy throughout the island by the Communist Youth
Union (UJC). But this nascent industry faced two basic problems: first, the lack of infrastructure meant it
was difficult to have state-of-the art facilities in place that could develop software among the
geographically separate facilities, and second, the state that was notionally ideologically opposed to the
idea capitalism that would bring substantial profits, and perhaps power, to the quasi-independent
companies that would produce the software. As a result, the “informatics” industry died out and produced
little new hardware or software.
The reluctance to adopt the Internet largely grew out of a similar reluctance that characterized
Brazil under the bureaucratic military regime: a fear of a foreign technology that the state could not
control. Unlike Brazil, Cuba never attempted to substitute its own alternative. Instead, the first Internet
connection was a UUCP exchange between the state-run Center for Automated Exchange of Information
(CENIAI) and a Canadian affiliate, the Association for Progressive Communications (Press 1998). In
1996, UUCP networks were replaced with a TCP/IP 64 Kbps link from CENIAI to Sprint in the US (Press
2011). The director of CENIAI, Jesus Martinez, sent the first email to his fellow networking community,
thanking the Forum of Latin American and Caribbean Networks whose assistance was vital for the knowhow to establish the link, and said in closing “A new era has just begun for us.” Press puts the director’s
enthusiasm in perspective: “Martinez was clearly proud of Cuba, but he also shared the values and
enthusiasm of the international networking community, who believed, correctly, that the Internet would
profoundly impact individuals, organizations and society.” Despite all of the obstacles that stand in the
way of the ICT professionals’ narrative, its presence in Cuba is enough to give Press hope in 2011.
Recent blog posts by Press follow the developments of Cuba’s recent steps towards recent Internet
penetration with a critical eye. Whereas Press seems to be optimistic about some the increased
availability detailed below, the presence of American ISPs and telecoms to fill in the gaps may not lead to
the equitable distribution or the new era for Cuba that Martinez hoped.

210

By 1998, Press et al report on the meaningfulness of Internet access in Cuba 66, and as expected,
it scored rather low overall and comparatively to the region. In the intervening years between UUCP
protocols and the switch to TCP/IP in 1996, only 100 users of the Internet were to be found in all of Cuba.
Geographically, Internet access was limited to Havana, but on this measure Cuba scored better because
of email access points scattered through other major cities. Cuba scored low on sectorial absorption
because of the rare use of the Internet outside hospitals and government sectors and connectivity
infrastructure. While they had the TCP/IP link, no other infrastructure existed alongside pre-revolutionary
telephone cables. Health care users were able to use the Internet for both email and information
retrieval, but little other use could be made of the connections that actually existed. In sum, the
meaningfulness of Internet access averaged 1.5 on a scale of 0-4 by 1998. While this assessment of
access in Cuba is nearly two decades old, it is nearly identical in terms of access today. This appears to
be slowly changing during the last twelve months, but the process is painfully slow and its outcome is not
guaranteed.
Internet penetration. According Freedom House (2015), roughly 30 percent of citizens in Cuba
have access to the Internet, a percentage that has doubled since 2009. Of the developments, two
positive trends emerge: websites registering the domain of .cu have tripled in the previous two years and
new laws have permitted more of the private sector to use the Internet. Markedly though, of the 65 cases
assessed, only two others scored lower on their ranking on Obstacles to Access, Ethiopia (23), the result
of poor infrastructure and government-owned ISPs like Cuba, and Syria (24), whose state’s infrastructure
has been devastated by war and electricity cuts due to government attempts to control the way the war
proceeds.
As in the past, Cuba’s Internet remains geographically centered in Havana, a few other major
cities, and for trusted elites. These include access for doctors, Cuban officials, trusted journalists, and
intellectuals in their offices, albeit using the Cuban intranet for email and informative websites. It was not
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Press et al (1998) present six measures of the meaningfulness of access: pervasiveness (users per capita and
the degree to which non-technicians are using the Internet), geographic dispersion (the concentration of the
Internet within a nation to a particular cities or major cities), sectoral absorption (the degree of Internet
utilization in the education, commercial, health care, and public sectors), connectivity infrastructure (IXPs,
internet backbones, and last-mile access methods), organizational infrastructure (ISPs and the market
share), and finally sophistication of use (whether the Internet is a substitution for other technology or it is
being used innovatively).
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until 2008 that home PC ownership became legal, but the average PC was $800 at a time when the
average wage for all Cubans was $20 per month (Voss). Internet access at home is highly regulated and
Resolution 92/2003 forbids access to unapproved persons; the penalty for disobeying the law is the
revocation of access privileges.
Speed and cost. Testmy.net reveals results for three locations in Cuba. First is La Habana,
referring either to the district or the city, at speeds of 1.7 Mbps download and 4.4 Mbps upload.
Mantanzas, a resort town 56 miles from Havana, has 788/919 Kbps connection, while another tested site
in Havana recorded 678/943 Kbps.
After the thawing of relations with the US after 2014, Havana is taking some steps towards
increasing Internet penetration. By mid-2015, 261 “navigation halls” were made available around the
island, mostly in major cities. Highly monitored by the state, these halls are prohibitively expensive.
While the price has gone down—from $4.50 per hour to $2 for access to the Internet ($0.60/hour for
access to Cuba’s intranet)—costs are approximately 10 percent of the average Cuban citizen’s monthly
salary. Users can also purchase a Nauta card from ETASCA for 30 days of access or a permanent card
(if they can afford it) that comes with the requirement of submitting to the authorities the users’ names,
email addresses, and passwords. Such accounts are extensively monitored. In order to get access,
users rely on expatriates to provide the cash for the hourly rates or ETASCA cards. It may be a
government policy aimed at profitability and hard currency rather than inhibiting penetration.
How well do new Internet access points accommodate demand? By October, Luis Paz reports
that the feeling among users was not optimistic. Demand had far outpaced supply at newly minted Wi-Fi
hotspots. They can accommodate only 50 to 100 users at a time, and the speed deteriorates according
to the number of users using the service simultaneously. Users are critical, with problems of being kicked
off the Internet alongside poor customer service. Even Cuban television segment on Cuba Dice, a show
that is controlled by state, saw fit to criticize its poor rollout: “The report criticized the terrible planning
evinced by [the Telecommunications Company of Cuba] ETECSA, which failed to provide comfort for its
customers, despite the high demand for the service, as well as the superficial replies offered by some of
its executives in this connection.” Interviewees claimed that the poor performance was indicative of the
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state using these hotspots and navigation halls as a distraction from the overall inadequacy of the
government’s provision of Internet services.
In 2007, an agreement between Cuba and Venezuela arranged for the construction and
deployment of a submarine fiber optic cable that would decrease Cuba’s dependency on satellites for
Internet access. Voss (2008) reports that preceding the agreement, the Cuban government blamed the
US embargo for its paltry infrastructure and inability to connect to any of the apparently plenty of
undersea cables in the region. Press (2013) reports that from 2007, Cuba had been dependent on three
satellite providers: Tata Communications (an Indian MNC), NewCom (a US satellite provider based in
Miami) and Intelsat (a former IGO privatized in 2001). The cable’s completion was planned for 2009, but
numerous delays meant that the cable’s connection was not made until early 2011. The cable is shown
below in red, while the remaining numerous cables conspicuously appear to go around the island:

Figure 5 Cuban submarine cable map 6 November 2015
(Telegeography 2015)
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Subsea News and Press (2013) both report that despite the cable’s completion, it remained unused for
nearly two years. When traffic began in January 2013, it did not serve the entirety of the Cuban intranet.
Instead, ETECSA Cuba’s de facto sole communications provider controls traffic asymmetrically (as
Lebanon did in 2011), using the cable to improve speeds and reduce latency for incoming information, but
directing outgoing traffic to the satellites. This improves web browsing for a few but makes it difficult for
most to send information outside the island. Freedom House argues that the cable connection that
directly links Cuba’s intranet to the rest of the world did not improve speeds for users as much as hoped.
This hampers the meaningfulness of access in 2015 in that any speed under 1 Mbps makes sites or
content with multimedia all but impossible to use.
Mobile phones, the bastion for access when all other avenues fail, are also underused in Cuba.
The ban on their ownership was lifted not long after the ban on PC ownership in 2008, and today there
are 2.5 million mobile phones in the country, reaching a penetration rate of 22 percent. Recently, the
state has cut monthly charges for mobile phone use, airtime, and SMS. Nevertheless, costs of both the
hardware and the service plans, provided by Cubacel, are unaffordable for most Cubans. Like the Nauta
cards and ETECSA hourly Internet charges, many of the fees are paid for by Cuban relatives living
abroad in the US and Spain. ETECSA has even enabled an online service that allows for easy payment
of fees of those living inside Cuba. Smartphones, again usually gifts from the diaspora, can send email
using the Nauta cards but have no further connectivity, and users are charged $1 per Mbps of information
transfer. GPS-enabled phones are forbidden. The state has restricted cell phone use in times of
heightened political sensitivity (Freedom House 2015 239).
Internet Service Providers
As with all of the cases explored, the ISPs of Cuba are indicative of the meaningfulness of access
for its citizens. There are two such providers: the Center for Automatic Interchange of Information
(CENIAI) and ETECSA. The former appears to be relegated to academia and Cuba’s informatics past.
Cubacel, the mobile provider, is a subsidiary of ETECSA, so in fact most access is channeled through
just one ISP. So few options are unprecedented in this study; in China, recall, that despite being stateowned, all three major ISPs are made to compete with each other to increase efficiency and innovation
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through the industry. However contrived such a model might be, consumer choice forces considerations
about customer satisfaction.
The fastest and most meaningful access most people can get in Cuba is in hotels, government
institutions, and foreign embassies. There is a stipulation that this access is solely for tourists rather than
for citizens, but people often subvert such rules in order to get access to unblocked social media and
other “dangerous” websites.
Following in the footsteps of Venezuela’s Telefónica, several ICT companies have already come
forward to work with ETECSA in developing its infrastructure. Orange Digital Horizons, a French ICT
agreed in July 2014 to help develop the industry in Cuba by sharing phones, equipment, and expertise.
There were concerns that the thawing of relations between the US and Cuba may endanger the
agreement, but the CEO of Orange assured interested leaders it would not (Paquette). This PPP is a
development that may signal how Cuba might proceed with increasing Internet penetration rates in the
future.
The evidence is carried over with other agreements that have developed in 2015. Bustamante
and Freedom House report that a Newark, NJ based long-distance company, IDT Corp, reached an
accord with ETECSA to provide direct international long distance calls.
Google came calling on Cuban blogger and Western media darling Yonai Sánchez in June 2014.
She gave the representatives, including Chairman Eric Schmidt, a glimpse into the realities of the Cuban
Internet.
It was a night without technology. No one pulled out a cell phone to check the web-not
possible in Cuba...We were very fortunate to be in front of the magic mirror, but she did
not want questions or answers, only to describe to him who Cubans are and where we
are going (Sánchez 2014).
Other interested ICTs in recent months include Microsoft, Airbnb, and Netflix. The latter two companies’
interest appears to be premature: "’Our first reaction was: “Really?”’ said Northwestern Engineering's
Fabián E. Bustamante. ‘As a business model, Netflix and Airbnb rely on most people having Internet
access (Morris),’” which is not the case, at least not yet, in Cuba.
Whitefield reports that Sprint, alongside Verizon Wireless, began offering roaming service for its
customers visiting the island late in 2015, connecting its service once again to ETECSA. US companies
can now do business in Cuba despite the embargo and can sell PC equipment, telecom services, and
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assist with the development of Cuba’s telecom infrastructure. New regulations from September 2015
would allow “…telecom companies to have a presence on the island through subsidiaries, branches,
offices, joint ventures, franchises, agencies or other business relationships with ETECSA, other
businesses or individuals (Whitefield).”
American MNCs’ interest in the Cuban market is palpable, coming on the heels of the
rapprochement of US-Cuban relations and perhaps a final end to the embargo. It is too early to tell what
shape these relationships will take. The requirement of working alongside—instead of as an alternative
to—ETECSA signals that while the authoritarian island-state is willing to open itself up to infrastructure
development guided by outsiders, it is not ready to relinquish control of the media or reduce its limitations
on expression and association.
State Policy Regarding Internet Penetration and Use
In the past, Freedom House reports that it was common for some residents to construct their own
illegal hookups to the Internet and would serve their neighborhood. These connections served to provide
information regarding entertainment and email, and at the behest of the administrators were apolitical in
content. They did not provoke the ire of the state until May 2014 when ETECSA’s drive for profits led it to
root out its competition. While it is unremarkable that the state would seek to aggrandize its own
monopoly, it is evidence of the validity Guerra’s assessment of what politics and the Internet will be like
“after Fidel.” Instead of clamoring for the Internet for greater participation in the political process,
democratization, or at least criticism of the government, there is proof that Cuban citizens already practice
self-censorship. Such a dynamic is unlikely to change quickly in the coming years as the state maintains
its hold on the telecom industry.
There are two basic appraisals of the meaning of the opening of US-Cuban relations for the
Internet in Cuba. First, is the kind offered by Bustamante, who reported in June 2015 on the increasing
tourism (a jump of 35 percent) the island had experienced since the announcement of rapprochement in
December. The turistas that bring demands for hyperconnectivity cannot be accommodated by the
contemporary Cuban infrastructure. As such, the inclusion of foreign ICT firms like IDT and Verizon will
be a boon to tourists and citizens alike. Bustamante’s conclusion in “Connecting Cuba to the World,” was
optimistic: “These improved connections and heightened access—both virtual and real—almost as an
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unavoidable consequence will help bring real and permanent change to every other aspect of Cuban
society.” Such a viewpoint misses the persistent power of the state which is an error that cyberpessimism authors like Morozov would be quick to point out reeks of technological determinism.
On the other hand, Elizabeth Llorente reports that progress in the ICT sector has been hampered
by the Cuban government. While there have been strides in increasing Internet penetration, like the Wi-Fi
hotspots, they are hampered by the nature of Cuban political economy. US State Department's Deputy
Assistant Secretary for South America and Cuba Alex Lee said that “The Cuban government…still clearly
prefers to channel all business opportunities to state-run enterprises.” There is a push-pull in which the
state wants more access but is hampered by lack of understanding of the fundamentals of banking and
credit and the desire to monitor who gets access and how it is used. Llorente adds that since both of its
greatest protectors—and financial supporters—have dried up, Cuba has little choice but to relinquish
some amount of control.
David Adams of Reuters reported that according to the US State Department, Cuba has pledged
to increase access dramatically by 2020, connecting 50 percent of households and getting mobile phones
into 60 percent of the population’s hands. Telecom equipment was one of the first exemptions from the
embargo after December 17, 2014. The unnamed official stated that Cuban leaders are aware that by
denying the Internet they deny people knowledge and “opportunity to grow as an economy and as a
people.” But the promises of broadband penetration, whether 50 percent or 90 percent by 2020 (if either
of those figures are possible), is met with the challenge of the persistence of the Cuban state apparatus.
A May 2013 policy statement already sets the boundaries on content; the Internet cannot be used to
politically undermine the state: “public security, the integrity, the economy, independence, and national
security (Human Rights Watch 2015).”
ZunZuneo
Of all the stories about the Cuban intranet and its relationship to the broader World Wide Web,
none is more bizarre and anachronistic than that of US-sponsored microblogging platform ZunZuneo.
ZunZuneo was named after the sound of an indigenous Cuban hummingbird, specifically its “buzz,” an
homage to the ‘tweet’ of another more famous microblogging platform, Twitter. The project was
undertaken by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) that works on development projects
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that include infrastructure development and policies that would grow a state’s ICT sectors. The
Associated Press broke the story in 2014 telling how the covert operation was orchestrated by Joseph
McSpedon, a USAID official working for the Office of Transition Initiatives, which was created after the
collapse of the Soviet Union. The service would make use of leaked cell phone numbers from an
informant at Cubacel and use the SMS platform as a microblogging site for those who could afford cell
phones in Cuba (less than 20 percent of the population).
The plan was to hide the existence of the platform entirely from the Cuban government, and to
present it to consumers as a genuine business model. USAID sought to cover the plan using “a
byzantine system of front companies using a Cayman Islands bank account, and recruit executives who
would not be told of the company's ties to the U.S. government (Arce, Butler, and Gillum).” End users
would also not know that the US government was behind the buzz. "This is absolutely crucial for the longterm success of the service and to ensure the success of the Mission." The Mission, as it were, was to
replicate the experience of Iran, Moldova, and the Philippines, in which Twitter and social media were
instrumental in orchestrating serious challenges to the government. It was hoped that by the time the
service reached a critical mass, “smart mobs” could initiate a Cuban Spring. Such hopes seemed
fruitless, because at its peak its user base was only 40,000, less than a quarter of the number anticipated
at the program’s outset.
Eventually, USAID, acting through the front of Creative Enterprise, gave up on trying to find a
buyer for the service to legitimize it as a real business, and funding dried up for ZunZuneo by 2012. The
program was indeed costly, because the service subsidized the costs of the SMS messages, and “…what
sane company would take over an operation that involved forking over tens of thousands of dollars to the
Cuban government in perpetuity to subsidize texts about the weather or music concerts (Tufekci)?” The
only vestige of the service is its Facebook page, pointed out by Washington Post journalist Adam Taylor.
It contains some of the promised apolitical, entertainment content alongside a slowly increasing coverage
of Internet freedom around the world (including the infamous Anonymous image of the Guy Fawkes
mask).
Long serving as an instrument of US foreign policy, USAID was criticized for working covertly in
Cuba along with several bases in the Latin American and Iberian regions. In Congressional hearings,
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Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt), who coordinates USAID’s budget, said USAID should never be used for
regime change. American magazine Politico called the plan the “Bay of Tweets,” and “bone-headed,” not
only because of the obvious embarrassment of a failed American attempt at indirect intervention in Cuban
affairs, but also the impact it might have on actual Internet activists all over the world and their reputations
as legitimate representatives of democratic movements or otherwise critics of the state. The Cuban
reaction was critical in tone: Josefina Vida, director of US affairs at Cuba’s Foreign Ministry said the
program:
…shows once again that the United States government has not renounced its plans of
subversion against Cuba, which have as their aim the creation of situations of
destabilization in our country to create changes in the public order and toward which it
continues to devote multimillion-dollar budgets each year.
The government of the United States must respect international law and the goals and
principles of the United Nations charter and, therefore, cease its illegal and clandestine
actions against Cuba, which are rejected by the Cuban people and international public
opinion…
Oddly, this episode showed little evidence that the Cuban people saw the Internet as a harbinger
of freedom. While Yonai Sánchez may receive a lot of attention in the US and beyond for her critical and
at times subversive blog, most Cubans simply view the Internet as an avenue to communicate with family
overseas. Ernesto Guerra, a blogger and Havana University student commented that if the platform had
begun to become more politically revolutionary in tone, it would have raised suspicions that likely would
have been shared among educated Cubans around the country. “If I had started getting subversive
messages or death threats or 'Everyone into the streets,”’ he laughed, “I would have said—OK—there's
something fishy about this. But nothing like that happened."
Instead, ZunZuneo might be a better example of the American foreign policy attachment to norms
about Internet freedom and the F2C. Or this episode could serve as an illustration of how misplaced
cyber-utopian hopes are about the power of technology to transform politics.
USAID top official Rajiv Shah said that the intention of USAID was “Working to improve platforms
of communication is a core part of what USAID works to do,” Shah said. “It’s inaccurate that [the program]
goes beyond that.” USAID’s blog post claimed that the AP story was misleading, and that there was no
intention to overthrow the Communist government, but simply to overcome the “information blockade”
present in Cuba (Stampler and Rhodan). What may be true is that while USAID top officials worked to
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overcome the information blockade, those on the ground that sought to complete the program may have
genuinely believed it to be much more akin to the democratic founts of the Middle East.
Yet those optimistic workers fell into the trap of technological determinism and failed to appreciate
the resiliency of state power. The episode is best appreciated as an example of each extreme view of
Internet freedom—as liberator or insidious tool of the enemy—writ in miniature.

***
Cuba is a unique addition to this study, but fundamental as a representative of the few states who
have chosen to largely leave technological progress and the Internet behind like North Korea and Eritrea.
As a small, politically-isolated state, the necessary infrastructure for meaningful access is at best several
years away thanks to the recent thawing between Cuba and the US. Havana still excludes access for
most unless one can afford to use the navigation halls or Nauta cards, both priced exorbitantly high in
order to bring hard cash onto the island. Regime type and political culture are good predictors of Cuba’s
relationship to the F2C, and the lack of widespread availability and self-censorship will likely survive for
many years as Internet penetration increases and the Castro regime becomes part of history.
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Iran
Iran has embraced the Internet with reservations; primarily, the state envisions the Internet as a
condition for economic growth, and it must filter content based on religious and political grounds. Like
China, Iran is pursuing cyber sovereignty norms, but is doing so by trying to protect its Internet users from
the outside through SHOMA, a domestic intranet that would be an alternative to the perceived Westerncontrolled Internet. Unlike any other case explored, concerns about increases in Internet penetration are
largely absent from both state bureaucracies and foreign commentators alike. Instead, most concentrate
on issues related to limitations on content and violations of users’ rights, especially after the failed Green
Revolution. Nevertheless, the limited capacity and reliable statistics indicate a state that is struggling to
manage the rise of a technology it cannot entirely control.
Background
Iran has a population of 81,824,270 people, ranking 17 th in the world and second in the region to
Egypt. Over 99 percent of the population is Muslim, of which are 90-95 percent are of the Shi’a
denomination. Islam plays a central role in politics and society in Iran and as such affects the way the
state sees the Internet. Its area is 1,648,195 km 2 (18th in the world), and is situated at a crossroads
among different civilizations with Turkey to West, the Indian subcontinent to the East, and Central Asia to
the north. In a radical transformation over the course of a century, 73.4 percent of its population lives in
an urban area, with 6 major metropolises with populations of 1.5 million or more67. It has the 19th largest
economy in the world with a GDP of $1.334 trillion, with a heavy reliance on petroleum and natural gas.
This equates to $17,100 GDP/capita, which correlates to a bourgeoning middle class, ranking it 96th in the
world. Like Indonesia, the state is heavily involved in the economy, either directly or indirectly. “The
Iranian government directly owns and operates hundreds of state-owned enterprises and indirectly
controls many companies affiliated with the country's security forces (CIA 2015).”
Looking at its ICT technologies 68, Iran has 30.59 million landlines, ranking 10th in the world; one
phone is plugged in for approximately every 38 people in the country. Cellular phones outpace landlines,
with 68.9 million in the country, placing it 22nd in the world. Still, such numbers do not equate to the
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Tehran (capital) 8.432 million; Mashhad 3.014 million; Esfahan 1.88 million; Karaj 1.807 million; Shiraz 1.661
million; Tabriz 1.572 million (2015)
68 CIA Factbook 2014
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penetration levels seen elsewhere in the world, especially in the archetype states, where in most cities
penetration reaches saturation levels. In total, there are 22.59 million Internet users in Iran (which totals
approximately 28.3 percent of the population) which ranks the state 26th in the world in number of users,
at least according to the CIA. This usage is concentrated among urban residents. Yet like Indonesia,
statistical estimates about penetration vary widely and are discussed below.
“Iran entered the twentieth century with oxen and wooden plough. It exited with steel mills, one of
the world’s highest automobile accident rates, and, to the consternation of many, a nuclear program
(Abrahamian 33).” Its modern history requires a disentanglement of sometimes competing forces:
nationalism, monarchy, Islam, and foreign interests over its natural resources.
The Iranian Constitution is simultaneously recognizable as a modern instrument of the state and
alien as it weaves together mosque and state in a way that is unthinkable for liberals. In Article 2, the
document states that the Islamic Republic is a system based on belief in first, “One God” and his
sovereignty over temporal domains, and second that God has given divine revelation through prophets
and imams so that they might set forth laws (sharia) that govern human behavior on Earth. The reliance
on sharia is not unique to Iran; eleven countries in the MENA region rely on it for both personal and
criminal law, with other countries relying on it for personal law or in particular regions, like Indonesia.
Nevertheless, the religious tone of the state colors the relationship with traditional civil rights. Article 3 of
the constitution outlines the states’ duties, which includes providing free education and using the press to
raise public awareness for the attainment of moral virtues. In the same article, it is also the duty of the
state to fight both imperialism and corruption and to eliminate poverty. Additionally, the dictates of foreign
policy states that the Republic must attempt to establish the “political, economic, and cultural unity of the
Islamic world” while being duty-bound to treat non-Muslims with the principles “Islamic justice and equity,
and to respect their human rights (Article 14).”
The disconnect between liberal norms and sharia law also appears in the dialogue between Iran
and the Human Rights Committee. The body challenged Iran’s actions relating to Internet freedom and
its incompatibility with the legal mandates of the ICCPR. In its third periodic report (2011), Iran reiterates
that civil rights must coexist along the five principles of the Iranian Republic. For instance, “…the
constitution considers man as free yet responsible toward God, i.e. the feeling of freedom is to be
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attended by a sense of responsibility before God (610).” While there are protections for expression and
the inviolability of correspondence, all must be circumscribed by the law that seeks to protect both the
security and the religious identity of the Republic.
The HRC took issue in 2011 with the creation of the web-crime unit created two years earlier,
which in some form continues to operate today. It asked Iran to comment upon the practice of the
blocking of websites after the Green Revolution (CCPR/C/IRN/Q/3). The reply makes the case that all
media is subject to legal controls in accordance with mandates of public morality and chastity.
Additionally, there “is also a serious demand of the people from the Government and the State to stand
against those who heedlessly and purposefully violate the rights of people to privacy and disclose their
private information.” The argument is that those who use the Internet for actions that may embarrass the
state or threaten social harmony are validly controlled or punished. The decision to characterize
discourse on the Web as part of all media is a unique if questionable argument. To be fair, where the line
between an individual and the media begins and ends on the Internet is far less clear than in print or on
television, but seeing tweets and edited publications as posing the same danger is fallacious.
The Special Rapporteur Report on Human Rights in Iran reported in 2014 that the situation of
human rights on the Web was not improving. He lamented that users were sentenced to a combined
123 years for simple comments against the government posted to Facebook. One user made the
comments in Britain, but was arrested upon her arrival in Iran. While President Hassan Rouhani had
promised to ease restrictions, 5 million websites remain blocked, many of which are related to the arts
and social groups. “In its response to the draft report, the Government noted that it (like many countries)
blocks all immoral websites in the arts or social groups.”
All rights and duties are constitutionally bound to serve Shi’ism. This sentiment extends to
institutions like the press, education, and by extension the Internet. While it is tempting to dismiss
theocracy as a veil of the concentration of power among political elites, Shi’ism is a dominant strain in
political discourse in Iran. This has had a profound effect on how the Internet has been diffused, what
obstacles users face, and what content is available.
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The Internet in Iran
Background. Iran began its relationship with the Internet in academia. The Institute for
Research in Fundamental Sciences (IPM) in Tehran first brought BITNET to Iran in 1992 through the
Trans-European Research and Educational Networking Association, a network similar to UUCP in
technical specifications that many states initially used before full connection to the World Wide Web. It
established an early domestic network among Iranian universities, IRANET, in 1993. In March 1994 the
facility was given the license to register domain names for the state. At the same time, with private
modems legalized, it established the earliest full-time Internet connection in the MENA region (Burkhart
and Goodman).
Early Internet was largely uncensored and unhindered by the Iranian state. Rahimi (2008) says
that restrictions placed on ISPs were largely on paper only. Iranian authorities, like so many others, saw
the Internet as a positive tool that would reflect cultural values, a “gift to spread the word of the prophets
(43).” Melissa Lerner (2010) affirms this early freedom on the web, commenting that it affirmed “the
original ideology of the Islamic Republic as a supporter of modern technology as a means to promote and
secure its authority (559).” Lerner’s article on virtual social movements in Iran warns that even at that
early stage, the Internet should not be considered a panacea. Many theorists like Tilly and Putnam had
argued that the Internet may encourage isolation in social movements, but student movements in Iran
proved that this was not necessarily a valid concern. More telling for Lerner was the inevitable insertion
of the state into the fray, encouraging anti-democratic voices within “Weblogistan” and cracking down on
activists.
Repression of virtual dissent did not begin in until 2001, due to the lack of technological knowhow
and to economic demands. Rahimi (2003) paints the Iranian attitudes towards the Internet as unique in
the MENA region; unlike the UAE or Saudi Arabia, the state actively sought the expansion of its
infrastructure (105). Rahimi’s hopes that Internet users could challenge the power of the state, however
limited, appears quixotic in the face of Iranian reputation today as one of the most repressive states with
regards to rights on the web.
In the words of an Iranian dissident, “At night, every light that is on in Tehran shows that
somebody is sitting behind a computer, driving through information roads; and that is in
fact a storehouse of gunpowder that, if ignited, will start a great firework in the capital of
the revolutionary Islam (111).”
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Morozov’s analysis is poignant here. While Rahimi acknowledges that one should be careful of attributing
too much transformative power to the Internet and the ability of the state to react to challenges to its
power on the web, the desire to see the Internet as a legitimate challenger to the state is palpable.
In the initial years of Internet use, speeds were comparable to other developing states. Until
1997, Iranian Internet was limited to 96,000 bps, or approximately 0.09 Mbps. Internet use was
dependent on satellite connections with Europe and Canada; in order to improve these speeds the state
invested in infrastructure. Sprint set up a sophisticated 2 Mbps connection with DCI, the subsidiary of the
state-owned Telecommunications Company of Iran (TCI) that operates the public data network. Seymour
and Burkhart report conflict between the state’s support of infrastructure development and ideology, and
that such conflicts inhibited Internet and other ICT penetration. The state had been worried about the
Western “cultural onslaught,” exhibiting early evidence for about cyber sovereignty claims, although
markedly different from China. While China makes the argument that the Internet is an important setting
for the “public opinion struggle,” and that it can be used to foster unity and harmony, the concern over
content is primarily about the strength of the state. In Iran, the Internet is an extension of the shaping of
Iranian identity and the struggle of the Revolution against the influence of its enemy from without, the
West.
Internet penetration and geographical divides. Official estimates of Internet penetration in
Iran vary greatly69. The CIA World Factbook reports in 2014 a penetration rate of 28.3 percent. The
same year, the ITU reported penetration at 39 percent, up from 14 percent just five years earlier. Yet,
ITU statistics are reliant upon reports filed with the agency by the domestic government agencies in
charge of ICT and national statistical offices (ITU 2015b), though the agency claims to verify these
numbers, calling itself “the reliable source of ICT statistics.”
National statistical sources are even more uneven. The Iranian National Internet Development
Management Center (MATMA), a subsidiary of the Ministry of ICT, reported penetration to be 49 percent
in 2014. This discrepancy was actually lessened from 2013, in which the center reported penetration at
61 percent of the population. It appears that 2015 is another boon for Internet penetration in the country,
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This is problem is acknowledged by Pourghadiri (2014) and Rahimi (2015).
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with a news report from the Islamic Republic News Agency, an official government-run newspaper,
reporting penetration at a whopping 82 percent! “By the end of 21 June 2015, the number of the Internet
users in Iran reached 61,709,929 with the Internet connections at 43,026,279 (IRNA).” While they report
that dial-up connections were still in use (approximately nine percent of all connections), broadband
expanded to nearly half of all Internet users by September. The tendency to exaggerate official statistics
in not unique to Iran— Indonesia is said by various sources to do the same. The desire for states to do
so is not certain; speculation points to attempts by the state to appear to be able to provide services at
rates that the public might expect, or to exceed those expectations.
Similar to the difficulty of finding national statistics, information on Internet penetration within Iran
is difficult to discover. Iranian official statistical agencies appear to be missing vital statistical reports, and
ISPs like the Telecommunications Company of Iran is particularly opaque. Admittedly, part of the
problem is language but cases like China and Russia where both the language and script are different,
information is simply more widely available. The statistics on provincial penetration rates are only
available second hand in the form of the Iranian Students News Agency, run by university students with
funding from the government. Their findings are reproduced in Table 16.

Table 16 Iranian Internet penetration by province
(Iranian Students News Agency 2013)
Province
Mazandaran
Tehran
Esfahan
Khuzestan
Semnan
~~~
Lorestan
Sistan and Baluchestan
Kerman
South Khorasan
North Khorasan

Internet penetration
83.85%
78.55%
70.48%
68.4%
65.45%
43.89%
41.77%
40.79%
39.82%
39.57%

The chart is remarkably consistent. Mazandaran Province likely enjoys relatively high levels of Internet
penetration due to its location on the Caspian Sea which makes it a good location for tourism and
supporting the oil industry. The least penetrated provinces like the Khorasan provinces and Kerman are
landlocked and primarily agrarian. Theses provinces are also among the most ethnically diverse in Iran,
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so the lack of ICT buildup might be a reflection of overall development disparities in the country, but this is
conjecture because these types of inconsistencies are seldom addressed in the media or official
literature. Nonetheless, disregarding the top five provinces, the gap of only 25 percent between the least
and most connected provinces is suspect. Most large states must combat physical and economic hurdles
to ICT development. First, geographic barriers pose physical limitations to spreading infrastructure
across large swaths of land. Mountain ranges crisscross Iran along with vast desert regions. Second,
states must often prioritize infrastructure development for communities that would immediately benefit
from sophisticated Internet access, including areas with major cities or those connected to global trade.
Combined, these conditions—which are not absent in Iran—make such uniform penetration rates unlikely.
The only other mention of domestic Internet penetration rates comes in the form of a news report
from the Mehr News Agency, a quasi-independent organization that is owned by the Islamic Ideology
Dissemination Organization, which is part of the Ministry of Culture. In its December 2014 report, the ICT
Minister for Iran Mahmoud Vaezi promised to connect 30,000 villages to broadband Internet by the first
quarter of 2016. Currently, 97 percent of villages have at least one landline, and so the goal of delivering
to so many villages is not without precedent; recall in the Russian case, connections were being built
alongside preexisting transportation infrastructure. The goal of getting fixed lines to villages with 20
houses or more is possible, but the accuracy of these claims absent reliable data is hard to ascertain.
How can these disparities be accounted for? The questions appear to mount when attempting to
assess Internet penetration in Iran. Why are there such discrepancies between the CIA, ITU, and Iranian
ICT Ministry total figures? Why do national statistics vary so widely from year to year? Are the provincial
totals anywhere close to accurate, or are they either fabricated deliberately to make the state look good or
out of an inability to properly assess Internet access? The possible answers come from Moheballi,
Shirazi, and Bazargan (2013), who regularly report on Iranian ICTs to the ITU in their World
Telecommunications/ICT Symposiums. In the most recent report, they discuss the main challenges to
ICT measurement in Iran:
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Lack of a model or conceptual framework for defining indicators in policy documents
Unclear and ambiguous definitions of national indicators
Unacceptable level of awareness and communications among stakeholders
Lack of updated and exact data
Lack of technical capacity for ICT measurement
Governing body for ICT measurement
Lack of enough financial resources in the responsible organizations
Security and privacy issues
Lack of coordianation among stakeholders, special ICT statistics users
Unacceptable level of timely and exact reporting to international bodies
Low importance of ICT measurement in government organization and private sector
(Moheballi, Shirazi, and Bazargan)

Fundamental problems like the lack of communication among various stakeholders, the lack of expertise
in gathering ICT statistics, and the disregard of the importance of measuring ICT performance all point to
the inadequacies of the available statistics through the DCI and news agencies like the Iranian Student
News. It is necessary to treat any statistics provided by the Iranian government with suspicion. Whether
the Iranian government is intentionally trying to fool its population or the rest of the region with inflated
numbers is merely conjecture, but it may be that combined with the fact the unintentional reality of having
no reliable means of providing such information.
Speed and cost. Freedom House (2015) reports “painfully slow” connection speeds that
compromise meaningful access throughout the country. Peak speeds are among the lowest in the world,
capping out at 6 Mbps for download, whereas average speeds are much lower. Political pressures from
the state have limited speeds for a long time. In 2006, the state arbitrarily imposed slower connections
for home Internet users, capping speeds at 128 Kbps. The fear was articulated by an aytollah in a call to
revoke the mobile Internet licenses before young minds could be poisoned by “dirty pictures and clips
(Edbrink).” This cap was recently lifted and in 2014 increased to 10 Mbps, still notably 40 percent less
than the FCC minimum for broadband in the US. Akamai has nothing to report on Internet speed in Iran,
while testmy.net reports an average of 1.6 Mbps downstream and a mere 355 Kbps upstream. Clerics
are divided between the scientific, and undoubtedly commercial, opportunities for meaningful access and
the issues over cultural and political challenges to the status quo.
Reported speeds reveal that while speed caps may have been officially lifted, users experience
poor speeds that are slower than even the Russian Far East. One has to go to Arctic Circle to find
anything comparable in this study.
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Table 17 Reported Internet speeds in Iranian cities
(testmy.net 12 April 2016)
City (Province)

Downstream

Upstream

Isfahan (Isfahan)

1.5 Mbps

395 Kbps

Karaj (Alborz)

1.5 Mbps

430 Kbps

Tehran (Tehran)

1.4 Mbps

342 Kbps

Shiraz (Fars)

1.3 Mbps

364 Kbps

Tabriz (East Azerbaijan)

746 Kbps

238 Kbps

Ardebil (Ardebil)

618 Kbps

337 Kbps

Kish (Hormozgān)

566 Kbps

182 Kbps

Outside of important cities, speeds are largely below 1 Mbps, below the standard for viewing most
webpages in 2016. TCI holds an effective monopoly over bandwidth, and resells it to public and private
small ISPs at rates eleven times their own cost (Freedom House 2015 427). For example, the cost of a
10 Mbps connection is $79.9 per month in 2016 (Numbeo), almost twice of all other utilities of a typical
apartment combined, at the highest percentage of salary in this study besides Cuba, at 16.99 percent. A
2/1 Mbps connection with unlimited data transfers to Pars Online, Iran’s second largest ISP, would cost a
user $131 per month, far exceeding comparable plans in the US.
Iran is nevertheless praising its increased access, mainly through mobile technologies. IranCell,
a subsidiary of TCI, claimed to have 12.5 million 3G subscribers covering 35.8 percent of the population
in all of the provinces. 4G is being rolled out as well with coverage in 82 cities. This report was filed with
the ITU, and therefore is mostly dependent on reports and statistics provided by TCI itself, and is
therefore questionable.
Internet Service Providers
The state is increasing connectivity, both through landline connections and through smartphones,
though to what degree is uncertain. Yet the meaningfulness of access is hampered by capped speeds,
the filtering of content, and the quasi-monopoly of ISPs. Iran’s mixed economy is characterized by a
large public sector and a heavy reliance on oil and natural gas; as such, the telecommunications market
operates largely at the behest of the state. The Telecommunications Company of Iran (TCI) is the main
provider of the Internet and sells bandwidth to other ISPs. While privatized in 2007, TCI is owned
primarily by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.
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In 2015, Tehran announced the licensing of at least twelve new mobile providers through MVNO
platforms that would compete with the IranCell and MCI. Raad reports that the addition of these
enterprises would further incentivize badly needed infrastructure upgrades that the established
companies had been undertaking since 2014. “[MVOPs] would ultimately give the freedom of choice
denied until recently to Iran's consumers.” Such sentiments have sufficient reasons for optimism, as they
would spur competition and infrastructure development. Yet, like all MVOPs, these new providers would
purchase airtime/bandwidth from established mobile providers, all indirectly controlled by the state.
As ISPs have been privatized as a result of a five-year plan by the government, they are still
heavily controlled by the state. In the past, the OpenNet Initiative reports that ISPs were put charge of
filtering content that was deemed inappropriate by the state, but enforcement was not uniform. Since
then, they have developed more centralized filtering systems that bypass the ISPs’ control. All
cybercafés must monitor users, including using closed-circuit television surveillance and are forced to use
bandwidth provided by the state or route traffic through Iranian government-made filter boxes. Moreover,
Website owners must register their sites with the Ministry of Culture and are then subject
to requests to remove particular posts deemed unacceptable by the government. The
2009 Computer Crime Law (CCL) makes service providers, such as blogging platforms,
responsible for any content that appears on their sites (Freedom House 2015 432).
Iran places the onus on controlling content partly on the middle men, so that despite privatization, the
state is still very much in control.
SHOMA: An Iranian National Information Network
Most Western media outlets are primarily concerned about the development of a unique,
domestic network that would exist alongside the global Internet if they show concern about the issue of
access in Iran. Having gone through several iterations, SHOMA is a national information network that
was first conceived in 2006 by the Iranian cabinet as part of the fifth Five-Year Plan. It was to be
developed three stages: first, establishing an independent network that separated local and global traffic
for all government installations and in all provinces; second, moving all Iranian websites to domestic
servers; and third, establishing domestic equivalents of familiar services, including an operating system,
email, and search engine.
SHOMA is a network not unlike the Internet - its infrastructure consists of switches,
routers and data centers. If users request data located on a data center inside the
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country, their traffic will not leave the country, and will remain inside the
network…SHOMA is intended to be a private and secure internal network (Small Media).
The national network would look much like its broader counterpart, but its purpose is threefold,
reflecting the dynamic relationship the Iranian state has with the Internet. First is the theocracy’s desire to
establish an Internet-e-Paak, or a “pure Internet” that would not require the close monitoring that current
Internet use does. Second, having a domestic Internet would allow the state a defense against cyberattacks. The validity of this belief is questionable, considering that global traffic will run alongside the
network, presumably using at least some of the same equipment. Any vulnerabilities to the global
connection points could therefore make SHOMA susceptible as well. Third, the state claims that the
network would be faster and more reliable than what users currently enjoy. By blaming poor speeds on
connections on hardware over which the state has no control, it appears that Tehran is attempting to pass
blame for their speed caps and poor service on the lack of domestic controls over the technology.
Particularly, it promises that 60 percent of families in Iran would have access to SHOMA at 20 Mbps,
speeds that far exceed the average speeds enjoyed by netizens today.
Since its announcement in 2006, Iranians and outside commentators have raised concerns about
what SHOMA would mean for increasing the state’s control over access. Not only would the service be
limited to Iranian-hosted websites, the greater control of the state over networking equipment could mean
that the state could shut off access to both SHOMA and the Internet when it was deemed necessary,
while keeping the administration’s connections intact. It might also mean that monitoring users would be
made far easier.
Reza HaghighatNejad provides the latest update on the “Halal Internet” in February 2016 70, a
name that mostly Western journalists have given this concept in a bit of satirical commentary.
HaghighatNejad claims that the project really dates to 2003, and much like many other aspects of ICT in
Iran, figures on funding and completion dates widely vary and are unreliable.
Nasrollah Pazhmanfar, a hardliner MP and a former member of the Supreme Council of
Cyberspace, said the government expects the project to be completed within 11 years —
figures that fly in the face of statements issued during the end of Ahmadinejad’s
presidency, which boasted that the project was 90 percent complete.

70

HaghighatNejad writes for IranWire, a “joint venture” of Iranian journalists in the diaspora. Highly critical of the
government, any insights must understood within the context that has a high potential for bias.

231

HaghighatNejad claims that the intranet is still in the “PowerPoint phase” and that the concerns that the
SHOMA could replace the WWW are at best more than a decade away. Nevertheless, the article also
reports upon throttling of the Internet ahead of parliamentary elections and other measures the state
regularly takes to control discourse and access to the web. It would not be surprising if SHOMA was
simply a proposal that has yet to find the political will to find expression, but nevertheless it does not
appear to be simply a dream never intent to be brought to fruition. Steps that the Iranian government has
taken after the sanctions have lifted, including meeting with ICT officials from other Not Free states, signal
that that an Internet-e-Paak is still in the works, even if it is years away.
The pursuit of an alternative network to run parallel to, and at times instead of the Internet,
speaks to the cyber sovereignty norm in important ways. First, there is the technological nationalism
element that is common to other proponents of the norm like China and Russia, which seeks to replace
perceived dependency on foreign technology by pursuing national alternatives. ASL19, an NGO working
to subvert content filters in Iran, explains that the national network is highly tied to conceptions of cyber
security. As Richard Clarke explains in his somewhat hyperbolic text, Cyber War (2012), one of the acute
dangers of conflict in the Internet-dependent age of commerce is that foreign production of hardware and
software leaves users vulnerable to attacks because of mistaken or intentional programming errors.
Tehran in part justifies the pursuit of SHOMA on this basis, claiming that “’it is a national need that this
network is constructed as expeditiously as possible,’ [Mohammad Hassan Entezari, head of Supreme
Council of Cyberspace] said (ASL19).” Additionally, the pursuit of SHOMA and cyber security measures
also promise to improve Iran’s IT industry in general, potentially employing thousands and catching the
Iranian economy up to global standards.
Second, this domestic network is taken on for the express purpose of making sure the content
lives up to Iranian cultural standards. While Russia, China, and Cuba all proclaim that they use the
Internet rhetorically to promote party propaganda and social harmony, the Iranian vision is different.
Tehran sees the Internet as useful for the proclamation of Islamic principles that would impact citizens’
daily lives. At the same time, SHOMA would help to minimize or eliminate dangerous outside influences.
This goes beyond the Chinese use of the Internet as a propaganda tool, and is part of Iran’s view of its
place in the world. Since its inception, the Islamic Republic has taken its anti-Western ideology as part of
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its mantle, and their view of the Internet as an extension of that influence is hardly surprising. The agency
that the state takes in creating their nation-states’ culture means that at its fullest expression, the Internet
must be part of this vision.
State Rhetoric Regarding Internet Access and Use
Through the Mehr News Agency, and presumably other news outlets, Tehran reports on its
progress in freeing itself from technological dependence. Events in 2015 center around further strides to
technological nationalism and new foreign partnerships that would assist the state in reaching that goal
after many economic sanctions being removed.
The year began with a report of the launch of domestic search engine, Yooz. Persian for
cheetah, the project is meant to improve speeds and security, and is especially designed for searches
conducted in Persian. The impetus is clearly techno-nationalist in tone: “Mehdi Naghavi said Google was
gradually turned into the ‘spine of the internet usage’ and the Iranian project will help in crawling out of the
compulsion (Sridharan).” By developing alternatives, Iranian netizens would not be subject to foreign
sanctions on the web and removing hurdles that academics currently face, but no articles specified what
that meant. Parsijoo is another Iranian search engine that launched in November and is rumored to
include an email platform, downloadable content, local directories, and e-commerce applications. Like
Yooz, it is meant to replace the public’s dependency on platforms like Google, and the Financial Tribune
reports that limited broadband availability and technical complexities had hampered the progress of both.
In June, Khamenei issued the sixth Five-Year Development Plan. He predicted an eight percent
annual growth rate in addition to the establishment of SHOMA. He claimed that he would be expanding
content fivefold while simultaneously engaging in “intelligent filtering” and “targeted participation” in
cyberspace. The Ayatollah envisions aligning citizens’ experience in cyberspace to the cultural vision of
Iran itself. By November, it was reported that Iran hosted the most websites in the Middle East, ranking
the state 4th in the world. The shift from foreign to domestic hosting is a consequence of state policy to
encourage technological nationalism and cost-efficiency. Domestically hosted websites also are
advantaged, apparently by state policy, by being directly connected to IXP ports, theoretically bypassing
some of the slowdowns inevitable with distance and being routed several times over an infinite expanse.
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Even more evidence for the cyber sovereignty norm is to be found with two high-profile meetings
between Iranian officials and other prominent states that are proponents of the norm. In June, ICT
minister Vaezi met with Miao Wei, his counterpart in China. The meeting’s purpose was twofold: first, it
sought to reassert that cooperation would be necessary to overcome some of the influence of foreign
technology in domestic spheres (particularly the US); and second, it signaled a partnership between Iran
and China in completing SHOMA. They agreed to form a special working group to operationalize the
task. In October, Vaezi met with Russian counterpart, Nikolai Nikiforov, primarily to discuss the norms of
cyberspace sovereignty but also some business opportunities. Vaezi reports that:
…during the meeting we discussed a wide range of topics including the breaking of US
monopoly on internet, cooperation on research and development, information security
mechanisms, developing and strengthening domestic social networks and the opening
office of Russian search engine Yandex in Tehran for easier access.
It is a curious thing that Iran makes such extensive claims for cyber sovereignty but fails to see the irony
in introducing more foreign technology like that of Russia’s search engine.
Domestic attitudes toward the Internet in Iran are hard to come by, especially quantitative survey
data. The only available data is the Kull et al. survey from 2008. Support for press freedom was among
the weakest in the survey, with 65 percent arguing that the news agencies should be free from
government controls, 45 percent saying the government should be able restrict access to preserve
stability, and only 32 percent arguing that should be able to read whatever they want on the Internet.
***
As the final case in the Not Free category, Iran exhibits some of the characteristics that typify
Internet policy in both China and Cuba. Many of the policies that the state undertakes to limit penetration
and meaningful access are done in the name of the maintenance of social harmony. Unlike China, its
political identity as an Islamic state colors censorship and surveillance policies differently for Iranian users
than for Chinese. While both states advocate for cyber sovereignty norms, Iran is more virulent in its
attacks against the corrupting influence and intentions of the West and the US in particular. Like Cuba,
Iran has experimented with ways to make access less meaningful (by slowing speeds) and pursuing its
own intranet. While it seems the SHOMA is no more than a policy goal as of 2016, the intention behind
the Internet-e-Paak is an obvious challenge to the F2C. Nevertheless, within the Iranian constitution and
its dialogue with the Human Rights Committee, it must frame these as deviations rather than alternatives
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to Internet freedom. For instance, the SHOMA is framed as something necessary to make the Internet
safe for Iranians, thereby implicitly recognizing that Internet access is necessary in the 21 st century, albeit
with conditions.
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Chapter 7: Comparison and Discussion
This chapter will proceed in two parts. First, comparisons will be drawn among the cases,
discussing the responses to the F2C norm; these findings are summarized in the Appendix. Second,
these findings will be discussed in relation to this study’s contribution to IR theory, addressing the
limitations inherent in its methodology, and suggesting areas of future research.
Demographics and History with Complementary Rights
Most of the cases observed are large, powerful states according to population, size, and GDP.
The three primary cases are among the top ten in the world according to land mass, population,
economy, and number of Internet users, with the US and China in the top three for each of these
measures. Every case besides Cuba has had to overcome geographic problems that inhibit technological
penetration and use amongst its population that in turn exacerbate existing inequalities. The US, China,
Russia, Brazil, Mexico, and Iran have struggled with urban-rural divides, with each state other than China
having about 75 percent of its population living in cities. Traditionally underserved areas—from tribal
lands in the US, to the Far East in Russia, the interiors of China and Brazil, and the farmlands of Mexico
and Iran—have lower rates of penetration. This fact is aggravated by the presence of ethnic minorities,
which traditionally have less political power and cannot make significant demands on the state or the
private sector.
In regard to culture, ideology, and political history, the US, Russia, and China share few
characteristics with each other or any other states in this study. The US, former colony turned colonizer,
has a long history struggling to reconcile civil rights with political expediency. While the early 20th century
saw limitations on speech as a result of the specter of war, the right of the state to restrict expression was
more narrowly limited under the premise of the likelihood and immanency of threats to security. Terrorism
has challenged the status quo of rights in the US, and the law is slow to react to developments in
technology that federal authorities have used in the name of security. Economic ideology has meant
limited options for state involvement in infrastructure development or as a provider of Internet access.
Russia’s limitations on civil rights reach back to its early modern history and it has struggled
deciding its identity as either European or Asian. The authority of its various governments has been
legitimated through the pursuit of power and greatness, and not by the consent of the governed, and has
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resulted in a troubled relationship with democracy and the balancing act between freedom of expression
with stability and security. The Polity data set labels Russia as an anocracy. While its history of
communism has led perhaps to an easier acceptance of the role of the state in the provision and
extension of access through Rostelecom, the state often justifies its Internet limitations through the frame
of cyber sovereignty and responding to the perceived threats posed by the United States.
China, like Russia, has a history with communist rule dating to 1949, and like Russia, its
relationship with the most important manifestations of state-run communism ended by the 1970s. Unlike
Russia, China is more easily labeled authoritarian, due to the overwhelming and unchecked power of the
Chinese Communist Party. While there had been some minor experimentations with civil rights within the
early 20th century Chinese nationalist movement, rights and duties are seen in Chinese politics through
the lens of communitarianism and social hierarchy. The state justifies intervention into Internet use in
terms of stability and unity. Increasing access is pursued for economic development. At times the
government will also frame the issue in terms of equity and to improve the responsiveness of
government, but not for purposes of expression, association, assembly, or privacy and expressly against
anything that might disrupt order.
Brazil and Mexico share many characteristics. Each is a powerful leader in Latin America, but the
former has double the population and is four and a half times larger geographically. Each has a long
history of colonization and achieved independence in the 1820s. Their post-independence histories are
characterized by tumultuous politics, dealing with ethnic disparities and populism, a series of military
coups and dictatorships, and finally the resurgence of democracy, though this took place earlier in Mexico
than Brazil. Each of these states has struggled with realizing the ideal of civil and socioeconomic human
rights. The 20th century was characterized by undemocratic systems, in Brazil by a bureaucratic military
regime, and in Mexico by the one-party rule of the PRI. Each state continues to struggle with living up to
ideals embodied in its constitutions because of structural inequality and political malfeasance.
The Philippines and Indonesia also share many characteristics. While the Philippines is smaller
in all measures with one third of Indonesia’s population, only 16 percent of its geographic area, and a
GDP that is 74 percent smaller, their cultural characteristics, political histories, and problems with
penetration mirror each other. Both are archipelagos with thousands of islands that have disproportionate
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populations scattered among them. Each has cities with high concentrations of educated, middle class
digital natives and islands that have been traditionally underserved by technological advances. Their
urbanization rates are 44 percent and 54 percent, respectively. Both are located in Southeast Asia with
an extensive history of outside influence from various sources: China, India, Arabia, and various
European nations. Each have Muslim populations, with Indonesia having the largest Muslim population in
the world, and both have fundamentalist populations that have demanded more autonomy. The
Philippines’ struggle with Muslim fundamentalists in Mindanao is conflictual and violent, while Indonesia
has accommodated demands for sharia law by having a semi-autonomous province located on Sumatra.
Both were colonized by European powers, but for the Philippines Spanish rule was replaced by
American, which explains the prevalence of English, while Indonesia was ruled throughout its colonial
history by the Dutch. The Japanese held both archipelagos, in different manners, during WWII, and both
had unstable democracies during the 20th century sharply punctuated by one-man rule over the course of
many decades. As a result, both states endure the legacy of patronage and corruption that in some form
continue to be manifest today. Both must deal with ICT companies entrenched within the state, and have
to varying degrees attempted to overcome these limitations.
Cuba and Iran are the outliers of this study, partially by design. Both states are well-known for
their restrictions on Internet use and the manner in which they limit access, engage in censorship, and
monitor their citizens’ Internet usage. Beyond this, both have historical legacies that are punctuated by
American intervention into domestic politics that have dramatically shaped their outlook on international
relations and the Internet. Both, too, have rhetorically supported socioeconomic rights. The
manifestation of these rights, however, have taken on cultural or political peculiarities. In Iran, the
centrality of Shi’ism after the Revolution has meant that all duties and rights are centered on the belief in
“One God,” and that media, including the Internet, should conform to the demands of religion and the
stability of the state. The belief may eventually result in the creation of an Iranian intranet that would once
and for all rid Iranian netizens from the disrupting influences of the larger World Wide Web. The
importance of Cuba’s Revolution to its Internet use also should not be forgotten. While Cuba is
undergoing a liberalization of sorts with the slow dismantling of the US trade embargo, so far the state
has held the reigns to the Internet close.
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Characteristics of the Internet
The US was the earliest to adopt the protocols that have become synonymous with the Internet,
having invented both the Internet’s precursor and the protocols themselves. TCP/IP became the
networking standard in 1985, and was adopted during various years between 1990 and 1996 for by of the
other states in the study, with Cuba being the final adoptee. In eight of the nine cases, networked
computing was first to be found in academia, which sought to bring sophisticated computing to various
domestic college campuses and to link research projects across the globe. During the Cold War, the US
and the Soviet Union both pursued networking or cybernetics through the military, either to enable
communication in the case of a nuclear attack or to efficiently monitor its industries. ARPANET would
ultimately give birth to the online bulletin boards, email platforms, and the World Wide Web, but due to
idiosyncrasies in Soviet politics, cybernetics never developed beyond competing networked systems
across Russia. The Philippines relied on IBM to set up its connections, likely as a result of cronyism.
Cuba is unique case in which Internet adoption relied on a state-run institution, CENAI, with an overseas
affiliate. While it had a computing sector dating back to the Batista regime, the industry never developed,
likely in part due to the failure of the Soviet Union’s own cybernetics industry.
The reliability of Internet penetration rates and the baseline measurement of access vary from
case to case. Iran and Indonesia’s own estimates vary dramatically from the CIA’s, with a range of 12
percent to 54 percent difference. Other estimates usually vary less than 5 percent, but there is no
standardization of practice. The variance is likely a result of capacity gaps and the degree to which the
national governments have set up routine, reliable measures of access throughout their territory.
Penetration rates range from 16 percent in Indonesia to 87 percent in the US, with the average of the
selected cases around 44 percent. Free states have higher penetration rates than all others, and Partly
Free more so than those in the Not Free categories: the US (86.8 percent) is higher than Russia (53.4
percent) and in turn higher than China (46.0 percent), Brazil (53.4 percent) is higher than Mexico (41.1
percent) and Cuba (27.5 percent), the Philippines (39.4 percent) higher than Indonesia (16.7 percent). As
Pew (2014b) has noted, there is a strong correlation (0.76) between Internet access and increased
demands for Internet freedom.
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Despite the fact that mobile Internet may become problematic as it is adopted at higher rates,
many states see mobile access as an alternative to fixed Internet. Each of the cases studied other than
Cuba is ranked in the top 15 states in terms of mobile penetration figures with China, the United States,
and Indonesia leading in absolute numbers. When calculated as a percentage of population however,
Russia, Brazil, and the Philippines lead all other cases with rates exceeding saturation levels.
Smartphone ownership is not as frequently recorded, but as consumers replace aging technology,
smartphones are the popular choice. Zuckerberg notes that while smartphone adoption may be climbing,
full use of the technology remains out of reach for many due the high cost of data plans. This was the
impetus for Facebook’s zero-rated Free Basics plan.
In its various forms, the digital divide is pervasive throughout this study. As noted above, a
primary cause is geography. In the US, Russia, China, Brazil, Mexico, and Iran large swaths of rural,
underpopulated land has made necessary infrastructure for access and broadband prohibitively costly.
Similarly, the thousands of populated islands that make up Indonesia and the Philippines make it
financially difficult for fixed infrastructure to be installed on remote locations. For the private sector, such
investments without the promise of short-term profits leave little motivation for companies to take on the
cost alone. The World Bank calls broadband a “club good,” that requires intervention, generally from the
state, in order to create conditions that make fair distribution possible. Each of these cases has adopted
a different combination of methods to counteract the geographic divide. Many states and netizens see
the problem of the digital divide through the lens of equality and a right to access (the US, Brazil, the
Philippines, Mexico, and Indonesia). The impetus for China and Russia is primarily economic, framing
the problem of the digital divide as lost economic opportunities and often cite statistics such as that a 10
percent increase in access leads to a 1.5 percent rise in GDP. Iran has a troubled relationship with
access, with the history of capping speeds and maintaining high costs through its quasi-monopolistic,
state-owned ISPs. Its SHOMA project, which would provide safer, faster, and reliable Internet, would limit
content in order to create an “Internet-e-Paak” that would be in line with fundamentalist Shi’a.
Other manifestations of the digital divide have been addressed sporadically in each of the
countries. The socioeconomic divide has been addressed through programs and legal instruments like
ConnectforGood, HUD, Mexico Conectado, and the Marco Civil da Internet, recognizing that access is
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problem of human rights and social justice. The provision of access furthers goals including equality of
opportunity in areas like education and employment. The Philippines and Indonesia have indirectly dealt
with the issue of unequal access while addressing the geographic divisions in their respective
archipelagos. For instance, the Palapa Ring Projects are meant to bring greater access to regions
traditionally unserved by infrastructure development. These islands also are home to greater proportions
of impoverished citizens, but the project is undertaken in the name of equality of opportunity and the
modernization of infrastructure and is not explicitly framed as a problem of social justice. The only other
state to directly tackle this issue is China, claiming that increasing Internet penetration will lead to social
progress in addition to growing its economy. Such language is indicative of China’s communist
ideological identity, which has long justified the state’s authoritarian measures and restrictions on civil
liberties by claiming that it is helping the masses. Whether the state plays this role sincerely is another
matter, but the framing of the issue of access in this way is indicative of its ideological context.
Speed and cost are other defining characteristics of the meaningfulness of access. The US and
Russia have the highest average speeds of this study, with 14.2 and 11.6 Mbps download speeds,
respectively. The average speeds for all remaining cases, besides Cuba, are 5.9 Mbps or less, and are
largely a determination of the availability of infrastructure and the structure of the ISP market. Costs for
fixed line connections vary greatly in each case, with five cases at or below the UN’s baseline of a
connection costing less than 5 percent of a user’s average monthly salary. In the cases of the Philippines
and Indonesia, exorbitant costs are a consequence of the market, especially in the former. Duopoly has
plagued the Philippine telephone and ISP markets; potential competitors to the entrenched providers are
hindered from driving costs down because of the lack of peering and other policies. For Iran and Cuba,
high costs are a consequence of state policy to control users. The Iranian state has had policies in place
to discourage meaningful access, including controlling prices and through speed caps that limit Internet
use. The prohibitive costs associated with Internet use in Cuba is partially related to limiting the number
of Internet users, but is also motivated by the desire to bring hard currency into the island’s economy.
Internet Service Providers and their Regulation
The relationship between the state and industry is one of the main manifestations of a nation’s
political economy. In the case of the Internet industry, the ISPs’ identity, the level of competition, and
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their relationship with the state dictate the manner and quality of Internet access. States that encourage
competition, as in Brazil, find that access is widened with increases in efficiency and competitive pricing.
In all three of the archetype states examined, power is concentrated asymmetrically, in the private sector
in the US, and with the state in both Russia and China. Access is thereby hampered by limitations in the
market or the goals of the state.
While ISPs are private in the US, the market share is concentrated among five national providers
who wield enormous power in deciding coverage areas and influencing the policies that regulate them.
The FCC has been battling ISPs since 2007 over issues like net neutrality and zero-rating schemes. It
has only recently established itself as a legal regulator of the Internet under Title II of the Federal
Communications Act (1934), and the FCC continues to be seen as the underdog in this arena. ISPs also
challenge efforts that may help bridge the digital divide. They commonly undermine municipal broadband
projects by arguing that they would artificially hamper competition and successfully advocate for laws
against them. They have also argued against the low-cost provision of fiber by Google in low-income
areas, again claiming that they would lead to unfair competition. The role of the state in the American
economy is generally seen as suspect by citizens and business alike. Additionally, whether true or not
ICT professionals in the US have long believed that the industry produced innovation with fair pricing
without intervention from the state, and so by definition the FCC is seen as a burden rather than a boon.
Unlike in other areas of comparison—demographics, the nature of the digital divide, and policies
aimed at increasing access—states with similar political culture do not share similarities in their respective
ISP markets. The Philippines and Indonesia both have hybrid marketplaces with some mixture of private
and public ownership, but the Philippines is characterized by one powerful player, the heavily stateconnected PLDT with 70 percent of the fixed Internet market and 52 percent of the mobile market, with
Globe making up a large portion of what remains. The Philippines’ regulatory agency, NTC, while
charged with creating a more competitive marketplace, has remained weak in the light of entrenched
interests and cronyism that continues to characterize the relationship between the PLDT and the state.
Indonesia’s market enjoys healthier competition among multiple players, though small and medium ISPs
do not provide sufficient competition that could improve prices or speed. This is a consequence of the
idiosyncratic development of the Internet and marketplace in each state’s history, with the APJII
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instrumental in the introduction of Internet infrastructure in Indonesia in the late 1990s. Its regulatory
agency has been challenged due to high licensing fees, but retains more power over its ISPs than its
Philippine counterpart.
Brazil and Mexico’s markets are similarly varied. While both are entirely privatized, Brazil’s is
characterized by a diverse range of players, with several nationwide ISPs like Embratel and Telefonica
and many medium and small ISPs serving distinct locales. Brazil’s telecommunications regulation
agency, Anatel, has worked to increase access through the CGI.br, consultations for the Marco Civil da
Internet, and coordinates the licensing of small ISPs to bring services to underserved areas. Mexico’s
América Móvil controls 80 percent and 70 percent of the fixed line and mobile markets, respectively, with
the next biggest competitor, Axtel, controlling just 6 percent of fixed Internet subscriptions. Brazil’s
diverse market has been a matter of policy, engineered by tax breaks and financial incentives, and the
Mexican state has only recently begun the process of dismantling Slim’s empire through IFETEL, whose
powers were not concretized until July 2014. To date, the anti-trust body has only declared América
Móvil to be the dominant provider in violation that no one company can control more than 50 percent of a
given market. Mexico is moving in the direction of Brazil, but it will take many years to dismantle the
engrained power of a company owned by one of the richest men on the planet.
Russia’s ISP market is shifting. In its early years, Internet providers were numerous, perhaps as
a consequence of shock therapy and the rapid privatization of many industries ushered in by the collapse
of the Soviet Union in the 1990s. Since then the Russian government has enacted policies that have
forced ISPs to comply with policies that are financially burdensome and that enable the state to monitor
access and censor content. Owned by the state, Rostelecom is the main provider of access and is the
institution that is pivotal to decreasing the digital divide. The Ministry of Communication and Mass Media
regulates the industry and is appointed by executive decree, much like the US, but in Russia such
controls are more important. The centrality of economic and technological modernization above concerns
for liberal values play out in the Russian ISP industry and its limitations on access and users’ freedoms.
Additionally, the state has asserted itself in other ways into the industry, requiring providers to employ
expensive monitoring equipment and their existence being subject to the state’s discretion.
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China’s curious economic structure is apparent in its ISP industry. Nominally communist, China’s
economy is state-controlled yet simultaneously subject to market conditions. Inefficiencies in the ISP
market resulted in the filing of an anti-trust suit by the People’s Congress and forced its decentralization in
2008. While China Unicom, China Telecom, and China Mobile must now compete with each other for
customers, all are still directly responsible to the state for carrying out all of its restrictive policies on use
and content. Combined with state-owned IXPs and backbones, these moves assure the state continues
to have direct control of the Internet. As with all the cases in the Not Free category, the engine of
regulation, the CNNIC, is directly tied to the authoritarian state and has little independent influence on
policy making.
The other Not Free states’ ISP markets are also highly centralized. Iran’s TCI is not directly
state-owned, but its majority shares are controlled by the Revolutionary Guard, which may be a matter of
happenstance rather than evidence that the private sector having real control over the market or that
possibility becoming a reality anytime soon. After all, Iran’s economy is highly dependent upon the public
sector, and it is reasonable that the state would desire to retain control of such a vital industry, even if
indirectly. Cuba’s ETECSA is directly owned and operated by the state. New services brought by
American providers are concentrated in Havana, and it has been signaled that these will be given in
conjunction with rather than in competition with the state. Despite rapprochement, the state’s control over
the market is likely to remain airtight.
Efforts to Increase Internet Penetration and Bridge the Digital Divides
One of the demands of the F2C is that by claiming citizens have a right to access the Internet, the
state is obligated to assist in the provision and spread of that access. The means adopted by each of
these states have been dependent on political culture and the nature of each case’s political economy.
States in the Free and Partly Free categories have adopted a wide range of policies aimed at increasing
Internet penetration, often partnering with the private sector to find innovative solutions to geographic or
socioeconomic causes of unequal levels of access within their state. As the sole providers of access,
states in the Not Free category have no such partnerships and included plans to increase access within
the larger schemes of economic development.
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National Broadband Plans. In providing blueprints for states to increase access, WSIS
recommended in 2003 that states develop “forward looking and sustainable national e-strategies (11)” in
consultation with the private-sector and civil society. As technological advancement and the overall the
level of development range greatly around the world, WSIS recommended that each plan be developed in
accordance not only with the main goals of WSIS, i.e. to bring ICT development in line with the MDGs,
but also be appropriate considering social and political contexts. Four out of the nine cases have
developed plans in line with WSIS’s recommendations—the United States, Brazil, Mexico, and
Indonesia—though notably later than WSIS’s 2005 deadline. China and Iran have adopted approaches
within five-year development plans, and the remaining states have yet to do so.
Adopted in 2010 “Connecting America” promised that by 2020, 100 million households would
have broadband capable of 100 Mbps download speeds, a sophisticated connection even in 2016. In
addition the 1002 promise, the plan contained other mechanisms to spread access, including increasing
public places of access and funding through Universal Service Funds. The plan was framed within the
context of the geographic and socioeconomic divides, and updates have continually noted that while
progress has been made, stark contrasts among rural, tribal, and lower SES populations mean that
people continue to be left behind. While the US has been part of the WSIS action plans since 2003, the
free-market perspective on the relationship between the state and ICT corporations limits the role of the
state. Ambassadors for International Communications and Information Policy have repeatedly seen the
role of states is to enable the market to do its job (Kaspar). FCC policy and update reports are absent
mention of WSIS and other international obligations despite American participation, but instead often
make comparisons to Asian tigers and European states in reference to the how US is falling behind (see
Crawford, Captive Audience). Framed within the US being the inventor of this important technology, the
persistence of the digital divide is regularly seen as unacceptable.
Brazil’s National Broadband Plan was also adopted in 2010 and sought to extend service to
remote and rural areas and make 1 Mbps connections available for 40 million households by 2014. While
access has increased in the interceding years, critics are skeptical of the impact of the incentives laid out
within the plan, with less than 10 percent of providers claiming to have taken advantage of the financial
incentives. The plan is best understood as complementary to the framework of Brazil’s larger efforts to
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increase Internet penetration and access, and while it has been part of the WSIS process, its reliance on
a multistakeholder model has displaced the state in some ways.
Mexico introduced its National Digital Strategy in 2013. Unlike Brazil, it neither contains set
targets nor prioritizes norms related to the F2C and Internet freedom. Instead, the document connects
ICT development to economic growth. However, it does acknowledge the effects access has to
education and job opportunities and discusses how they are boon for achieving human rights.
Indonesia’s plan, produced in 2013, is commensurate with the vision as originally presented by
WSIS. The prerequisites of the plan include “government leadership, national commitment, multi-sector
synergy, and public-private partnerships.” By 2019, it hopes to achieve urban speeds of 1 Gbps and
individual speeds of 1 Mbps nearing 100 percent. Far less ambitious than other states, the plan is a
reflection of what is achievable within the timeframe given the extant infrastructure.
Russia’s unnamed targets for broadband penetration by 2018 were produced by the Ministry of
Communications and Mass Media, and reflects other such plans, laying out targets for fixed (5 million
households with 100 Mbps capability) and mobile broadband (20 million new 4G customers per year).
Like Indonesia, the modest targets are a reflection of current infrastructure capabilities.
Both Iran and China have included ICT development within the larger frameworks of 5-year
economic plans, a reflection of the centrality of the state in each case’s political-economic arrangement. ,
Like other national broadband plans, China has adopted targets for mobile and fixed lined penetration
increases. Iran’s intranet, the SHOMA network, was included in its most recent five-year plan. SHOMA is
a drastic representation of the state’s intervention into the provision and use of Internet for its citizens,
both China and Iran’s plans are a reflection of the state’s desire to shape the Internet into its own vision of
the state’s political culture. For China, it is a reflection of economic progress and social harmony, and
with Iran the plan is meant to make a pure Internet that would exist beyond the corrupting influence of the
West.
For various reasons, the Philippines and Cuba all do not have long-term Internet provision plans.
For the Philippines, the entrenchment of the PLDT and the relative weakness of the state to direct policy
may have discouraged the design of a plan that may never meet with any success. Cuba, the outlier of
this study, is slowly increasing Internet penetration in a country that has had only a handful of users of a
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system that is antiquated and forcibly limited. The state may prove resilient to the political rapprochement
with the US, but at this point there is little need, both from a technical and political standpoint, for the state
to develop Internet penetration policies that are currently practically nonexistent.
State-Sponsored Studies. The presence of routine, state-sponsored studies that investigate
Internet penetration rates and the digital divide is a reflection political will and capacity. All states in the
Free and Partly Free categories, save the Philippines, have bureaucracies in place that routinely measure
and publish studies regarding access. The NTC and other Filipino institutions do not have much power,
so the lack of studies may be reflection of cronyism in that important financial resources may be diverted
from labor-intensive and expensive work. These measures are important for national broadband plans
and reports to the ITU, which depends on such institutions for their own gauge of the growth of the
Internet around the world. China’s CNNIC also collects reliable statistics.
Cuba’s current Internet access points are directly controlled by the state, either through Wi-Fi or
community “navigation halls,” all supplied by ETECSA, so such studies would be redundant. The
motivation for Iran’s poor record of Internet penetration statistical collection is unclear. A state that is so
concerned with how the Internet used by its citizens should desire to know where, when, and who goes
online; it may be that the stated ICT rates are greatly exaggerated.
Rights-based Access Statement. Four of the nine cases examined have issued or attempted to
issue either constitutional or other legal statements assuring that Internet access is a right to be enjoyed
equally among all of its citizens. These statements are written within the context of the larger scope of
rights associated with Internet freedom that have become synonymous with the relationship between
politics and the Internet today, including privacy and net neutrality. They appear only in the Free and
Partly Free categories among the Philippines, Brazil, Indonesia, and Mexico.
The Philippines and Indonesia, as states with similar political cultures and problems relating to
access, have both adopted rights-based statements that are the result of consultation with various
stakeholders concerning Internet access. These generally include the state, NGOs, ICT professionals,
and end-users. The Philippine Magna Carta is focused on how civil rights are to be understood on the
Internet while the Jakarta Declaration included initiatives to expand access, including last-mile access
and backbone infrastructure completion. The reason for the lack of a push for infrastructure buildout in
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the Philippines’s crowd-sourced version is not directly clear, but may be a consequence of the
document’s origins. Unlike the Jakarta Declaration which grew in part thanks to the Digital Divide
Institute, the Magna Carta was a reaction to a controversial cybercrimes bill that may have limited
meaningful access, so it fails to extend the scope of access beyond the threats to civil rights the law had
made.
Brazil has risen to its influential status as a result of its Marco Civil da Internet, a document that
touches on freedom of expression, privacy, net neutrality, and a host of other rights to be enjoyed on the
web. Like the Philippine document, the rights framework was partly crowd-sourced and found its origins
in reaction to a controversial cybercrime bill that had the potential to limit meaningful access. It goes
further than the Philippine version, creating an obligatory role for the state in the provision of ICT
infrastructure and regulation of the industry. Similarly, Mexico’s Internet para Todos gathered signatures
for a petition to include Internet access as a civil right in an amendment to the Mexican constitution. Such
a move is not unprecedented and illustrates the commitment the Mexican state has to increasing
meaningful access.
None of the cases from the Not Free category have produced any legislation that guarantees
citizens’ access or limits the state’s power on the web. Neither the US nor Russia have produced such
artifacts, either. For Russia, the increasing power of the state and its growing presence in the provision of
Internet may partly explain its absence, in addition to the little demand from the public and support for the
Putin regime, and that access has been spreading throughout the country, albeit slowly. American
political culture and the power of ISPs have been influential in the US in shaping Internet policy,
prioritizing private efforts over PPPs and municipal broadband. Internet pioneers like Vint Cerf and ICT
professionals are vocal against the idea of framing the Internet as a human right, despite the fact that
nearly three-quarters of Americans from two surveys think it should be seen as such. It may be that the
combination of government power, entrenched Interests of ISPs, and the ICT professionals’ narrative of
technological innovation works together against the formulation of such a policy. In the meantime, a
relatively weak public agency, the FCC, works piecemeal in reaction to NGO and other grassroots efforts
on issues like privacy, piracy, and neutrality.
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Tax incentives. Only two states actively use the power of fiscal policy to encourage further
Internet penetration through the private sector. Naturally, as states in the Not Free categories are the
ISPs or directly control ISPs, such policies would be redundant. Cronyism in the Philippines would also
logically favor incumbent ISPs against any measures designed to encourage domestic competition.
Brazilian tax policy, as conceived by the national broadband plan, has encouraged infrastructure
buildout in rural areas by reducing or eliminating taxation on ISPs. Similar programs are available for
ISPs that connect public schools. Sales tax has been exempted on smart phone technologies at their
point-of-sale that would encourage users to purchase the necessary equipment to make use of wireless
technologies.
Some municipalities in the US have used tax incentives to encourage municipal-level buildouts.
AT&T other ISPs have challenged these incentives, arguing that they should have “right of first refusal”
when cities are considering the adoption of GONs (Gustin). The failure of major private ISPs to provide
service should be enough to preclude such an argument from being taken seriously, but ISPs continue to
frame municipal broadband as an unfair competitor. The debate over municipal broadband continues, so
far in favor of entrenched interests.
Regulatory Efforts and Legislation. Five of the nine cases examined have taken up measures
to further regulate ISP sectors. All three of the states from the Free category have done so with varying
support from the public. The FCC reclassified ISPs as public utilities allowing the agency authority to
regulate pricing and practices that might be deemed as against norms of net neutrality. The Philippines
“Fair Competition Act” that was passed in December 2014 was to break up duopoly conditions of the
Filipino ISP markets, but as of yet it has not passed any legislation or policies that have been reported as
having an effect on the PLDT or Globe. In addition to framing the Internet as a right and assuring other
civil liberties be upheld on the web, the Marco Civil da Internet upholds policies like net neutrality and
privacy.
Mexico and China, in different manners, have taken steps to forcibly breakup de facto
monopolies. The Federal Institute of Communication was created by the “Pact for Mexico” that was
designed to break up the empire enjoyed by América Móvil. The efforts are ongoing, and while Mexico is
following in some of Brazil’s footsteps, it has a way to go. China’s anti-trust legislation declared that its
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ISPs were in violation of the law, and required reorganization. China Mobile, Unicom, and Telecom run
each region’s branch semi-autonomously, and compete with one other in both fixed and mobile Internet
provision markets. These steps may lead to greater and more efficient provision of access in China, but
says little regarding the meaningfulness of that access.
Public access. The direct provision of access in community centers is one approach states have
taken to addressing the divides that persist within their territories and populations. The US federal
government does not usually participate in the direct provision of access in public places, but indirectly
supports its availability in libraries and other municipal-level community points of access. HUD’s program
that would wire broadband in housing projects is an exception, and may signal more such policy initiatives
in the future.
Brazil, Mexico, and the Philippines have all undertaken projects to provide free access in central
locations within municipalities that is tied to their manifestations of the digital divide. Community eCenters
(Philippines), Knowledge Labs such as those found in Piraí Digital City (Brazil), and telecenters provided
by Mexico Conectado are grassroots projects that intend not only to provide connections to its citizens,
but to provide digital literacy courses and assistance with other issues about learning to make full use of
the Internet. Other cases have public access areas, but they are not touted as anything particularly
special. For Cuba, public access is a way in which the state limits access for most Cubans. Government
initiatives to overcome problems of digital literacy are absent.
Public-Private Partnerships. PPPs can take many forms. In every case, PPPs function in
areas where public or club goods are pivotal to the development of particular communities, but are
unattractive to be independently developed by private sector. In the cases examined, they run the gamut
from partnerships undertaken for the construction of infrastructure, as temporary service providers, or
providing public access areas in communities.
For the US, despite the objection from national ISPs, PPPs take the form municipal broadband
projects. They most-often succeed when framed as temporary or as “alternative delivery systems,” that
divert attention from public-sector involvement in the traditionally conceived private markets. In the
provision of public access for communities, municipalities pay private ISPs for their service more or less
like any other consumer, it should not be properly conceive as a PPP.
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The Philippines has begun a PPP centered on the development of TVWS, partnering with
Microsoft to benefit from unused television frequencies to bring broadband to underserved areas. As the
World Bank suggests, such an arrangement is ideal in states with entrenched private sector actors and
weak bureaucratic controls. Likewise, Brazil’s Cinturão Digital Belt project laid out cable across the state
of Ceará, with the municipal government footing the bill of a 2,600 km build out. Through taxation and
other incentives, small and medium ISPs were encouraged to extend the cable’s capacity to end users.
NGOs. Non-governmental organizations aimed at providing further Internet penetration and
meaningful access are active in the US, the Philippines, Indonesia, Brazil, and Mexico. Two
organizations, Mexico’s Internet para Todos and the Philippines’s Democracy.Net.Ph were coalitions of
groups and NGOs that petitioned their government to include access as a right or legal protections for its
use. Mexico’s Fundación ProAcceso and America’s Connect for Good both work at the community level
to provide training in digital literacy and provide other prerequisites to meaningful Internet use, like free
access and cheap hardware. The Digital Divide Institute, a collaboration between Western and
Southeast Asian academics, advises in Indonesia the proper utilization of Internet infrastructure
Russia’s NGOs have been repeatedly challenged in the past several years, with a law passed in
May 2015 that bans NGOs that the government claims as “undesirable.” The power of the state in the
realm of the provision of access has meant relatively little in the providing of free access or training. Still,
grassroots projects like the Glasnost Defense Foundation and other civil rights advocates contest
limitations on content and violations of users’ rights perpetrated by the Russian state. Civil society is
truncated in Iran, China, and Cuba as a result of both regime type and political culture.
Special Projects. In four cases states have taken additional, unique steps to increase access or
otherwise provide new avenues of access.
The US’s Connect Home program is a partnership between the federal Housing and Urban
Development program and service providers in 28 pilot communities. Each pilot is a reflection of the
existing partnership, but all will provide low or no cost broadband based on the model developed by the
ConnectforGood model in Kansas City. Funds for the program are budgeted out of existing funds for the
HUD.
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Brazil’s NETmundial conference of 2014 was conducted to present an alternative to the
American-centric model of Internet governance. Multistakeholder governance was not a new concept,
but stands in contrast to perceptions of US dominance in the wake of the Snowden revelations and the
multilateral model encouraged by some in the ITU.
Indonesia’s Palapa Ring projects are meant to enable connections among its lesser populated
islands that are far removed from the urban centers of the state. Not a PPP, the ring projects are funded
through universal service obligations, much like the proposed Lifeline program in the US. The approach
is reliant on the market to make the most efficient use of the infrastructure once completed. Backers of
the Palapa Ring’s first project were also subject to the whims of the market in a different way, backing out
of the project in the midst of the global recession.
Finally, Iran’s SHOMA project, long-conceived and promised stands in contrast from other special
projects and efforts through NGOs and PPPs to extend access. While it promises to do just that, the
state’s intranet efforts are meant to create a culturally acceptable web. Ideas considered heretical or
dangerous to the Islamic Revolution normally found on the global Internet can be avoided. Presumably,
SHOMA would enable easier surveillance of Iranian netizens that may use to platform in ways that the
government disapproves.
Taken together, Free and Partly Free states have been the ones that have taken the biggest
strides to increase Internet penetration in addition to meaningful access. While Russia and Not Free
states have adopted medium-term goals, these have been almost exclusively driven by the state and its
apparatuses and designed to enhance the states’ control of content and monitoring of use. At varying
levels, the US, the Philippines, Brazil, Mexico, and Indonesia have each addressed the divides between
urban and remote, rich and poor using the rhetoric of the F2C while acknowledging the importance of
access to educational and employment opportunity and membership in the political community.
Restrictions on Access and Other Limitations on Internet Use
States can simultaneously work to increase Internet penetration while inhibiting meaningful
access in ways that are a reflection of political culture and context. There are two main methods. First
and more directly, through policy or happenstance ISPs may be dependent on the state-owned
infrastructure like IXPs and fiber. Second is the monitoring of access. While it largely characterized by
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Freedom House as violation of users’ rights, an examination of the practice is warranted as users “selfcensor” themselves and do not use the Internet in ways that would be meaningful, and that such practices
are indicative to a case’s overall relationship to Internet freedom.
None of the states in the Free or Partly Free categories, save Russia, own or directly control the
infrastructure that enables Internet access. For Russia, the Ministry of Communication and Mass Media
requires ISPs to purchase foreign Internet traffic directly from state-controlled providers. This policy
signals another avenue for the state to restrict access as an expression of techno-nationalism. The
degree to which techno-nationalism serves merely as a guise for further state intrusion into Internet use is
unclear, but to consider them one in the same is a mistake. Techno-nationalism can be seen as a
reaction to perceived national security threats, whereas cyber sovereignty is more all-encompassing view
of the role of the Internet and its relationship to the state.
The governments of China and Iran control the infrastructure connecting their Internet to the
outside world. China has demonstrated its degree of control by shutting off access to entire regions or
areas in times conflict. By exploiting the infrastructure owned by the TCI, Iranian authorities have
developed ways to filter content and websites from their users. Despite the completion of an undersea
cable connecting Cuba with Venezuela, ordinary Cuban users have not benefitted from the faster
possible speeds made possible by the infrastructure improvements. Instead, government officials may
use the improved download speeds, but the rest of domestic traffic is routed through the older and slower
technology. It could be a consequence that Cuban officials not having the sophistication to filter content
efficiently, and would prefer in the meantime to rely on the limitations of technology to do their work for
them, with most websites being content-heavy that would easily frustrate users relying on slower
connections.
Four of the six cases from the Free and Partly Free categories do not regularly monitor access or
restrict content. However, the two archetypes states do so in important ways and have been the subject
of scrutiny by the media, ICT professionals, and the public. While the US continues to struggle to
increase Internet penetration and overcome the unequal access to broadband like all geographically large
and diverse states, its credibility as a champion of Internet freedom has been tarnished by the revelations
related to the PRISM program. Realistically, the method and extent of the data collection by the program
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pales in comparison to scope and levels of coercion explored in other cases in this study like China and
Iran. The NSA collects metadata purportedly for the purposes of curbing threats to national security,
particularly terrorism, and investigators are not supposed to know the identities to whom the data
belongs. In order for a formal investigation to be opened, a court (albeit a closed, secret court) must
judge if there is sufficient cause. It uses voluntary cooperation from at least nine US companies,
including Facebook, Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo. Yet recent battles over privacy reveal that while
some elements of the American case are in favor of restricting Internet freedoms by the likes of the NSA
and FBI, others see such invasions of privacy as inimical to consumers’ expectations. Apple’s refusal in
April 2016 to unlock the San Bernardino terrorist’s iPhone illustrates the fact that the relationship between
the state and ICTs in the US is contested rather than hierarchical.
Unlike its Not Free counterparts, Russia’s desire to control the Internet is complicated because its
early development was accomplished under the auspices of the private sector. With the concentration of
his power, the Putin regime continues to take steps to circumscribe content and monitor citizens’ access.
The state blocks “dangerous” websites related to suicide-promotion and child pornography. In
themselves, such curtailments seem benign, but that the state takes these measures means it has the
capacity and willingness to do so for other that challenge the power of the government.
China, Iran, and Cuba all directly monitor citizens’ access to varying degrees. China requires
ISPs to report illegal content and activity to the government, thereby contracting out the task in order for
ISPs to keep their license. For places of public access in Iran, closed-circuit television monitor users’ use,
while in Cuba navigations halls are one of only two widely available avenues of access.
Defining Problems and Evidence of the F2C
Each of the archetype cases has unique defining problems that inhibit Internet penetration and
meaningful access. For the US, the ISP fixed and wireless markets are dominated by few players,
especially considering that availability for each is not nation-wide. Competition is stymied and companies
like Verizon, Time-Warner, and AT&T hold enormous power. The continuing fight over net neutrality, in
different and creative manifestations, pits these powerful companies against a bureaucracy that was
empowered only recently to regulate the industry. Legal challenges to the reclassification are expected to
continue.
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Russia’s moves towards an Internet Security Doctrine and a proposed intranet are indicative of a
desire to further centralize and coordinate control over the medium. Its reclassification from Partly Free to
Not Free stems from the shifting power of the regime itself, moving from relatively off-hands approach
during the 1990s and the waves of liberalization after the collapse of the Soviet Union to the increasing
centralization of power around the Kremlin today. For China, efficient Internet broadband rollout has
been hindered by its near-monopolistic market and the state’s attempts to create competition is meant to
circumvent the high-costs and inefficiencies inherent in any such model.
The Philippines and Indonesia share similar problems to the hindrance of Internet penetration and
meaningful access. In both cases, there is stark urban-rural divide perpetuated by market forces and the
bottom line of large ISPs or associations. These inequalities are reinforced by preexisting disparities in
technological dispersion, literacy, and socioeconomic status. Each state’s political culture is marred by
endemic patterns that disadvantage smaller ISPs and challenges to the status quo, especially
patrimonialism and cronyism. As such, their bureaucracies remain relatively weak in developing or
enforcing policies that would encourage anything but the pursuit of profit at the expense of efficiency.
Brazil can be viewed as a precursor to the Mexican relationship with Internet freedom, having
started their relationship with Internet access in the early 1990s with an ICT environment that is eerily
similar to what Mexico’s is like today. Embratel was a subsidiary of the state-owned telecom Telebras,
which had near-universal monopoly until the state stepped in (Norm 004-1995) to create rules that would
not allow the ISP to charge higher fees to users and to encourage competition. By 1998 the state forcibly
de-monopolized Telebras, much in the same way Mexico is currently doing to equally monopolistic,
though privately-owned, América Móvil. Beneath the all-important layer of poor market environment, both
Mexico and Brazil suffer from the inhibiting effects of the digital divide, shaped by territorial difficulties and
differences in SES.
Internet penetration in Iran is inhibited by unreliable record keeping and strategies that do not go
beyond broad goals. While the state’s five-year plans have included the impetus for the SHOMA, it is not
clear at this time whether this Iranian intranet is approaching anything near completion. It may have been
hampered by the embargos or other difficulties in the importation of necessary equipment, but as
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Freedom House correctly notes, the level of control that the network would give the state over users is
concerning. There are no programs that address the meaningfulness of access.
Access in Cuba is likely to change dramatically in the next few years, considering the thawing of
tensions that have shaped the Cuban political climate for nearly six decades. The ability to import
equipment in addition to the demands of tourists who will visit Havana will likely increase speeds for
some. Nonetheless, the resiliency of the state should not be underestimated; the methods that the
Castro regime have used to solidify their power will not be erased when they are gone. The singular ISP
and woefully outdated telecommunications infrastructure are problems that will persist despite a changing
of the guard in a state run by el Sistema. The impetus for foreign ISPs to build out beyond Havana is
questionable as a consequence of the lack of a marketplace.
All of the states in the Free and Partly Free categories, save Russia, show strong evidence of the
acceptance of the norms of the Freedom to Connect. In the US, politicians have used the F2C as rhetoric
in the wake of the Arab Spring and as a way to justify the multistakeholder model of governance of the
Internet in contrast with the state-centered model supported by illiberal states.
The disparities between this type of rhetoric and the US federal government’s actions through the
PRISM program and the FBI makes such support for the F2C seem hypocritical. Yet the realist tendency
to view state action through the “billiard ball” lens misses that bureaucracies and other manifestations of
pluralism that can and do often work towards different ends. Policies do not have to be consistent. The
Department of Housing and Urban Development can support the F2C while the National Security Agency
works against Internet freedom. The FCC can fight to uphold net neutrality while the courts and local
politicians empower ISPs. Google and Connect for Good can partner to bring broadband to the urban
underprivileged, while Verizon and Comcast can work against municipal broadband projects as
dangerous to the competitive market. It is of note, however, that each of these battles take place within
the framework of the F2C. While their claims about the viability of the marketplace and innovation are
thinly veiled attempts to protect corporate self-interest evidenced by widespread and expensive lobbying
efforts, Verizon’s protests against GONs must be framed as hindering the advancement of Internet
penetration and innovation and not simply hurting their bottom-line. Boli and Thomas highlight the drive
to couch self-interest in global culture:
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The burden of proof lies on self-interested actors to demonstrate that more than selfaggrandizement animates their action, even though their action promotes purposes like
progress or growth. Just as medieval merchants met this burden of proof by paying for
masses in the town cathedral, even quintessential self-interested actors feel compelled to
demonstrate their collective concerns: Mobil sponsors public broadcasting productions,
George Soros supports numerous charitable organizations. Higher virtue is reserved for
those who act as agents of others, subordinating personal gain to broader concerns.
(295).
The US lacks the nationally coordinated efforts among states, NGOs, and the private sector to
increase access in ways that are present in the Philippines, Brazil, Indonesia, and Mexico. In the
archipelagos, the demands have been addressed by legislation that require ISPs to be responsive to
consumer demands to increase penetration, efficiency, and transparency. This has been done through
coalitions among the consumers, NGOs, and corporate partnerships have used online petitions and other
means to present their demands to the government. Such a methodology is one-way street, with those at
the receiving end of policy demanding change to varying degrees of success.
In the Latin American cases, states have become partners with NGOs and ISPs with the aim of
improving Internet penetration and meaningful access. Through PPPs and legislation, and in Brazil with
the early creation of the Internet steering committee, the state has been an integral player in shaping
policies that embody the F2C. NETmundial, in addition to providing an alternative model of Internet
governance, also has platforms of equality, digital inclusion, and connects Internet access to traditional
civil liberties including expression, association, and privacy.
Russia and the Not Free cases have asserted ideas that are framed through the lens of cyber
sovereignty. The argument that the state should retain control over their citizens’ use of the Internet as a
matter of policy has numerous justifications. For China and Russia national security ranks high on the
list, arguing that internal and external threats necessitate state control over infrastructure, epitomized for
China by shutting off access in areas of political conflict. Such actions are seen as temporary
necessities, an abrogation of otherwise necessary access to technology that is pivotal to the 21st century
Western notions of economy and life.
Perceived threats to state ideology are common among these four states as justifications for
limiting both Internet penetration and content and are far more engrained in policies surrounding the
Internet. Each state sees information on the Internet as a threat to its culture or its conception of a
healthy society. Russia’s control of pornography and sites associated with suicide are the tamest
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explanation for such intrusions on access, but the power to regulate has grown to include attacks on
Russia’s Orthodoxy and the criticism of the state. China’s promotion of social harmony justifies placing
limitations on the criticisms of the government and has resulted in self-censorship that is common among
Chinese netizens. Iran shows the strongest predilection to assert the importance of morality in its
limitations to Internet use, typified by steps to cap speeds, create its own intranet, and condemn the West
as using the technology to undermine the Islamic Republic. Just as the Iranian constitution uses Western
political structures to legitimize its unique political culture and authority, Iran’s relationship with the
Internet is similarly disingenuous. The state aligns the technology with its vision of politics and its
worldview as a reaction to the challenges to the power that it enabled during the Green Revolution.
As in most other respects of this study, Cuba remains an outlier. One could argue that it neither
supports nor challenges the F2C. The Internet in Cuba remains woefully backward as a consequence of
economic stagnation and embargo, and as a consequence access is limited by geographic availability
and speed. The state provides navigation halls and wireless access as an apparent means to raise funds
rather than enable meaningful access for anything beyond contacting family outside of Cuba and
whatever materials might be contained on its intranet. Yet the state does not suggest that it should be
free develop its own sophisticated Internet in absence of the norms and associated rights as is the case
in China, Russia, and Iran. The state does not prioritize increased Internet penetration or meaningful
access and opt-outs of the financial benefits that Internet access might have on the country’s GDP.
The degree to which the assertions of cyber sovereignty and techno-nationalism stand as an
alternative to the F2C or as an exception have yet to be determined. Instead, it may signal that the state
has been forced into dialogue with the expectations of state behavior surrounding the Internet. This
viewpoint is evidenced by the defiant proclamation that “China’s Internet is open,” and the assertions in
the 2010 White Paper that access does not impede Chinese citizens’ rights of privacy and enhances
political participation. Whether the Chinese government truly believes these conditions are in place for its
Internet users is questionable at best, but that the most illiberal state on the web feels it must justify its
position in a long document is a start.
Concluding Thoughts
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This study sought to discover first, the normative development of Internet access as a component
of Internet freedom and second, how states have reacted to various demands that would further enable
meaningful use of the Internet. Access is more than being able to plug in an Ethernet cable or connecting
a smartphone to Wi-Fi, and can include elements of digital literacy, affordability, and efficiency. States
take a variety of steps to assure or deny access depending upon their understanding of the importance of
the Internet and the immediate benefits access can bring its citizens. Evidence for the impact of the
Freedom to Connect or a right to access is present in five cases: the US, Brazil, the Philippines, Mexico,
and Indonesia, and correlates loosely with Freedom House’s assessment of these states. Not Free
states’ policies on increasing Internet penetration have not demonstrated strong adherence to the
framework of a right to access, but instead pursue the promise of economic growth tied with the
technology. Each of these four states has taken measures to curtail access when it deems it necessary
framed in terms of national security or the maintenance of social harmony.
This concluding section discusses each of the study’s hypotheses, asking to what degree the
F2C is similar and dissimilar to previous normative developments and then how IR theory can help to
explain the effect this norm has had on state policy. It will then address some of the limitations of the
methodology about the predictive power of the theoretical framework and suggest some further areas of
research and its applicability to Internet freedom research writ large.
Normative development of Internet freedom and access. The first hypothesis tested was that
the Freedom to Connect is an emerging norm in the international system that is being advanced by
traditional and non-traditional norm entrepreneurs. Chapter 3 addressed the frames that surround the
F2C and the identity of the actors who are constructing the narrative. The frames vary according to the
identity of the entrepreneur and of how they understand the media’s role in enabling human rights.
The F2C or right to access has taken on different interpretations according to the entrepreneur
and the context in which it is advocated. Sandholtz and Stiles argue that normative discourse transforms
norms’ substantive content, their specificity, and authoritativeness. The study of the F2C’s entrepreneurs
and the reactions from states have revealed four major dimensions and their related phenomena:
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Physical infrastructure penetration
o Wired components: IXPs, backbones, last-mile wired services
o Mobile components: Base transceiver stations, TVWS
Digital literacy
o Correlated to SES and overall literacy
o Knowledge of benefits of Internet
o Content in primary language
Meaningful access
o Relative speed: does capacity of connection make Internet use fast/efficient for desired
content?
o Cost: can users go online without “breaking the bank” or is reliable, fast service costprohibitive?
State interventions regarding access
o The provision of public access points, PPPs, municipal broadband
o State-as-ISP, monitoring and censorship with ISP consent, ability to disconnect users

At the outset of this study, it was assumed that access equated to the physical manifestations of the
Internet—routers, servers, fiber, satellites—and the provision and control of this equipment by states and
powerful ISPs. Instead, the meaning of access takes on deeper dimensions according to many
entrepreneurs so that it can enable democratic participation and help in the provision of information,
healthcare, education, and jobs. Digital literacy is a problem for many developing states in which SES
and demographic factors work together to make simple physical access relatively worthless. When
people in the developing world can use a computer or smartphone, they cannot find information in an
efficient manner due to poor speeds or cannot afford plans that provide reliable service. The state also
regularly intervenes into the issue of access, either proactively by providing public access or teaming with
the private sector to expand infrastructure or services. Finally, illiberal states use several means to inhibit
access, sometimes by throttling speeds, often by monitoring users or limiting content, or in the most
extreme interventions by switching off access to entire areas.
Traditional norm entrepreneurs work from the top-down, advocating that the international system
and states adopt policies in line with their demands. The most prominent of these platforms have been
associated with the UN, and the F2C finds advocates in WSIS and the Special Rapporteur for Human
Rights. WSIS advocates for closing the digital divide and promoting equal access, in addition to
connecting access to the SDGs and the problem of Internet governance. The last has been the stickiest
point for the ITU and WSIS, cemented in a divide between states that prefer multilateral to
multistakeholder governance. Combined with the fact that the IGF cannot create binding policy, the
impact of the UN on Internet governance has not been direct and is a questionable representation of the
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normative discourse regarding Internet freedom. But the ITU and WSIS have had an impact on the
development of policies surrounding access. Following the recommendation of the ITU and WSIS, many
states have developed regional and national strategies to expand access which started being adopted by
2010 (US, Brazil, Indonesia, Russia, China, and Iran); these plans become important points of
coordination among those promoting Internet diffusion within their states. Along with the Special
Rapporteur, WSIS places the issue of access with the broader scope of human rights. The WSIS+10
outcome document highlights the necessity for access to economic and human development, while La
Rue directly connects expression and association with undisrupted access. While the platforms have not
created hard international law, the best practices and connections to human rights laid out by the action
plans and reports have validated the continued importance of the UN in shaping normative discourse in
this area of transnational behavior.
Other organizations working on international platforms have shaped the dialogue of Internet
freedom and F2C, notably the World Bank and NETmundial. Along with APEC, the World Bank frames
access in terms of economic growth and development. Noting the digital divide, each organization sees
inequality as a hindrance to the potential for economic growth in the 21st century, which often bypass
industries that are no longer required passages to contemporary economies.
NETmundial was touted as an alternative to the UN and development models of Internet
governance and rights, calling for a richer multistakeholder model that would include the powerful actors
that have a direct impact on Internet penetration and use. The group frames its work upon the necessity
to increase Internet use to enable economic opportunity and to promote human rights. The crowdsourced
model of the continued work of NETmundial is borrowed from Brazil’s Marco Civil da Internet, and
highlights the changing nature of normative development in the international system.
NGOs are active on the international and domestic levels, and are tied together through
hyperlinked social networks. Prominent international NGOs like the Internet Society work at meetings like
WSIS stock-taking events and are in turn associated with regional and domestic affiliates. Those like the
Internet Society and WSIS are the ones generating “symbolic master frames” on which states and NGOs
base their platforms and actions. For instance, the Digital Divide Institute, a regional NGO that worked in
Indonesia to formulate and implement the Jakarta Declaration on Meaningful Broadband, highlights its
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affiliation with Google, national governments, and the UN system. While they “support and applaud” the
ITU’s efforts relating to broadband within their FAQ, they claim that their understanding of the digital
divide does not appreciate the particular contexts in which states are trying to implement meaningful
broadband work. The ITU “…does not claim to consider how to establish the political will to implement
ITU’s own policy recommendations [emphasis in original].” The Institute is an important node in
Southeast Asia, translating these broad policy recommendations into workable solutions like the Jakarta
Declaration.
These patterns are repeated by local NGOs and associations working in Free and Partly Free
states. Internet para Todos works with organizations that are directly interested in telecommunications
reform, like Mozilla Mexico and Wikimedia Mexico, but do not directly deal with the NGOs constructing the
master frames. Conversely, the Fundacion Proaccesso works among local NGOs along with international
partners ranging from Google, Cisco, the UN Information Centre, and the World Bank. Brazil’s
NETmundial, while being a state initiative, sought to promote a new, albeit complementary “master
narrative” which was coordinated with the CGI.br and 1net, a Uruguayan advocacy network along with
numerous NGOs and MNCs interested in expanding Internet access and human rights.
Facebook and Google have undertaken initiatives in collaboration with local governments and
ISPs to provide access in innovative ways. These are undertaken absent from hyperlinked social
networks, instead relying on partnerships with mobile ISPs in countries where these initiatives are
launched. The primary motivation for Free Basics and Project Loon are profit, but nonetheless have
benefited local access initiatives in Latin American and Southeast Asia. While equality of access and the
language of human rights are often used by these companies, their identity as enormous corporate
entities with interested shareholders must drive these expensive and time-consuming projects. The
apparent lack of collaboration with the state has tarnished the reputation of Facebook and Free Basics
where the criticisms over neutrality have led to the dismantling of its arrangements in India and possibly
slow its rollout elsewhere. Keeping this lesson in mind, the expansion of these and related projects by
powerful MNCs still depend on the rhetoric of Internet freedom and the F2C, further deepening their
meaning.
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Not Free states contain none of these dynamics. The negligible power of NGOs in each of these
states combined with the overwhelming power of the state and its control over or ownership of ISPs mean
there is little room to advocate for increasing penetration that would bridge any of the manifestations of
the digital divide.
The cyber sovereignty claim is a predictable reaction to the of the F2C norm life-cycle process as
described by Sandholtz and Stiles. One of the difficulties of the F2C is that its demands are
confrontational to the states outside the liberal international society based upon civil liberties and the free
market. As most norm development is, there is evidence that the cyber sovereignty norms that challenge
the F2C are in fact reactionary. “…one or more transnational actors provokes an interaction (or series of
interactions) with another, which forces an interpretation or enunciation of the global norm applicable to
the situation (Sandholtz and Stiles 8).”
The story begins with the Iranian Green Movement, which resulted from perceived irregularities in
a national election and was bolstered by the use of social media. The importance of Twitter was not lost
on observing states, which in turn reacted to the role technology played in assisting activists’
organizational efforts by tightening their own controls on access and stepping up censorship efforts. In
January 2010 Clinton remarked on the importance of rights on the Internet and articulated the “freedom to
connect” as a reaction to the threats to expression on the web by authoritarian states. China published its
White Paper on cyber sovereignty in June of that year rebuffing the idea that actions on the web should
be free from government intrusion. By September 2011, China, Russia and Central Asian states
submitted a brief to the General Assembly further asserting their belief that sovereignty should extend to
cyberspace. Sovereignty in general has been a powerful norm in UN discourse due to its enshrinement
in the Charter and has often been used as a fallback in response critiques over domestic human rights
abuses. In reaction to the brief, the UN affirmed the right of sovereignty but reminded the states of their
human rights obligations, both through human rights instruments and the general international
acceptance of their basic principles.
Whether the cyber sovereignty defense that is being articulated is a full-fledged alternative
normative development to the F2C is questionable. Sandholtz and Stiles argue that the normative
process is not linear, and that the violation of a norm or rule is not evidence is disintegration or
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meaninglessness. For instance, when powerful domestic actors break the law, they are not making new
law but instead incur costs like fines or jail-time. The development of a new norm would be predicated
upon how many other actors violated the rule and their justification for doing so. One of the conditions of
Sandholtz and Stiles is the presumption of some measure of a liberal international society, tied to the
solidarist British school that sees the development of new norms as a continuation of the ones that are
complementary to norms that are pervasive for members of that society. The “foundational metanorms”
of international society, they claim, are based on the belief in individual dignity and is evidence by
universality and equality (1). The number of states that are Not Free total 30 percent of the 65 states
examined by Freedom House and are concentrated in Asia, the Middle East, and the northeast part of
Africa, and cyber sovereignty finds little support outside of these arenas and regime types. At its most
powerful manifestation, cyber sovereignty will be limited to already authoritarian states.
The F2C is an emerging norm in the international system whose strongest effect is seen within
the established international society that contains domestic and international agreements to protect liberal
rights and equality. The international system, through the methods of “naming and shaming” by Freedom
House’s Index and the UN periodic reviews have forced those outside this liberal society to justify the
actions of the state that impinge upon the right to access. China, Russia, and others have taken great
pains to prove that Internet access is being increased to the benefit of their citizens, and that the
restrictions placed on access and content are unfortunate but necessary aberrations due to problems that
seem of genuine concern—suicide, drug trafficking, pornography, or the advocacy of violence. An
inherent right of the state to censor, monitor, and control the actions of everyday citizens for the stability
of the state is not part of the official discourse, but they only assert that sovereignty precludes critique of
these practices. While this may be Russia or China’s intent throughout the ways they inhibit access, they
must use the language and tools supplied by international society. The hegemonic nature of the
international society, made up of the US, Europe, and perhaps Latin America, sets the rules of the game
in terms of access and the state’s relationship with its Internet users.
Social movements on the web are not a new phenomenon. Studies of the Internet’s effect on the
foundation and organization of these movements goes back to the popular adoption of the web in the
middle of the 1990s. There is evidence that hyperlinked social networks and informal social media
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connections fuel the development of the F2C norm alongside UN and MNC platforms. The breadth of
their effect on states is curtailed by the strength of the civil society in general and the degree to which the
state controls access and content. Crowdsourcing the implementation of norms is a new phenomenon for
IR that needs further investigation.
The F2C’s impact on state behavior. The second hypothesis tested sought to explain how this
norm affects state policy about the distribution and availability of Internet access. It used the Freedom
House’s Freedom on the Net rankings to predict whether the states examined would have a proactive or
reactive response a right to access. State reactions have largely fell in line with the assessments made
by Freedom House. When this study began, Russia had been categorized as Partly Free but since has
moved to qualify as Not Free due to increases in censorship and monitoring of citizens. This study has
shown that all states have taken measures to increase Internet penetration, but the framework justifying
these measures taken by states diverge into two camps.
First, the US, the Philippines, Brazil, Mexico, and Indonesia all have framed their efforts to
increase access using the rhetoric of the F2C, equality of opportunity, and human rights. This positive,
proactive response to the multiple dimensions of access signal an acceptance of the larger Internet
freedom regime that includes institutions like WSIS, the ITU, and the HRC. There is a powerful argument
that the broader understandings of regimes beyond states is at work in Internet freedom, as the content of
the F2C is shaped both by the likes of WSIS and the Digital Divide Institute. While international
institutions more often shape and articulate the metanorms associated with a right to access, feedback
from states and NGOs loop together to identify directions in which Internet freedom should be pursued
and how the Internet is diffused.
Constructivism emphasizes the impact of norms, identity, and culture on behavior in the
international system. Moreover, their malleability allows normative discourse that is constructed on the
international level to have a meaningful impact on the states and cultures where they are applied
(Sandholtz and Stiles). WSIS, the ITU, and the HRC construct the “master narratives” of Internet freedom
and the F2C is interpreted by states, NGOs, and netizens according to their culture and market
conditions. The right to access in the Philippines is largely a means to challenge the entrenched interests
that keep the PLDT as a monopoly provider, while in Brazil it has transformed into the need to address
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the inequality feedback loop of the digital divide, while in the US it has become the affirmation of net
neutrality principles. Actors on the ground influence the master narratives over time. Cybersecurity has
become part of the WSIS agenda thanks to state demands, but with different meanings: privacy, the
vulnerability of data, minors or vulnerable populations being able to access explicit or questionable
content, DDoS attacks, and so forth. As Sandholtz and Stiles suggest, the construction of norms operate
in a feedback loop, and in this way the F2C is no different. The identity of entrepreneurs contained within
these loops, however, is the remarkable change from earlier normative development, and it is likely that
future normative development both inside and outside the realm of Internet freedom will look much the
same. International platforms, hyperlinked networks, social media, and crowdsourcing will all be places
to look for entrepreneurial activity to have an effect on the construction of normative platforms and their
implementation.
Regime theory and the British school both view the central importance of norms and identity of
actors in shaping and reacting to policy. The biggest difference between these approaches is
methodology, the former emphasizing formal modeling while the latter utilizing qualitative methodology
and interpretation. Evans and Wilson suggest that these approaches can be complementary, with the
British school explaining the historical rise and prominence of certain regimes within international society.
The solidarist school is especially pertinent in this regard.
The British school’s conception of international society looms over the Internet freedom regime
and explains the repeated connections between the F2C and human rights, particularly civil and political
rights like expression, assembly, and privacy. International society is liberal, consisting of first the West
and later expanding to include parts of the democratizing, developing world including Latin America and
democratic states in Southeast Asia. Foot, Gaddis and Hurrell (2003) and Hurrell (2007) maintain that
international society is faced with the problem of coming together to solve transnational problems and that
its members are both unequal and have important differences in identity and priorities. Despite these
difficulties, they present five reasons why international society cannot “retreat to pluralism” that applies
the problems of Internet diffusion, the digital divide, and Internet freedom in general: 1) the
interdependence among economic, social, and security concerns, 2) that structural changes mean that
states need to coordinate to tackle these problems, 3) that citizens’ expectations over the role of states
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have increased, 4) the expectation that international society should exist to solve these demands, and 5)
the changing global distribution of power. The authors anticipate that norm creation in the era of
“globalization” is no longer solely the realm of states, but that transnational actors can shape expectations
about the behavior of states and develop norms that they had little or no hand in creating. The
importance of the hyperlinked social movements and the impact of crowdsourcing upon domestic policy
and state rhetoric has had enormous impact upon how Internet freedom is understood and how the F2C
has been articulated by the UN and other international platforms. Food, Gaddis and Hurrell continue that:
Within the solidarist order states are no longer to act for themselves as sovereigns but
rather, first, as agents for the individuals, groups, and national communities that they are
supposed to represent—hence the move towards sovereignty as responsibility—and,
second, as agents or interpreters of some notion of an international public good and
some set of core norms against which state behaviour should be judged and evaluated
(41).
Many of the Internet freedom and F2C advocates—Facebook, Google, the Digital Divide Institute, WSIS,
the US State Department, the HRC—have framed the problem of access as transnational problem in
which everyone should be connected and as integral to economic and social development, disaster relief,
and healthcare. Naturally each of these actors has various goals in promoting the F2C. For MNCs, their
primary goals are profit and the expansion of their marketplaces. US foreign policy is reflected in hortatory
statements about the F2C from the State Department. The Digital Divide Institute’s work reflects the
academic and practical desires to extend access in a culturally relevant manner. These various and
potentially conflictual goals work together to shape the normative discourse surrounding Internet. They
are neither good nor bad in themselves, and work as both functional and abstract ideologies according to
context and purpose.
The UN is not a mouthpiece of this liberal society but its agencies and organizations are often a
proxy for the articulation of the outputs of the major policy initiatives. The UN also serves as a place for
illiberal states to articulate their demands as seen through a letter to the General Assembly regarding
cyber sovereignty and the periodic reviews conducted by the HRC. Nevertheless, the UN’s dialogue with
states that fail to live up to human rights norms illustrates how these states’ actions are seen as
incompatible with liberal international society in general and the regimes that make it up. Buzan clarifies
that solidarism should not be considered synonymous with cosmopolitanism, and it is apparent that
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illiberal states are not forming an alternative society based on some other set of norms. Instead, their
priorities remain centered on state power.
For Free and Partly Free states, realism’s emphasis on state power and its ability to shape norms
is revealed better in issue of Internet governance rather than Internet freedom. Since the Snowden
revelations announced the hypocrisy in American actions regarding Internet freedom in general, US
foreign policy has largely been silent. To be fair, Clinton and Obama’s rhetoric immediately followed the
Arab (false) Spring, and it would take another window of opportunity to test the US’s political will to use its
power to shape the frames of Internet freedom. In the meantime, domestic policy in the US continues to
follow along the line of the F2C through agencies like the FCC, HUD, and domestic NGOs, despite facing
an uphill battle with ISPs. In this normative power vacuum, Brazil appears to be stepping forward to fill
the gap as evidenced by both its domestic and foreign policy, enacting the Marco Civil da Internet utilizing
feedback from users and pursuing privacy resolutions in the General Assembly. Mexico appears to be
following in Brazil’s footsteps and is attempting to become a tech hub in its own right. Nevertheless, there
are some setbacks here too, including the ongoing controversy swirling around President Rousseff and
the introduction of a new cybercrime bill in Brazil that appears to be much like SOPA.
Second, Not Free states have not used the norms associated with the F2C or Internet freedom to
justify their policies associated with increasing penetration and meaningful access. Russia stands
between Free states and its Partly Free counterparts in terms of its rhetoric; while giving primary
consideration to economic growth, Russia has used the language of participation and equality, but has
not emphasized these benefits to be the focus of its plans. Along with China, Iran, and to some extent
Cuba, Russia has taken actions through those same international institutions to assert its own norms
about the relationship between the state and the Internet. Cyber sovereignty is a concept first articulated
by China whose mantle has been taken up by other states found in Freedom House’s scheme in the Not
Free category. Realism indicates that these states have the power to transform normative discourse
because they can mold morality/norms international system. Is the F2C threatened by this rhetoric?
I contend that cyber sovereignty is a defensive reaction to the perceived threats to the power of
these illiberal states. Applying either in the virtual or actual world, sovereignty norms are inherently
limiting, only signaling a fallback to the idea that states should be left to their own devices. China and
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Russia are not obligated to give any attention to the F2C or Internet freedom and could pursue their
domestic and foreign policy never having entered into a dialogue with rights advocates. Instead, they
have framed their needs as exceptions to otherwise valid norms of Internet freedom in terms of how they
interpret the need to maintain order and social harmony within their state. These derogations are similar
to other human rights instruments, in which states do not claim that these rights are inherently illegitimate
or invalid, but claim that do not apply to them in particular circumstances.
A summary of these insights are contained within the matrix that follows. It is certainly not a
simplistic (or pretty) chart, but does convey the overlapping loops among the actors involved in the
creation of the F2C and how it shapes state policy.
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Figure 6 Matrix of the F2C, State Policy, and Cyber Sovereignty

Additionally, while concerns over spying uncovered by Wikileaks and Snowden are in themselves
valid, illiberal states have used them as a window of opportunity to validate practices that they were doing
anyway. These contextual exceptions to otherwise valid norms in the likely overblown threat posed by a
Western-dominated Internet again do not form a basis for action in themselves. The push for multilateral
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control of Internet governance, a topic strictly speaking separate from Internet freedom, is the strongest
area where these states may have an impact on policy. Brazil’s multistakeholder approach that is aligned
with the F2C and Internet freedom seems to have won, with ICANN’s transfer to multistakeholder model
to be quietly completed in September 2016.
Limitations and areas of future research. The main limitation of the study is that it cannot
establish a definite causal relationship between the development of the F2C and particular state policies.
Finnemore and Sikkink’s model of constructivism describes normative development to be a linear
process, a cycle in which norms emerge, states react through rhetoric and the development of policy, and
become concretized as part of the ideology and identity of state. Sandholtz and Stiles cycle theory of
normative change better reflects the normative development of the F2C in which states contest and
thereby construct the meaning of the F2C according to contexts in which they must meet the demands of
the norm. The inclusion of the various aspects of access into shaping what the F2C really means—ISP
markets, the digital divide, cyber security, social media—has been the result of the disputes (phase II) of
the incompleteness and internal contradictions of this new norm.
In short, this study is limited because the F2C is a norm in the early stages of development. If the
origins of WSIS is taken as its earliest benchmark (the 1998 ITU Plenipotenary conference), the F2C is
less than 20 years old. This problem is magnified due its subject. The rapid pace of the development of
technology has meant that states and other actors have had to make their policies about
telecommunications diffusion and access at a disadvantage. Policy and law have an overwhelming
tendency to be reactive, and when added to bureaucrats’ mediocre understanding of infrastructure
demands and how quickly ICTs change, normative development will be behind the times. Pledges to
bring 3G technology to remote corners of the world by targets that range between 2017 and 2020 seem
insufficient considering the ubiquity of 4G in the developed world and the rapid development of 5G that is
expected to begin being rolled out early in the next decade.
Another weakness is that while patterns have emerged from the formation of the F2C by various
entrepreneurs and from cases that were observed, they are not enough to make predictions about other
regions’ and states’ reactions. How the F2C might be interpreted in European or African states, its
relation to existing human rights standards, and how the state and MNCs shape their telecommunications
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markets, cannot be extrapolated from Latin America or Southeast Asian cases. The plasticity of
normative discourse around Internet freedom means only that researchers should look for contextual
clues that would be relevant within the setting of the state in which they study.
Three other areas of future research stand out. One of the main contributions of this study to IR
is a deeper understanding of normative development and discourse in generally, and specifically,
determining how the F2C relates to other norms contained within the Internet freedom regime. How do
hyperlinked networks and crowdsourcing change the way in which international norms that influence state
behavior differ from the past? In what ways might we see more of these types of input during normative
development and implementation in the future? For many entrepreneurs and states, the F2C came within
a package of protections, duties, or rights related to the use of technology and the Internet. Does the
debate over censorship work any differently from the right to access? How do privacy protections relate
to the practice of surveillance within the context of exigent circumstances of national security? There is a
clear argument that access is fundamental while censorship and monitoring can be temporary or
necessary only given a particular need or overall context. As the surveys revealed, many users are
willing to truncate their rights in the name of the protection from cyber threats or to hunt terrorists on the
Web. Is access substantively different from how it is used, or are these rights indivisible, interdependent,
and interrelated as other human rights are conceived?
The evolution of the cyber sovereignty deserves attention. I have argued here that as it stands
today, the assertion of sovereignty in the virtual realm is a reaction to perceived demands and critiques
upon state practices the limit access and violate users’ rights. While it cannot form an alternative norm or
regime, the degree that other states assert this defense of their actions that violate the principles of
Internet freedom and the F2C will have an impact on how the norm is interpreted in local contexts and its
frames. WSIS and the HRC have already acknowledged national security concerns within their
articulations of the F2C, but they maintain the primacy of human rights as the focus of concern. The
question will be if this powerful idea can have an even greater effect on the F2C that would substantially
change its meaning.
Finally, tangential to the F2C and Internet freedom, the governance of the Internet has become
an increasingly contested space among states. The insights of realism and the impact of regimes have
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the greatest explanatory power in the development of ICANN past its American roots to a
multistakeholder non-profit corporation. While technical management does not have a direct impact on
how the Internet is used, the discourse over who gets control over the increasingly perceived important
technology has been a place of contestation for the past several years. The exposure of the PRISM
program has given a window of opportunity for greater criticism of the US and the drive for multilateral or
multistakeholder control. Studying how states have reacted to the perceptions of inequity in Internet
governance and how they relate their understanding of Internet freedom is worthy of attention.

***
The Internet and can be conceived as a right in itself and something necessary to achieve other
rights in the 21st century. Political participation and economic development are increasingly dependent on
meaningful access, and it is difficult to imagine areas of life in the developed world that have not been
transformed by this technology. Developing states may be able to at least partially bypass some of the
hurdles to economic, social, and political growth through the medium.
But the spread of the Internet is by no means equal or even guaranteed. Digital divides persist
and require the intervention of powerful actors—states, MNCs, IGOs—in order to be overcome. Power
on the web is taking shape in different ways from the past and is perhaps even more diffuse.
Nevertheless, states remain front and center in the question of access, and they can take steps to
increase its meaningful use or curtail it according to its own interests.
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Appendix: Summary of Statistics and Policies on Internet Access from Selected Cases

Free
Demographics

Brazil

Population

321,368,864

100,998,376

204,259,812

4

13

6

9,833,517

300,000

8,515,770

3

73

5

81.60%

44.40%

85.70%

GDP

$17.97 trillion

$693.4 billion

$3.276 trillion

Rank

3

31

8

$56,300

$7,000

$16,200

19

153

12

129,400,000

3,090,000

44,100,000

3

47

8

317,400,000

113,000,000

280,700,000

5

13

6

98.77%

111.88%

137.42%

276,600,000

39,200,000

108,200,000

86.80%

39.40%

53.40%

3

17

6

Rank
Land mass

(km2)

Rank

Urbanization

GDP/capita
Rank

Landlines
Rank

Cellular phones
Rank
Percentage of Population

ICTs

Philippines

Economics

US

Internet users (CIA)
Percentage of Population
Rank (absolute)

Internet percentage (ITU)

57%

Internet percentage (Domes.
CGI.br: 50%

Est.)

Internet Environment

Adoption of TCP/IP
Who?

1986
Military/academia

Internet/telecom regulator

1994
IBM

FCC

1992
Academia

NTC

Anatel

Average speeds
Cost (wired, 10Mbps, per

14.2Mbps

3.2 Mbps

4.1 Mbps

month)

$50/month, 1.82%

$44.03, 14.28%

$19.80, 4.30%

Cost (other)

$12/month,
wireless
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Verizon, TimeWarner,
AT&T, Comcast,
CenturyLink

PLDT (70%),
Globe

Embratel,
Telefonica,
many medium and
small

State owned / Hybrid / Private

Private

Hybrid

Private

Symmetric or Asymmetric?

Symmetric

Asymmetric

Symmetric

Verizon, AT&T -->
T-Mobile, Sprint

Smart (PLDT;
52%)
, Globe

Telefónica’s Vivo,
América Móvil’s
Claro,
Telecom Italia’s
TIM Brasil, and the
domestic player Oi

State owned / Hybrid / Private

Private

Hybrid

Private

Long-term Broadband Plan

National
Broadband
Plan (2010)

Not available

State-sponsored studies

OBI Technical
Paper

Not available

Tax or financial incentives

Via municipalities

No

National
Broadband
Plan (2010)
Brazilian Internet
Steering
Committee, ICT
Households
Reduce or
eliminate
taxation on ISPs
building
infrastructure

Regulatory legislation for
expansion

FCC Title II

Philippine Fair
Competition Act

Marco Civil da
Internet

Rights based access
statement

No

Magna Carta for
Philippine Internet
Freedom (pending)

Marco Civil da
Internet

Public access

Libraries

Community e
Centers

Piraí Digital City,
Knowledge Centers

PPPs

Municipal
Broadband

TVWS

Cinturão Digital
Belt

NGOs

Connect for Good

Democracy.Net.Ph

Special projects

ConnectHome

Major fixed ISPs

Digital Divide

Major mobile ISPs

NETmundial
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Laws restricting access
Take-Away

Monitoring of access?

PRISM

No

No; declarations of
privacy on the
Internet

Providers dependent on
state infrastructure?

No

No

No

Defining problems

Net neutrality, few
competitors,
PRISM

Urban-rural divide
exaggerates digital
divide; culture of
cronyism

Speed; digital
divide

HUD's
ConnectHome
program

Coalitions among
consumers, NGOs,
business
partnerships that
demand more
responsive
legislation

Coordinated efforts
of states, NGOs,
and ISPs through
various means:
taxation, PPPs,
law; CGI.br

Evidence of F2C

Partly Free
Demographics

Russia*

Population

255,993,674

121,736,809

142,423,773

5

12

10

1,904,569

1,964,375

17,098,242

15

14

1

53.70%

79.20%

74%

GDP

$2.676 trillion

$2.149 trillion

$3.471 trillion

Rank

10

12

7

$10,600

$18,000

$23,700

133

90

79

29,670,000

21,100,000

39,430,000

11

14

7

319,000,000

102,200,000

221,000,000

4

14

7

124.61%

83.95%

155.17%

42,400,000

49,500,000

84,400,000

16.70%

41.10%

59.30%

Rank
Land mass (km2)
Rank

Urbanization

GDP/capita
Rank

Landlines
Rank

ICTs

Mexico

Economics

Indonesia

Cellular phones
Rank
Percentage of Population

Internet users (CIA)
Percentage of Population
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14

Rank (absolute)

Internet percentage (ITU)

12

7

16%

Internet percentage (Domes.
Est.)

APJII: 28%

INEGI: 44.39%

1994

1990

Academia

Academia

Adoption of TCP/IP
Who?

Academia

Ministry of
Communication
and Infomatics

Federal
Telecommunications
Institute, Ifetel

Ministry of
Communication
and Mass
Media

Average speeds
Cost (wired, 10Mbps, per

3.9 Mbps

5.9 Mbps

11.6 Mbps

month)

$26.37, 8.58%

$21.89, 3.79%

$5.71, 1.08%

Telkom, Indosat,
First Media

América Móvil
(Telemex; 80%),
Axtel (6%)

$14/month
Rostelecom
(39%), ERTelecom,
Vimple.com,
MTS, Telecom,
AKADO

State owned / Hybrid / Private

Hybrid

Private

Symmetric or Asymmetric?

Symmetric

Asymmetric

Hybrid
Quasi
symmetric

Telkomsel,
Indosat,
Axiata

América Móvil
(Telcel; 70%),
Movistar (20%)

MTS, Megafon,
VimpleCom
and Tele2

State owned / Hybrid / Private

Hybrid

Private

Private

Long-term Broadband
Plan

Indonesian
Broadband Plan
(2013)

National Digital
Strategy 2013-2018

Unnamed
2012-2018
ICT goals

State-sponsored studies

Bureau of
Indonesian
Statistics

INEGI's
MODITUH

The Public
Opinion (FOM)
Foundation

Tax or financial incentives

No

No

No

No

Forcible breakup
of de facto
monopoly

No

Internet/telecom regulator

Internet Environment

1991

Cost (other)

Major fixed ISPs

Digital Divide

Major mobile ISPs

Regulatory legislation for
expansion
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Rights based access
statement

Jakarta
Declaration on
Meaningful
Broadband

Yes; via Internet
para Todos and
constitutional
amendment

No

Public access

No

Mexico Conectado
telecenters

No

PPPs

No
Grameen
Foundation: micro
franchises; Digital
Divide Institute
Palapa Ring
Projects

No

No

Fundación Pro
Acceso ; Internet
Para Todos

Glasnost
Defense
Foundation

NGOs
Special projects

No
Blocks access
to "dangerous"
websites;
required to
No, but some
install
manipulation of
monitoring
Monitoring of access?
content
No
devices
Ministry
requires ISPs
to purchase
foreign Internet
traffic directly
from statecontrolled
service
providers;
Proposed
Providers dependent on
Russian
state infrastructure?
No
No
intranet
Urban-rural divide
Internet
exaggerates
Security
digital divide;
Doctrine:
culture of
Poor market
further
Defining problems
patronage
environment
centralization
Primarily
economic;
Coalitions among
some lipconsumers,
service to
NGOs, business
Coordinated efforts
rights;
partnerships that
of states, NGOs,
preliminary
demand more
and ISPs through
assertion of
responsive
relatively various
cyberspace
Evidence of F2C
legislation
means: PPPs, law
sovereignty
*Russia was ranked under the Partly Free category when this study began. It has since been
recategorized as Not Free by Freedom House.

Take-Away

Laws restricting access

No
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Iran

Cuba

Demographics

Population

1,367,485,388

81,824,270

11,031,433

1

17

80

9,596,960

1,648,195

110,860

4

18

106

55.60%

73.40%

77.10%

Economics

Not Free
China

GDP

$19.51 trillion

$1.334 trillion

$128.5 billion

Rank

1

19

76

$14,300

$17,100

$10,200

112

96

131

249,400,000

30,590,000

1,260,000

1

10

67

1,300,000,000

68,900,000

2,500,000

1

22

144

95.07%

84.20%

22.66%

626,600,000

22,590,000

3,000,000

46.00%

28.30%

27.50%

1

26

85

Rank
Land mass (km2)
Rank

Urbanization

GDP/capita
Rank

Landlines
Rank

Cellular phones
Rank

ICTs

Percentage of Population

Internet users (CIA)
Percentage of Population
Rank (absolute)

Internet percentage (ITU)
Internet percentage (Domes.
Est.)

39%
China Internet
Watch48.8%

MATMA 2014:
49%
Islamic Republic
News Agency
2015: 82%

Adoption of TCP/IP

Internet Environment

Who?

Internet/telecom regulator

1992

1994

1996

Academia

Academia

State

China Internet
Network
Information Center

Ministry of ICT

Ministry of
Informatics
and
Communications

Average speeds
Cost (wired, 10Mbps, per

4.1 Mbps

1.6 Mbps

512Kbps-2Mbps

month)

$17.37, 1.83%

$79.90, 16.99%

N/A

Cost (other)

$7.88/month
(mobile)

Major fixed ISPs
China Unicom,
China Telecom

$2/hour

Telecommunicati
ons
Company of Iran

ETECSA
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State owned / Hybrid / Private

State

Hybrid

State-owned

Symmetric or Asymmetric?

Asymmetric

Asymmetric

Asymmetric

China Mobile

IranCell

Cubacel

State owned / Hybrid / Private

State

Hybrid

State-owned

Long-term Broadband
Plan

Within Five-Year
Plans

Within Five-Year
Plans

No

State-sponsored studies

CNNIC

No

No

Tax or financial incentives

No

No

No

Forcible breakup
of de facto
monopoly

No

No

No

No

No

Public access

No

No

"Navigation
halls"

PPPs

No

No

No

NGOs

No

No

No

Special projects

No

SHOMA

No

Monitoring of access?

ISPs required to
report illegal
content

Yes, CCTV

Providers dependent on
state infrastructure?

Yes

Yes

"Navigation
halls"
Reroute traffic
from cable to
satellite

Defining problems

Unique, artificial
competition in
state-controlled
market

Lack of
governmental
records, strategy

One ISP;
dependency on
MNCs

Cyberspace
sovereignty

Cyberspace
sovereignty with
cultural addition

Cyberspace
sovereignty,
without clear
articulation

Take-Away

Laws restricting
access

Digital Divide

Major mobile ISPs

Regulatory legislation for
expansion
Rights based access
statement

Evidence of F2C
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